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“Should a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal 
deeds to convey my estate to him, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by 
his sword, has an unjust conqueror, who forces me into submission. The injury and 
the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty 
villain”, 
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 
 
“[N]ot [in favor of] preserving polite fiction at the expense of human life”, 
Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird 
 
“Law is powerful, but more powerful is the need”, 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Faust 
 
““They, on the other hand, judge […] that the partnership of human nature is instead 
of a league; and that kindness and good nature unite men more effectually and with 
greater strength than any agreements whatsoever; since thereby the engagements of 
men’s hearts become stronger than the bond and obligation of words”, 
Thomas More, Utopia 
 
“There is no "neutrality" in Law; every Law is finalist, and the ultimate addressees of legal 
norms, both national and international, are the human beings”, 
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade 
 
“Conflicts and laws are made by man. So are the theories which pronounce, for 
example, that international law cannot confer rights or impose duties directly on an 
individual because, says theory, the individual is not a subject but an object of 
international law”, 
Philip C. Jessup 
“[A] singular reliance on positive law, unchecked by the application of right reason, 
leads to positivism”, 
Robert John Araujo 
 
“If the result of a definition is to make them seem to be illusions, so much the worse 
for the definition; we must enlarge it till it is broad enough to answer to realities”, 
Benjamin N. Cardozo 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Both jus gentium1 and international human rights law have evolved in ways that have 
considerably improved the protection of human dignity. Among relevant developments, the 
acknowledgment that human rights norms can be directly regulated by international law in 
substantive terms and that individuals have access to some international mechanisms of 
protection when domestic remedies fail are noteworthy. This is an ongoing process, and recent 
developments include the procedural sanction of some violations of human rights by international 
judicial bodies. Important landmarks concerning the jus standi and locus standi of individuals can 
be identified in the European and Inter-American regional human rights systems.2  
In addition to procedural progresses, the substantive protection of human rights has 
evolved as well and increased with the adoption of different instruments and the emergence of 
peremptory human rights norms. Such evolution is related not only to the internationalization of 
human rights but also to their specialization, because some norms address special needs of 
protection of the human rights of some individuals, such as children, the elderly, women, or 
persons with disabilities, among others; while some of those and other norms address the 
protection of some rights from worrisome or frequent violations, including protection from torture, 
genocide, or discrimination, among others.  
That being said, taking into account how frequently individuals are harmed by non-state 
entities, it can be argued that international human rights law must also protect individuals from 
non-state abuses in substantive and procedural terms, taking into account the needs of victims. 
Curiously, that dimension of the protection of human rights is overlooked or rejected by 
some authors and practitioners. This is problematic, because the fact that non-state actors can 
prevent the exercise of human rights in practice implies that unless individuals are sufficiently and 
effectively protected from them, which may require international action, the goals of the human 
                                                     
1 This legal system is commonly but, in my opinion, inaccurately termed international law in spite of covering much 
more than the regulation of relations between political groups that assume the State form. On these issues, see 
Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", The Yale Law Journal, vol. 106, 1997, at 2626; Antonio 
Gómez Robledo, Fundadores del Derecho Internacional (Vitoria, Gentili, Suárez, Grocio), Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 1989, at 14-15, 98-99; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human 
Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, Global Legal Goods Working Papers, Nº 
2/2011, at 45-46, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1753036 
2 See Protocol 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, 16 November 2009, para. 232; article 25 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights approved by the Court during its LXXXV Regular Period of 
Sessions, 2009; article 45 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights approved 
by the Commission at its 137th regular period of sessions, 2009. 
 
 
9
rights system will not be fully accomplished, its demands and the implications of its foundation will 
not be met, and some victims will be defenseless in legal terms. 
As was declared in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights in 
1993, the aforementioned foundation is human dignity. According to persuasive theories and 
studies, human dignity is non-conditional: this means that it does not depend on any factor 
different from human nature. Therefore, its protection cannot depend on the identity of violators, 
for instance regarding their being State or non-state actors. Additionally, due to its being a legal 
foundation, the protection of human dignity is the basis of international entitlements and burdens, 
and is protected among others by prohibitions found in international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law, which clearly bind non-state actors. The legal protection of human 
dignity has hermeneutical effects and implications,3 including that of guiding the interpretation of 
human rights norms. 
According to the previous ideas (studied in depth in Chapter 1), the protection of human 
dignity must be complete. This implies that it must be protected from all threats, not only those 
attributable to States. Otherwise, some individuals, who always have dignity, will be unprotected 
and violations will remain in impunity. This analysis stresses human rights analyses must be 
centered on human beings and not on other actors.  
Furthermore, the fact that the protection of human rights must be universal and 
interdependent further demands a comprehensive approach and rejects limited approaches that 
focus on some violations and excludes some individuals from the scope of legal protection.4  
In sum, arguments that put forward that the protection of victims of non-state entities is 
not pertinent under human rights law seems at odds with the fact that they are often violated in 
practice by those entities and also with the comprehensive and interdependent5 protection of 
human dignity that law requires. In fact, that exclusion may amount to an additional violation: 
discrimination against some victims (as examined in Chapter 3). 
                                                     
3 See Carlos Villán Durán, Curso de Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, Editorial Trotta, 2006, at 63, 
92; Jordan J. Paust, “The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law”, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, Vol. 5, 1992, at 54, 56; Chris Jochnick, “Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the 
Promotion of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 21, 1999, at 55, 59-60; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapter 11.  
4 See Part I, infra; Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, “Looking beyond the State But Not Ignoring It”, in George Andreopoulos 
et al., Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe, Kumarian Press, Inc., 2006, at 5-6; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, 
“Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal 
Goods”, op. cit., at 24-25. 
5 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, it is convenient to bear in mind that disaggregated analyses reveal that 
States are constructs operated by individuals,6 and that throughout history many acts attributed to 
States have had a non-state origin.7 The facts that non-state actors can impact on the conduct of 
States, that they can affect human rights, and that the responsibility of those actors and that of 
States can coexist (see Chapter 7), make it possible to argue that actors without links to States 
must have responsibilities as well, because they can engage in similar factual abuses. 
Another argument that lends strength to the necessity of protecting human rights from 
non-state violations is that failure to protect the victims of violations is inconsistent with some of 
the purposes, principles and rules of human rights law (as examined in Part I). 
Given its relevance, it is important to examine what the protection of human dignity 
demands. Some conceptions about it condemn using individuals as means to ends,8 which is an 
idea that can be invoked to criticize non-state conduct that treats human beings as instruments. 
Additionally, some authors posit that human beings have inherent worth and inalienable rights.9 If 
these rights are based on human nature, then all individuals must be protected from abuses 
against them. 
Additionally, it would be unfair to only protect victims who are “fortunate” enough to be 
attacked by States. Taking into account that human rights advocacy rests to a great extent on 
solidarity with victims,10 the suffering of victims of non-state entities deserves attention and 
effective responses.  
                                                     
6 Concerning this, see Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism, The University of Chicago Press, 2009, at 40-
41, 71; Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., at 2627, 2633; Hersch Lauterpacht, 
International Law and Human Rights, Steven & Sons Limited, 1950, at 40; Judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, where it was considered that “Crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities [States], and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes 
can the provisions of international law be enforced.” 
7 See Fred Halliday, “The Romance of Non-state Actors”, in Daphné Josselin and William Wallace (eds.),Non-state 
Actors in World Politics, Palgrave (ed.), 2001, at 27-34. 
8 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction (EPUB version), Oxford University Press, 2007, at 
9-10, 22; Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott, Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication, 1785, at 44-47, 50, available at: 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/Metaphysic-Morals.pdf (last checked: 2/11/2011); Immanuel Kant, The 
Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, Penn State Electronic Classic Series 
Publication, at 89, available at: http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/Critique-Practical-Reason.pdf (last 
checked: 2/11/ 2011); Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 
Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication, at 26, available at: 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/metaphysical-ethics.pdf (last checked: 2/11/ 2011); Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 535-547. 
9 See, for instance, Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in Terris, 1963, paras. 3, 9-10, 30; Jack Donnelly, “Human 
Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights”, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 76, 1982, at 306. 
10 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, supra, at 11, 28, 30, 131; Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 107. 
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From a legal point of view, it can be added that if victims are not repaired, their 
international rights to reparations will be violated as well. Additionally, international human rights 
law is contrary to the impunity of violations,11 and so non-state abuses of human rights must be 
tackled. 
Furthermore, the fact that human rights obligations of States address both how States 
can affect the exercise of human rights and their duties to protect those rights recognizes both 
that non-state entities can violate human rights and that law commands to tackle their abuses.12 
In light of State duties to protect from those abuses, it can be argued that it would be inconsistent 
to recognize that States have duties to prevent and respond to non-state violations and deny that 
non-state actors can violate human rights regardless of State involvement. 
Moreover, legal developments show that non-state entities, as for instance international 
organizations and non-state armed groups, can have international obligations, compliance with 
which ensures the respect or protection of human rights.13 This rebuts the supposed impossibility 
or irrelevance of international human rights obligations of non-state actors. 
While the previous ideas are based on the notion that human dignity is the foundation of 
human rights, it must be acknowledged that some authors suggest that the foundation of human 
rights is or ought to be emancipation, which demands the protection of individuals from actors 
                                                     
11 See Chapter 7, infra; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, 
A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, paras. II.60, II.91; Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and 
Human Rights, Sweet & Maxwell (ed.), 2003, at 12-13; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Gelman v. 
Uruguay, Judgment, 24 February 2011, para. 206. It must be noted that there is a trend to hold every actor who 
violates principles considered important by the international community accountable, as commented in: José Manuel 
Cortés Martín, Las Organizaciones Internacionales: Codificación y Desarrollo Progresivo de su Responsabilidad 
Internacional, Instituto Andaluz de Administración Pública, 2008, at 56-58. On the other hand, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has considered that toleration of a human rights violation, which is not dealt with by law, does 
not “allow society to learn what happened, and […] reproduces the conditions of impunity for [that] type of facts to 
happen again”, as commented in: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. 
Colombia, Judgment, 15 September 2005, para. 238. Likewise, the Preamble to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court declares that “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” of heinous violations of 
international law may “contribute to the prevention of such” violations. 
12 See Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, Amsterdam Center for International Law Research Paper Series, Non-State Actors in 
International Law, Politics and Governance Series, 2010, at 36, 40; Nicolás Carrillo, “Enhanced Multi-Level 
Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., at 46. 
13 See common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 1949; article 96.3 of the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), and the commentary of the ICRC to that article, available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750123?OpenDocument (last checked: 2/11/ 2011); Nicolás Carrillo, “The Links 
between the Responsibility of international organizations and the Quest towards a More Reasonable and Humane 
International Legal System”, international organizations Law Review, Vol. 7, 2010, at 442; article 59 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; or articles 43 and 44 of the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., 
at 73. 
 
 
12 
with power over them.14 This consideration would also demand protection from non-state abuses, 
because States are not the only entities that can have such power.  
While a discussion on foundations is found in Chapter 1, for the time being it can be said 
that if emancipation were the only foundation of human rights, many victims would be 
unprotected, because there are many cases in which actors that are not in a position of power 
prevent the enjoyment of human rights. The emancipation paradigm would have a problem 
similar to that of State-centered human rights conceptions: it would lead to a limited protection, 
which would be inconsistent with principles and values and discriminatory against some victims.  
Logically, this does not mean that the protection of victims of non-state entities in a 
position of power is inappropriate, but only that it ought to be complemented by the effective 
protection of other victims. The risk is that emancipation theories may fail to envisage human 
rights protection from violations that take place outside of the contexts of abuses of power and 
failure to discharge the functions of authorities.  
It is important to add that emancipation is protected by human rights. For example, some 
international supervisory bodies have considered that certain non-state actors have human rights 
duties because they have powers and prerogatives that are somewhat similar to those of States, 
and also that individuals must be protected from abuses of actors that are quite powerful in 
relation to individuals.15  
The limitations, shortcomings and unfairness of paradigms of human rights limited to 
protection from State abuses explain the presence of initiatives that put forward the necessity of a 
a more complete protection of human rights.  
One of those initiatives, that is semantic and symbolic, consists in the fact that 
international bodies, authors and some NGOs, among others, have used expressions that 
recognize that non-state actors can impinge on human rights, such as ‘human rights abuses’ and 
‘human rights destruction’. The fact that those expressions are used to describe the conduct of 
both States and non-state actors permits to affirm that those expressions serve to condemn 
abuses and do not deny that non-state actors can violate human rights and may have human 
rights obligations.16  
                                                     
14 See, infra, Chapter 1; and Michael Goodhart, “Human Rights and Non-State Actors: Theoretical Puzzles”, in 
George Andreopoulos et al., Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe, Kumarian Press, Inc., 2006, at 36-37. 
15 See Sergio García Ramírez, Los derechos humanos y la jurisdicción interamericana, Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 2002, at 117-119; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador, 
Judgment, 12 November 1997, para. 98. 
16 See Chapter 2, infra; Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
2003, at 14; Robert Dufresne, Review of: Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in 
International Law, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, 2004, at 227; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 49. 
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Other initiatives are of the type adopted by bodies as the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, which has issued press releases and statements, reports and resolutions in which 
it condemns or criticizes the conduct of non-state actors, such as non-state armed groups or 
international organizations. Additionally, that Commission has examined non-state conduct in 
light of human rights and guarantees. By means of those actions, the Commission has been able 
to directly address non-state conduct and ignore competence limitations that it has in contentious 
procedures triggered by individual complaints.17  
For its part, the Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights have 
acknowledged that there may be violations of human rights committed by non-state actors and 
that States have duties to prevent and respond to them.18 This recognition is quite important, 
even if those actors did not have international legal obligations, because actions of different 
actors and authorities to respond to those violations and protect affected legal goods are 
legitimated and authorized in substantive terms by that recognition.19 Furthermore, such 
recognition and those actions send signals against non-state abuses. Moreover, they strengthen 
condemnations of non-state abuses and highlight the duties of authorities to deal with them. 
It must be added that some authors and non-governmental organizations have realized 
that support of communities and victims could be withdrawn if non-state violations are ignored, 
and that it is unsustainable to deny the unlawfulness and unfairness of those violations from both 
a legal and a moral standpoint. For these and other reasons, they have opposed non-state 
abuses.20  
                                                     
17 See Resolution 03/08 and Press Release Nº 28/08 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102. 26 February 1999, paras. 5-9; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on 
Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, 22 October 2002, para. 48. 
18 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, 29 
July 1988, paras. 166, 172-174, 176, 177; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton 
Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, 16 November 2009, paras. 236, 252, 254; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, 17 September 2003, paras. 
140-153; European Court of Human Rights, Second Section, Case of Vona v. Hungary, Judgment, 9 July 2013, 
paras. 54-57. 
19 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, paras. 4, 13-15; Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Leval to: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 
06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, at 30, especially footnote 30 therein; Antonio Cassese, 
“Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law”, European Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 1, 1990, at 225-231; United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo 
et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, p. 12; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights 
Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 102, No. 1, 2008, at 43-44; Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of 
Human Rights”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 32, 2004, at 326-328, 345. 
20 See Chris Jochnick, supra, at 58; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 44, 
50 (especially footnote 94 therein); Nicolás Carrillo, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a 
Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., at 5, 22. 
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When examining whether international law can directly protect individuals from non-state 
violations of human rights, it is important to consider that individuals may have international rights 
but no direct remedies to claim their protection, and that actors can have obligations without 
being subject to international procedures of supervision and sanction.21 That does not imply that 
human rights and obligations do not exist, only that non-international authorities must enforce 
those substantive guarantees. Therefore, it is not true that norms that protect human dignity from 
non-state abuses that are not endorsed by procedural mechanisms have no substantive or 
indirect procedural effects, although this stresses the necessity that different actors protect that 
international legal value.  
It is possible to affirm that violations of human rights happen when any actor hinders the 
enjoyment of those rights, and that if effective mechanisms of protection to address any such 
situation do not exist, they must be created de lege ferenda.22 It is important that non-state 
violators have substantive obligations, because their existence ensures that authorities can 
sanction them and order them to repair victims directly. To my mind, all non-state actors have at 
least implicit and inherent duties to respect peremptory human rights and to not harm individuals 
in ways contrary to their human dignity, as examined in Chapter 6. 
The fact that there can be non-state violations makes it necessary to respond to them 
and protect victims, which requires the existence of different mechanisms of protection from those 
abuses. Among other possibilities, international organs and agents that have tasks that are 
related to the promotion and protection of human rights can be considered to have competences 
and powers to contact non-state actors and ask them to refrain from violating human rights or to 
cease violations, and to promote human rights persuading those actors to respect them.23 
                                                     
21 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, supra, at 74-75; Andrew Clapham, “The 
Role of the Individual in International Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, at 29; 
Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., at 27, 34; Anna Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The Position of Minorities 
and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, Intersentia, 2001, at 58-62; United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, at 11-13; 
International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors: 
Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and Scope of Project and Legal Issues, The Hague 
Conference, 2010, at 21, where it is clarified that not all actors who have an international legal “status” have the 
same capacities or enjoy them in the same degree; and Kate Parlett, “The PCIJ’s Opinion in Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Danzig. Individual Rights under Treaties”, Journal of the History of International Law, Vol. 10, 2008, at 136-
137, where the argument that an entity does not enjoy international personality if it does not have a right to employ 
an international mechanism to protect or enforce it is dismissed. 
22 That expression alludes to desirable regulations that do not exist in positive law but should or ought to be 
enshrined in it, as explained in Michel Virally, El devenir del derecho internacional : ensayos escritos al correr de los 
años,  Fondo de cultura económica, 1998, at 242. 
23 See Chapters 1 and 8, infra, especially the Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights 
Council of August 2008, paras. 81-83; Committee Against Torture, Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 
120/1998, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, 25 May 1999, paras. 6.5 through 7; Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 2006 (hereinafter, the ‘UNMIK case’), para. 4. 
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Soft law instruments have also addressed the protection of victims of non-state violations. 
The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, for instance, mention in Principle 15 that non-state entities can have a duty to 
repair victims. This is important because, as examined in Chapter 7, quite often the full reparation 
to which victims are entitled is only be possible if all the entities that participate in a violation 
provide reparations, either because a State sometimes cannot fully repair victims or because it 
has not breached duties of its own but non-state actors still violate human rights.  
For example, the right to know the truth is a component of reparations, and guarantees of 
non-repetition must be given by responsible entities.24 Concerning this, it can be said that the 
whole truth about a violation, or relevant parts of it, may be known only by non-state participants; 
and all participants in violations must guarantee that they will not victimize again. These 
arguments illustrate why non-state provision of reparations is often indispensable for victims.  
Concerning guarantees of non-repetition of violations, taking into account that non-state 
actors can violate human rights or be complicit in abuses, it can be added that even if States that 
participate in violations promise to not do so in the future, victims will not be reassured unless all 
participants promise this, and everyone else will benefit from those assurances and from the 
training of agents to prevent similar violations from being committed. 
Concerning the possibility of non-state actors having legal responsibility, it is important to 
stress that the evolution of international jurisprudence and practice reveals that the 
responsibilities of different entities involved in a violation of law can be complementary and are 
not exclusive. In this sense, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter, ICJ) has declared that 
States can be complicit in violations perpetrated by States or non-state actors which are contrary 
to human rights, such as genocide.25 The International Law Commission (hereinafter, ILC), in 
turn, has also considered that States can be responsible as aiders or abettors of violations of 
international law attributable to international organizations, or vice versa.26 This line of reasoning 
can be transplanted to other situations involving other actors. To this, it must be added that non-
                                                     
24 See, inter alia, Principles 18, 22 and 23 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law; Preamble and Article 24 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance; Human Rights Committee, Abubakar Amirov and Aïzan Amirova v. Russian Federation, 
Views, Communication No. 1447/2006, CCPR/C/95/D/1447/2006, 22 April 2009, pars 11.7, 13; Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, 14 March 2001, paras. 43, 48. 
25 See International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 
2007, paras. 419-420. 
26 See International Law Commission, articles 14, 42 and 58 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international 
organizations adopted in 2011, A/66/10, 2011. 
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state actors can be responsible on different bases in connection with one same violation, for 
instance as perpetrators or as assistants. 
It is certainly possible for non-state actors to have international legal responsibility 
because they can be bound by international obligations, which can be created by the sources of 
international law, provided that fundamental rights and jus cogens are respected and some 
conditions are satisfied. 
Concerning this possibility, Theodor Meron, Kate Parlett and other authors have argued 
that even the Permanent Court of International Justice accepted that international norms can 
address non-state entities, such as individuals, in its Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Danzig, in which it accepted that the object of an international treaty can be the creation 
of individual rights and obligations.27 Whether the Advisory Opinion fully accepted that non-state 
entities could be subjects of international law is somewhat controversial, because the Permanent 
Court mentioned that a treaty could not “create direct rights and obligations for private individuals” 
but that its object could be “the adoption by the Parties of some definite rules creating individual 
rights and obligations”, which would have effects in their domestic legal systems.28 The 
aforementioned authors posit that the Court was cautious and employed a language that averted 
criticisms but ultimately accepted that international treaties can regulate rights and duties of 
individuals.  
Currently, it is widely accepted both that international law can regulate non-state behavior 
and that it can also protect human rights. It must logically follow that it can directly protect human 
dignity from non-state actors. John Knox has described how international law can do this in 
different ways: it may regulate State obligations that generally indicate to authorities that they 
must protect individuals from non-state actors; it may specifically determine how that protection 
must be; it may regulate non-state human rights obligations; or it may regulate procedures in 
which non-state conduct and compliance with norms that protect human dignity can be 
examined.29 Those possibilities confirm that international law can directly address non-state 
violations without the mediation of domestic law or authorities in substantive and/or procedural 
terms.  
                                                     
27 See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006, at 40; Kate Parlett, “The 
PCIJ’s Opinion in Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. Individual Rights under Treaties”, op. cit., at 120, 143-145; 
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 71-73, Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., at 
27-29. 
28 See Permanent Court of International Justice, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of Danzig 
Railway Officials who have passed into the Polish service, against the Polish Railways Administration), Advisory 
Opinion, Series B, No. 15, 3 March 1928, at 17-18. 
29 See John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., at 20-31. 
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For example, the Nüremberg Trials of war criminals revealed that individuals could not 
only be bound by international duties but also be sanctioned for their abuses and be parties in 
international procedures in which compliance with their duties are examined. Likewise, human 
rights treaty and customary norms, principles and soft law, among others, have envisaged the 
possibility of adopting recommendations or duties addressing the conduct of individuals and other 
non-state actors,30 and permit to restrict their rights when restrictions are necessary to protect the 
human rights of others as long as proportionality and other conditions are satisfied.31  
Additionally, some international norms and bodies have ordered States to enact domestic 
prohibitions for the sake of the protection and promotion of human rights, including prohibitions 
from racial discrimination; have ordered States to protect individuals from violence or violations 
committed by non-state actors; and have also directly regulated and enforced obligations of non-
state actors, such as criminal duties, without State mediation.  
The prohibition and prosecution of piracy, for instance, acknowledges both the 
importance of dealing with non-state actors that can affect international legal interests and the 
possibility of adopting international norms to protect them from those and other actors. 
Interestingly, their being considered hostis humanii generis due to their putting at risk the safety 
and freedom of the seas, which are interests of the international society, led to the establishment 
of a rule of “quasi-universal” jurisdiction, which can be more properly considered as a rule that 
solves possible conflicts of jurisdiction32 by permitting States that detain pirates to try them. 
It is important to mention that, as explored in Chapter 8, judicial supervision of 
compliance with non-state human rights obligations is not the only way in which it is possible to 
seek to protect human dignity from non-state abuses. Furthermore, non-judicial strategies have 
effects that are complementary to those of judicial ones; and non-state actors can participate in 
mechanisms and processes that promote the protection of human dignity, being it important to 
permit that participation. 
Regarding duties and legal capacities of non-state actors, it may be asked if only actors 
that are “international legal persons” can have them, especially because some authors argue that 
only actors with certain international substantive (e.g. lawmaking powers) or procedural legal 
capacities (e.g. to request protection of rights or be subject to supervisory procedures) can be 
considered subjects or persons of international law. However, as studied in Chapter 5, those 
theories are challenges by persuasive arguments that explain how any actor with legal capacities 
                                                     
30 See Chapters 5 and 6, infra. 
31 See Chapters 1 and 8, infra. 
32 See Antonio Cassese, “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on 
the Congo v. Belgium Case”, European Journal of International Law (EJIL), Vol. 13, 2002, at 857-858. 
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regulated by international law is one of their addressees and subjects. To my mind, those 
arguments not only better describe legal possibilities and practice but can also be invoked to 
prevent the impunity and lack of protection of legal goods that could be the result of the 
application of norms in the belief that narrow theories of legal personality are correct.33 
Interestingly, apart from being addressees of international law, non-state actors can 
contribute to shaping it. This is revealed, for example, by the power of international organizations, 
armed groups and other entities to consent to be bound by international treaties and even to 
participate in their creation, and by the fact that other actors can participate in and exert their 
influence on the formation of customary law and negotiations of international norms, as revealed 
by the drafting history of the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, as examined in Chapter 5.  
Apart from not being the only possible direct and indirect international lawmakers, States 
are neither the only actors that can impede the exercise of human rights dignity nor the only 
participants of the international society and supra-national legal frameworks. For instance, it 
cannot be denied that throughout history non-state actors have violated the right to life, the 
enjoyment of which permits the exercise of other human rights.34 Those are some of the reasons 
why it is preferable to call international law jus gentium,35 another being that this legal system 
protects important non-State interests as well.  
Concerning the relevance of non-state actors in international relations, studies have 
indicated that it is not always easy to determine if some internationally-relevant actions have a 
State or a non-state origin, or whose interests they favor.36 The fact that the agents of collective 
actors, as States, have their own motivations and that they can have legal responsibility of their 
                                                     
33 On these theories, see: José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones 
Internacionales, Tecnos, 2003, at 186; Manuel Díez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público, 
Tecnos, 2005, at 258; Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 
pp. 274-275; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 64-65; Malcolm N. Shaw, 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Fifth Edition, 2003, at 176; Elena Pariotti, “Non-State Actors, 
International Law, and Human Rights”, in Sanford R. Silverburg (ed.), International Law: Contemporary Issues and 
Future Developments, Westview Press, 2011, at 102, 104; ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations, with commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, at 8-9, para. 8 of the commentary to article 2; Gaetano 
Pentassuglia, “Review of: Meijknecht, Anna. Towards International Personality: The Position of Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, 2003, at 391. 
34 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, 16 
November 2009, para. 245. 
35 See Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, Number 4, 2011; Fred Halliday, op. cit.; Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, 
“Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework”, in Daphné Josselin and William Wallace (Eds.), Non-state Actors 
in World Politics, Palgrave, 2001, at 4-10, 15, 19. 
36 See Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 22-35; Eric A. Posner, op. cit., at 53-55. 
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own, which can coexist with that of collective entities,37 indicate that non-state responsibility is 
possible and that it does not displace State obligations.  
That being said, non-state violations must be tackled even when no States are involved 
in them, and this is pressing nowadays because of different challenging factors present in a 
global society. Among them, it must be noted that many States have lost power and are 
challenged by other actors, and are often unwilling or unable to respond to the human rights 
challenges generated by non-state actors, due to difficulties such as the power of those actors, or 
to the fact that States sometimes attach more importance to interests that differ from those 
concerned with the protection of human dignity, among others.38  
Concerning the aforementioned factors, studies indicate how States acting alone and 
even cooperating with others are sometimes unable to effectively control and respond to actors 
whose power in economical, military, logistic or other terms is greater than theirs.39 This is 
sometimes explained by the fact that the power and capabilities of non-state actors are often 
heightened in a globalized context that offers them opportunities to elude control, and that they 
take advantage of them and engage in old and new conduct that challenge international legal 
goods.40 
Additionally, practices of privatization, delegation of powers –even of some traditionally 
ascribed to sovereignty-, competition among domestic legal systems to attract foreign investment, 
                                                     
37 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, International Responsibility for the 
Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights), 9 December 1994, para. 56; Principles I through IV of the Principles of International Law Recognized 
in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal; Judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals. 
38 See, among others, Alfred Van Staden and Hans Vollaard, “The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a Post-
territorial World?”, in Gerard Kreijen et al. (Eds.), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, at 167-168; Sandra Lavenex, “Globalization, Global Governance and the Bonnum Commune: 
a Conceptual Investigation”, European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 6, 2004, at 381, 388; Celestino del Arenal, “La 
nueva sociedad mundial y las nuevas realidades internacionales: un reto para la teoría y para la política”, in Cursos 
de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de Vitoria-Gasteiz 2001, Bilbao, 2002, at 23, 27-29, 34, 52-
53, 64-66; Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in 
International Law”, op. cit., at 216; Francisco Galindo Vélez, “Consideraciones sobre la determinación de la 
condición de refugiado”, in Sandra Namihas (Ed.), Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados, Pontificia Universidad 
Católica del Perú – Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Fondo Editorial, 2001, pp. 125-126; Alexandra Gatto, 
“Corporate Social Responsibility in the External Relations of the EU”, in Yearbook of European Law, 24, 2005, at 
423. 
39 Ibid.; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., at 3, 6, 9, 20, 26, 45, 49-50. 
40 Ibid.; Anna Badia Martí, “Cooperación internacional en la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada transnacional”, 
in Victoria Abellán Honrubia and Jordi Bonet Pérez (Dirs.), La incidencia de la mundialización en la formación y 
aplicación del Derecho Internacional Público, Los actores no estatales: ponencias y estudios, Bosch Editor, 2008, at 
319; ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, United Nations, 2000, pp. 11-12; Gáspar 
Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, Working paper on human rights and non-State actors, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/40, 11 
July 2005, paras. 42-45; Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and the Protocols Thereto, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004, pp. iii-iv. Available on: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf 
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the lowering of standards that benefit individuals –e.g. due to race to the bottom phenomena or 
labor dumping-, and the possibility that potential perpetrators choose to be bound by systems 
with low levels of protection,41 among others, may lower domestic human rights standards and 
guarantees and expose individuals to non-state threats without prospects of an effective domestic 
protection. For this reason, international norms must outlaw non-state threats and order 
protection from them, so that States have an international duty to adjust internal legal systems to 
those human rights demands and other States and actors can demand protection and cooperate 
in this field. 
Apart from this, international norms that protect individuals from non-state violations 
directly or indirectly (i.e. directly regulating non-state behavior or commanding authorities to 
protect) have an additional benefit: some States may be willing to tackle non-state threats but be 
unable to effectively do so due to their loss or lack of power. In those cases, international norms 
against non-state violations can authorize (and sometimes command) other entities to cooperate 
in the protection of individuals and respond to conduct that is considered contrary to international 
law, thus increasing the possibilities and prospects of protection of human dignity.  
The power of some non-state actors cannot be underestimated. For instance, not only 
many of the most powerful economies in the world are corporate,42 but also many actors have 
accumulated soft, systemic and even hard power, and it sometimes rivals even that of States, 
which they can therefore pressurize.43 This, and the fact that actors that have always challenged 
the protection of human dignity, as transnational criminal groups, have alliances with others and 
                                                     
41 See August Reinisch, “The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors”, in Philip 
Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 54-55, 75-76; Menno T. 
Kamminga, “The Next Frontier: Prosecution of Extraterritorial Corporate Misconduct before Non-US Courts”, in 
Willem J.M. Van Genugten et al. (eds), Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years after the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009, at 172; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 14; Koen de Feyter, 
“Globalisation and human rights”, in: Felipe Gómez Isa and Koen de Feyter (eds.), International Human Rights Law 
in a Global Context, 2009, at 81-82; Alexandra Gatto, supra, at 423; Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the 
international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal personality”, op. cit., at 7; Elena Pariotti, 
op., cit., at 98; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 227-228; Zoe Salzman, “Private Military Contractors and the 
Taint of a Mercenary Reputation”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 40, 2008, pp. 
860-866; Corporate Responsibility, the corporate responsibility coalition, “Protecting rights, repairing harm: How 
state-based non-judicial mechanisms can help fill gaps in existing frameworks for the protection of human rights of 
people affected by corporate activities”, briefing paper for the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on 
Business and Human Rights, 2010, at 7, available at: http://www.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/core-submission-to-ruggie-nov-2010.pdf (last checked: 06/02/2012). 
42 See Alexandra Gatto, supra, at 423. 
43 See Celestino del Arenal, op. cit., at 27-28, 34, 52-53, 64-66; Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126; Janne 
E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal 
personality”, op. cit., at 3. 
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take advantage of possibilities available in a globalized landscape,44 often make it impossible for 
States acting alone or with isolated strategies to effectively protect individuals.  
This consideration highlights the importance of international cooperation, in the 
understanding that not only States but also non-state actors can contribute to pursue shared 
goals as the protection of human dignity.  Indeed, some non-state actors, as some NGOs, have 
contributed to the effectiveness and development of the local and international protection of 
human rights, making it possible for many victims to find hope in the international legal system 
after fruitless domestic attempts.45 Those entities have sometimes also examined and criticized 
the conduct of other non-state actors in light of human rights standards and recommend or 
adopted standards on the protection of human rights from non-state actors. 
While substantive and procedural legal burdens of non-state actors can bind them to 
respect human rights and serve to protect them otherwise, it must be considered that some 
authors have argued that non-state human rights duties could be used by States to divert 
attention away from their obligations or as excuses to commit abuses; or that non-state actors 
could take advantage of the existence of non-binding regulations to falsely suggest that it is 
unnecessary to create legal obligations that bind them and/or to reap benefits from their 
existence, such as by improving their image without having real human rights commitments.46  
In my opinion, those objections to non-state human rights duties and other 
responsibilities can be rebutted: States retain their duties even if non-state obligations exist; and 
labeling an actor as a human rights violator in no way legitimizes it. Additionally, previous 
arguments found in this introduction indicate how problematic it is to not tackle non-state 
                                                     
44 Ibid. 
45 On these issues, see Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, in Gerard Kreijen et 
al. (eds.), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 133-134; Concurring 
Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et-al v. 
Peru, Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 4 September 1998, para. 35; ASIL, Proceedings of the 92nd Annual 
Meeting: The Challenge of Non-State Actors, The American Society of International Law, 1998, pp. 22-23; Daniel 
Thürer, “The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and 
the Changing Role of the State”, in Rainer Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, 
Duncker & Humblot (ed.), 1999, at 44-45, 47; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state 
Actors”, in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth (ed.), 1997, pp. 188-190; Thomas 
Buergenthal, “The Evolving International Human Rights System”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, 
2006, pp. 803-804; Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., pp. 337-338, 342-343; Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, “Actores no estatales 
en la creación y aplicación del Derecho Internacional”, in Victoria Abellán Honrubia and Jordi Bonet Pérez (Dirs.), La 
incidencia de la mundialización en la formación y aplicación del Derecho Internacional Público: los actores no 
estatales: ponencias y estudios, Bosch (ed.), 2008, pp. 34-38. 
46 See, among others, John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., at 32-46; John H. Knox, “The Human 
Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, ASIL Insights, Vol. 15, Issue 21, 2011, at 1 (PDF 
version, available at: http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110801.pdf, last checked: 04/11/2011); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, “Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror?”, Columbia Journal of 
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violations by international law, which creates problems that far exceed difficulties created by 
international norms addressing them, which can be overcome or simply not exist. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
An example illustrates some of the previous points. Under International Humanitarian 
Law (hereinafter, IHL), non-state armed entities are bound by common article 3, by customary 
law, and eventually by some treaty norms.47 As that article and legal interpretation indicate, the 
obligations those norms regulate do not alter the status of bound entities and do not legitimize 
their violations.48 On the contrary, they indicate how non-state actors are expected to behave lest 
they are exposed to condemnation. Additionally, States remain bound by their own IHL 
obligations even when non-state duties exist.  
The same rationale about status is found in point 4.5 of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the United Nations and the group JEM in Sudan, and in the Manual of 
Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council of August 2008, according to 
which: 
“[I]nteraction between the mandate-holder and representatives of the non-State actor or de-facto 
authority might take place within the country concerned.  The context of such meetings and the 
conditions under which they are held should seek to ensure that the involvement of the mandate-
holder is not understood as an endorsement of any particular claim made by the non-State actor or 
de-facto authority as to representativity, legitimacy, or other matters”49 (emphasis added). 
As explained above, saying that an actor must comply with some standards and that if it 
does not do so it can be branded as a violator of norms that protect human dignity highlights that 
it can commit violations that must be prevented and responded to,50 making others aware of their 
possibility or duty to address violations of that actor. 
In sum, there can be international obligations of non-state actors that protect human 
dignity, apart from other legal capacities with the same purpose, and they can be implemented 
and supervised by means of different mechanisms found across normative systems and the 
action of different actors that promote international legal goods. If lex lata does not fully or 
properly protect human dignity from non-state abuses, it must be complemented or modified until 
                                                     
47 See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 
Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 159-160; article 3 of the Updated Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
48 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 51. 
49 See Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, adopted in June 2008 at the 
15th Annual Meeting of Special Procedures, published in August 2008 (available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/docs/Manual_August_FINAL_2008.doc, last checked: 14/11/2001), 
para. 82. 
50 Similarly, Andrew Clapham has mentioned how imposing human rights duties on an entity does not “increas[e] its 
legitimacy” but rather limits their conduct, as expressed in: Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors, op. cit., at 52-53. 
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it is compatible with the demand of the full protection of human dignity, and practitioners and 
authorities must interpret norms in light of it. Needless to say, according to the rule of law this 
cannot be done in an arbitrary fashion, and international obligations must be both accessible and 
foreseeable by entities bound by them, as indicated by the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights in the Kononov case.51 
The creation and regulation of non-state human rights obligations is one among different 
complementary measures that can be used to protect individuals. Some of those obligations can 
be criminal, since some norms of international criminal law share the goal of protecting human 
dignity. Likewise, other branches of international law, as IHL, also have norms that seek to 
protect human dignity, as described in the CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, “The Challenges of 
Change”, Helsinki Summit Declaration.52 
The protection of human dignity from non-state abuses can be strengthened by resorting 
to other measures that are different from the creation of obligations. They include, among others, 
recommendations, non-binding norms such as those found in some codes of conduct, initiatives 
to generate non-state culture that is respectful of human rights, the enforcement of obligations to 
prevent and respond to non-state violations of States and other authorities, domestic protection of 
human dignity, education, addressing the causes of violations, or the shaming of offenders, 
besides some actions of transnational and private actors. Some of those mechanisms are 
explored in Chapter 8. 
Regarding codes of conduct, it can be said that due to the pressure exerted by other 
actors and society itself, or out of a genuine commitment, some corporations, NGOs and other 
entities have adopted instruments that address issues related to the respect of human rights and 
other values. The nature and effects of these codes vary: some are self-regulation initiatives and 
others are adopted by some actors but address the conduct of others;53 some are mere 
declarations of aspirations whereas others have stronger and perhaps even legal commitments; 
some may be considered manifestations of non-state regulations or “global non-state law”, as 
understood in the theories put forward by Günther Teubner and examined by global 
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administrative law or global law theories;54 and international law may attach some value to some 
of them, for example due to the expectations they generate and due to the protection of good 
faith and trust in them.  
Additionally, it is important to examine codes of conduct with care, because some of them 
may be merely rhetorical exercises that seek to promote a good reputation or may be used to 
divert attention away from the needs of adopting binding obligations of non-state actors and/or of 
regulating remedies that victims can effectively access to, which is something many codes of 
conduct lack. 
As indicated above, international obligations of non-state actors can be complemented, 
among others, by initiatives that seek to make non-state culture respectful of human dignity. 
Concerning this, the human rights Committees and experts of the United Nations have 
highlighted that States must employ all the legal and legitimate measures they can in order to 
promote the respect of human rights by non-state actors, including the promotion of non-state 
culture that is consistent with them. It is possible to seek to generate such culture in different 
ways, including normative strategies because norms can have symbolic and expressive functions 
and effects. Others have pointed out that non-judicial and non-legal mechanisms and strategies, 
such as (lawful) boycotts, socialization, exclusion, and persuasion, can be relevant and useful for 
protecting human rights from non-state threats.55 These considerations confirm that different 
mechanisms can be used to prevent and respond to non-state violations and that they can 
complement each other, which is relevant given the advantages and disadvantages each of them 
have. 
Regarding normative strategies, it can be said that they can truly contribute to enhance 
the protection of human dignity because making non-state actors be bound by obligations and 
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responsibilities can change their perceptions and attitude. It is considered that this happened with 
some non-state armed groups, which began to justify their behavior in light of international 
humanitarian law after the emergence of obligations that bound them under that branch of 
international law.56 Regulation can therefore strengthen the full protection of human dignity not 
only from the perspective of its enforcement but also from a psychological, educational or 
symbolic point of view.  
However, normatively addressing non-state conduct is not simply a voluntary choice: it is 
imperative that legal systems procure the respect of human rights and the non-repetition of 
violations, including non-state ones.57 For this reason, the adoption of non-state duties is 
mandatory and necessary whenever they are indispensable for the protection of human rights to 
be effective. 
Another important development that helps to protect many victims from non-state abuses 
is the international supervision of compliance by States, and also by other authorities, with their 
duties to protect human rights with due diligence. Some factors can make the diligence with 
which authorities must strive to protect individuals stricter, such as the vulnerability of rights and 
persons, the guarantor position of authorities in some events, or the creation of risks of violations 
by authorities.58 The obligation to protect requires entities bound by it to diligently strive to prevent 
and respond to all human rights abuses, including non-state ones.  
It is important to mention that the obligations of authorities, including positive ones, do not 
cease to exist or have effects when there are  events of privatization, public-private partnerships, 
or delegation or transfer of powers to international organizations and other entities. Therefore, 
authorities cannot elude their obligations by means of those dynamics, and they continue to be 
bound by their duties to ensure that actors involved in those processes do not violate human 
rights, which often oblige them to oversee the conduct of private and public actors that perform 
actions and supply services that can affect the exercise of human rights which were previously 
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directly or only conducted or supplied by authorities, in order to ensure that human rights are 
effectively protected from the respective non-state entities.59  
Likewise, the International Law Commission has considered that States shall not elude 
their obligations by taking advantage of their membership in international organizations, and that 
those organizations cannot circumvent their obligations by making their members commit acts 
that those organizations are forbidden from committing.60 
Regarding positive human rights obligations, it is important to take into account that apart 
from being bound by duties of respect, sometimes non-state actors have positive duties and that 
other times it is necessary for them to be bound by such duties for the protection of human dignity 
to be effective, as explored in Chapter 6. For example, positive human rights obligations of non-
state entities can bind some international organizations in the field of the protection of persons 
with disabilities, in the European regional human rights system, or can bind actors that administer 
territories in relation to its inhabitants, whose rights remain and are unaffected by changes of the 
entities that administer those territories.61 
The international supervision of compliance with the obligations of States and other 
authorities to put an end to, sanction, or prevent non-state violations of human rights, and to 
ensure the reparations of victims, do not protect individuals from non-state abuses directly but 
offer indirect protection when authorities breach their duties, cases in which the authorities can be 
rightly sanctioned and held responsible due to their passivity, because their powers must be used 
diligently to protect human beings62 from all abuses, including those committed by powerful 
actors that are often able to operate across borders or have powers that can affect human rights.  
Obligations to protect human rights recognize some dimensions of the horizontal effects 
of those rights,63 and their implementation and enforcement protect some individuals from non-
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state violations. However, since those legal processes do not protect all victims, as happens 
when authorities behave diligently, complementary effective mechanisms must be offered to 
victims not protected by them for the protection of human rights to be truly universal and 
consistent with the non-conditionality of human dignity and the equality of all victims. Certainly, in 
some cases States discharge their duties with due diligence but violations are committed and 
remain in impunity despite their efforts. In those cases, it is undeniable that there are human 
rights violations, which the authorities attempt to tackle, despite which victims suffer and face the 
risk of not being fully repaired.  
Denying that there are violations of human rights in those cases, or not offering 
alternative effective protection to victims, would be inconsistent with the basis of the existence of 
duties of protection, with the equality of victims, and with the non-conditionality of human dignity 
(this is further explained in Chapter 2 when examining what I call the “Mastromatteo paradox”). 
Moreover, as explored in Chapter 6, it can be argued that according to general principles 
of law, whenever an actor violates human rights it is bound to repair victims. This may be required 
by a principle according to which an entity that causes harm must repair those that are affected, 
which can achieve the status of a general principle of law with international relevance,64 
especially if the notions of inherent and implied duties presented in that Chapter are accepted. 
Additionally, it can be considered that automatic, presumed and/or implicit obligations demand 
that all entities respect peremptory law, as examined in Chapter 6 as well. Otherwise, the 
absolute protection and effects of jus cogens regarding all manifestations and norms and in 
relation to all potential offenders would be questioned.65  
In other words, non-state actors have duties to respect jus cogens norms that protect 
human dignity. If they did not, the achievement of goals and interests of the international 
community would be impracticable. Those duties flow, among others, from the consideration that 
jus cogens trumps all interpretations and manifestations that would deprive it of practical effects, 
and also from the principle of effectiveness.66  
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It cannot be said that only actors with international legal personality have that obligation, 
because such an alleged requirement fails to properly describe legal practice and is actually not 
required by positive law. Certainly, all actors can have legal obligations created by the sources of 
international law, and to achieve fundamental international purposes all actors that can violate 
them can be implicitly bound by duties of respect. 
Moreover, studies on the history of the notion of subjectivity, as one conducted by 
Janneke Nijman, indicate that originally it did not allude to a supposed exclusive or primordial 
formal legal participation of States, and did not mean to exclude other actors or participants from 
international legal life either, but was in fact devised by Leibniz to justify more participation of 
some entities within the Holy Roman Empire and at the same time to explain why they could be 
subject to certain regulations.67 In fact, even after the peace of Westphalia, the personality of 
entities within the Empire was far from clear.  
Leibniz designed a concept of personality to strike a balance between the desire of 
independent action of those entities and the perceived importance of them remaining in the 
empire and being bound by some standards.68 In my opinion, this implies the recognition that 
they were not the only participants in the international landscape, contrary to some conceptions of 
legal personality that endorse notions of exclusive participation of States. Even if some theories 
that challenge non-state subjectivity under international law are widely accepted in some circles, 
they must be examined in light of positive law, which can change. Truly, non-state actors can be 
and are addressees of international legal norms. 
According to the previous ideas, the notion of international subjectivity can be considered 
to have been designed to stimulate the recognition of the legal relevance of State action 
alongside that of other entities, contrary to what the theories of Oppenheim and other authors 
seem to suggest. Jordan Paust rebutted those theories and explained how even during periods of 
the history of jus gentium in which States were supposedly the only or principal actors, other 
entities participated and had international legal capacities, entitlements and obligations.69 
Altogether, non-state conduct may be regulated by international law and non-state actors can be 
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its subjects. The fact that they can impact on international legal goods also indicates that their 
conduct must be regulated when it is not sufficiently addressed.70 
It is also necessary to take into account that some authors have critically examined the 
notion of international legal personality and proposed alternative conceptions. They include 
Andrew Clapham, Rossalyn Higgins and others. According to some of them, some can invoke the 
concept of international legal personality to exclude important non-state actors and participants in 
international legal processes, and it is necessary to overcome the dichotomy of objects-subjects 
regarding those processes. Others argue that the concepts of legal personality and subjectivity 
have mainly descriptive functions, and that nothing impedes an actor that is not considered a 
subject in doctrine to be directly addressed by international norms. In turn, other authors consider 
that international law has undergone a process of increasing the inclusion of non-state entities 
and call for its continuation and expansion.71  
Undoubtedly, the issue of legal personality is a controversial one, being there different 
viewpoints about it. Some of them stress the importance of active or passive access to 
international procedures; others emphasize the direct attribution of rights or obligations to an 
entity; others argue that entities that have some procedural or substantive legal capacities 
possessed by States are subjects of international law;72 and still others consider that not even 
States have all international legal capacities, rights and duties.73 Regardless of what theory is 
endorsed, non-state entities can frequently have international legal capacities even if they are not 
regarded as subjects or persons of international law according to one of those theories. 
Those legal capacities can be regulated by norms that seek to protect human dignity from 
non-state abuses. In legal practice, mechanisms that can be used to offer that protection include 
those of transnational litigation, universal jurisdiction, human rights processes and other fields.  
This reveals that State agents, judicial or otherwise, can contribute to the protection of 
international legal goods and human rights from non-state abuses. This possibility strengthens 
the protection of human dignity because of the importance of complementing international 
protection with domestic and non-state initiatives. Among other examples, it can be said that the 
defense of international human rights from non-state abuses, such as those of private actors as 
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individuals or corporations, can be taken into account by authorities implementing the U.S. Alien 
Torts Statute;74 and that the legal system of States as Colombia and the United Kingdom offer 
protection from non-state violations of human rights directly and indirectly under certain 
conditions.75 
Just as international action can have shortcomings, domestic protection is often 
constrained by limitations and hindrances, related for instance to the reach of domestic law, gaps 
in internal norms, or the power of States against some actors. The fact that all legal systems and 
actors have limitations makes a comprehensive approach in which different actors and normative 
systems contribute to the protection of human dignity and complement each other necessary.76  
Additionally, to cope with the challenges to the exercise of human rights in a global 
society, the protection and promotion of human rights and guarantees must legitimately use tools 
and seize opportunities that are available in a globalized context,77 such as the proper and lawful 
use of technological developments and opportunities of formal and informal joint action. The 
common efforts of different actors and norms may shape the attitudes of participants and society, 
and lead to the emergence of legal goods jointly protected. Additionally, it can prompt 
manifestations of lex humana that supersede, complement or exert an influence on the opinio 
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juris of actors that can shape international law, and so bolster supranational community links, for 
which the opinion and participation of human beings are important.78 
The synergic interaction and common efforts of actors and legal systems can also 
generate a global legal space, in which domestic and international law and private regulation and 
actions interface.79 The common interests found in that space can include legal goods related to 
the protection of human dignity, which demands protection from all violators, State or not. The 
fact that interaction between actors and systems can also impact on their practice explains why 
recognition of the possibility and importance of that protection can spread and why the protection 
carried out by some participants in a global space benefit all of them and can be complemented 
by the protection given by others. 
Global legal dynamics strengthen the protection of human dignity from non-state threats 
for different reasons. First and foremost, they make the impunity of non-state violations more 
unlikely because different mechanisms and actors can tackle and regulate non-state conduct, and 
because actions from one system can be complemented by others that can be used if the former 
fail in a multi-level arrangement.80 Additionally, the importance of the position of victims is 
highlighted and they help to overcome distinctions of private and public law and internal and 
international norms, generating a (common) legal culture and messages that are sent to society 
and practitioners, that will be made aware of the necessity of protecting human dignity from all 
abuses and will be required to interpret norms in light of common legal goods.  
On the other hand, the recognition of global legal goods found in different normative 
systems legitimizes their protection by actors and participants of those systems; and the fact that 
their implementation and interpretation should be made in light of the legal goods that all those 
systems share can strengthen the common protection of those legal goods, including dignity. 
Taking into account the previous considerations put forward in this introduction, it can be 
concluded that it is necessary to examine if international law fully and effectively protects human 
dignity from non-state violations, especially because law must benefit human beings to be 
justified,81 and also because it is unacceptable that individuals are unprotected or under-
protected from abuses contrary to essential rights.  
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It is thus relevant to note that many violations of human rights and guarantees based on 
human dignity are attributable to non-state actors.82 Ignoring this can lead to re-victimization, 
impunity, and the belief by victims that law or authorities abandon them and consider their 
suffering as irrelevant. This goes against the human rights ideals of equality and protection of the 
inherent worth of all human beings, which belongs to individuals and does not depend on who 
they interact with.  
Concerning this, it is important to always bear in mind that individuals are the 
protagonists of the protection of human rights. Therefore, if local remedies to request protection 
from serious abuses do not exist or are not effective for some reason, they must have access to 
other remedies. Moreover, if victims of non-state abuses are told that human rights are not 
concerned with their suffering, they may lose faith in law and regard it as unfair, partisan or 
incomplete; and if law only protects some victims it will fail to protect all individuals, as it should.83  
Whether it is because the right to food cannot be enjoyed due to non-state action, or 
because someone is killed by members of non-state armed groups, among other examples of 
violations, daily examples make it necessary that a coherent and comprehensive regime of 
human dignity protects victims from all abuses and regulates the conduct of potential non-state 
violators. Otherwise, law will fail to address problems found in practice and society, and fail to live 
up to the idea that sic societas, sicut jus84 or that law must take into account social features, 
which include dynamics of non-state violations. Additionally, law has an instrumental character, 
which must be used to serve human beings. Since States cannot always protect victims of non-
state abuses, the law of peoples should prohibit non-state violations and tackle them directly or 
indirectly, as circumstances and legal considerations demand (Chapter 4 offers proposals about 
when direct international action is needed). 
In a globalized landscape, international law cannot fail to take account of non-state 
challenges and of how protection of individuals from those challenges is demanded by legal and 
extra-legal goals and interests, which must be safeguarded in an effective way. This demands, 
                                                     
82 See Michael Goodhart, op. cit., at 24-27, where it is explained that State powers exist precisely to protect 
individuals from non-state violations, and that insisting on exclusive State responsibility is fictitious and leads to 
ignoring the protection needs of persons subject to non-state threats. Moreover, taking into account that as fictitious 
entities violations attributable to States are also attributable to non-state entities (their officers), who can be 
responsible as well, it can be seen that in factual terms ultimately individuals, who are non-state entities (that can 
compose group entities), are always involved in violations of human dignity, and often they carry out violations on 
their own or in group structures without engaging the responsibility of a State. Concerning these issues, see foonotes 
5 and 37, supra. 
83 Concerning these issues, see Chris Jochnick, op. cit., at 58; Jordan J. Paust, “The Other Side of Right: Private 
Duties Under Human Rights Law”, op. cit., at 62; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 
pp. 43-44, 50, 53-54. 
84 See Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 46. 
 
 
33 
among other things, rethinking what international law is. As Jessup and Scelle posited, it is to a 
certain extent improper to label this legal system as international because it encompasses much 
more than the regulation of inter-State relations and interests; and as other authors argue, it has 
included inter-gentes, intra-gentes, human, collective and cosmopolitan dimensions throughout its 
history.85  
Regarding the idea that different mechanisms and strategies can contribute to the 
protection of human dignity from non-state abuses, it must be said that they can be legal and 
extra-legal mechanisms, the latter of which may sometimes be required by law, as happens with 
the promotion of a non-state culture respectful of human rights, recognized as important by 
Amartya Sen and by international bodies.86 The complementariness of different mechanisms of 
protection is one of the dimensions of the comprehensive character of the human rights 
framework, being another one the necessity of protecting individuals from all abuses, and another 
the need to permit the contribution of different actors and normative systems.  
Interestingly, international law has doctrines and mechanisms of subsidiarity and 
complementarity87 that acknowledge that the protection of some legal goods is embedded in a 
multi-level structure and can be pursued by joint legal effort, and also presuppose that local and 
other actors can contribute to protect international law. All of these considerations imply that the 
boundaries between legal systems are not absolute and can be blurred due to common 
enterprises, principles of “shared responsibility”, and the need of cooperation and 
complementarity among actors and norms. Relevant authorities and authors recognize that the 
                                                     
85 See Antonio Gómez Robledo, Fundadores del Derecho Internacional (Vitoria, Gentili, Suárez, Grocio), op. cit., pp. 
14-15, 98-99; Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Essay (translated by M. Campbell Smith), George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1917, pp. 119, 139, 142, 152, 157, 165-166; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho 
global?, supra, at 71-72; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law, supra, at 29, 31-32, 34; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 102; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, 
McGraw-Hill, 1997, pp. XLV-XLVI. 
86 See Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, op. cit., paras. 27-32; Amartya Sen, op. cit., at 345; Oscar Schachter, “Human 
Dignity as a Normative Concept”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, 1983, pp. 853-854; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, judgment, op. cit., para. 256; articles 2 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and 4 of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
87 See articles 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2 of the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 46 of the American Convention on Human Rights, or 35 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, among others; Darryl Robinson, “The Mysterious Mysteriousness of 
Complementarity”, Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010; articles 14 and 15 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection of the International Law Commission, A/61/10, 2006; Paolo G. Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a Structural 
Principle of International Human Rights Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, 2003, pp. 78-79. 
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effective protection of human rights and different legal goods requires the cooperation of local 
authorities and non-state actors.88  
Complementariness is important for different reasons, including the facts that State 
authorities, agents and norms may be too entrenched in selfish and artificial State interests;89 that 
non-state actions may be undemocratic, biased, contrary to international law or may not provide 
guarantees of access to victims; and that international law usually has few resources, may be 
encumbered by strict and slow lawmaking processes, and its agents may bend it to seek to 
impose unfair decisions against legitimate domestic processes or human rights. 
A multi-level framework of protection of human dignity in which different actors and 
initiatives seek the same purposes and complement others must take into account aspects of 
simultaneous action, allocation of power, multi-level governance, and the importance that 
legitimate domestic debates (that respect human dignity) are not circumvented.90  
Taking into account that the protection of individuals must be complete, it is important to 
consider that apart from perpetrating violations, non-state actors may be complicit in abuses 
committed by States and other actors, and that individuals must be protected from those forms of 
participation as well, because they contribute to abuses and harm. It is possible for assistant 
actors to have international responsibility, because under international law the responsibilities of 
different entities can coexist in relation to one violation.91  
                                                     
88 See European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2011, Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, 
2012, pp. 34, 36-37. 
89 See Celestino del Arenal, supra, p. 29; Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” 
(dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law”, op. cit., p. 216; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global?, op. 
cit., at 174-181. I consider that State agents and even “citizens”, category that excludes foreigners, often think to 
favor exclusively or mostly their own, even if it implies acting against others, and thus the reinforcement of a broader 
more inclusive conscious and subconscious category of belonging to humankind is needed. 
90 See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, pp. 73-76; Paolo G. Carozza, op. cit., pp. 78-79; Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of 
Sovereignty”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20 No. 3, 2009, pp. 535-536; Hans-Otto Sano, “Good 
Governance, Accountability and Human Rights”, in Hans-Otto Sano, Gudmundur Alfredsson and Robin Clapp (eds.), 
Human Rights and Good Governance: Building Bridges, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, pp. 137-141; Pierre 
Calame, op. cit., pp 19-20, 22-23. 
91 See Chapter 7, infra. Furthermore, that responsibility of an actor does not exclude that of another entity in relation 
to one same breach or violation has been acknowledged in doctrine and jurisprudence and is demonstrated by the 
fact that States may be complicit in crimes committed by non-state actors or by the possibility of holding a state agent 
and a State simultaneously responsible for breaches of international law caused by one same act. See International 
Court of Justice, Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, paras. 419-420; 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, International Responsibility for the Promulgation 
and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention, December 9, 1994, para. 56; Antonio Cassese, “When May 
Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case”, supra, at 
864, where it is mentioned that “there may coexist state responsibility and individual […] liability”; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, 30 May 1999, para. 90. 
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Furthermore, for the sake of the complete protection of victims, full reparations must be 
provided. They include components of satisfaction92 and other elements that can only be 
provided if all entities involved in a violation repair victims; and law requires that future violations 
be prevented, which also demands involving non-state agents of abuses. 
On the other hand, it is important to insist on the idea that non-state actors can also 
contribute to the protection of human dignity. In this regard, some of them have contributed to the 
effectiveness of many mechanisms of protection, and their participation is often crucial because 
of how States have limitations that do not hinder those actors, which may have advantages such 
as flexibility and expertise.93 The fact that State agents can and must take humanitarian interests 
into account and seek to protect them94 does not detract from the importance of a principle of 
complementarity, which alludes both to the multi-level protection of human dignity and the 
contribution of non-state actors in that protection, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
In light of what has been said, it can be said that for international law to be fair and 
legitimate95 it must protect essential human rights from all abuses and take into account the 
opinion of actors that promote that protection. 
Law cannot remain passive before cases in which private security corporations injure 
individuals; domestic violence; cruel atrocities perpetrated by non-state armed groups; corporate 
violations of labor and other rights of employees and members of the societies they operate in; or 
abuses and negligent offenses of international organizations, among other non-state offenses. 
If not all individuals are sufficiently and effectively protected from non-state abuses, law 
must change de lege ferenda, because the foundation and principles of human rights require their 
                                                     
92 See Principles 18 and 22 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law; articles 31, 34 and 37 of the articles on the responsibility of international organizations drafted by the 
International Law Commission (version adopted at its sixty-third session in 2011) and 31, 34 and 37 of the articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts drafted by the International Law Commission, adopted 
at its fifty-third session in 2001.  
93 See Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., at 25; 
Daniel Thürer, supra, at 40, 58; Pierre Calame, op. cit., pp. 9-10, 17, 22-23.  
94 See Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International 
Law”, op. cit., at 226-231; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a 
Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, supra, at 13; Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?", at 2659. 
95 Regarding fairness, Thomas Franck distinguished the notions of procedural correctness as allusive to legitimacy 
and material properness as related to justice, and considered them as components that make law fair, as explained 
in: Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Clarendon Press – Oxford, 1998, at 3-24. I 
must mention that, in any case, I disagree with his narrow conception of justice, because in my opinion it is not 
correct and is even risky to focus exclusively on distributive justice and disregard other meta-legal considerations, 
because this stance may justify abuses that go against the ethics and morals that law should take into account, that 
is to say those that without confusing their identities or making the latter an instrument of the imposition of the former 
impede law becoming an instrument that permits or orders abuses against human dignity and several values. Among 
others, while being distinct from positive law, natural law can still serve in order to critically examine the former. 
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full and effective protection. After all, for all victims, potential and actual, direct and indirect, who 
violates their rights does not matter as much as their need to be protected from all abuses.  
Deng Xiaoping is quoted as saying that it is irrelevant what the color of a cat is, because 
what matters is that it catches mice.96 I cannot fully subscribe to that idea because I reject the 
idea that goals, however noble they are, justify all means (something the phrase could be 
interpreted to endorse), and in this regard Chapters 1 and 5 posit that the adoption of non-state 
obligations and legal burdens must respect fundamental rights, legality and jus cogens. Still, 
international law must protect individuals from all abuses and permit this protection to be offered 
under other normative systems. This cannot be done in any way, but it must be done. For 
instance, counter-terrorism measures must respect human rights, but still terrorism must be 
countered, because it can violate human rights. 
Accordingly, the aforementioned phrase is not entirely irrelevant, because it stresses the 
importance of focusing on goals. In this sense, Mahatma Gandhi stressed how important it is to 
adhere to cardinal principles.97 The protection of all victims of human rights violations must be 
one of them, being a core principle of the global and international human rights frameworks and 
guiding them.  
To summarize this introduction, it must be stressed that for victims what matters is not so 
much who violates their rights but that they are protected from all violations and offenders. After 
all, human rights not serve only to protect human dignity from States but from all possible 
violations.98 
This thesis critically examines if and how international law can or does offer protection 
from non-state abuses, and has the following structure: Part I explores why the legal foundations 
and principles of human rights and guarantees, including human dignity, equality and non-
discrimination, and the horizontal effects of human rights, demand the protection of individuals 
from all violations, as required for instance by the non-conditional character of human dignity. 
                                                     
96 The phrase attributed to him is the following one: “No matter if it is a white cat or a black cat; as long as it can 
catch mice, it is a good cat.” See http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaoping (last checked: 17/11/2011). 
97 Gandhi expressed that “as the doctrine of satyagraha developed, the expression ‘passive resistance’ ceases even 
to be synonymous, as passive resistance has admitted of violence as in the case of suffragettes and has been 
universally acknowledged to be a weapon of the weak. Moreover passive resistance does not necessarily involve 
complete adherence to truth under every circumstance. Therefore it is different from satyagraha in three essentials: 
Satyagraha is a weapon of the strong; it admits of no violence under any circumstance whatever; and it ever insists 
upon truth.” (emphasis added). Excerpted from: Mahatma Gandhi, The Essential Writings, Oxford University Press, 
2008, at 326. 
98 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 56, where it is mentioned that “[i]f 
human rights once offered a shield from state oppression in the vertical relationship between the individual and the 
state, they now also represent a sword in the hands of victims of private human rights abuses.” 
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Afterwards, it explores when it is convenient to regulate international non-state duties and when 
direct international action can be used to protect victims of non-state abuses. 
Part II examines if non-state conduct can be regulated with the purpose of protecting 
human dignity, how this can be done, and what the conditions of the creation of non-state duties 
and legal burdens are. To conduct this analysis, issues of legal subjectivity, interaction of non-
state actors with the sources of international law, and what human rights obligations non-state 
actors can have, are examined. Afterwards, aspects of non-state responsibility arising out of 
breaches of non-state duties are examined alongside the right to full reparations of victims of non-
state abuses. Finally, the question of which strategies can be used in a complementary fashion to 
protect human dignity from non-state threats is examined. 
Finally, it must be said that human beings can suffer because of the action or omission of 
State and non-state entities, as examined in the painting Evicted 1887 by Blandford Fletcher 
(being the bailiff portrayed in it an authority and unsupportive villagers private actors).99 Every 
person who cannot exercise her human rights deserves protection, sympathy and support –as 
expressed by artists100, intellectuals and activists, and experienced by those who show solidarity 
towards victims-. International law must fully and truly protect human dignity and establish a 
lowest common denominator that has an impact on different legal systems,101 at least regarding 
peremptory human rights and guarantees, and must be further humanized102 and seek to protect 
all potential and actual victims, not slipping into apathy or dehumanization, dangers always 
looming when authorities, scholars and practitioners become too fond of abstract theories that 
ignore human needs and suffering, which must be addressed by law, that can and must protect 
all victims. 
 
                                                     
99 The image of the painting and a description of it can be found in the following Web Page Address of the 
Queensland Art Gallery: http://qag.qld.gov.au/collection/international_art/blandford_fletcher (last checked: 
17/11/2011). The image is shown at the outset in this book. 
100 On the transmission of feelings through art, see Leo Tolstoy, What is Art?, Aylmer Maude (translator), Crowell, 
1899, where the process of transmission of feelings is analyzed. 
101 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through 
Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., at 6, 15. 
102 On the humanization of international law, see Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, 
op. cit., paras. 48, 71; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, 17 September 2003, 
paras. 25, 27, 88; Theodor Meron, “The Humanization of International Law”, American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, p. 239. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Both preexisting and recent factors increase the likelihood and seriousness of different 
non-state threats to the enjoyment of rights based on human dignity. For long, non-state entities 
have been relevant participants in the international society, but their importance and influence 
have increased due to developments concerning their roles, capacities, functions and powers.103 
Hence, it is necessary to examine if international law can and must demand the protection and 
promotion of human dignity vis-à-vis non-state entities, especially because of the need to ensure 
a lowest common denominator that demands universal standards of protection to ensure that no 
victim is unprotected. Moreover, those standards of protection can be referred to by domestic and 
non-state initiatives, having thus both practical and educative functions. 
The approach to the aforementioned protection must include different legal systems and 
actors. This is because that task cannot be achieved with States acting alone without the 
cooperation of other actors, and neither can it be accomplished if only States are held as possible 
responsible entities. Likewise, it would be naïve to think that international law strategies alone are 
sufficient.  
In that regard, it is important to highlight that international law has a complementary or 
subsidiary nature, because ideally domestic norms and authorities must be the first to try to 
prevent and respond to violations, especially because frequently there are few resources 
available to international bodies as compared to those at the disposal of actors in other levels of 
governance.104 Furthermore, the content of international norms is sometimes the result of 
compromise and thus may not afford the maximum protection possible, reason why it ought to be 
complemented by domestic -or even private- rules. Finally, the implementation of jus gentium in 
the international level is often difficult, and so the presence of mechanisms found in other levels 
that enforce and promote its content is usually convenient for the achievement of common 
humanitarian goals to be feasible. 
In the field discussed in this text, the aforementioned interaction and complementarity of 
normative systems and actors must be guided by the attachment of central importance to the 
protection of human dignity and by heeding the demands of the principles and values that 
constitute the foundations of that protection. This first part of the book explores why those 
                                                     
103 See Celestino del Arenal, op. cit., pp. 27-28, 34, 52-53, 64-66; Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., at 319-320, 324, 336, 
342; Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126; Sandra Lavenex, supra, p. 388; Alexandra Gatto, supra, at 423; 
Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a  
Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., at 49. 
104 See John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 2, 19, 44. 
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foundations require that human beings be protected from non-state abuses and what the general 
and concrete implications of this are; while Part II addresses the way in which those requirements 
can be made effective: through the existence of legal obligations and responsibilities of non-state 
actors and of mechanisms to promote and protect human dignity from their eventual abuses.  
The insights of Part I suggest that human dignity demands the international legal 
protection of individuals from non-state abuses, and so law must change de lege ferenda if that 
protection is not offered or is given only in an incomplete manner. Part II examines why such 
legal changes are possible under international law, and also examines why it is clear that de lege 
lata non-state actors currently do have some international duties (primarily related to peremptory 
law) and responsibilities on the subject. 
It must be mentioned at the outset that the viewpoint held in the text is neither 
reductionist nor centered on the negative impact of non-state entities, because it is acknowledged 
that non-state actors can also have a positive impact on human rights and sometimes may 
contribute to their promotion in ways that State entities often cannot.  
Needless to say, apart from internal legal considerations pertaining to rights, principles 
and normative consistency, protection of human beings from non-state abuses is also demanded 
by ethical considerations, and also by socio-normative notions according to which authors of 
serious abuses must be held accountable.  
The goal of protecting all victims makes it necessary to overcome the belief held by many 
that international law is largely State-centered and also demands the modification of norms and 
practices that endorse such a reductionist framework. The possibility of overcoming normative 
limitations in that regard has been examined by authors as José Manuel Cortés and has been 
implicitly acknowledged by Andrew Clapham or Philip Alston,105 and has multiple manifestations, 
as for instance evinced by the evolution of individual international responsibility and the regulation 
of the responsibility of international organizations106 Discussions and developments regarding 
                                                     
105 See José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 56-58; Philip Alston, “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International 
Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?”, in Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human 
Rights, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 5-6; Nicolás Carrillo, “The Links between the Responsibility of 
international organizations and the Quest towards a More Reasonable and Humane International Legal System”, op. 
cit., pp. 443-444; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 96, where the author 
comments that “the development of the law of international crimes has highlighted questions of individual 
responsibility for violations of international law […] In turn, the scope of human rights obligations is coming to be seen 
as having an impact on other non-state actors”. 
106 See article 59 in conjunction with articles 33 and 34 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; articles 1 and 6 in conjunction with articles 10 through 12 of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Nicolás Carrillo, “The Links between the 
Responsibility of international organizations and the Quest towards a More Reasonable and Humane International 
Legal System”, op. cit., at 448; United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, OSS Nokalva, INC. v. European 
Space Agency. 
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human rights duties and responsibilities of transnational or other corporations also form part of 
this dynamic. 
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CHAPTER 1. HUMAN DIGNITY DEMANDS TO PROTECT ALL VICTIMS 
 
The evaluation of the demands of international human rights law and related norms must 
examine their foundation, which shapes their goals, objects and purposes, that in turn influence 
the interpretation of those norms, as described in article 31 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law 
of Treaties of 1969 and 1986. As indicated in international instruments and the works of several 
scholars, and posited by philosophical theories that shaped them, that basis is human dignity.107  
To analyze how the foundation of human dignity has an influence on the question of 
whether individuals must be protected from non-state entities, it is useful to examine how it or its 
implications are mentioned in international instruments. 
In the Preamble and articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is 
mentioned that: 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world […] 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and 
women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom  
[…]  
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (emphasis added). 
The concept of human dignity is also mentioned in the Preamble of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which refers to human rights in article 1.3. 
The two Universal Covenants on Human Rights adopted in 1966, along with the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
allude to the foundational character of human dignity in a more revealing way, expressly 
mentioning that: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant, [consider] that, in accordance with the principles 
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
                                                     
107 See Carlos Villán Durán, op. cit., at 63, 92; Daniel O’Donnell, Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, 
Oficina en Colombia del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, 2004, at 66; 
Chimène I. Keitner, “Rights Beyond Borders”, The Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 36, 2011, at 113; Roberto 
Andorno, “Human dignity and human rights as a common ground for a global bioethics”, Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 2009, at 4 (version available at: 
http://www.unesco.org.uy/mab/fileadmin/shs/redbioetica/dignidad_Andorno.pdf, last checked: 21/11/2011); Oscar 
Schachter, op. cit., at 853; Oliver Sensen, “Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and 
Traditional Paradigms”, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 10, 2011. Additionally, see Resolution 41/120 of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations; Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 of the Conference on Security and 
Co-Operation in Europe; Preamble and Articles 1, 22 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
Preamble to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993; 
Preambles to the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights; 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 112/10, Inter-State Petition IP-02, Admissibility, Franklin 
Guillermo Aisalla Molina, op. cit., para. 117; Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
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and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world,  
Recogniz[e] that [human] rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person” (emphasis 
added). 
Comparing the texts cited above, Oliver Sensen has considered that the evolution of the 
way in which notion of dignity is treated from the Charter and the Declaration to the Covenants 
reflects a developing conception according to which human rights are derived from human 
dignity,108 i.e. the inherent worth of every human being.109 Certainly, while being undoubtedly 
related, it would be improper to hold human dignity and human rights as equivalent notions. 
Human dignity is also mentioned in universal human rights instruments different from the 
ones examined before.110 In the regional human rights systems, the essential role of human 
dignity as the basis of human rights seems to be recognized as well. References to human dignity 
are made, for instance, in the American Convention on Human Rights; in the Preamble to 
Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, related to the abolition of the death penalty; or in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
The latter treaty is quite interesting, since it seems to envisage both individual dimension 
and collective dimensions of dignity, the latter of which refers in it to the African peoples. This 
may be explained by the idea that human beings are not the only entities that can have dignitas -
although that of human beings must be recognized as having unique features and a privileged 
character, in my opinion-. As to the human dimension of dignity under the African Charter, this 
treaty goes as far as recognizing a right to the respect of dignity, the content of which is 
somewhat vague but concretized in the prohibitions of some degrading treatments in article 5. 
This is consistent with the ideas put forward by authors as Roberto Andorno regarding the 
                                                     
108 See Jack Donnelly, op. cit., at 304; Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where it is mentioned that “human dignity is presented 
as the main foundation of [human] rights: Rights ‘derive’ from inherent dignity.”; Oscar Schachter, op. cit., p. 853; 
Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 mentions that “human rights and fundamental freedoms 
[…]derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development”; while 
paragraph 4 of Resolution 41/120 of the General Assembly states that human rights norms should be mindful of the 
idea that those rights “derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person”. 
109 See Oliver Sensen, supra, where it is considered that “[h]uman dignity is associated with worth and said to be 
inherent.” Moreover, see Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 849, where it is mentioned that “[a]n analysis of dignity may 
being with its etymological root, the Latin “dignitas” translated as worth (in French, “valeur”). One lexical meaning of 
dignity is “intrinsic worth.” Thus, when the UN Charter refers to the “dignity and worth” of the human person, it uses 
two synonyms for the same concept. The other instruments speak of “inherent dignity,” as an expression that is close 
to “intrinsic worth.” Furthermore, Roberto Andorno has posited that “dignity is not an accidental quality of some 
human beings, or a value derived from some specific personal features such as the fact of being young or old, man 
or woman, healthy or sick, but rather an unconditional worth that everyone has simply by virtue of being human” 
(emphasis added), as found in: Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 6. 
110 E.g. the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; or 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, for example. 
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possibility of human dignity having some direct legal effects, implementation and implications, 
and also with the consideration that some violations of human dignity are clearly recognized as 
such under human rights law.111 That article reads: 
“Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the 
recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, particularly slavery, 
slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.” 
Similarly, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa includes a right to dignity under article 3, concretized in the recognition 
and protection of the human rights of women, emphasizing certain guarantees given the 
vulnerability to which women are often exposed. The text of that article has the following wording: 
“Right to Dignity 
Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition and 
protection of her human and legal rights; 
Every woman shall have the right to respect as a person and to the free development of her 
personality; 
States Parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to prohibit any exploitation or 
degradation of women; 
States Parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to ensure the protection of every 
woman’s right to respect for her dignity and protection of women from all forms of violence, 
particularly sexual and verbal violence.” 
The African model seems to stress the relevance of a collective dimension of protection 
alongside an individual one, and on the other hand seems to consider that, besides being their 
foundation, the respect of human dignity is a concrete right, somewhat related to the right to have 
one’s personality recognized or to the prohibition of certain acts against individuals. Likewise, in 
other regional systems and the universal system of protection of human rights, it has been 
considered that certain violations are contrary to human dignity. Since all rights are meant to 
protect dignity, this must be understood as indicating that those violations are contrary to a 
specific right, and are not to be interpreted as suggesting that some violations do not violate 
human dignity, which would be contrary to the idea that it is the foundation of all human rights. 
                                                     
111 See article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 5, 7, 10, where 
among other ideas it is mentioned that while “‘Dignity’ alone cannot directly solve most bioethical dilemmas” and that 
“[t]hus, to become functional, dignity needs other more concrete notions that are normally formulated using the 
terminology of ‘rights’”, the “requirement of non-instrumentalization [related to human dignity] […] means, for 
instance, that no one should be subjected to biomedical research without his or her informed consent, even when 
very valuable knowledge could result from that research; it also means that law must prevent poor people from being 
induced to sell their organs as a means to support themselves or their families […] These two examples illustrate that 
the idea of dignity as a requirement of non-instrumentalization of persons, far from being purely rhetorical, has some 
immediate applications” (emphasis added). Likewise, Andrew Clapham has studied how “many human rights 
instruments and treaties not only recall the importance of protecting dignity, but actually specifically provide for its 
specific protection as such”, as mentioned in: Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. 
cit., at 537. Additionally, see Daniel O’Donnell, op. cit., at 94, 130-131, 166, 169-170, 175, 182-184, 191-193, 195-
196, 197, 200, 210, 212, 221-222, 224, 226, 234, 258, 275, 276, among other pages. 
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Additionally, some conduct is contrary human rights violations if they are understood as being 
contrary to human dignity, as happens for example with the prohibition of mistreating persons 
deprived of liberty and mandatory labor, among others.112 
A most interesting mention is made in the Preamble to the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, also 
known as the Protocol of San Salvador, according to which rights from all the categories of 
human rights used by some authors are relevant, because:  
“[T]he different categories of rights constitute an indivisible whole based on the recognition of the 
dignity of the human person, for which reason both require permanent protection and promotion if 
they are to be fully realized” (emphasis added). 
The previous passage confirms that all human rights are based on human dignity, which 
is the ultimate reason why all human rights, civil and political, economic or otherwise, are equally 
relevant regardless of the formal categories they belong to.113 This reasoning is also expressly 
mentioned in the Preamble to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World 
Conference on Human Rights of 1993, where it is said that: 
“[A]ll human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person, and […] the 
human person is the central subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and consequently 
should be the principal beneficiary and should participate actively in the realization of these rights and 
freedoms” (emphasis added). 
In the same manner, the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 of the Conference on 
Security and Co-Operation in Europe stated that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of 
the human person and are essential for his free and full development.” 
Furthermore, according to General Assembly Resolution 41/120 of 1986 and doctrine, 
States, the United Nations and all pertinent entities should make sure that human rights are 
intimately connected with the protection of human dignity when identifying human rights and 
drafting their instruments.114  
Notwithstanding, it must be admitted that given human fallibility when drafting human 
rights instruments, it is possible that a norm that claims to address a human right deviates from 
the scheme according to which human rights are derived from dignity. Yet, should this happen the 
right envisaged in that norm that is not based on human dignity may be formally called a human 
                                                     
112 See, for example, articles 10.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 5.2 and 6 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights. 
113 See paragraph I.5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; Preamble to the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where the concepts of the “universality, indivisibility, 
interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” are mentioned. 
114 See Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 10, where the mutual relations of human dignity and human rights are 
mentioned, although I consider that humanitarian guarantees also protect the former, that is not limited to the latter 
for having concrete effects in many cases. Additionally, see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Actors, op. cit., at 538. 
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right but is not substantively such, and the respective norm should in consequence be modified 
de lege ferenda or else be remove from the legal system. 
That being said, apart from the consideration that human rights are based on dignity, 
some important insights pertaining to the question of the protection of human dignity from non-
state entities can be gleaned from the text of the Vienna Declaration quoted above. One of them 
is the apparent endorsement of one understanding (among competing ones) of human dignity: 
that dignity is the inherent worth of every single human being, that must therefore be upheld and 
respected. In my opinion, this endorsement does not entail the exclusion of other conceptions, 
such as those based on ideas of the non-instrumental character of human beings, especially 
because they are not rejected and can complement it. The non-instrumental character of human 
beings, for instance, is to my mind one of the implications of their unconditional inner worth. 
The Declaration mentions another essential idea: the sake of individuals must be at the 
center of every analysis of human rights. Therefore, excluding individuals from protection and 
leaving them unprotected runs contrary to the logic that underlies those rights. In other words, just 
as the Protocol of San Salvador mentioned that excluding the protection of certain rights is 
opposite to human dignity, I consider that the exclusion of some victims from protection equally 
contradicts the foundation of human rights. 
In that regard, it is pertinent to note that the Declaration and Programme of Action of 
Vienna itself contains the idea that human rights are “universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated.”115 The exclusion of individuals victimized by non-state actors from the scope of 
the protection of human rights law would be contrary to those four aspects.  
First of all, while universality certainly entails a territorial component, according to which 
human rights are to be upheld everywhere regardless both of which State has sovereignty over 
one place and of whether some cultural conceptions do not recognize those rights,116 which is the 
traditional understanding of the notion of universality. To my mind, there is a second dimension of 
the universality of human rights: universality concerning protection, that alludes to protection from 
all possible threats to the enjoyment of (the content of) human rights.117  
                                                     
115 As expressed in paragraph I.5. 
116 In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, for example, it was stated that “All human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated (…) While the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of 
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” (…) “Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human 
rights. They should reinforce universal human rights standards.” See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
World Conference on Human Rights, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, paras. I.5, I.37. 
117 See Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., at 24-25. 
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It has been considered that one implication of the first aspect of the universality of human 
rights (and of the dignity they are based upon) is that State and other actions must be taken to 
change or tackle cultural and other practices and customs that are contrary to human rights 
standards,118 especially because cultural arguments should not be successfully invoked against 
human rights norms.119 This implies that territorial concerns are not the only elements to be 
examined in relation to the protection of human rights, since others as cultural manifestations are 
relevant too. This logic posits that universality comprises multiple dimensions. Therefore, if it is 
accepted that cultural and other practices and patterns can be contrary to human dignity, it 
follows that not only State practices can run counter to that dignity.  
For example, there may be one practice of the majority of the population in one State that 
is the minority of the inhabitants of another State has as well, without the latter being supported 
officially in any way whatsoever, being it possibly even discouraged and responded to by that 
State. Yet, the fact that the practice is one and the same implies that it can equally affect the 
enjoyment of human rights and thus must have the same connotation from their perspective. 
Therefore, universal and non-discriminatory protection considerations demand addressing both 
situations and contexts (admittedly, sometimes with different strategies), since the problems are 
generated by one identical factor, even if in one case there can be State responsibility and not in 
the other one. 
This suggests that whenever protection demands so, non-state actors that carry out 
practices that can be inimical to human rights must have duties to not engage in violations and to 
repair victims. Those duties must respect the principle of legality and fundamental rights, because 
also violators have them.120  
                                                     
118 See articles 24.3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 2 and 3 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (along with its Preamble); 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women and 4 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, 16 November 2009, 
para. 256; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, op. cit., paras. 11-12, 14, 
38-39;Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 13; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, supra, paras. 78, 81, 88, 
104; Henry J Steiner, “International Protection of Human Rights”, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law (third 
edition), Oxford University Press, 2010, at 804. 
119 This is a subtle matter, for sometimes the human rights discourse endorses ideas that are not really hard law and 
are argued against reasonable cultural matters and decisions that are adopted by human communities, while other 
times the margin of appreciation of States that is respectful of human rights is ignored, being those approaches 
contrary to the need of allocating power in several levels in accordance with democratic ideas, in accordance with the 
maxim that those affected by something should regulate it if they have the capacity and willingness to do so. On 
these issues, see John H. Jackson, op. cit., 73-76; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global?, op. cit., at 217. 
120 See Chapter 5, infra; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, 22 October 2002, para. 5, where it is mentioned that “efforts to oppose terrorism and the 
protection of human rights and democracy are not antithetical responsibilities”; Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, 30 May 1999,  para. 89; Christoph J. M. Safferling, “Can 
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Altogether, a universal protection of human dignity requires complete protection in all 
dimensions: territorial, cultural, and subjective ones, that is to say protection from every threat, 
because both State and non-state entities can harm human rights. That the universality of human 
dignity demands its protection regardless of who participates in a violation is a conclusion shared 
by other authors, as Elena Pariotti.121 After all, universality refers to a totality, and law must 
address all threats to human dignity, so that human beings are fully protected. 
Moreover, some authors have suggested that a State-centered system of human rights 
that leaves victims of non-state aggressions unprotected (and so unrecognized) is contrary to 
other features of human rights: their interrelatedness, interdependence and indivisibility.122  
I agree with this idea because, since human beings must be at the center of the analysis 
of human rights, excluding some individuals from their scope of protection simply because a State 
did not participate in a violation cannot be reconciled with the fact that the crux of human rights is 
that those individuals have an inherent and non-conditional entitlement to enjoy human rights, 
rather than considerations of what entities violate them. The aforementioned exclusion should 
thus be understood as rendering the protection of rights divided and dependent on extraneous 
aspects as the State identity of violators. What Hannah Arendt called the right to have rights and 
procedural dimensions of human rights are ignored in such a scheme, which attaches importance 
to formal aspects rather than to the foundational character of human dignity. 
To overcome this deficiency, it is imperative to replace rules and preconceptions 
centered on a State-based paradigm with a human-centered/victim-centered framework of 
protection that calls for protecting victims of violations committed by any actor, because legally 
and ethically relevant the central factor is that rights can be violated and their enjoyment curtailed, 
instead of the consideration of who can commit violations, which is an accessory factor that may 
be relevant for determining strategies, not for determining if action must be taken.  
Altogether, since the wellbeing of all human beings is one of the essential factors in a 
framework that protects human dignity, this comprehensiveness cannot be reconciled with 
systems that exclude some individuals from the scope of protection.123  
One example illustrates this point: according to judge Williams of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the U.S. Alien Tort Statute can be used against 
non-state entities when they commit acts that are contrary to the so-called Westphalian (legal) 
                                                                                                                                                            
Criminal Prosecution be the Answer to massive Human Rights Violations?”, German Law Journal, Vol. 5, 2004, at 
1472; articles 55, 66 and 67 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
121 See Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 96. 
122 See Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, “Looking beyond the State But Not Ignoring It”, op. cit., at 6. 
123 See pp. 60-61; Chris Jochnick, op. cit.; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., 
p. 546; Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 848, 850; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 8. 
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system. Judge Rogers disagreed considering that this is not required.124 This rebuttal considers 
that violations of non-state entities can be examined even when they do not affect inter-State 
legal interests, and thus defends the idea of a broad protection. This shows how a paradigm that 
over-focuses on States and inter-State relations is too narrow and may lead to failing to protect 
some individuals. 
A comprehensive protection is related to two features of human dignity: it is inherent to 
every human being, and on the other hand it is inalienable, which entails that rights and 
guarantees founded upon human dignity cannot be unrecognized, renounced or “withdrawn.”125 
This aspect also ensures that no one can invoke the existence of protection from non-state 
abuses to curtail rights or evade human rights responsibilities (e.g. State obligations).126 Thus, 
criticisms according to which non-state responsibilities will undermine State ones are unfounded. 
After all, the inherent character of human dignity demands respect from all actors, 
including States and other functional authorities, which retain their duties and responsibilities –
including positive obligations-, as pointed out by authors that reassure those who mistrust the 
protection of human dignity from non-state violations.127  
On the other hand, universality stresses the idea that individuals who violate human 
rights also have dignity and human rights.128 Doctrine and international bodies as the Inter-
American Human Rights Court and Commission uphold for instance that even terrorists and other 
                                                     
124 Unlike judge Williams, who insisted on offenses against the “Westphalian system”, judge Rogers considered that 
the need to identify that element was inappropriate. The debate is found in the concurring votes of: United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Ali Mahmud Ali Shafi et al. v. Palestinian Authority, Decision of 
14 June 2011. 
125 See Jack Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 306, 310; Oscar Schachter, op. cit., p. 853; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 6; Oliver 
Sensen, supra, where it is posited that human dignity is “a non-relational property, that is, a property that does not 
change according to the different circumstances or relations in which a human being finds himself.” Concerning the 
non-exclusiveness of human rights regarding the protection of human dignity, see Jack Donnelly, op. cit., at 303. 
126 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 41-46; John H. Knox, 
“Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., at 20. 
127 See August Reinisch, op. cit., at 78-83; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., 
p. 44; Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., p. 339; Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003, para. 1; 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, commentary 
to principle 11, at 13. 
128 Cf. Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in Terris, op. cit., para. 158. On the other hand, some consider that group 
entities can also have dignity or be worthy of protection due to the link between the respect of the dignity of 
individuals who interact with them, and therefore actions regarding them must take that dignity into account, as 
studied in: Oscar Schachter, op. cit., 850, 852-853; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors, op. cit., p. 545-546. 
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violators of human dignity have human rights, and that protection from their misdeeds must 
respect the rule of law and human rights.129  
Having said this, it is important to determine which rights and guarantees demand 
protection from all abusers and violations according to their foundations, values and principles. 
In that regard, human rights are not merely those rights found in instruments formally 
called as such. Therefore, it is useful to use the expression human rights lato sensu, which 
despite not being called as such is a concept handled in case law and practice. According to it, 
every right of human beings founded upon their dignity that is directly recognized in their favor 
and respects the dignity of others in abstracto130 is a human right, irrespective of its being 
formally called as such or its being included in a document with such a label or not. 
Concerning this, when facing the question of whether rights of individuals found in the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were human rights or not in the Lagrand case, the 
International Court of Justice considered it unnecessary to ascertain whether they were human 
rights, but Germany considered that they were indeed human rights. The latter position endorses 
the viewpoint that all human rights are one and the same, be them stricto sensu (formally called 
as such) or lato sensu.131  
Insofar as it focuses on the need of protecting rights the content of which makes human 
rights instead of on formalities, this conception is closely related to the inter-relatedness and 
equal importance and nature of all human rights, mentioned in doctrine and instruments as the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993.  
Regarding this, it is necessary to stress that lato sensu and stricto sensu human rights 
share the same qualities because both categories refer to rights directly recognized in favor of 
human beings that protect their inner worth or dignity, being both thus equally human rights, with 
no distinction besides the nominal one. 
That this is so is illustrated by the fact that when facing a dilemma that was similar to the 
one of the Lagrand case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was of the opinion that some 
                                                     
129 See the answer of Philip Alston to the question of whether persons who violate human rights have those rights, 
found in: http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/qna/alston.asp (last checked: 21/11/2011). Additionally, see 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, op. cit., para. 5; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, 30 May 1999,  para. 89. 
130 If a right is compatible with the dignity of third parties in abstracto but not in a specific case, it is still a right of the 
humanitarian framework but measures such as restrictions or the application of doctrines such as the abus de droit 
or the engagement of the responsibility of an offender are called for and their use by authorities is mandatory. 
Concerning these measures, see Chapters 5 and 8, infra. 
131 See International Court of Justice, LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, 27 June 
2001, paras. 77-78. 
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rights comprised in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were indeed human rights.132 
This position is consistent with the one the Inter-American Court held in its first Advisory Opinion, 
in which it maintained that human rights can be found in various instruments, even in those the 
main object of which is concerned with other issues. This position confirms that human rights may 
be found in instruments without that formal label or not belonging to that branch formally, even if 
most of the norms present therein are not concerned with the protection of human dignity.133 
Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has said that:  
“In common with other universal and regional human rights instruments, the American Convention 
and the 1949 Geneva Conventions share a common core of non-derogable rights and the mutual 
goal of protecting the physical integrity and dignity inherent in the human being”134 (emphasis added). 
The Commission thus recognizes the idea that there are human rights lato sensu and 
values and interests commonly protected by different normative sectors.135 Furthermore, the fact 
that some IHL treaties are included as human rights instruments in the webpage of the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights136 confirms this conclusion. 
The previous considerations lay the groundwork for an important aspect related to the 
object of this work: authors as Elena Pariotti have examined how some norms that attempt to 
address and regulate non-state conduct (for instance in the field of armed conflicts) may be truly 
human rights norms.137 Couple to this the facts that there are international humanitarian norms 
that protect human dignity and rights, as the Commission said in the passage cited above; that 
those norms may well address non-state conduct; and that norms in other branches and sectors 
may also protect human rights and so could address non-state conduct as well, and it follows that 
                                                     
132 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular 
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, 1 October 1999, Opinion 2, at p. 64. 
133 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative 
Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights), 24 September 1982, paras. 32-34 
and the first opinion, shown in page 12. 
134 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 112/10, Inter-State Petition IP-02, Admissibility, 
Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador – Colombia, op. cit., paras. 91, 117, where it is also mentioned that 
“human rights are inherent in all human beings and are not based on their citizenship or location”. 
135 Legal goods are those interests and values protected by law. This concept has been examined in doctrine and 
has been handled by entities such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See: Markus Dirk Dubber, 
“The Promise of German Criminal Law: A Science of Crime and Punishment”, German Law Journal, Vol. 6, 2005, at 
1069-1070; Santiago Mir Puig, “Legal Goods Protected by the Law and Legal Goods Protected by the Criminal Law 
as Limits to the State’s Power to Criminalize Conduct”, New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 11, 2008; Christoph J. M. 
Safferling, “Can Criminal Prosecution be the Answer to massive Human Rights Violations?”, German Law Journal, 
Vol. 5, 2004, at 1472; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 95/08, Admissibility, Nadege 
Dorzema et al., or “Guayabin Massacre” v. Dominican Republic, 22 December 2008, footnote 7; Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 64/01, Leonel de Jesús Isaza Echeverry and Others v. Colombia, 6 April 
2001, para. 22; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49, 11 April 1980, in: Chapter II, The Right to Life, para. 1 of section A. General Considerations. 
136 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 112/10, Inter-State Petition IP-02, Admissibility, 
Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador – Colombia, op. cit., para. 117; http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ (last 
checked: 30/11/2011). 
137 See Elena Pariotti, op. cit., in section 4 (“Armed Non-State Actors”). 
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human rights standards, be them lato or stricto sensu, are and can be pertinent for assessing 
non-state conduct. 
The consideration that human rights are not limited to those that are formally called as 
such (i.e. are not human rights stricto sensu) confirms that developments in a given branch or 
instrument that deals with the protection of human dignity can be perfectly followed in others, 
including developments concerning protection from non-state participants in violations. 
Returning to the example that some norms of international humanitarian law share the 
foundation of human dignity, it is important to note that common article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 prohibits “[o]utrages upon personal dignity” committed by State and non-
state participants in hostilities: those prohibitions protect human rights, because those rights 
protect human dignity. It must be recalled that human rights and humanitarian law are 
interconnected.138 
It must be clear though that not only humanitarian law may have human rights lato sensu. 
As indicated above, even a branch that at first glance seems unrelated to them, as that of 
consular relations, may protect human rights. Even the law of the sea may contain norms that 
protect human dignity directly or indirectly, for instance concerning the rescue of persons at sea 
or protection against slavery, piracy (which can affect rights such as liberty, among others) and 
drug-traffickers;139 and some norms dealing with transnational crime and terrorism seek to 
dissuade and sanction behavior that may have a negative impact upon the enjoyment of human 
rights.140 Refugee law and criminal law are other branches that contain human rights lato sensu, 
                                                     
138 Regarding these issues, cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, 
Merits, Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, 18 November 1997, paras. 157-171; International Court of Justice, Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, 
para. 106; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 112/10, Inter-State Petition IP-02, Admissibility, 
Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador – Colombia, op. cit., paras. 117, 121-122, 124; Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 28 May 2010, para. 29, footnote 53; Marko Milanovic, “Lessons for human rights and 
humanitarian law in the war on terror: comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings case”, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 866, 2007, pp. 390-392. Moreover, Rule 99 of the Customary IHL Database of 
the ICRC, related to the deprivation of liberty, makes references to human rights treaties for the purpose of clarifying 
customary rules applicable in non-international armed conflicts, being it important to recall that non-state entities are 
bound by those rules. See: http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule99 (last checked: 30/11/2011). 
139 See articles 98 through 108, 110, 111 and 146 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Claire de 
Than and Edwin Shorts, op. cit., pp. 257-262; articles 3 through 5 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; Eugene Kontorovich, “International Legal Responses to Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia”, ASIL Insights, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2009. 
140 See, for instance, Tom Obokata, “Smuggling of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective: Obligations of 
Non-State and State Actors under International Human Rights Law”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 17, 
2005, pp. 394, 399-402, 414-415; Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, op. cit., pp. iii-iv; articles 23 through 25 of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, especially its articles 6 and 7; Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; Ilias Bantekas and Susan 
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which is logical because of how intimately related to the protection of human dignity many of its 
norms and purposes are. As will be explained shortly, what is remarkable is that many 
international norms protect human dignity from non-state actors. 
International criminal norms, for instance, can regulate non-state conduct and often 
protect human rights141 by prohibiting conduct that violates their content. It is telling that, as 
happens in the African human rights system (explained pages above), under international 
criminal law some conduct contrary to human dignity are held to amount to wrongful acts branded 
as violating human dignity -with a criminal nature in this case-. In this sense, Articles 8.2(b)(xxi) 
and 8.2(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court forbid “outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” during armed conflicts, and 
Article 68 calls for taking into account the dignity of victims and witnesses. Similarly, international 
criminal norms and decisions, as those of the International Criminal Court or the criminal 
Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, have developments concerning the 
criminalization of serious offenses against human dignity.142  
That being said, it is important to take into account that criminal law has an ultima ratio 
character. Therefore, neither every non-state violation of human dignity amounts to a crime de 
lege lata nor ought every such violation to amount to a crime de lege ferenda. For instance, non-
state actors may negatively affect economic, social and cultural or other rights and have 
responsibilities –which can be criminal or otherwise, depending on several factors-, as recognized 
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.143 In any case, criminal law highlights 
how non-state actors can not only enjoy rights but also be subject to international legal duties.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Nash, op. cit., at 14; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, 30 
May 1999, para. 89. 
141 See Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, op. cit., pp. 12-13; Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 36, 38; Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 42. 
142 Cf. article 4.e of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto 
Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 44, 158, 162, 168, 173, 176, 183-184, 186, 188, 259, 274-276, 
279, 295, and footnotes 192 and 201. 
143 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The right to adequate food (art. 
11), E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, paras. 10, 15, 19-20, 27, 29; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 33, 42; Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of he 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, paras. 23-24; 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16, The equal right of men and women 
to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (art. 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2005/4, 11 August 2005, para. 20; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 18, The right to work, E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, para. 25; Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 
2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, para. 
11. 
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The notion of human rights lato sensu highlights two aspects: that developments 
regarding the protection of human dignity may also be followed by other norms; and that this 
protection may counter fragmentation because human rights and human dignity concepts 
constitute a lingua franca that can operate as a legal cohesive element, as highlighted by August 
Reinisch and Roberto Andorno144 and revealed by the fact that, due to social and legal demands, 
the protection of human dignity and human rights must be recognized as being relevant in fields 
where due to prejudices it was believed they had no role. After all, international legal regimes are 
often interdependent and exert influence on each other,145 which may be partly explained by the 
existence of common legal goods. Granted, issues found across regions and systems may 
sometimes be addressed by resorting to different rights regulations protecting common legal 
goods in order to deal with particularities but ensuring that human dignity is protected.146 
Concerning human rights, lato sensu or not, it must be said that the Global Compact and 
other initiatives acknowledge that even though human rights were traditionally understood to be 
relevant in relations between individuals and the State, it is possible and important to extend their 
reach beyond the State and make other entities that may potentially prevent the enjoyment of 
human rights respect them.147 This is relevant not only with respect to those initiatives but across 
the human rights universe, due to all of its norms sharing common traits whatever their label or 
branch is. 
One of the grounds on which the aforementioned extension can be based is the fact that:  
The “Universal Declaration of Human Rights […] calls on ‘every individual and every organ on 
society’ to strive to promote and respect the rights and freedoms it contains and to secure their 
                                                     
144 On these issues, cf. Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 11; August Reinisch, op. cit., at 72-74; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, 
“Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal 
Goods”, op. cit., at 17. 
145 See Thomas M. Franck, op. cit., p. 12. 
146 In this regard, Paolo Carozza has argued that human dignity “serves as a common currency” in legal practice, that 
is taken into account in core and non-controversial cases, at least. See Paolo G. Carozza, “Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, 2008, 932, 938-
939. On the other hand, Christopher McCrudden acknowledges that “A principled interpretation of a grand principle 
often seems to call for agreement on what the effect of applying the principle is, whilst nevertheless disagreeing on 
what a full theoretical basis for the principle may be. Cass Sunstein has described the process of deciding cases on 
their facts without necessarily agreeing on any particular theory supporting the decision as giving rise to ‘incompletely 
theorized’ agreements. Such agreements exist where individuals can agree on a specific result, even if they do not 
agree on all the aspects of the specific theory justifying that result.” This argument supports the idea that the same 
result (the protection of human dignity), which is demanded by the common foundations of law, is brought about by 
different processes (the use of different particular norms). Cf. Christopher McCrudden, “Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, 2008, at 697. 
147 Principles 1 and 2 of the Global Compact mention that “Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights” and that they must “make sure that they are not complicit in human rights 
abuses.” 
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effective recognition and observance. The concept of ‘every organ of society’ covers private entities 
such as companies.”148  
As explained before, the Declaration recognizes human dignity. Its evolutive 
interpretation149 must recognize that the rights enshrined therein are based on it, as stated in later 
instruments. The fact that elements of protection against abuses committed by non-state entities 
are addressed in instruments as the Declaration builds upon and is required by the foundations 
on which all human rights rest reinforces the necessity of taking those developments into account 
generally. 
For its part, the practice of the United Nations may reveal an unconscious or intuitive 
recognition of the idea that human rights norms may be included in different instruments that can 
formally belong to diverse “formal” branches of international regulation, and may sometimes 
address non-state behavior. Article 2.1 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of Sudan –a non-state entity- and the United Nations –
another non-state actor- on 21 July 2010, for instance, says that: 
“UNICEF mandate and actions are guided by the principles of international humanitarian law. The 
basic elements of these principles are drawn from UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 and 
other instruments, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols relating 
to the protection of victims of war, the protection of victims of international and non-international 
armed conflicts, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the two Optional Protocols, the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and other international human rights instruments” 
(emphasis added). 
Complementary to the concept of human rights lato sensu, it is possible to conceive a 
related category of norms: those enshrining human or humanitarian guarantees (including but not 
limited to those found in international humanitarian law).  
Humanitarian guarantees consist in norms that, despite not directly regulating individual 
rights entrenched in human dignity, promote and protect that dignity and sometimes human rights 
indirectly or directly in a form that differs from a direct regulation of rights. This may happen, for 
example, when norms place duties on actors to prohibit and discourage violations against dignity 
or to command them to strive to protect individuals; when norms regulate the restriction of rights 
when it is necessary to ensure a proportional protection of human rights; or when norms aim to 
exert influence on the culture of certain actors fostering new practices conducive to greater 
harmony with the respect and promotion of human dignity, among other measures.  
                                                     
148 Cf. United Nations Global Compact and the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Embedding 
Human Rights into Business Practice, at 15. 
149 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Interpretation of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 14 
July 1989, paras. 37-38. 
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From a theoretical standpoint, humanitarian guarantees reflect the idea put forward by 
Oscar Schachter that the respect of human dignity and human rights can be promoted by means 
beyond those available under litigation or rights-schemes, because promotion may for instance 
take place also under social or political processes150. This explains why soft law initiatives are 
relevant when addressing non-state conduct, especially because they may contain some 
proposals or ideas relating humanitarian rights or guarantees that despite not being formally 
binding are persuasive or otherwise impact on the practice of non-state actors or authorities. 
It is important that at least a minimum of complementary strategies is legally binding. 
Otherwise, we would be entirely at the mercy of the good will of some actors, which is sometimes 
nonexistent or unreliable. Actually, the very fact that Professor Schachter mentions codes of 
conduct151 is telling, because they may sometimes be adopted out of a desire to improve public 
image and evade criticisms with no real commitment.152 The lack of obligatoriness, remedies and 
enforceable supervision of many codes of conduct makes them frequently ineffective instruments 
of protection needs unless complementary action is taken. 
Human or humanitarian guarantees encompass a wide variety of initiatives and 
manifestations, as for example: criminal provisions, international legal obligations, provisions 
allowing the restriction of certain rights after a proportionality test has been effectuated in order to 
prevent private violations of human rights, principles as the pro homine principle, precautionary 
measures, prohibitions of the use of force, legal initiatives that seek to ensure self-defense 
against non-state actors in order to prevent otherwise vulnerable populations from being 
undefended,153 refugee law guarantees, or procedures granting access or locus standi to 
individuals to fora where their human rights can be invoked to request protection from non-state 
threats directly or indirectly, among others. 
It must be clarified that the notions of human rights lato sensu and humanitarian 
guarantees may be somehow related to the concept of obligations stemming from the principle of 
humanity lato sensu as explained by Antonio Cançado, but are different from it, because his 
notion seems to try to explain how the respect of human dignity is an integral part of international 
                                                     
150 Cf. Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 853-854; Amartya Sen, op. cit., at 345. 
151 See Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 853-854. 
152 See Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 431; August Reinisch, op. cit., at 53. 
153 Cf. articles 4 or 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 5 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 27, 29 or 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, or 15, 17, 18 or 53 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, among others; Álvaro 
Francisco Amaya Villarreal, “El principio pro homine: interpretación extensiva vs. el consentimiento del Estado”, 
International Law: Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, 2005, at 356, 361, 374-375; Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 156. 
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law,154 whereas the two concepts proposed here are normative manifestations of the protection of 
human dignity. 
Those concepts suggest that all human rights are part of the same corpus juris, which 
has been humanized and must continue to be so and become a full lex humana with human 
beings at its center –therefore, the aphorism of dura lex, sed lex is not to be blindly accepted-.155 
They also highlight how different international norms and measures may have a positive direct or 
indirect impact on human dignity and may address non-state conduct.  
The normative categories being discussed are not something completely new. Ian 
Brownlie, for example, considered that international human rights law, while being a useful 
“category of reference”, does not constitute a “separate body of norms”, reason why scholars 
should focus on applicable norms when analyzing human rights.156  
This reasoning confirms the non-closed and open character of “human rights law”, which 
makes it possible for human rights norms to be present in diverse legal fields, and reinforces the 
idea expressed before that approaches and mechanisms found in some of those norms may also 
be present in other norms protecting human dignity, including approaches to protect individuals 
from non-state abuses. Among some examples, one can consider the mechanisms for the 
protection of human dignity against non-state threats under refugee law (where the concept of 
persecutors is not limited to States),157 humanitarian law (non-state armed actors may clearly be 
bound by its norms),158 or criminal law (which criminalizes some human rights violations and 
sanctions perpetrators and participants even if they belong to non-state groups), among others. 
Different norms belonging to different branches that have the same purpose to protect 
victims reveal the possibility and confirm the need to protect human dignity from all offenses, 
                                                     
154 See Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade to: International Court of Justice, Case concerning Ahmadou 
Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment, 30 November 2010, paras. 93-
106; Separate Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: International Court of Justice, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 
2010, paras. 74-76. 
155 Cf. Ibid.; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, 28 August 2002, para. 19; John 
Finnis, “The Priority of Persons”, in Jeremy Horder (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, pp. 1-3, 13; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, OC-6/86, The word “laws” in article 30 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights, 9 May 1986, para. 33. 
156 See Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, pp. 65-66. 
157 Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, Reedited, Geneva, 1992, para. 65; Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126. 
158 See Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the 
Miguel Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment (Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 2 
August 2008, paras. 90-91. 
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whatever their origin. This is supported, for example, in the following statement of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross: 
“Enforced disappearance is a crime under international human rights law and – when it occurs in war 
– under international humanitarian law.”159 
In light of the previous considerations, mentions of human rights or victims of human 
rights violations160 must be construed as referring to all human rights and victims, unless 
expressly excluded. This is how, for example, the following principle of the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Law, must be read: 
“15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by redressing gross 
violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. In 
accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation 
to victims for acts or omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of 
international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law. In cases where 
a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should 
provide reparation to the victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation 
to the victim” (emphasis added).  
According to what has been said so far, it is possible to assert that human dignity is the 
legal foundation of all human rights and that its protection is one of its main goals, in light of which 
pertinent norms should be interpreted, as confirmed by a value-based interpretation of human 
rights promoted in international jurisprudence.161 Additionally, human dignity is the foundation of 
humanitarian guarantees as well, with the same implications. 
Moreover, apart from being the foundation of many norms of jus gentium and determining 
their purposes, human dignity serves to assess the fairness162 of that legal system.  
An objection I have to some theories that agree with the identification of human dignity as 
an overarching and transversal foundation of jus gentium is, ironically, their State-centrism, which 
                                                     
159 Cf. ICRC, “ICRC calls on States to join Convention against Enforced Disappearance”, News Release 10/155, 
available at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/missing-news-270810 (last checked: 30/11/2011). 
160 Such as, for instance, the references found in the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power. 
161 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v.  Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., 
para. 33, where it was mentioned that “international human rights law is composed of a series of rules (conventions, 
treaties and other international documents), and also of a series of values that these rules seek to develop. 
Therefore, the norms should also be interpreted based on a values-based model  that the Inter-American System 
seeks to safeguard from the perspective of the “best approach” for the protection of the individual.” Likewise, cf. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade to: International Court of Justice, Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 3 February 2012, para. 293. 
162 Cf. Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law, Hart Publishing, 2009, pp. 5, 273-
276; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, 28 August 2002, paras. 10-34; Concurring 
Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 
Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, 17 September 2003, paras. 4-12; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué 
es el derecho global, op. cit., pp. 91, 110, 158-159. 
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is a feature that is contrary to both international legal practice and reality163 and to the ideal of a 
law centered on human beings. Truly, some of those conceptions over-focus on the idea that jus 
gentium is concerned with regulating relations among States and affirm that only those entities 
have a duty to respect and protect human dignity. 
Certainly, protecting individuals against State abuses is of the utmost importance and an 
achievement that cannot be renounced to, albeit it must be clarified that it is not the only 
dimension in which human dignity is relevant, insofar international law and human rights norms 
are not solely devoted to the regulation of State relations.164 Protecting individuals only from 
States is insufficient to fully protect them, being it necessary for other entities capable of affecting 
their interests to be addressed by law in light of the legal principle, value and foundation of the 
protection of human dignity, lest it is not effective, given how multiple entities can violate it. 
Authors as Pierre Calame, Fred Halliday or Jordan J. Paust have demonstrated how 
neither in social nor in legal practice the international or global levels of governance have been 
exclusively concerned with States, because there have been other entities that are important in, 
participate in, and are addressed both formally and informally by the international legal system, 
that is not concerned only with State relations and interests.165  
This is why I disagree with some theories of the fiduciary character of peremptory 
international law, according to which States have their legitimacy and sovereignty conditioned to 
the respect of jus cogens, being this consideration determinant of the identification of that sub-set 
of hierarchically superior norms:166 I agree with the first idea, but the second one denies that 
some international peremptory norms are founded on the respect and inner worth of individuals, 
regardless of what authority exercises control or power over them, being power not necessarily 
juridical but also factual, which explains why protection of human dignity is not only owed against 
                                                     
163 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., pp. 
985-1004; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, 28 August 2002, para. 26-29. 
164 In this regard, for instance, supervisory bodies of human rights treaty norms have acknowledged that States must 
protect human beings from non-state threats because the latter can “violate” human rights, and are sometimes able 
to offer direct or indirect protection against entities different from States. Complementary norms of the humanitarian 
corpus juris, such as those of international criminal law that protect human dignity, sanction abuses that are 
committed by persons that either have or do not have an affiliation with a State. The evolution of that corpus has 
answered to the normative and meta-legal demand and need to protect human dignity from all threats, but naturally 
must continue to progress in the possibilities of offering that protection. 
165 See Pierre Calame, op. cit., pp. 3-4; Fred Halliday, op. cit., pp. 27-37; Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor 
Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., pp. 985-1004. 
166 Cf. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens”, Yale Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 34, 2009, pp. 361-368. 
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entities that exercise State or formal authority over individuals, who are vulnerable to the actions 
of other entities as well.167 
These considerations stress that only an integral approach to the subjective elements of 
the protection of individuals can bring about a full protection of the inner worth of individuals. This 
idea is echoed in the opinion of activists that call for integrating multiple dimensions in the 
protection of human rights (social, legal, etc.), taking into account the protection demanded and 
made possible by norms belonging to different formal branches that yet form part of the same 
substantive corpus juris.168 This holistic approach must take into account all relevant norms and 
dimensions of protection and human needs, and also all actors and levels of governance. This is 
the only way to effectively and fully protect human dignity from all threats, which often also 
requires the legitimate contribution of all actors that can help to achieve that goal, as explained in 
section 1.4. As a consequence, one must integrate all relevant provisions, be they against piracy 
in the law of the sea, against transnational organized crime or terrorism, on consular provisions 
dealing with human rights, or others that protect human dignity directly or indirectly. 
Apart from being their legal foundation, several conceptions consider that human dignity 
justifies human rights, which derive from it. Among these, one can find philosophical, legal, 
political and religious accounts. Those theories may occasionally differ in regard to what they 
conceive as human dignity, but in all those approaches there are elements that permit to consider 
that human dignity must be protected from non-state threats.  
Studying those conceptions is important because the absence of a general legal 
definition of dignity, notwithstanding its clear legal relevance, makes their analysis pertinent, 
especially due to the fact that philosophical and extra-legal theories have often had an impact on 
                                                     
167 Cf. Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, “Enhancing Compliance with International Law by Armed Non-State 
Actors”, Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL), Vol. 3, 2011, at 187. In the Issa and others v. Turkey case 
the European Court of Human Rights handled a concept of factual power (in that case, manifested as effective 
control due to a general control of a territory or the actions of agents) over someone as a criterion that triggers the 
applicability of human rights obligations in relation to the entity exercising that power, criterion that is also present in 
advisory opinion of the ICJ concerning the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory or in the Colombian regulation 
of the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis non-state entities, as opposed to the concept of formal authority, that 
can also generate human rights responsibilities, as discussed in the UNMIK case. On these issues, see: European 
Court of Human Rights, Case of Issa and others v. Turkey, Judgment, 16 November 2004, paras. 69-71, 76, 81; 
International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, op. cit., paras. 109-113; article 42.9 of Decree 2591 of 1991 of Colombia; Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 2006, para. 4 (the “UNMIK case”). 
168 Cf. the notion of the interface or intersectional approach to human rights expounded in: “Intersectionality and the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women”, 2010, available at: 
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/09/intersectionality-and-un-special.html (last checked: 30/11/2011); and the idea 
of the need to focus on material rights rather than on formal distinctions when it comes to analyzing human rights 
presented in: Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of 
the United Nations, op. cit., at 65-66. 
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legal practice, as explained by Mario G. Losano and Jack Donnelly, and that practitioners work 
based on theoretical conceptions even if they are not aware of this, as Jans Klabbers argues.169  
Certainly, considering the multiplicity of legal processes (law creation, adjudication, etc.), 
law is not fully isolated separated from other disciplines and realities. For instance, religious 
considerations have had an impact on rules of interpretation, as the teleological and systemic 
ones, which were methods employed to study theology and transplanted to legal analysis by 
Roman law scholars.170 In turn, legal institutions as human rights respond to philosophical and 
political demands, having sometimes divergent interpretations because of indeterminate or broad 
contents due to compromises in legal negotiations; and policy choices may be considered an 
integral part of the practice of some legal processes, including but not limited to lawmaking and 
adjudication.171 Therefore, law is not hermetic,172 and the analysis of a legally relevant concept as 
human dignity must therefore pay attention to sources that inspired its legal recognition, 
especially because of the vague content of some norms about it. Furthermore, such an analysis 
may shed some light on issues concerning non-state responsibilities. 
Additionally, it is also convenient to examine alternative proposals that have been put 
forward as allegedly better bases of human rights instead of dignity, to determine if they would 
better demand a complete protection of human rights from all violations, State or not. As will be 
explained below, human dignity is a better and more proper foundation, which conceives human 
rights as comprehensive guarantees of all individuals, because alternative suggestions fall short 
in some respects and may leave some victims unprotected. 
 
                                                     
169 The influence of philosophy and other fields of study in law and legal analysis has been examined, among others, 
in: Mario G. Losano, “Towards a Common Good: A Path to Utopia?: From Philosophy through Legislation to the 
Dignified Life”, European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 6, 2004, p. 329-330; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced 
Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., 
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Jan Klabbers, International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2013, locations 541-550 of 11783 (Kindle version). 
170 See, for instance, Yezid Carrillo de la Rosa, “Derecho y argumentación: el modelo de adjudicación del derecho en 
la antigüedad y el medievo”, Revista de Derecho (Universidad del Norte), No. 28, 2007, pp. 78-82; Sara Bialostosky, 
“Historia o dogmática: dicotomía que ha resuelto la romanística contemporánea”, Revista de la Facultad de Derecho 
de México, 2005, pp. 14-16; Pope Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth: Holy Week: From the Entrance into Jerusalem to 
the Resurrection, Ignatius Press, 2011 (EPUB version), at 212. 
171 Cf. Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, “The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public 
Order”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, 1959, at 9-10; Myres S. McDougal, “Some basic 
theoretical concepts about international law: a policy-oriented framework of inquiry”, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. IV, 1960, at 341-342, 345-350. 
172 Some criticisms of the “hyper-purification” of law, that in my opinion highlight the risks of hermetic legal 
conceptions, are offered in: Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global?, op. cit., at 22-23. Additionally, cf. Andrea 
Bianchi, “Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 19, 2008, at 495, 
on the non-isolated character of law concerning social ordering and protected values. 
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1.1. The legal implications of the protection of human dignity concerning protection from 
non-state threats and conflicts of rights 
In spite of its being mentioned in many international instruments, there is no clear general 
legal definition of human dignity or of its elements, save for its occasional identification with the 
inherent worth of human beings, as in doctrine and the Preambles to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations or in the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993.173  
According to Oliver Sensen, this normative ambiguity of the concept can be understood 
as some sort of compromise that was necessary for adopting international treaties on human 
rights.174 If this were true, it would be necessary to combine resorting to extra-legal explanations 
of what human dignity is to understand this concept with the exploration of legal developments 
and frameworks on its protection in order to determine which its legal implications are. 
An alternative explanation could suggest that the absence of a clear general legal 
definition of human dignity does not have negative connotations and is not derived from the 
impossibility of agreement. In fact, this absence could be some form of agreement. As Roberto 
Andorno and Sensen explain, there seems to be an intuitive understanding of what human dignity 
is, and it would be difficult to provide a single definition capable of satisfying all the parties to a 
given treaty that refers to it.175 Taking this into account, an indeterminate definition may be useful 
given its adaptability to different circumstances and the necessity of avoiding a narrow stagnant 
legal definition in the face of emerging challenges, while endorsing a minimum shared notion. 
Ascertaining whether the history of the national and international recognition and 
protection of human rights has always been based on human dignity is a difficult question, 
especially because some authors consider that it was only after World War II that they emerged 
                                                     
173 Cf. Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 849. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mentions that 
“the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person”, and the second paragraph of the Preamble to the Charter of the United 
Nations has a similar expression. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on 
Human Rights of 1993, in turn, apart from making a reference to that idea as expressed in the Charter, mentions in 
its Preamble that “all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person”, while paragraph 
I.18 mentions some acts that are contrary to the “dignity and worth of the human person”, that therefore “must be 
eliminated.” 
174 Cf. Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where he considers that “[i]n documents like [the UN documents] key terms [such as 
human dignity] are deliberately kept vague, since one can only secure an agreement among so many different 
parties at the price of a certain ambiguity.” 
175 Cf. Ibid., where it is mentioned that “[t]he way one can detect such a value [i.e. human dignity] is often said to be 
by intuition as direct recognition […] [although] [n]ot every proponent of the contemporary paradigm of dignity holds 
an intuitionist epistemology”; and Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 6, where it is considered that regarding the notion of 
human dignity, as handled in some human rights instruments, “the term is not explicitly defined by international law. 
Rather, its meaning is “left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large measure by cultural factors”. 
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in positive law, or because philosophers as Oliver Sensen hold that only a contemporary 
conception of dignity, unknown before, became the foundation of human rights.176  
Assertions concerning the date of the emergence of human rights may be contested, 
especially because prior to international legal endeavors international legal doctrine, political 
movements and constitutional norms had an idea of human rights, even if not formally called as 
such; and as explained in the previous section, the formal denomination of rights is not a decisive 
factor when examining if they are human rights, just as calling an instrument a treaty or not does 
not determine if it is one. Additionally, it is important to consider that some conceptions held that 
law must respect natural inherent and inalienable rights of human beings, and that there were 
attempts to codify such rights, as happened in the revolutionary American and French 
declarations (the latter being immersed in a context where revolutionaries engaged in conduct 
that clearly violate today’s recognized human rights).177  
Additionally, some authors have evaluated positive law in light of the respect of dignity. 
Therefore, traditions on which drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal adopted in London on 8 August of 1945 to deal with 
war atrocities drew, at least partly, must not be ignored. 
It is pertinent to mention that David Boucher has suggested that even though they are 
related in some respects, the notions of human rights and natural rights are distinct and 
independent –although notions of inalienable human or natural rights existed in “classical and 
medieval concepts of law”-,178 basically because to him each of those notions has a different 
formal normative foundational basis: while natural rights would be founded on a conception of the 
rights of human beings under a religious and/or rational conception, human rights would be 
special rights granted by positive law, which is a relatively recent phenomenon.179  
                                                     
176 Cf. Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where he argues that “In the contemporary pattern of thought human rights are based 
on an inherent (value) property of human beings. One can claim one’s rights in pointing to one’s absolute value. The 
traditional paradigm, in contrast, does not rest rights on a non-relational value property of human beings.” According 
to him, unlike the contemporary conception of dignity, for the traditional one “dignity is not the basis of rights”. 
177 In this regard, the novel “A Tale of Two Cities” by Charles Dickens is worth reading. Furthermore, Ruth Scurr 
considered that “[i]n Lyon and elsewhere there were plenty of terrible examples: horrific mass executions…and group 
drownings in the Vendeé—crimes  against humanity that the revolutionaries would today be called to answer for 
under the European human rights legislation they themselves pioneered. Robespierre had argued consistently since 
1789 that in a time of revolution the end justified the means, and even his advocates have to acknowledge that he 
did not flinch from the bloodiest implications of his position”, as commented in: Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: 
God, State, and Self, Basic Books, 2008, at 299. 
178 Cf. David Boucher, The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Human Rights 
in Transition, Oxford University Press, 2009, where the author considers that “natural law, natural rights (both 
prescriptive and descriptive), and human rights are conceptually distinct, but are related to each other, not as 
answers to the same question, but as part of the same historical process by which one turns into the other.” 
Additionally, cf. Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., at 46. 
179 Ibid., where it is mentioned that “[n]atural rights […] retained the foundation of a religious world view to sustain its 
moral claims […] Reason, for the most part, could not in itself create obligation. Reason is what enables us to come 
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Nonetheless, I do not find this supposed separation of the aforementioned rights totally 
convincing. First of all, because as the aforementioned author admits, human and natural rights 
are related in some regards, and I consider that one of those links is their sharing the same 
substantive foundation: both categories are based on the necessity of defending the inherent 
unconditional dignity of human beings. Therefore, would human rights not be an ulterior 
manifestation of the quest for the practical applicability of the idea of natural rights, at least for 
some drafters and practitioners?  
Admittedly, international norms are sometimes adopted with compromises. However, it is 
worth wondering if the very mention of the word recognition in human rights vocabulary and 
instruments points to the belief of some drafters that international law merely translates into 
positive law what human beings were entitled to prior to that recognition. Moreover, admitting for 
the sake of discussion that some lawmakers did not believe in a natural foundation of human 
rights, other participants in the drafting processes of human rights instruments may have held 
such a belief, and they could certainly have had an influence on elements of the normative 
framework. Certainly, in certain official international human rights discussions some participants 
have held that certain traditions and beliefs are translated into regulation proposals,180 while 
renowned authors indicate that there is an important natural law tradition and component in the 
history of international law and human rights law.181 
The idea that human rights have nothing to do with natural rights is further challenged on 
two bases: first of all, authors as Amartya Sen and John H. Knox have considered that the human 
                                                                                                                                                            
to know what our rights and duties are, while God provided the foundation for the enjoyment of the rights, and for 
fulfilling our obligations. The British Idealists are important […] because they play an important role in the transition 
from natural rights to human rights. They jettison the rationalist element in natural rights, but retained the religious. 
Ideas of human rights, on the whole, abjure the divine and present us with foundationless universal principles that 
constrain the actions of individuals domestically and internationally, and within and between states.” In spite of the 
claims of the author, I disagree with some of his ideas, since some religious conceptions can and in fact do uphold 
the idea of human rights, which are compatible with their beliefs and yet applicable to all human beings, even those 
who do not share their faith. For example, see Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in Terris, op. cit., paras. 3, 9-10, 
30, 60-61, 63, 75, 143. The Israeli human rights organization Additionally, B’Tselem, for example, explains how its 
name has a meaning that is related to its mission in the following way: “B'Tselem in Hebrew literally means ‘in the 
image of,’ and is also used as a synonym for human dignity. The word is taken from Genesis 1:27 ‘And God created 
humans in his image. In the image of God did He create him." It is in this spirit that the first article of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states that "All human beings are born equal in dignity and rights.’ As an Israeli human 
rights organization, B'Tselem acts primarily to change Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories and ensure that its 
government, which rules the Occupied Territories, protects the human rights of residents there and complies with its 
obligations under international law.” Excerpted from: http://www.btselem.org/about_btselem (last checked: 
30/11/2011). 
180 Cf., for example, Report of Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martínez, Human rights and human responsibilities, 
E/CN.4/2002/107, 19 March 2002, para. 69. 
181 Cf., among others, Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, 28 August 2002, paras. 
20, 46; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, 17 September 2003, paras. 7-12, 26, 
41, 48-49, 58; Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., at 46. 
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rights discourse may have legal and extra-legal dimensions (which can be ethical and moral, for 
instance, and even meta-legal considerations), and have warned against over-legalized or 
exclusively-legal approaches to the promotion of human rights.182 Non-legal dimensions of human 
rights have also been taken into account by international authorities and authors.183  
It is important to clarify, however, than even though there may be claims in human rights 
terms that appeal to ethical and moral considerations, or that appeal for recognizing them in 
positive human rights law, there are cases in which human rights claims may be regarded as 
unethical or immoral by some, as happens when they consider that those rights permit or entitle 
to claim things deemed as wrong by others, with the vague content of rights and margins of 
appreciation complicating the scene. Moreover, not all claims are supported by human rights law. 
Concerning their extra-legal dimensions, human rights advocacy in the human rights is 
relevant both regarding implementation and drafting procedures,184 demonstrating that positive 
law does not subsume the whole human rights lexicon and discourse, which often calls for 
including contested political or ethical demands in legal institutions and doctrines. Indeed, human 
rights law lato sensu and humanitarian guarantees (as some international criminal law norms) 
became part of positive international law as a response to demands and appeals after atrocities 
as those of World War II, due to the idea that some core rights should be respected everywhere, 
with States not being allowed to refuse to respect and protect them.185 
Altogether, the fact that human rights (under international law) and some natural rights 
theories and accounts are based and founded on the concept of human dignity makes it 
convenient to study this notion.  
This foundational character stems from the understanding that some rights are 
inextricable from the human dignity they protect. Some authors consider that such dignity is be 
                                                     
182 See John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 43-44; Amartya Sen, op. cit., pp. 326-328, 345. 
183 Such as some experts of the United Nations extra-conventional human rights framework, that discussing draft 
human rights norms addressed to corporations [the draft Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with regard to human rights], considered that even though those norms were not 
binding or did not enjoy a coercive character, “the value of the Norms was not in their binding effect but rather in their 
ethical and moral value, which should be reinforced by monitoring mechanisms”, as shown in: Commission on 
Human Rights, Report of the sessional working group on the working methods and activities of transnational 
corporations on its fifth session, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/13, 6 August 2003, para. 13. 
184 Cf. George J. Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, and Peter Juviler, “Rethinking the Human Rights 
Universe”, in George Andreopoulos et al., Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe, Kumarian Press, Inc., 
2006, pp. 335-337; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 185-
186; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 30. 
185 Cf. Felipe Gómez Isa, “International Protection of Human Rights”, in Felipe Gómez Isa and Koen de Feyter (eds.), 
International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges, University of Deusto, 2006, 19-20, 24-26; 
Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 254-257; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., p. 38 
(“the horrors of the Second World War provided the impetus for the modern human rights movement […] they had 
been stirred profoundly by those outrages upon human dignity perpetrated by the Nazis”); Eric A. Posner, op. cit., at 
182. 
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based on the –intuitive or not- understanding that there is an inherent and unconditional human 
worth that is to be respected. This philosophical conception of dignity is described as the 
contemporary conception by Oliver Sensen,186 and the aspect of the non-conditionality of human 
dignity is regarded by many authors as essential,187 position with which I agree. 
Whereas some religious and non-religious conceptions of inherent rights attach 
importance to a notion of human dignity, the expression is not found in all the historical texts that 
exerted an influence on the gradual emergence of the legal recognition of human rights. 
Notwithstanding, some of them have upheld ideas of an inherent human worth, which is a central 
element of the concept of dignity,188 and thus may have exerted an influence on its current 
understanding. It is thus useful to reexamined aspects of them when assessing if the protection 
law currently offers is sufficient and adequate. For example, John Locke dealt with notions that 
would often qualify as dealing with human rights from a current perspective, and it is relevant that 
he refers to how rights can be violated by individuals,189 which are entities different from States. 
Such insights therefore help examining how human dignity must be protected. 
                                                     
186 Cf. Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where it is argued that “The [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights], though, does 
not give an account of what this ‘inherent’ (value) property is, nor of how one is able to know or ‘recognize’ it […] 
Although in [some United Nations human rights] documents ‘dignity’ is neither defined any further nor justified, the 
UN documents can serve as an illustration of the contemporary paradigm of human dignity and its prominence.” 
Additionally, see the discussion in: James Griffin, “Human Rights and the Autonomy of International Law”, in 
Samantha Besson and John Tasiou, The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp- 341-
350; Emily Kidd White, op. cit., at 2. 
187 Cf. Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where he mentions that, regarding the “ontological status” of the value of human dignity 
as understood contemporarily (i.e. as an inherent value of human beings), “[some] scholars […] consider the value to 
be a non-relational property, that is, a property that does not change according to the different circumstances or 
relations in which a human being finds himself. The distinguishing feature of this property is a moral importance: 
Each human being has an ‘intrinsic and objective preciousness’. Dignity is said to be a value that is 
‘incommensurably higher’ than other values”. Likewise, Jack Donnelly considered that human rights (which are one 
“path to the realization of human dignity”) “are not grants, either conditional or unconditional, of state or society, but 
are inherent to man”, as found in Jack Donnelly, op. cit., at 310. Roberto Andorno, in turn, argued that “dignity is not 
an accidental quality of some human beings, or a value derived from some specific personal features such as the 
fact of being young or old, man or woman, healthy or sick, but rather an unconditional worth that everyone has simply 
by virtue of being human. The same idea can be expressed by saying that all human beings are ‘persons.’” Cf. 
Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 6. 
188 Cf. Oscar Schachter, op. cit., pp. 849-850; Jack Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 304, 310; Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where it is 
considered that the “members to the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights], present dignity as an ‘inherent’ fact 
or property that can be ‘recognized’. As I indicated above, this way of conceiving of dignity suggests that human 
beings are equipped with dignity as a distinct (value19) property, in virtue of which one is justified in demanding one’s 
rights from others.” Roberto Andorno posited that “The term “inherent” means “involved in the constitution or 
essential character of something,” “intrinsic,” “permanent or characteristic attribute of something.” The idea 
expressed in this term, when it is accompanied by the adjective “human,” is that dignity is inseparable from the 
human condition. Thus, dignity is not an accidental quality of some human beings, or a value derived from some 
specific personal features such as the fact of being young or old, man or woman, healthy or sick, but rather an 
unconditional worth that everyone has simply by virtue of being human.” See: Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 6, 8. 
189 Cf. Jack Donnelly, op. cit., at 305; John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, where the author argued that 
“Should a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to 
him, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by his sword, has an unjust conqueror, who forces me into 
submission. The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain.” 
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Concerning these ideas, Professor Oscar Schachter posits that some theories about 
human dignity are too embedded in a given society at a given time and are the result of which 
rights are considered essential to human beings in them.190 Nevertheless, it is possible to ask the 
opposite, that is to say whether human dignity is an intuitive conception related to essential 
human needs and qualities which leads to the conviction that some rights must be protected to 
satisfy and respect them. In other words, it may be that our understanding of the unchanging 
human dignity evolves alongside new challenges, developments and insights, explaining the 
expansion, modification and increase of rights.  
This idea supported is by the fact that rights can be exercised and must be protected in 
relation to new realities and developments, with previously recognized rights remaining the same 
but being applicable in new ways and other rights emerging to protect dignity from new 
challenges not properly tackled. The first idea is exemplified by the protection of the exercise of 
the freedoms of opinion and expression in relation to new technologies, as explained by the 
Human Rights Committee.191 Concerning the need to update and improve the protection of 
human dignity in the face of existing challenges, the realities and risks of non-state abuses 
demand effective legal mechanisms that protect human dignity from non-state threats. 
On the other hand, while word dignity, which comes from the Latin term dignitas,192 was 
not invented by Kant, his explanations are still influential to this day and must therefore be 
examined. According to the German philosopher, human beings have an inner worth and cannot 
be treated as means but as an end in themselves.193 In his own words: 
“Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has a market value; 
whatever, without presupposing a want, corresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the 
mere purposeless play of our faculties, has a fancy value; but that which constitutes the condition 
under which alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i.e., value, 
but an intrinsic worth, that is, dignity”194 (emphasis added). 
The idea of worth has been quite influential, and authors as Oscar Schachter put forward 
that human dignity is a notion that is almost or actually interchangeable with that of the inner 
                                                     
190 Cf. Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 853, where it is posited put forward that “[a]s history, it would probably be more 
correct to say […] that the idea of dignity reflects sociohistorical conceptions of basic rights and freedoms, not that it 
generated them. However, as a philosophical statement, the proposition that rights derive from the inherent dignity of 
the person is significant. It clearly implies that rights are not derived from the state or any other external authority.” 
191 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, 
CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, para. 15. 
192 Cf. Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where it is mentioned how “The Roman dignitas is a complicated notion that has further 
connotations than rank, e.g. excellence, worthiness, and esteem.”  
193 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 535-536; Roberto Andorno, op. 
cit., at 7, where it is mentioned that Kant’s “second formulation of the categorical imperative is very helpful for 
understanding the practical consequences of the notion of dignity. According to this principle, we should always treat 
people as an end in themselves […] The Kantian requirement of non-instrumentalization (or non-commodification) of 
persons is extremely illuminating”. 
194 See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., at 51. 
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worth that every individual has, and that its recognition by others is deserved by all human 
beings, who should be entitled to demand respect from all that threaten to disrespect it, 
something that legal systems must recognize (for them to be fair and legitimate, in my opinion).195  
In my opinion, the idea of dignity discussed by Kant about the prohibition of treating 
human beings as means for attaining goals or satisfying interests must not to be understood as 
the definition of dignity, but as one of the implications of the intrinsic value/worth of every human 
being, that is not dependent on any condition whatsoever. This unconditionality is general and 
thus makes dignity not dependent on legal recognition, as the right to the recognition of the legal 
personality of every human being confirms.196  
In regard to the inherent value of every individual, according to the Kantian theory it is 
possible to state that everyone ought to acknowledge and respect the dignity of human beings, 
and that sometimes an individual should strive to ensure that the dignity of others is respected, 
just as he or she would be morally bound to respect and ensure the defense of his or her own 
dignity. Some natural rights theories endorse similar ideas.197 
Acknowledging the importance of the contributions of Kant and other pre-contemporary 
authors, it has been debated if their theories truly reflect the current understanding of what human 
rights are. There are opposed views on the subject: according to one, Kantian and other ideas 
are pillars and antecedents of a theory of human rights, and an opposite one held by Oliver 
Sensen considers that those ideas are circumscribed in the “traditional” notion of dignity, which 
differs from the contemporary one, being the latter the only one that, for the author, is taken into 
account by human rights. For him, only this last conception is compatible with a human rights 
theory, and its shorter history does not make it any less important.198 
Sensen considers that prior to the internationalization of human rights, i.e. before their 
emergence in the international legal system, the conception of human dignity had the following 
features: it was based on the idea of the distinctiveness of human beings in regard to other 
                                                     
195 See Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 849; and the notions of legitimacy and justice, related to fairness. 
196 Cf. Rita Joseph, Human Rights and the Unborn Child, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 66-68; John Finnis, 
op. cit., pp. 7-10; articles XVII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 3 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 16 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; Daniel O’Donnell, op. cit., pp. 546-549; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Judgment, 8 September 2005, paras. 176-180. 
197 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., p. 547; Immanuel Kant, 
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., at 46. Additionally, see David Boucher, op. cit., where 
the author mentions how, for Paine, “[a]ny declaration of rights, such as that of the National Assembly of France is 
also a declaration of duties. Whatever right as a man I may have, the same right is that of every other. In addition to 
possessing such rights it is also my duty to guarantee them”. 
198 Ibid., where it is said that “The character and importance of [the] contemporary conception of dignity can be 
illustrated by the usage of ‘dignity’ in United Nations documents […]If I am right that the contemporary pattern does 
not have the support of a long history, it does not undermine the current view. To argue this would be to commit a 
genetic fallacy. Just because an idea is relatively new,70 does not mean it is not justified.” 
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species; and it encouraged individuals to fulfill their potentials by means of striving to reflect 
superior qualities of humankind, having thus a “perfectionist” character. According to that author, 
traditional conceptions of dignity thus emphasized a duty of human beings to strive for human 
perfection, and as a result he alleges that traditional theories obligations emphasized obligations 
rather than rights, especially since the duty of respecting other human beings flowed from what 
God or nature exacted from individuals, being offenses against fellow human beings contrary to 
those tenets.199 According to Sensen, traditional theories of human dignity are two-layered: 
human beings have a special status in the world, but they must realize the potential of the 
attributes given to them by such status.200 
Oliver Sensen goes on to say that the logic of contemporary understandings of human 
rights is the opposite one, because rights are prior to duties; and holds that international human 
rights instruments reflect the contemporary philosophy of human dignity and are often based on 
an ‘intuitive’ idea of what human dignity is. Nonetheless, in my opinion, if one considers dignity as 
prior to rights, one can conclude that the demands to respect the dignity of others flow from the 
entitlements that those others have due to their having dignity, which is the central concept from 
with both rights and obligations flow.  
Moreover, a different point of view may seek to infer what human dignity is from the 
features of the rights founded upon it, but this may be inconsistent with the idea that some rights 
formally called human rights may fail to be founded upon dignity.  
Altogether, human dignity as understood by different conceptions leads to ideas of an 
intrinsic, absolute and inherent value of all human beings, that is not dependent on external 
factors, and that generates entitlements and/or obligations and responsibilities of entities in order 
to protect this inherent and inalienable worth. While those elements are clearly recognized in 
current conceptions of dignity, the underlying ideas can also be inferred from previous accounts 
or considered as implied in some of them, and those elements of non-conditionality and inherent 
nature are relevant to examine the protection of dignity from non-state threats. 
As the intuitiveness of the contemporary theory suggests, lack of verbal formalization of a 
concept does not amount to its absence, and so some secular and religious developments that 
are previous to contemporary frameworks may have paved the way for current guarantees and 
can shed light on pending developments. 
                                                     
199 See Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where it is argued that “[i]n the traditional conception of dignity, the prime emphasis is 
on duties, not on rights.” 
200 Ibid., where this feature is described as “perfectionism”, explained in the sense that authors that upheld the 
traditional conception of dignity “emphasize that the agent should realize his or her own initial dignity. In talking about 
human dignity, they highlight a privilege or capacity human beings have been given, and their emphasis is on how 
one should use that capacity.” 
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Furthermore, it may be difficult to categorically separate two generations of theories 
about dignity, and elements ascribed from each can complement each those from the other (not 
necessarily in legal terms). In this sense, it can be said that there are two aspects of dignity: 
according to one, every human being must be respected and protected; and another according to 
which individuals ought to develop their faculties in ethical terms, including those faculties related 
to respecting and protecting others, which is an idea that can have legal manifestations. Both 
theories recognize the special value of human beings. Because of this, one can conclude that 
such value demands that human beings are respected simply because of who they are. That both 
rights and responsibilities must be devised based on such recognition is consistent with the idea 
that both “empowerments” and “constraints” derive from the necessity of protecting human dignity 
and can complement each other in human rights law.201 
This reflection is supported by some considerations. First of all, previous theories and 
normative developments tend to show an understanding that all human beings have inherent 
rights, as confirmed by norms that instead of referring to the “creation” of rights talk of their 
“recognition.” Secondly, while Sensen explains his theory commenting how Pope Leo I exhorted 
Christians to lead a laudable life because of their dignity, considering that this reflects a pre-
contemporary notion of human dignity, his text does not mention that later Pope John XXIII talked 
about inherent human rights derived from human nature, shared by all individuals.202 While it may 
be considered that this is a case of the evolution of notions, it could be argued that the different 
discourses of both Popes address different concerns that draw on common principles, or that the 
acknowledgment of both conceptions, which thus would not be antagonizing, reveal a more 
complete understanding of those principles, as happens with other issues.203 Similarly, the 
contemporary, the humanist and the classical understandings of human dignity described by 
                                                     
201 See Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 9; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 
541. 
202 Cf. Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in Terris, op. cit., paras. 9-27, 30, 61, 63, 75, 143; Oliver Sensen, op. cit. 
203 Cf. the doctrine of development of certain doctrines, which does not equate with their evolution because they do 
not change but are better understood later, as described in: Acta Apostolicae Sedis 65, 1973, pp. 402-403, where it 
is said that “Transmissio Revelationis divinae ab Ecclesia in difficultates varii generis incurrit. Hae autem oriuntur ex 
eo, quod arcana Dei mysteria ((suapte natura intellectum humanum sic excedunt, ut etiam revelatione tradita et fide 
suscepta, ipsius tamen fidei velamine contecta et quasi caligine obvoluta maneant)); atque etiam ex historica 
exprimendae Revelationis condicione. Ad hanc historicam condicionem quod attinet, initio observandum est sensum, 
quem enuntiationes fidei continent, partim pendere e linguae adhibitae vi significandi certo quodam tempore 
certisque rerum adiunctis. Praeterea, nonnumquam contingit, ut veritas aliqua dogmatica primum modo incompleto, 
non falso tamen, exprimatur, acpostea, in ampliore contextu fidei aut humanarum cognitionum considerata, plenius 
et perfectius significetur. Deinde, Ecclesia novis suis enuntiationibus, ea quae in Sacra Scriptura aut in praeteritis 
Traditionis expressionibus iam aliquomodo continentur, confirmare aut dilucidare intendit, sed simul de certis 
quaestionibus solvendis erroribusve removendis cogitare solet; quarum omnium rerum ratio habenda est, ut illae 
enuntiationes recte explanentur. Denique, etsi veritates, quas Ecclesia suis formulis dogmaticis reapse docere 
intendit, a mutabilibus alicuius temporis cogitationibus distinguuntur et sine iis exprimi possunt, nihilominus interdum 
fieri potest, ut illae veritates etiam a Sacro Magisterio proferantur verbis, quae huiusmodi cogitationum vestigia 
secumferant.” 
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Sensen may also accommodate both dimensions as complementary. In fact, authors as Donnelly 
have considered that some western conceptions paved the way for and were able to 
accommodate notions of human rights.204 On the other hand, the possible existence of two 
dimensions of dignity, namely one allusive to inherent entitlements and a moral dimension linked 
to axiological considerations, as examined by Roberto Andorno and Alan Gewirth,205 does not 
presuppose a complete separation of conceptions of human dignity. 
In any case, in order to avoid abuses and the exclusion of some individuals from human 
rights protection, it must be clarified that philosophical or theoretical conceptions that refer to the 
dignity of human beings as being based on their reasoning or autonomous capacity of designing 
“universal laws”206 are to be understood as restricted to the perfectionist dimension of dignity. 
This must be done to prevent anyone from conditioning the recognition and respect of someone’s 
dignity, for instance, on his mental faculties, because that would be contrary to the unconditional 
character of dignity. This explains why I consider dignity to be a better basic foundation of human 
rights than autonomy, which could be interpreted by some as justifying exclusions of some 
human beings from the protection of human rights.207 Exclusions of that or any other sort are 
                                                     
204 Cf. Jack Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 303, 305. 
205 See Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 8. 
206 See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., pp. 51-52, where it is held that 
“What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good disposition, in making such lofty claims? It is nothing less 
than the privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in the giving of universal laws, by which it qualifies 
him to be a member of a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege to which he was already destined by his own nature 
as being an end in himself and, on that account, legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as regards all laws of 
physical nature, and obeying those only which he himself gives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of 
universal law, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has any worth except what the law assigns 
it. Now the legislation itself which assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess dignity, that is an 
unconditional incomparable worth; and the word respect alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which 
a rational being must have for it. Autonomy then is the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature.” 
207 Concerning this, it has been mentioned that “[w]hile [f]or Kant, the goods of freedom and moral action spring from 
the faculty of reason[,] Certain scholars have criticized this approach […] believing that individuals lacking, or seen to 
be lacking, certain rational capacities would be deemed less worthy of respect or protection”. Excerpted from: Emily 
Kidd White, “Emotions and the Judicial Use of the Concept of Human Dignity”, J.S.D. Proposal of Study, p. 7, 
available at: 
http://law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__llm_jsd__graduate_admissions/documents/docume
nts/ecm_pro_069003.pdf (last checked: 21/11/2011). Nonetheless, the potentiality of every human being can be 
invoked by those who defend their protection in regard to limitative arguments. See, for instance, John Finnis, op. 
cit., at 10, where he says that “a being of a rational nature can, with sufficient health and maturity, make choices 
(because understanding different kinds of benefit and different ways to one and the same benefit), and by making 
choices one shapes one’s character/identity […] A day-old baby has—radically, albeit not yet in actually usable 
form—this capacity to choose (with such self-determining, intransitive effects). A mouse, whether day-old or mature, 
lacks that radical capacity, though even as a day-old embryo it has the radical capacity, unlike an acorn or an oak 
seedling, to run.” I prefer not to rely on potentiality exclusively, because even persons who cannot recover from 
conditions that impede certain actions deserve protection for the mere fact of their having a human nature, being they 
therefore endowed with inherent and non-conditional worth. On the other hand, Roberto Andorno has mentioned that 
“the recourse to human dignity reflects a real concern about the need to ensure respect for the inherent worth of 
every human being. This concern is far broader than simply ensuring “respect for autonomy” for the simple reason 
that it also includes the protection of those who are not yet, or are no more, morally autonomous (newborn infants, 
senile elderly, people with serious mental disorders, comatose patients, etc.). As noted above, this broad view of the 
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contrary both to the way in which law should serve human beings208 and to the non-conditionality 
of human dignity, according to which the mere existence of a human being endows him/her with a 
dignity that cannot be made dependent on any circumstance different from his/her being a 
member of the human race or on any contingent condition, as for instance the degree of 
development of his reasoning, consciousness or abilities,209 or his/her entering into relations with 
entities with a State nature. Moreover, I consider that the pro homine principle demands 
protecting everyone who is human even when in doubt. 210 In relation to this, inherent dignity 
refers to the respect and protection that are owed to a human being recognized as such out of the 
simple fact of her existence, even if her personality is not recognized by law as it should, which 
would be an autonomous violation of her human dignity and rights.211  
Therefore, whatever discourse one prefers, there are some general 
largelyuncontroversial features of human dignity with important legal consequences: its inherent 
character and non-conditionality, and its enjoyment by every member of the human species for 
the mere fact of that belonging, recognized by others or not.  
Another feature of human dignity is its inalienability, based on its inseparability from 
human beings. It delegitimizes attempts to ignore it, either by potential agents of violation or even 
by the same victim.212 This delegitimation of ignoring human rights is found in primary and 
                                                                                                                                                            
concept of human dignity is explicitly enshrined in international human rights law, which assumes that the worth of 
human beings does not rest on their actual intellectual or moral abilities, but merely on their human condition.” Text 
found in: Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 7. 
208 See John Finnis, op. cit., pp. 7-9. 
209 Ibid. 
210In cases of doubt such as that of when life begins, rather than simplistic theories put forward by Courts such as the 
European Court of Human Rights, that ultimately endorse legal systems’ conditioning of when to recognize 
personality, ignoring that it is a right of every human being to have it recognized, it should be thought that in cases of 
doubt, pro homine interpretations are to be applied (the pro homine principle, thus, not only serves to choose the 
most favorable norm, but also the interpretation most favorable to the protection of human dignity). Thus, if someone 
is not sure when life begins, is it not better to not risk killing a human being than risking it? In my opinion, the pro 
homine principle demands the election of both the most favorable norms and interpretations. 
211 Cf. Rita Joseph, op. cit., at 67, 171, 216. 
212 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., pp. 45-46, where Kant argued 
that “the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of 
any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now inquire whether this can be practically 
carried out. Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself 
whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to 
escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the 
end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his 
actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own 
person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, 
so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e. g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to 
exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.) Secondly, as 
regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying promise 
to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without the lat ter containing at the 
same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly 
assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation 
of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and 
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secondary international norms and rules, such as those according to which it is unlawful to justify 
violations of human rights, international humanitarian law or peremptory law based on the 
consent of the victim or on previous wrongful acts attributable to a victim.213  
Altogether, the non-conditional character of human dignity is one of its central elements 
and demands the effective protection of the inherent worth of all human beings.214 This may 
explain why authors as John Knox are wary of provisions that allegedly seek to protect individuals 
from non-state abuses but can actually be used to subject the enjoyment of human rights to some 
conditions as compliance with obligations towards collective actors.215 In turn, the draft Universal 
Declaration of Human Responsibilities drafted by the InterAction Council mentions in article 7 that 
“[e]very person is infinitely precious and must be protected unconditionally”, linking the 
recognition of the inner worth of all human beings with the unconditional character of its 
protection, that must be given against every conduct that can disregard human dignity, including 
that of individuals. Those two considerations suggest that such mandatory protection must be 
made in a way that is respectful of human and fundamental rights, being it thus required that it is 
proportionate and lawful. 
That being said, the ideas presented until now do not suggest that all rights based on and 
protecting human dignity are absolute, admitting no restrictions; and for sure they do not imply 
that violating the rights of others is permitted.216 Concerning this, the protection of dignity both 
empowers and restricts, demanding or permitting that some rights be restricted under certain 
circumstances to protect individuals, on the condition that those restrictions are necessary, 
                                                                                                                                                            
property of others.” Likewise, see Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 9, where the author wrote that “the notion that 
individual freedoms can be restricted to ensure respect for human dignity is neither new, nor specific to the 
instruments dealing with biomedicine. Rather on the contrary, such restrictions are quite common in legal documents, 
both at the domestic and international level. Just to give two examples: labour laws do not allow workers to waive 
their basic rights and benefits or to accept working conditions close to slavery; contract laws do not recognize the 
validity of contracts containing terms that are unfairly burdensome to one party and unfairly beneficial to the other.” 
Additionally, see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 540-541, 547. 
213 See articles 60.5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and international organizations or between international organizations of 1986, 50 of 
the articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts drafted by the International Law 
Commission, or 53 of the version of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations adopted by 
the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session in 2011. 
214 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, mentions that “[a]ll human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights” (emphasis added). 
215 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 1-3, 5, 7, 13-16, 18, 20, 34-37, 39-40, 47. 
216 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., p. 10; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Jack 
Donnelly, op. cit., at 306. That some rights such as the right to not be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatments are absolute is due to their peremptory character, and they are recognized as overriding all 
opposing claims. See Paolo G. Carozza, op. cit., at 79; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 
December 1998, paras. 153-157; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, 
Judgment, 21 November 2001, paras. 30-31, 60, 61, 65, where the Court recognized the peremptory character of the 
prohibition of torture but failed to implement all the consequences of that conclusion, as explained in the Joint 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch Joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and VajiĆ. 
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proportionate, and comply with some formal and substantive requirements. Additionally, legal 
institutions such as the prohibitions of the abus de droit and of manipulating human rights 
frameworks to “destroy” the rights of others, and as the principle of ex iniuria jus non oritur, can 
be resorted to as well in order to protect individuals.217 
The features of human dignity that have been explored are legally relevant because they 
refer to the foundation of human rights, and hence ought to guide the interpretation of human 
rights and humanitarian guarantees, because according to the teleological principle enshrined in 
Article 31 of the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties,218 an international norm has to 
be interpreted in its “context and in light of its object and purpose.” Apart from that teleological 
dimension, features of human dignity also relevant when interpreting those human rights and 
guarantees insofar as the value of human dignity is certainly the most relevant one when the 
value-based interpretation that international human rights jurisprudence calls for is conducted. 
In that regard, as mentioned by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its 
Judgment to the case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, human rights norms are to be 
interpreted in light of the values underlying the human rights framework. This idea was expressed 
in the following terms: 
“[I]nternational human rights law is composed of a series of rules (conventions, treaties and other 
international documents), and also of a series of values that these rules seek to develop. Therefore, 
the norms should also be interpreted based on a values-based model that the Inter-American System 
seeks to safeguard from the perspective of the “best approach” for the protection of the individual.”219 
As indicated above, another important aspect of human dignity worth studying is the idea 
that human dignity has positive and restrictive normative implications. In other words, both 
entitlements and limitations are derived from it and required for its effective protection. Briefly, it 
can be said that the demands derived from the respect owed to human dignity both “empower” 
individuals and “constrain” behaviors contrary to that respect.220 Both effects are essential in a 
human rights framework for it to be comprehensive: law ought to recognize rights to have 
                                                     
217 Cf. Regarding these principles, see Allan Gerson, “Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel’s presence in the 
West Bank”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 14, 1973, at 5; Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun to the 
Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 5 February 1970 in the Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited, at pp. 297, 325, paras. 7, 32. Additionally, see the quote of H. Lauterpacht found 
in Michael Byers, “Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age”, McGill Law Journal, Vol. 47, 2002, at 391, 
footnote 2; articles 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 17 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or 29.a of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 
218 Between States and involving international organizations, adopted in 1969 and 1986, respectively. 
219 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., 
para. 33. 
220 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp.540-541; Roberto Andorno, op. 
cit., pp. 8-9. 
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essential needs of protection and respect satisfied and basic freedoms guaranteed, while at the 
same time outlawing and responding to conduct contrary to those entitlements. Out of logic and 
consistency, every entity that can impedes the enjoyment of rights linked to human dignity should 
have responsibilities. These two legal implications of human dignity are thus complementary. 
In light of what has been explained in this section, one should ask what the legal 
implications of what human dignity demands are, for instance concerning protection from all 
abusers. If the qualities of dignity demand protection from non-state abuses and no 
implementation takes place or required legislation is not enacted, there is a wrongful act due to 
the breach of an obligation to adopt measures required to make human rights effective, and 
measures must be adopted de lege ferenda. In case it is possible to protect victims under existing 
law and all that is needed is a change in interpretation and action, that change must take place. 
Certainly, historically the notion of dignitas had an “aristocratic” connotation once,221 and 
some historical understandings of dignity have emphasized status or the fulfillment of duties,222 
but the notion of human dignity that human rights are based on highlights the worth of every 
single human being, no matter what, and therefore legal manifestations must recognize that 
worth.223 This is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word dignity. The Oxford English 
Dictionary, for instance, provides the following definition of dignity: “1. The quality of being worthy 
or honourable; worthiness, worth, nobleness, excellence.” 
An interesting question must be asked: does the concept of human dignity equate with 
human rights? The answer is a negative one because, as Jack Donnelly rightly mentions, they 
are different but related concepts.224 They have a link, which is the fact that human rights are 
entitlements to have human dignity respected and protected.225  
Unlike alternative mechanisms and traditions, the notion of dignity as a non-conditional 
inherent worth of all individuals is remarkable because it refrains from conditioning the enjoyment 
of human rights on things as the fulfillment of duties, the meeting certain requirements, having 
certain status, or the absence of goals that can override human entitlements. This is manifested 
in law partly as their nature as “trumps” over multiple claims (some human rights have this feature 
                                                     
221Cf. Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where it is considered that “The traditional paradigm of human dignity is related to an 
older aristocratic usage of ‘dignity’. The aristocratic usage is familiar from common parlance if, for instance, one 
speaks of a ‘dignitary’ or a ‘baroness who carries herself with dignity’. The aristocratic usage of ‘dignity’ can be seen 
in the ancient Roman dignitas26, according to which dignity is an elevated position or rank. In ancient Rome dignitas 
was a concept of political life: It expressed the elevated position of the ruling class.” 
222 Ibid.; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., p. 8. 
223 Professor Schachter believes that the notions of (intrinsic) dignity and (inner) worth employed in philosophical 
analyses and legal texts, as the Charter of the United Nations, are synonyms or exchangeableCf. Oscar Schachter, 
op. cit., p. 849. 
224 Cf. Jack Donnelly, op. cit., at 303. 
225 Ibid.; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 10. 
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in an absolute manner, which are those with a peremptory character).226 This feature of human 
rights is related to what Oliver Sensen and Seifert describe as the non-relational property of 
human dignity, according to which dignity is a value:  
“[T]hat does not change according to the different circumstances or relations in which a human being 
finds himself.”227 
As entitlements to the respect and protection of human dignity, the scope of human rights 
should not be limited to protection from official power, and so ought to protect from non-state 
abuses too, as the horizontal effects of those rights hint. Hence, they must transcend a mere 
State-individual relationship. Thus, while human rights are often defended against the State, the 
basis of those invocations is human dignity,228 which also demands protection in other events.  
Additionally, being the protection of human dignity the key element of human rights, 
relativist arguments that hold that some cultural or other practices contrary to them ought to be 
respected should not prevail,229 given the imperative that human rights are protected universally 
and comprehensively. This does not mean that the only way in which they can be protected 
depends on the creation of obligations: sometimes they are necessary, but not always. As 
discussed in Chapter 8, there are multiple mechanisms to promote and protect human rights and 
guarantees, even from non-state abuses, that differ from the creation of obligations.  
When they are necessary or, despite not being so, it is convenient to create them, the 
fulfillment of obligations must not be made a condition for the enjoyment of human and 
fundamental rights, because that would be detrimental to the whole edifice of human rights. As 
John Knox comments, this logic could be taken advantage of by States to abuse or unduly restrict 
many rights;230 and as mentioned by Donnelly human rights are based on the assumption that 
they are inherently enjoyed by human beings without prior requirements of status or action for 
that enjoyment being admissible (although restrictions can sometimes be permitted or even 
required).231  
Therefore, duties in a framework of human rights must respect fundamental rights and 
seek the recognition, respect and sometimes even the protection of human dignity; and 
restrictions of those rights that are necessary for protecting human rights are admissible when 
proportionate. For instance, the logic that someone (B) has to respect rights flowing from the 
                                                     
226 Cf. James Griffin, op. cit., at 341; Jack Donnelly, op. cit., p. 306. 
227 See Oliver Sensen, op. cit. 
228 See Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 851, where it is argued that “[t]here is also a "procedural" implication [of a 
concept of personality based on human dignity] in that it indicates that every individual and each significant group 
should be recognized as having the capacity to assert claims to protect their essential dignity.” 
229 See Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 12; Jack Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 303, 314-315. 
230 See John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, supra, pp. 2-3, 16, 34, 37. 
231 Cf. Jack Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 307-308. 
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dignity of an individual (A) is consistent with human rights, unlike the idea that A has and can 
enjoy rights if she fulfills duties that bind A towards a collective entity or enjoys a given status. 
Human beings automatically have human rights and dignity, which is a non-conditional 
consideration. These reasons explain why attempts to introduce a duty-based logic have been 
met with opposition both with philosophical and legal arguments.  
• B (anyone) must respect the inherent rights of A = consistent with dignity 
• The rights of A exist as long as some conditions are met = contrary to the non-conditional, 
inherent and inalienable nature of dignity 
Figure 1: Dignity-based rights as different from relational conceptions of rights 
A framework that is consistent with the logic that human rights are enjoyed by all human 
beings with no further requirements than their belonging to humanity, that ensures that States 
and other duty-bearers will retain their obligations, and that protects individuals from non-state 
violations effectively directly or (when permissible and effectively) indirectly, can overcome 
criticisms based on fears that non-state responsibilities will undermine it. Thus, it is convenient 
that projects and initiatives to protect from non-state abuses do not introduce conditions to the 
exercise of human rights in the form of converse duties, which are those owed to a collectivity, 
due to their being prone to being used to condition the enjoyment of rights, and instead employ 
correlative obligations, which are those owed to individuals as demanded by their dignity.232 
While human rights and guarantees serve to protect and ensure the respect of human 
dignity, encompassing legal entitlements and guarantees derived from aspects of that dignity,233 
the principle-value of human dignity itself is not without specific direct legal consequences.  
In this sense, besides its relevance in the interpretation of human rights and guarantees, 
it has been considered by some that there are cases in which dignity has concrete legal 
consequences, being it possible to directly protect human dignity without the mediation of 
concretized human rights or guarantees that (are meant to) specify and support its demands. This 
is illustrated, for instance, by the prohibition of experimenting on human beings without their 
consent with the aim of obtaining material or scientific profit, which would amount to making an 
                                                     
232 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 1-3, 20, 32-33, 37-38, 40, 47. 
233 Cf. Roberto Andorno, op. cit., p. 10. While James Griffin considers that the content of dignity is vague or broad, to 
be settled with proposals based on ethics and legal implications, I consider that dignity is the best foundation of 
human rights, especially because it is the one that is more encompassing regarding the protection of essential 
features of human beings. In my humble opinion, just as the functional accounts that he criticizes, the importance 
that Griffin places on “normative agency” for identifying human rights limited is narrow for over-focusing on some 
implications that are already protected in a framework founded upon human dignity and leaving other guarantees 
offered by human dignity outside the scope of human rights. The opinion of James Griffin can be found in: James 
Griffin, op. cit., pp. 341-344, 346-348, 350. 
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individual a means towards that gain instead of regarding him as an end in himself, as explained 
by Roberto Andorno.234  
This does not deny the relevance of human rights, because frequently the concept of 
dignity is too broad or vague so as to permit to solve individual cases, and it is certainly useful 
that human rights and other norms offer more detailed manifestations of their foundation,235 
although sometimes the content of human rights itself is vague or indeterminate and the concept 
of dignity can help to interpret them. 
Besides handling notions of dignity, secular and religious conceptions and traditions also 
have opinions concerning human rights, the analysis of which may be useful, as said above. 
As Donnelly reflects, there are different traditions with conceptions of human dignity, but 
their analysis is not useful for our purposes when they place conditions (different from being an 
individual) to the enjoyment of basic rights and thus exclude some individuals.236 Some 
interpretations of traditions and religions endorse ideas of human rights expressly or implicitly, as 
revealed by the fact that some have expressly alluded to such recognition, as happens with the 
conception of Judaism described by the Israeli NGO B’Tselem, that stresses that because of their 
nature all human beings have worth and value and must thus be respected. Some Catholic 
teachings, in turn, endorse the belief in human rights derived from the inherent and non-
conditional dignity of every individual.237 
Having examined the previous general considerations, I will now turn to exploring some 
legal implications of the absolute foundational value of human dignity in relation to protection from 
non-state abuses. 
To begin with, different authors, as Clapham, Jochnick, Bellal and Casey-Maslen, agree 
that a system based on human dignity is incompatible with the exclusion of victims of non-state 
abuses from the legal protection of human rights.238 To my mind, this conclusion is correct 
                                                     
234 Ibid., pp. 5, 7, 10. 
235 ibid 
236 Cf. Jack Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 303, 305, 307-308, 310, 312. 
237 See the following previously examined references: http://www.btselem.org/about_btselem; Pope John XXIII, 
Encyclical Pacem in Terris, op. cit., paras. 10, 14, 20, 24, 26, 41, 44, 48, 50, 73, 89, 104, 112, 122, 132, 144, 145, 
158; “Human dignity central to Catholic faith, Archbishop Dolan teaches”, available at: 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/human-dignity-central-to-catholic-faith-archbishop-dolan-teaches/ (last 
checked: 09/12/2011). Pope Benedict XVI has written that “Jesus’ innermost dignity cannot be taken from him- The 
hidden God remains present within him. Even the man subjected to violence and vilification remains the image of 
God- Ever since Jesus submitted to violence, it has been the wounded, the victims of violence, who have been the 
image of the God who chose to suffer for us […] God is on the side of those who suffer” (emphasis added). Passage 
found in: Pope Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth: Holy Week: From the Entrance into Jerusalem to the Resurrection, 
op. cit., at 140 (epub version). 
238 Cf. Chris Jochnick, op. cit., at 60, where it is held that “Human dignity makes certain claims on all actors, state and 
non-state, regardless of custom or consent […] the emphasis on the human person places human rights beyond the 
narrowness of particular treaties or, at a minimum, suggests a broad interpretation of these treaties and their 
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because such exclusion is contrary to the inalienability, non-conditionality and effectiveness of 
dignity. After all, it is undeniable that in practice human dignity is and can be disregarded by 
diverse entities. As John Locke considered: 
“Should a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey 
my estate to him, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by his sword, has an unjust 
conqueror, who forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by 
the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain.”239 
Moreover, all victims deserve preventive or responsive protection, because their common 
human dignity is equally threatened. This is recognized, among others, in article 16 of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, according to which: 
“Migrant workers and members of their families shall be entitled to effective protection by the State 
against violence, physical injury, threats and intimidation, whether by public officials or by private 
individuals, groups or institutions” (emphasis added). 
Truly, excluding victims of non-state entities amounts to conditioning the recognition of 
the entitlement to the protection of human dignity to the presence of State violations, which is 
unfair in extra-legal terms and contrary to the tenets of the protection and respect of dignity, 
especially because as human beings can be victimized by State and non-state misbehavior alike, 
placing requirements of that kind pertaining the identity of offenders runs counter to non-
conditionality. Furthermore, this would generate impunity, leaving some victims unprotected and 
vulnerable to future violations, which instead of being deterred would be encouraged. And as 
examined previously, such exclusion is also contrary to the universality, interdependence and 
integrality of human dignity and the rights based on it. 
Therefore, human dignity must be protected from all abuses and potential agents of 
violation, lest its protection is illusory and incomplete. It is interesting to recall that Chris Jochnick 
considered that: 
“A broader conception of human rights is consistent with their original foundation in human 
dignity. International law generally is understood to be based on a mix of customary practice and 
consent. States are either bound by those norms that achieve the distinction of customary law or 
                                                                                                                                                            
corresponding duties. Thus human rights obligations linked to human dignity may be violated by a host of actors 
including non-parties to the treaties; the exclusive focus on the state must be viewed as pragmatic and contingent, 
rather than necessary.” Likewise, see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 
534, 546, where Clapham says that “[o]nce one accepts the proposition that human rights are ultimately concerned 
with the protection of human dignity and that assaults on that dignity have to be prevented, remedied, and punished, 
there is little room left for arguments about the state or non-state character of the assailant […] [i]f the overriding aim 
is to protect the victim’s dignity, then that victim has to be protected from everyone, states and non-state actors. It 
matters not whether the actor has public functions, is financed by the state, or is simply a private individual.” Oscar 
Schachter, in turn, considered that “[a]ffronts to dignity may come from nonofficial sources.” See Oscar Schachter, 
op. cit., p. 852. Furthermore, see Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, “Enhancing Compliance with 
International Law by Armed Non-State Actors”, Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL), Vol. 3, 2011, pp. 
186-187. 
239 Cf. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government. 
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those that they explicitly consent to through treaties. However, human rights law has in large 
measure defied these narrow categories by suggesting an additional foundation--human dignity. 
Human dignity makes certain claims on all actors, state and non-state, regardless of custom or 
consent. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the twin covenants of 1966 do not merely 
recognize those rights that are considered customary or to which states have previously consented, 
but also acknowledge those rights derived ‘from the inherent dignity of the human 
person’”240 (emphasis added). 
As a consequence, identifying one violation as a violation of human rights/human dignity 
makes the protection of those affected imperative. In light of this consideration, statements as the 
following by Amnesty International regarding violence against women are to be examined, 
considering that the underlying rationale is applicable to other violations and that public 
responses are but one form of protection measures required by legal principles and basic tenets: 
“One of the achievements of women’s rights activists has been to demonstrate that violence against 
women is a human rights violation. This changes the perception of violence against women from a 
private matter to one of public concern and means that public authorities are required to take 
action.”241 
The previous conclusions are further supported by the legal principle of effectiveness, 
according to which the interpretation and implementation of norms must seek that they have 
practical effects. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights mentioned in the Rantsev 
Case that: 
“[T]he object and purpose of [a human rights treaty], as an instrument for the protection of individual 
human beings, requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards 
practical and effective”242 (emphasis added). 
According to that principle, In my opinion, denying human rights and protection to the 
“unfortunate” victims of non-state misdemeanor limits the effectiveness of the legal protection of 
human dignity243 and of human rights, and so alternative interpretations and implementation must 
be preferred, if available. If not, obstructing norms are to change de lege ferenda. 
Roberto Andorno, Andrew Clapham and Oscar Schachter, for example, have considered 
that there are other possible legal implications and dimensions of human dignity that are relevant 
                                                     
240 Cf. Chris Jochnick, op. cit., p. 59-60. 
241 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 121-122. 
242 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, 7 January 2010, para. 
275. Furthermore, concerning the principle of effectiveness see: Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, 
Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja to the Preliminary Objections Judgment of the 
International Court of Justice of 1 April 2011 in the Case concerning Application of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), para. 22; Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v Panama, Competence Judgment, 28 November 2003, paras. 66-
67; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, Application no. 23458/02, Judgment, 24 
March 2001, para. 177; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, Tirant Lo Blanch, 
2010, at 377. 
243 Human dignity is a value, and its protection a principle. See Oliver Sensen, supra, where the author sustains that 
“dignity […] is often referred to as an inherent value of human beings[…] Dignity is said to be a value that is 
‘incommensurably higher’ than other values”. Roberto Andorno, on the other hand, mentions that “[t]he principle of 
respect for human dignity holds a prominent position”, as written in: Roberto Andorno, op. cit., p. 4. 
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for our purposes. At least the following implications of the legal protection of the inherent worth of 
human beings can be found: 
a) First of all, human dignity demands that individuals are not mistreated, denigrated, 
attacked or injured.244 Therefore, dignity legitimizes claims to protection from these acts, because 
they are contrary to it. It is interesting to note that the concept of respect is closely linked to that of 
dignity. Oliver Sensen, for example, considers that contemporary conceptions of dignity demand 
the respect of individuals.245 
This first implication of human dignity is expressly considered in several international 
norms recognizing human rights and guarantees.246 
It can be said that it is expressly recognized that human integrity, both physical and 
psychological,247 is protected because of the respect dimension of dignity, a guarantee that is 
translated into (but not limited to) the prohibition of torture, inhuman, cruel, denigrating and 
humiliating treatments, being humiliating mistreatments and attitudes an affront to human dignity 
that should be addressed by law, as pointed out by Oscar Schachter and Andrew Clapham.248  
Furthermore, the duty of respecting human dignity ought to be placed on all potential 
perpetrators and requires, among others, prohibiting every entity from making human beings 
means for achieving ends (as profit, political benefits, etc.). This dimension is exemplified in 
prohibitions of slavery, forced labor or other violations, which can be attributable to non-state 
entities. Additionally, it requires that the (lawful or not) generation of risks of a negative impact on 
entitlements based on dignity gives rise to an intensified duty of diligence to prevent those risks 
                                                     
244 Cf. Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 852; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 
545; article 4.e of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 
Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 44, 158, 162, 168, 173, 176, 183-184, 186, 188, 259, 274-276, 279, 295; 
articles 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 5, 6 and 11 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, or 10 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
245 Cf. Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where the author wrote that “it is often said that one should respect other people 
because of their dignity […] Josef Seifert expresses the contemporary view as follows […] when we speak of human 
dignity, we speak of a morally relevant value, one which evidently imposes on us a moral call and an obligation to 
respect it.” 
246 For instance, Articles 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 28.2, 37.c and 40 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; 5.2, 6.2 and 11.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 5 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, or 3 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, expressly link the respect of human dignity and rights with the prohibition of 
certain acts, as violent acts, acts that constitute torture, inhuman or degrading treatments, infringements of privacy, 
exploitation and slavery, or those that ignore the demands of protection in relation to persons in vulnerable conditions 
that make them more prone to being potential victims of abuses, such as detainees or prosecuted persons. 
247 See articles 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, and 4.e of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 
Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 158, 162, 168, 173, 176, 183-184, 186, 188, 259, 275-276, 279, 295, and 
footnote 201. 
248 Cf. Oscar Schachter, op. cit., pp. 850, 852; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. 
cit., pp. 544-545. 
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from materializing, as evinced by calls for ensuring the respect of the dignity of detainees or 
prosecuted persons, for instance.  
This duty of intensified diligence has been examined in international case law, as in the 
case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, concerning which the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights declared that the generation of risks of non-state violations of human rights 
intensified the positive duties of the State that created such risks. Other supervisory bodies have 
identified the guarantor position or the vulnerability of human beings as other factors that make 
positive duties of State and other authorities (to protect or to fulfill) more demanding.249  
Interestingly, in the Pueblo Bello case the Court ruled that the State-created risk it 
examined had to do with the empowerment and legitimization of non-state actors who afterwards 
carried out violations of the content of human rights.250 This position is coherent with the 
jurisprudence of the Court and other international supervisory bodies, which have consistently 
considered that States must strive to prevent and put an end to violations of human rights 
committed by non-state actors in their jurisdictions, and to ensure that victims are repaired in 
those cases.251 
The previous considerations confirm how inseparable the protection of human dignity is 
from the protection of persons against non-state threats: insisting on a State-centered paradigm 
that relies on the false assumption that only States can violate human rights contradicts the 
content, aims and causes of positive State obligations under human rights law. Factual and 
ethical critical analyses also challenge the State-centered paradigm, because they indicate how 
legal fictions surrounding the constructed entity called the State cannot be used in order to deny 
                                                     
249 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, 31 
January 2006, paras. 125-126; European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, 
Judgment, 30 November 2010, paras. 41, 45-46, 50; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20,op. cit., 
para. 11; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, Judgment of 4 July 2006, paras. 
138-141; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release 114/10, “IACHR Deplores Acts of Violence in 
Prisons in Brazil”; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The right to adequate 
food (art. 11), op. cit., para. 15 (where the positive duties of ‘protection’ and to ‘fulfil’ are discussed). 
250 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment of 
January 31, 2006, paras. 123-131. 
251 Cf., inter alia, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 
Merits, op. cit., paras. 166-178, 181; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 8; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 140-153; Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., 87-91; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 208, 218-219, 232-233, 285, 287;  European Court of Human Rights, 
Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 45; European Court of Human Rights, Case 
of Mastromatteo v. Italy, Judgment, 24 October 2002, paras. 67-68; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 236, 243-247, 252; Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 111-115, 123; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 85-87; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 112-114; 
European Court of Human Rights, Case of N. v. Sweden, Application no. 23505/09, Judgment, 20 July 2010, paras. 
55, 60, 62. 
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the satisfaction of real needs of human beings, whose existence precedes and conditions that of 
States and their sovereignty, as mentioned by legal scholars and philosophers.252  
In connection with this, Andrew Clapham argues that the strength of the human rights 
movement rests partly on the compassion and solidarity with victims and those who suffer.253 If it 
is admitted that the acts of a State agent can resemble those of particulars and non-state actors 
in how they make individuals suffer, and that from a factual point of view non-state entities can 
also prevent individuals from enjoying guarantees they have, it must follow that individuals must 
be fully protected from non-state violations as well. Victims deserve protection regardless of who 
attacks them, and because anyone can make them suffer, they must be protected everywhere 
and from everyone, given the non-conditionality of their dignity.254 Regarding this, for example, 
John Locke mentioned that even in the absence of a State framework individuals are exposed to 
threats of other individuals,255 and, I might add, of other non-state entities. 
Additionally, and from a legal theory standpoint, the respect of human rights and dignity is 
centered and rests on the person and not on other factors, because it is the individual who must 
be protected from trespasses and offenses against her dignity, which amount to a breach of its 
respect. This respect is in consequence also non-conditional or non-qualified, due to its not being 
                                                     
252 It is important to stress that being creations and artificial constructs, the power of States is justified and must be 
oriented towards the protection of human beings, in the furtherance of which it must act. John Locke considered that 
“the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the 
common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above 
mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme 
power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the 
people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those 
laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or 
redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other 
end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.” Kant, on the other hand, criticized the “attachment to […] 
lawless liberty, the fact that [some people] would rather be at hopeless variance with one another than submit 
themselves to a legal authority constituted by themselves, that [people] therefore prefer their senseless freedom to a 
reason-governed liberty”, which in turn can be implicitly considered as the condition whose maintenance justifies 
State power. On these issues, see John Locke, Second Treaties of Government; Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, 
Cosimo, 2005, p. 13; “Locke & Kant: Why Form a State?”, available at: http://tryingliberty.com/2008/06/06/locke-kant-
why-form-a-state/ (last checked: 09/12/2011). Regarding the “construct” nature of States, see the Judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, where it was considered that “Crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities [States], and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” 
253 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 11, 28, 30, 131. 
254 See Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 96, where she mentions that “the attention on NSAs [non-state actors] may (1) give 
more relevance to the content of rights and on the actual violations rather than to the form of rights and the legal 
status of the violator […] help withdraw human rights from their ambiguous link with state sovereignty and give 
expression to their inner universality” (emphasis added); Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection 
of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 4, 46; Chimène I. 
Keitner, “Rights Beyond Borders”, op. cit., at 113, where the author holds that “International human rights seem 
particularly well suited to a conscience approach, and thus to extraterritorial application, because they are based 
explicitly on the intrinsic dignity and worth of individual human beings regardless of geographic location or national  
membership.” 
255 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 19-20. 
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based on and limited to one among the different relationships a human being can have, i.e. a 
relationship with a State. Instead, the underlying logic of is that all threats and conduct that are 
contrary to human dignity are illegitimate.  
Hence, a framework based on human dignity must be human and victim-centered and 
universal in scope regarding the threats against which protection is provided. 
Concerning the respect exacted by human dignity, it is interesting to observe that Oscar 
Schachter points out that such respect has both a subjective dimension, related to the esteem 
and perception by an actor about a human being, and an objective aspect, that is assessed in 
terms of how an individual is treated in practice. Both relate to the attitude of third parties towards 
an individual, but Professor Schachter argues that while both aspects may have legal relevance, 
the second dimension is more likely to be taken into account when examining cases.256  
Complementing this approach, Andrew Clapham indicates that international 
jurisprudence has gradually taken into account the other side of the relationship when evaluating 
if a violation has been committed: the perception of the victim. This jurisprudence takes into 
account the feelings, self-esteem, intensity of suffering and outrage of a victim in relation to a 
treatment he has been subjected to, being those elements relevant to assess if a breach of the 
respect of dignity has taken place. For Clapham, this perspective entails a shift from focusing on 
the perpetrator to focusing on the victim,257 and so forms part of a trend to focus on individuals. 
Some supervisory bodies have adopted this approach but are cautious to avoid unduly 
affecting respondents. Such moderation is necessary, because of possible unreasonable or 
exaggerated reactions of individuals, which if endorsed uncritically could in turn jeopardize 
guarantees of the rule of law and the principle of legality, more precisely the latter’s elements of 
accessibility and foreseeability.258 For this reason, bodies as the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia have tempered the analysis of the victim’s perspective with the 
requirement to take into account objective elements, requiring that “the humiliation to the victim 
must be so intense that the reasonable person would be outraged” to consider that a violation of 
dignity has been committed.259 
Another jurisprudential development related to the centrality of victims has to do with the 
necessity of examining the concrete situation of a victim to decide upon certain legal questions, 
                                                     
256 See Oscar Schachter, op. cit., p. 849. 
257 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 542-543. 
258 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 185-
187. 
259 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 542-543. 
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as some related to admissibility, e.g. the exhaustion of domestic remedies or the existence of a 
significant disadvantage in the European regional system of human rights.  
Concerning this, among the elements of the situation of a victim that international bodies 
have considered relevant are the material and economic conditions of the victim/applicant, her 
fear and perceptions (tempered with objective elements), and the social context in which victims 
are, as mentioned in the case Korolev v. Russia of the European Court of Human Rights or in the 
Eleventh Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, among others.260 
Steps as these highlight the necessity of a complete protection of all victims and of 
making victims the main object of legal attention. As a result, they support the protection of 
victims from all abuses, State or not, which is possible under international law. This does not 
mean, however, that direct international legal mechanisms must always be set in motion against 
all non-state violations. Nevertheless, mechanisms from other legal systems and levels of 
governance must always have a prospect of effectiveness, as commented by the European Court 
of Human Rights in relation to cases where non-state abuses have been invoked.261 If they do not 
have this prospect, international substantive or procedural action is necessary to not leave victims 
undefended, at least before serious violations, as will be examined in Chapter 4. 
b) Alongside the call for respecting human dignity, which is related to the “constraining” 
effect of dignity referred to previously in this section, its legal protection calls for “empowering” 
human beings. According to this idea, there are some rights that are essential for the enjoyment 
of a dignified human life. Besides being complementary to legal guarantees that forbid 
infringements against individuals, those rights protect positive or freedom-related entitlements 
connected to dignity. Granted, violations of the empowering, freedom and positive-related rights 
amount to disrespecting the inherent dignity of a human being. A distinctive aspect of this 
                                                     
260 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Exceptions to the Exhaustion of 
Domestic Remedies (art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), 10 August 1990, 
paras. 25-31, 33, 35; European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Case of Korolev v. Russia, application no. 
25551/05, Decision of Admissibility, 1 July 2010, where it was held that “The severity of a violation should be 
assessed, taking account of both the applicant's subjective perceptions and what is objectively at stake in a particular 
case […] the impact of a pecuniary loss must not be measured in abstract terms; even modest pecuniary damage 
may be significant in light of the person's specific condition and the economic situation of the country or region in 
which he or she live […] a violation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a 
significant disadvantage without affecting pecuniary interest […] The applicant's subjective feeling about the impact 
of the alleged violations has to be justifiable on objective grounds” (emphasis added). 
261 Regarding the effectiveness that domestic mechanisms must have and the prospect of success of the protection 
of human rights with their use, see European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, 
Judgment, op. cit., paras. 36-38. Concerning the other issues, see Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado 
Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et-al v. Peru, Judgment (Preliminary 
Objections), op. cit., paras. 5, 11, 20; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. 
Honduras, Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 26 June 1987, paras. 58, 60, 62, 67, 70; Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Case of Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v. Honduras, Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 26 June 
1987, paras. 58, 60, 62, 67, 70; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras, 
Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 26 June 1987, paras. 61, 63, 65, 70, 73. 
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implication is that pertinent rights are concrete manifestations of the empowering dimension of 
dignity. 
Concerning this, Andrew Clapham, for instance, argues that the inherent dignity of 
individuals requires that their autonomous choices be protected.262 In the end, there is a link 
between this legal manifestation of dignity and rights that materialize it. In consequence, dignity 
protects human rights that guarantee non-interference with voluntary and freely adopted 
decisions and manifestations of individuals, such as the freedoms of association, of speech, of 
movement, of conscience, of opinion and of religion, among others. Non-state actors can 
certainly interfere with those decisions (and the enjoyment of all other human rights),263 and 
therefore protection from those interferences must be given. Additionally, since all dimensions of 
dignity are relevant, human beings must be protected from decisions and choices of others that 
are contrary to their dignity. 
c) A third implication of human dignity is related to the interdependency of human rights. 
As domestic and international jurisprudence have demonstrated, exaggerating the distinctions of 
categories of rights may contribute to undermine the human rights framework because human 
dignity is integral and all its demands must be protected, and also because denying the 
enjoyment of some rights may adversely affect the enjoyment of other rights, besides ignoring 
how similar rights classified in different categories may be in some respects.  
Concerning this, for example, it has been said that the right to life is to be understood as 
the right to a dignified life, requiring sometimes positive duties of protection of third parties such 
as the State, and not merely demand refraining from attacks for that right to be effectively 
guaranteed.264 It thus requires the satisfaction of essential needs that allow human beings to fully 
develop their potentials and have a dignified quality of life.265 Likewise, scholars have mentioned 
                                                     
262 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 546. Similarly, see Oscar 
Schachter, op. cit., at 851. 
263 Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 6, 51, 
52; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, at 13. 
264 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 06, The right to life (art. 6), 30 April 1982, para. 5, where 
the Committee held that “the right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The expression "inherent right to 
life" cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt 
positive measures. In this connection […] it would be desirable for States […] to take all possible measures to reduce 
infant mortality and to increase life expectancy”; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Mastromatteo v. Italy, 
Judgment, 24 October 2002, paras. 67-68; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and 
Russia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 218-219; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton 
Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 243-245. 
265 See, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, 
Judgment, 19 November 1999, para. 144, where the Court said that “the fundamental right to life includes, not only 
the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that he will not be prevented 
from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence. States have the obligation to guarantee 
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that dignity demands that individual “essential needs” are satisfied.266 This third implication of 
dignity is reflected in the third of the four freedoms envisaged by Franklin Roosevelt in his 1941 
State of the Union address: freedom from want,267 which tries to secure a “healthy peacetime life” 
for every human being.268 The notion of this freedom is so important that it is expressly mentioned 
in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.269 
Moreover, International treaties dealing with Economic, Social and Cultural Rights link 
dignity with the satisfaction of those rights -which are interdependent with other rights based on 
human dignity-, for instance concerning the relationship between the right to education and 
human dignity.270 Such connection, as that of the rights to work and living conditions that are not 
degrading and permit satisfying basic needs, is also mentioned by Schachter concerning 
guarantees of human dignity.271 
The link of this implication of dignity with the object of this text is the following: just as it 
would be inconsistent to deny the character of human rights to rights that require positive means 
of implementation and satisfaction, given their interdependency and equal value, because some 
individuals would be left unprotected in relation to the enjoyment of what their dignity entitles 
them to, it is also legally contradictory and ethically unsound to deny legal protection to victims of 
non-state actors. Furthermore, just as even civil and political rights require measures of protection 
and facilitation, so it is widely accepted that authorities must protect human beings from non-state 
violations.272 
                                                                                                                                                            
the creation of the conditions required in order that violations of this basic right do not occur and, in particular, the 
duty to prevent its agents from violating it” (emphasis added); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Actors, op. cit., pp. 545-546. This aspect of the right to life and of human dignity is all the more pressing in a 
world in which so many suffer from poverty, hunger, famine and starvation, a poignant fact exposed, among others, 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). See Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Economic crises – impacts and lessons learned, Rome, 
2009; United Nations, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, paras. 22, 45, 145. 
266 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 546. 
267 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 38. 
268 Cf. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms, State of the Union address to Congress, Speech delivered on 
6 January 1941, available at: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm (last checked: 
13/12/2011). 
269 See “Freedom from Want/Freedom from Poverty”, available at: 
http://www.everyhumanhasrights.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17:freedom-from-want-
freedom-from-poverty&catid=1:udhr; Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where it is said that 
“the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and 
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people”. 
270 On the concrete rights mentioned above and their relation to human dignity, see articles 13 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 13 of the Protocol of San Salvador. 
271 Cf. Oscar Schachter, op. cit., pp. 851-852. 
272 See, for instance, article 4 in conjunction with articles 43 and 44 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 
2006, para. 4 (the “UNMIK case”). 
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In consequence, since human rights address different essential human needs, deriving 
“from the inherent dignity of the human person,”273 those needs must be protected whenever their 
satisfaction is threatened. Therefore, law cannot support violations by means of its silence and 
omission, since they generate suffering. As Louis Henkin commented concerning principles in 
international law, good sense ought to “triumph […] over the limitations of concepts and other 
abstractions.”274  
Legal developments support the necessity of addressing non-state conduct when it can 
threaten needs and guarantees stemming from human dignity. Some have taken place in the 
fields of international humanitarian law and of international criminal law, and consist in the 
existence of norms that protect human dignity and prove how non-state actors as non-state 
groups and individuals may be addressees of international norms,275 confirming that they can be 
subjects of international legal responsibilities for the purposes of ensuring the protection of 
human dignity and not only be possible rights-holders. Interestingly, Hans Kelsen considered that 
the evolution of international law involved an individualization of responsibility,276 which holding 
non-state actors as duty-bearers contributes to achieve. 
Moreover, doctrine and international authorities agree that some violations of 
international criminal law amount to human rights violations, showing how norms with different 
structures, i.e. those that confer rights based on dignity and those that protect that dignity in a 
non-rights form (human guarantees) can have the same purposes and complement each other. 
Three additional ideas must be considered:  
                                                     
273 The Preamble to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights mentions that the rights 
recognized therein “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”, just like the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and the Preamble to the Additional Protocol to the American Convention of Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”) mentions that there is a “close relationship 
that exists between economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights, in that the different categories of 
rights constitute an indivisible whole based on the recognition of the dignity of the human person”. 
274 Cf. Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General 
Principles”, Australian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 12, 1988-1989, p. 108. 
275 See United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, p. 9; Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years after the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, T.M.C. 
Asser Press, 2009, pp. 174-175; Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 276-277, 280-281. While U.S. judge Leval has 
considered that criminal sanctions of corporations can undermine the purposes of criminal law because those 
responsible for the “corporation’s misdeeds” may evade responsibility as a result, I disagree, because the 
responsibility of entities involved in violations is complementary and not exclusive, as seen in Chapter 7, infra. The 
opinion of judge Leval is found in: Concurring Opinion of Judge Leval to: United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 
2010, at 35. Moreover, see Moreover, see Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 20, 31, 83, 105. 
276 See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, University of California Press, 1978, pp. 326-328. 
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1) First of all, not every material violation of a human right amounts to an international 
crime.277 Even though some norms of criminal law protect human rights, only some serious 
violations are and should be criminalized, given the ultima ratio character of criminal law,278 which 
it must have given how it affects those it sanctions. It is implicit in the fourth principle of the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Law that not 
every violation of human rights is a crime. It states that: 
“In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, States have the duty to investigate and, 
if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the person allegedly responsible for 
the violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or him. Moreover, in these cases, States 
should, in accordance with international law, cooperate with one another and assist international 
judicial organs competent in the investigation and prosecution of these violations” (emphasis added). 
2) Secondly, since non-state entities can commit violations of human rights or human 
guarantees, States and other functional authorities with proper mandates must strive to prevent 
or respond to those violations in order to protect victims, and in some cases they can or must do 
so without resorting to criminal law-mechanisms. After all, human rights lato sensu and 
humanitarian guarantees highlight that different strategies and normative responses and 
branches279 can be relevant to defend human rights and can complement each other. 
                                                     
277 This is implicitly recognized when it is asserted that the criminalization of the violation of some human rights 
constitutes an indicator of the possibility of the prohibition of that violation being part of peremptory law. This last 
argument is found in: Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 
169-170. 
278 See George P. Fletcher, “Parochial versus Universal Criminal Law”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 
3, 2005, p. 31. 
279 See Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations, op. cit., pp. 65-66; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 112/10, Inter-State 
Petition IP-02, Admissibility, Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador – Colombia, 21 October 2010, para. 117; 
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, supra, at 73; Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, op. cit., paras. 32-34 and the first opinion, shown in page 12. In those documents, 
it is argued that instead of focusing on formal distinctions, when it comes to the protection of human rights that, as we 
know, must protect human dignity, it is preferable to acknowledge that they can be shared and protected in various 
branches, that in my opinion therefore form part of the same corpus juris. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the 
mechanisms or strategies used in one of them can inspire the adoption of similar strategies to protect the same 
foundational values, rights or guarantees in other branches forming part of the same corpus juris. Concerning the 
existence of corpus juris in the humanitarian legal context, see the notions of the corpus juris of the protection of 
children, the corpus juris of human rights and a general humanitarian corpus juris, founded upon values and incuding 
human rights (both broadly and strictly speaking) and guarantees, in: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 24, 92; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 15, 18, 31, 37, 50, 53; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment, 
op. cit., para. 194. Moreover, the International Law Commission has considered that “rules and principles that 
regulate a certain problem area are collected together so as to express a ‘special regime’” [as happens with 
‘humanitarian law’  and ‘human rights law’, that in my opinion belong to the corpus of the protection of human dignity 
alongside other sub-regimes and norms]”. Cf. International Law Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study 
Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, 2006, para. 12. 
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3) Thirdly, the complete protection of human dignity must address all violations, be them 
criminal or not, State or not, that affect civil, economic or other human rights, because limiting 
protection to some violations, for instance those that amount to crimes, excludes victims and 
goes against the non-conditionality and comprehensiveness of human dignity. 
In light of the previous ideas, it can be concluded that the third legal implication, i.e. that 
of the interdependence and equal relevance of all aspects of human dignity, which thus must be 
protected, demands protection from all threats, including actual and potential non-state ones. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for instance, has confirmed this 
when arguing in its General Comments that non-state actors can violate the content of the rights 
it supervises; that those actors should refrain from committing those violations; and that States 
have a duty to prevent and respond to them, fostering a climate of respect of rights and 
stimulating conditions for their enjoyment, which may require dealing with possible non-state 
abuses or obstacles.280 
d) In addition to the previous legal implications of human dignity, some scholars have 
considered that a fourth general implication can be identified. Unlike the previous ones, that have 
an individual rightsholder approach, it has been put forward that some group or collective entities 
may have dignity. According to Andrew Clapham or Oscar Schachter, for example, some groups 
may deserve legal protection in the humanitarian corpus juris (not limited to IHL, covering the 
protection of human dignity), given the connections between them and their individual members 
and how important they are for the latter, reason why they argue that protecting those groups 
sometimes contributes to protecting individuals affiliated with or related to them281 (other 
arguments may claim that some groups have a dignity or worth of their own, which in any case 
should never prevail over human dignity). The possible nature and features of the collective 
groups in question are manifold: some may be based on a common identity, some on common 
cultural characteristics leading to a voluntary or spontaneous association, etc. 
I consider this last possible implication to be the most complex and perhaps the 
problematic one, which demands its careful analysis. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the pertinent implications may be justified by arguments 
such as that according to which just as dignity is inherent to human beings, their social dimension 
                                                     
280 Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, op. cit., paras. 15, 19-20; 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, op. cit., paras. 33, 42; Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, op. cit., paras. 23-24; Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16, op. cit., para. 20; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 18, op. cit., para. 25; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 20, op. cit., para. 11. 
281 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., p. 545-546; Oscar Schachter, op. 
cit., 850, 852-853. 
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is also inherent to them, as explained by theories such as Aristotle’s conception of the individual 
as a zoon politikon or political animal.282 Because of this, it could be considered that the links of 
human beings with other individuals and their associations and groupings are essential for them, 
as confirmed by the theories of relatedness and non-separateness of Erich Fromm.283 Moreover, 
the development of emotional and intellectual bonds with such groups may lead to close 
relationships, which lead to suffering when the “dignitas” or rights of the group are heinously 
violated. 
As hinted earlier, the difficulties of translating these conceptions into law are not few. 
Firstly, aside from some rights as the right to self-determination or those related to the protection 
of some collective entities in the European regional human rights system,284 most stricto sensu 
human rights norms are based on the idea of individuals as their holders. Furthermore, the 
international mechanisms of protection of such rights are designed to protect individuals even 
when the respective rights allude to beliefs or manifestations shared with others, as asserted for 
example by the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations.285 However, that same 
Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have acknowledged that offences 
against entities different from individuals may indirectly have a negative impact on the rights of 
those individuals, who must thus be protected.286 
Care must be taken not to overemphasize on groups and lose sight of individuals, which 
may generate the risk of justifying violations against them for the sake of those groups, even 
                                                     
282 See Aristotle, Politics, Forgotten Books, 2007, pp. 3, 58. 
283 See Erich Fromm, The art of loving, Perennial Classics, 2000, pp. 8-9, where the author argues that “Man is gifted 
with reason; he is life being aware of itself. This awareness of himself as a separate entity, the awareness of his own 
short  life span, of the fact that he will die before those whom he loves, or they before him, the awareness of his 
aloneness and separateness, of his helplessness before the forces of nature and of society, all this makes his 
separate, disunited existence an unbearable prison. He would become insane could he not liberate himself from the 
prison and reach out, unite himself in some form or other with others, with the world outside. The experience of 
separateness arouses anxiety […]The deepest need of man, then, is the need to overcome his separateness, to 
leave the prison of his aloneness.” 
284 Cf. articles 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (where the right of self-determination of 
peoples is mentioned), 34 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (according to which “any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of a violation […] of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols” may file applications for the 
European Court of Human Rights to protect their rights) , or 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (that mentions that “[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”). 
285 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23, The rights of minorities (Art. 27), 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 8 April 1994, paras. 1, 2, 3.1, 5.1, 6.2; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 
31, op. cit., para. 9. 
286 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 9. Regarding the protection of human 
rights when they are affected as a result of actions against group entities in the Inter-American framework of human 
rights, see Juanita María López-Patrón, “Los derechos laborales en el sistema interamericano de protección de 
derechos humanos: la protección de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales”, International Law: Revista 
Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, No. 12, 2008, pp. 187-199; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
Cantos v. Argentina, Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 7 September 2001, paras. 22-31. 
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limiting individual freedom in a totalitarian way. To prevent this, in the first place, as has been 
considered in case law in connection with the freedom of association and the right to form and 
join trade unions, the freedom to belong to a group is one dimension of those rights, which also 
include the liberties to not join one such group and to abandon them.287 As a result, belonging to 
a group cannot be compulsory, and because of this there must be freedom to leave it. 
Secondly, care must be taken to bear in mind the strict requirements to restrict rights and 
to interpret them in the way that most favors individuals, as required by the pro homine 
principle.288 Thus, only exceptional circumstances justify limitations of rights, that must be 
necessary and proportionate, which is something that must never be lost sight of when analyzing 
relations between individuals and groups.  
These considerations indicate that rights or interests of collective entities cannot be 
invoked to justify violations of the rights of individuals,289 because it is for the sake of those 
individuals and in relation to their inherent features that some of their aspects are protected to a 
certain extent in human rights frameworks. Cases filed before domestic and international 
authorities indicate the perceived need that individuals are protected from groups, even if they 
belong to them, as discussed in relation to cases where individuals belonging to indigenous 
groups requesting protection from them, being it inadmissible in my opinion to hold groups’ rights 
as deemed to prevail over the inherent and non-conditional rights of those individuals.290  
Another example is that of the debates before the Human Rights Council concerning anti-
defamation or “blasphemy” measures. Interestingly, both secular and Christian individuals and 
groups have opposed proposals by some Muslim representatives that seek to legally back up 
these measures: the former consider that they may be employed in a way that thwarts individual 
                                                     
287 Cf. articles 20.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 8.3 of the “Protocol of San Salvador”; Daniel 
O’Donnell, op. cit., pp. 721-723. 
288 As mentioned above, I believe that the pro homine principle demands not only the election of norm that better 
protects human dignity but also of the interpretations that meet that requirement. According to the Court, “the 
principle of the most favorable interpretation cannot be used as a basis for an inexistent normative principle”. 
Conversely, it can be understood to be applicable when a normative basis does exist, such as a norm that is 
applicable in a given case, that must therefore be interpreted in the most favorable way for the protection of human 
dignity, which is the foundation and a goal of human rights law. The excerpted passage is found in: Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., para. 79. 
289 Concerning the relevance of this assertion in relation to obligations of individuals, see John H. Knox, “Horizontal 
Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 1-2, 9-10, 20, 34, 40. 
290 Cf. Vicente José Cabedo Mallol, “La jurisdicción especial indígena de Colombia y los derechos humanos”, 
Facultad de Derecho de la Universitat de València, 1998, sections “Las sanciones indígenas y la prohibición de las 
torturas, tratos inhumanos o degradantes” and “A modo de conclusión”, available at: http://www.alertanet.org/F2b-
VCabedo.htm 
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human rights, as freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The Human Rights Committee 
supports this position.291 
Just as it has been considered that when determining who is an indirect victim, i.e. 
someone whose enjoyment of human rights is negatively affected as a result of the direct 
violation of the rights of someone else,292 it has been considered that those with a close bond 
with direct victims will likely suffer concerning their right to personal psychological integrity,293 the 
bond between an individual and a collective entity, along with the nature of an offence and its 
impact of on that bond, must be analyzed to examine if there is a violation of the dignity of the 
former. 
It must be said that international law is no stranger to norms that protect principles and 
values that guarantee collective or social manifestations. For example, as mentioned by Antonio 
Cançado Trindade, a principle of humanity and the recognition of humankind are relevant in 
international law;294 and additionally norms as the prohibition of genocide protect both individual 
and group/social dimensions, and interestingly prohibit both State and non-state actors from 
engaging in their violations.295 In fact, the extra stigmatization of genocide lies on this very fact, 
                                                     
291 See “The limits of freedom and faith”, The Economist (31 March 2010), available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/15833005 (last checked: 14/12/2011); “Islamic bloc drops 12-year U.N. drive to ban 
defamation of religion”, Reuters, 24 March 2011, available at: http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2011/03/24/islamic-
bloc-drops-12-year-u-n-drive-to-ban-defamation-of-religion/ (last checked: 14/12/2011); United States Commission 
on International Religious Freedom, “USCIRF Welcomes Move Away from “Defamation of Religions” Concept”, 24 
March 2011, available at: http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/3570-uscirf-welcomes-move-away-from-
defamation-of-religions-concept.html (last checked: 14/12/2011); “Defusing the defamation issue”, The Economist 
(25 March 2011), available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/03/free_speech (last checked: 
14/12/2011); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, op. cit., paras. 47-48. 
292 Note how the ‘indirect’ victim still suffers the violation of his own rights, being the term “indirect” thus didactic but 
not altogether precise Cf. Sergio García Ramírez, Los derechos humanos y la jurisdicción interamericana, op. cit., 
pp. 117-118. 
293 On the protection of individuals who are close to direct victims, see, among others, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Case of Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment, 25 November 2000, paras. 160-165; Claudio 
Nash Rojas, Las Reparaciones ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (1988 – 2007), Universidad de 
Chile, 2009, pp. 79-82. On the psychological dimension of personal integrity, see, for instance, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 
163-165, 173; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment, 17 September 
1997, para. 57. 
294 Cf. Separate Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: International Court of Justice, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, op. cit., 
paras. 74, 209-210; Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade to: International Court of Justice, Case concerning 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment, op. cit., para. 106. 
295 In this regard, the International Court of Justice has mentioned that the drafting history of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide reveals how genocide is “the denial of the existence of entire 
human groups”, as “contrasted with homicide, ‘the denial of the right to live of individual human beings”, and that the 
Court had said previously that “an object of the Convention [is] the safeguarding of the ‘very existence of certain 
human groups’”. Andrew Clapham, on the other hand, has highlighted the human rights dimension of the prohibition 
of genocide by saying that “today genocide and other crimes against humanity are increasingly seen as part of the 
human rights story.” See International Court of Justice, Case concerning application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 
Judgment, op. cit., para. 194; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., p. 42. Additionally, 
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because conduct that would otherwise amount to different crimes in the absence of a design to 
eliminate a group, such as homicide, is regarded as more heinous due to the presence of a 
purpose to eliminate a human group. Still, it cannot be forgotten that multiple individuals are 
victimized by genocidal acts, and the protection of a group does not mean that murders 
conducted by authors of genocide are irrelevant in ethical, legal and philosophical terms. After all, 
the killing of even a single human being is very serious.296 
Additionally, the so-called third generation of human rights have collective or meta-
individual features,297 given their importance for multiple human beings, peoples and generations, 
and in consequence there may be a simultaneous victimization of multiple human beings with a 
single trespass against such rights.298  
The recognition of those rights often protects joint or common interests, although as 
mentioned before, individuals are victimized when they are violated. This also happens with other 
rights, as civil and political ones, for example the right of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities to manifest and enjoy their shared beliefs, knowledge and culture along with 
other members, whose titular are the individuals and not the group, as discussed by the Human 
Rights Committee.299 However, it cannot be denied that, in practice, a blend of individual and 
meta-individual features is found in those rights, which constitutes further evidence of possible 
                                                                                                                                                            
article IV of the aforementioned Convention states that “[p]ersons committing genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or 
private individuals” (emphasis added). 
296 Besides the recognition of the right to life in international law and domestic norms, and by philosophers, several 
religions recognize it (through the prohibition of murder). Judaism and Christianity hold so in the Decalogue (“Thou 
shalt not kill”/”You shall not kill”). See Part Three, Section Two, Chapter Two, article 5 of the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church. The Jerusalem Talmud mentions in Sanhedrin 4:1 (22a) that “Whoever destroys a soul, it is 
considered as if he destroyed an entire world. And whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire 
world.” 
297 It has been considered that the so-called third generation of human rights encompasses “solidarity rights” that 
“address more directly the collective of social groups or peoples”, although “Due to the fact that the complexity of 
“third generation rights” is highly debated by the international community of states, solidarity rights have not yet 
reached the legally essential status for their full implementation as collective human rights.” Albeit some consider that 
States might consider themselves “right-bearers” regarding them, this assertion has been challenged by some that 
consider that, for instance concerning the right to development, “[t]he collective dimension of the Right to 
Development did not mean rights of States, simply because States could not be bearers of “human” rights. The 
holders of the collective dimension of the Right to Development therefore were the peoples.” References extracted 
from: Carolin Sehmer, Report of the Parallel Event “Third Generation” Human Rights – Reflections on the Collective 
Dimension of Human Rights, Geneva, 2007, pp. 3-4, available at: http://www.fes-
globalization.org/geneva/documents/Report_FES-Geneva_3rd-generation_human_rights.pdf (last checked: 
15/12/2011). 
298 It is possible to think that some of these rights protect global public goods, which are goods that by their nature 
can benefit multiple individuals across boundaries and even generations, given the spontaneous or socially-created 
characteristics of non-rivalry and/or non-excludability they exhibit in various degrees. See Inge Kaul and Ronald U. 
Mendoza, “Advancing the Concept of Public Goods”, in Inge Kaul et al. (eds.), Providing Global Public Goods, Oxford 
University Press, 2003, pp. 95-99. 
299 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 9; Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 23, op. cit., paras. 1, 6.2. 
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connections between singular individuals and groups they belong to. Non-state agents can attack 
both of those features, and as a result protection against those attacks is necessary. 
e) Finally, when analyzing the protection of individuals from non-state abuses it is 
necessary and inevitable to examine the notion of whether the protection of human dignity is 
based on the separation of a private sphere from a public one or if, on the contrary, those 
boundaries should be eroded or exist at all.  
Arguments supporting each alternative have been put forward. As to the first idea, some 
consider that the conception of a private sphere derives from the respect and protection of human 
dignity, which demands the respect of privacy rights, which that position tends to describe as 
being “located” in a private sphere. According to this position, infringements against it should be 
prohibited and dealt with properly in order to protect those rights and their purposes.300  
An opposing position argues that a full separation of a private sphere, isolated from legal 
intrusions, may actually protect some violations committed by private entities, as for instance in 
the context of domestic violence, which would remain in impunity and victims be left unprotected 
if it is ignored that human rights can be violated by non-state entities. A third option suggests that, 
unlike what some feminists claim, freedoms within a private sphere are not incompatible with a 
scheme of protection from private and other non-state violations, because that sphere protects 
rights, but on the condition that private violations are forbidden and tackled by law.301 
In my opinion, some norms protecting human dignity defend rights that protect what 
some have called aspects of a “private sphere”, but it is actually unnecessary to employ that term, 
which may suggest a barrier, being it preferable to talk of rights that protect privacy and private 
issues as demanded by human dignity. I consider that this better illustrates the context and what 
is at stake.  
Altogether, the same foundation of human rights that protects privacy is contrary to 
violations of human dignity committed in a private context, which must as a result be regarded as 
unlawful, being it necessary to protect their victims, as demanded by the comprehensive 
protection required by human dignity. This is what Andrew Clapham may be suggesting when he 
argues that privacy cannot be an obstacle to tackling violations and that privacy rights protect 
individuals against abuses,302 being their recognition in my opinion a legal, individual and social 
conquest.  
                                                     
300 See Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 850; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., 
pp. 544-546. 
301 Concerning these issues, see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 544-
547; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 94-99. 
302 Ibid. 
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In sum, it can be said that human rights that protect aspects of privacy are to be 
protected and respected, and violations are to be prevented and responded to wherever and 
however they are committed. This is confirmed by the Durban Programme of Action of the World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance of 2001, 
according to which authorities must ensure that victims “can fully exercise their rights in all 
spheres of public and private life” (emphasis added). Moreover, articles 1 and 3 of the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(“Convention of Belém do Pará”) demand that women are protected from violence “in both the 
public and private spheres” (emphasis added), since such violence can take place in any of those 
contexts, and women accordingly have a right to protection in all of them. 
It must be recalled that even individual offenders have human rights,303 which must not 
be ignored when exploring this issue. Yet, doctrines as the prohibition of the abus de droit, 
contrary to the abuse of rights, among others, confirm that it is possible and important to attach 
negative legal consequences to abuses committed by private actors, including not recognizing 
the result of abuses, sanctions, and obligations to repair.304 Those consequences in no way can 
lead to denying rights of offenders and the necessity of proper responses by authorities and 
norms that sufficiently protect victims. 
According to the previous idea, some aspects of privacy are protected by international 
norms protecting human dignity, which at the same time oppose abuses against the dignity of 
others perpetrated in a private context. Therefore, the rights that protect privacy persist, and calls 
for protecting victims in private contexts must not lead to ignoring them or subordinating their 
enjoyment to fulfilling duties, something that can pervert the system.305 Duties to protect 
individuals in private contexts, and responsibilities for violations committed in them, are better 
strategies than conditioning the enjoyment of some rights. As all responses to violations, they 
must respect the principle of legality and human dignity, being it both necessary and possible to 
do so while protecting victims. 
                                                     
303 See, among others, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, op. 
cit., para. 89; answer of Philip Alston to the question on the human rights of persons who violate human rights, found 
in: http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/qna/alston.asp (I disagree with one aspect of his answer, that in 
which he identifies individual violators with criminals, because not every violation of human rights amounts to a crime 
and because crimes can well be simultaneously human rights violations, as recognized by Lauterpacht, as seen in: 
Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 36-37). Furthermore, see European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi 
v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, 28 June 2011, para. 212. 
304 Cf. Michael Byers, op. cit., p. 400; 325-327; Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun to the Judgment of the 
International Court of Justice in the Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, op. 
cit., paras. 32-36. 
305 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, supra, pp. 1-2, 4-5 
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After all, we are dealing with inherent rights306 that protect essential aspects and 
entitlements derived from dignity that protect personal and private life and convictions. Some 
examples of those rights, truly important, are the right to the protection of the family; freedoms of 
thought, of conscience and of religion, manifested for instance in conscience objections; or the 
right to privacy. Privacy aspects protected by human rights have public relevance given dynamics 
related to exchange of ideas and manifestations of beliefs, and also because of their nature as 
human rights. The recognition of those rights constitutes a historical achievement and forbids 
violations against them, that are contrary to the inner worth of an individual.307  
Conditioning or denying those rights, contrary to what human dignity features demand, 
could pave the way for abuses and the imposition of totalitarian majoritarian or minoritarian (when 
minorities have the respective power) religious or secular ideologies or decisions ignoring 
individual freedoms. These risks of conditioning human dignity guarantees, contrary to the 
inherent and non-relational nature of human rights, are to be averted.  
The risk is high given the temptation that some may have to manipulate interpretations so 
as to deny freedoms of opinion and expression of those with whom they disagree. It must be 
stressed that the freedoms of opinion, expression and beliefs protected by human rights cover 
religious and non-religious beliefs, and that no one should suffer being intimidated for his 
conscience.308 The double standards that some may have when they decry some ideologies 
while promoting their conceptions in a forceful way may also generate risks.309 
As mentioned above, privacy rights do not confer freedoms to abuse, and protection must 
be given from abuses in relations between private parties. Therefore, private actors neither have 
nor ought to have a “sphere of immunity.” Accordingly, international bodies and authors have 
                                                     
306 Cf. Rita Joseph, op. cit., at 233. 
307 Cf. Robert John Araujo, “Conscience Protection and the Holy See”, Ave Maria International Law Journal, 2009, 
pp. 7-17. 
308 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, op. cit., paras. 9, 11, 48, where it is mentioned that “All 
forms of opinion are protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or religious nature […] 
[freedom of expression] includes political discourse, commentary on one’s own and on public affairs, canvassing, 
discussion of human rights, journalism, cultural and artistic expression, teaching, and religious discourse […] it would 
be impermissible for any such laws to discriminate in favour of or against one or certain religions or belief systems, or 
their adherents over another, or religious believers over non-believers” and vice versa, it should follow. Moreover, 
see articles 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 12 of the American Convention on uman 
Rights, 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights, XXII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man, 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, or 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
Robert John Araujo, op. cit. 
309 The Constitutional Court of South Africa has considered that “the dignity of the parents may be negatively affected 
when the state tells them how to bring up and discipline their children and limits the way in which they may express 
their religious beliefs”, as mentioned in Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 105-
106; articles 26.3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where it is mentioned that “[p]arents have a prior 
right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.” 
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recognized how private and public non-state actors can violate human rights even in private 
relations and that individuals must be protected accordingly.310  
For this examination to be complete, however, it must be added that clashes of rights do 
not necessarily amount to violations of rights. As will be discussed, sometimes those conflicts can 
be resolved by proportionality tests or other mechanisms.311 Certainly, in some events rights that 
protect privacy and personal freedoms may clash with other human rights or among themselves.  
These are complex cases that are tackled by some domestic legal systems by balancing 
rights and using a proportionality test, although authors as Dawn Oliver argue that balancing is 
not always convenient and may be detrimental to some rights in the long run. For this reason, 
some jurisdictions have opted for having recognizing indirect horizontal effects of human rights. 
This opinion also explains why that author argues that tensions of the sort being described should 
be solved by decisions made by “politically accountable” entities. This assertion, to be 
satisfactory, should provide guidance on “how” those decisions must be reached, which in my 
opinion presupposes the need to not engage in the “total denial” of a human right in practice 
when solving conflicts, to not permit abusive exercises that attack the human dignity of others, 
and to resort to a balance analysis that recognizes the two prior elements. 
Other authors discuss that authorities, frequently domestic ones (due to factors as 
limitations of international supervisory entities), must conduct a proportionality analysis, taking 
into account however whether the rights that are clashing are relative or absolute, because if two 
                                                     
310 See, among others, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Preliminary Observations of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights after the visit of the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Afro-Descendants and 
against Racial Discrimination to the Republic of Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134, Doc. 66, 27 March 1999, para. 46 
(“The armed actors in the conflict -- guerrilla groups, security forces, and paramilitary groups -- have committed 
human rights violations and serious breaches of international humanitarian law against the civilian population”); 
European Court of Human Rights, Case of Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment, 9 June 2009, para. 159; Ilias Bantekas and 
Susan Nash, op. cit., p. 14; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, 
Judgment, op. cit., paras. 166, 172; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., 
para. 140; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, May 30, 1999, 
para. 89; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, pp. 43-44, 47-53, 56-58, 70-73; Human 
Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 
op. cit., para. 4; Committee Against Torture, Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, op. cit., para. 6.5; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 03/08, Human 
Rights of Migrants, International Standards and the Return Directive of the EU; Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Press Release No 06/09, IACHR Condemns Killings of Awá Indigenous People by the FARC; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release No. 35/07, “IACHR expresses its repudiation of the deaths 
of eleven legislators held as hostages by the FARC in Colombia”, where the Commission said that “the taking of 
hostages constitutes a serious crime, prohibited by the standards of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, and urges armed groups that continue to illegally hold numerous civilians in Colombia to respect 
their lives” (emphasis added); European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment, op. cit., paras. 94, 104, 131; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 
Judgment, op. cit., paras. 208, 218-219, 232-233, 285, 287, 319;  European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, 
Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 45; European Court of Human Rights, Case of N. v. Sweden, 
Application no. 23505/09, op. cit., paras. 30, 34, 55, 60, 62; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 20, op. cit., paras. 11-12, 24, 28, 37-40. 
311 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 92, 97-99. 
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of the latter are in conflict, in principle they must be protected “in all circumstances”, although 
sometimes inevitable choices “may have to be made between conflicting absolute rights”, as 
commented by Jonas Christoffersen. Other authors, as Xiaobing Xu, highlight that balancing 
conflicting rights is complex and entails ascertaining whether the weight of each right is to be 
taken into account, or whether utilitarian or rights-calculus considerations are to be employed, 
being those elements criticized by authors such as McCloskey and Waldron due to how they run 
counter to the ideals and the defense of human rights.312  
Andrew Clapham, in turn, tells how some authors have put forward the idea that conflicts 
between rights can be solved by authorities whenever there are causes of (legal) action, while 
some judges have put forward the idea that rights are to be balanced taking into account the 
details of each case, including factors as the public character of a service offered by a non-state 
entity that enjoys human or fundamental rights, the absence or presence of which may tilt the 
proportionality analysis to one side or the other. Clapham himself considers that all conflicts must 
be solved and that considerations as seriousness of the consequences of a given outcome, along 
with its impact on the respect of values (and principles regarding their protection) as dignity or 
democracy must be employed.313  
Concerning these ideas, Xiaobing Xu comments that conflicts of human rights have: 
“[U]sually two types of results: either one of the conflicting rights overrides the other, or a compromise 
is reached between the conflicting rights […] There are plenty of methods to resolve [conflicts of 
human rights]. From the point of view of judicial practice, Aharon Barak, Israeli Supreme Court  
President, has divided them into two categories: one is principled balancing, the other is ad hoc 
balancing.  The former may be applied in future  cases  while the latter may not.”314 
Whatever strategy is adopted, it is necessary to not ignore that when opposing parties 
have human rights and guarantees that are inherent and non-conditional they cannot be ignored 
or considered to disappear, especially because the “total denial” of a human right is not 
permissible when it is restricted,315 and it is neither possible when solving conflicts of such rights. 
Additionally, I put forward the idea that if in a conflict or tension or rights it is detected that a given 
manifestation or exercise of a right would be contrary to the human dignity of the other party, for 
example because the latter would be treated as means or his inner worth would be seriously 
attacked, then that manifestation (not the right itself as a whole, which cannot be denied 
                                                     
312 Ibid.; Dawn Oliver and Jörg Fedtke, Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study, Routledge, 
2007, pp. 18, 508-509; Dawn Oliver, “Human Rights and the Private Sphere”, UCL Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 
1, 2008, pp. 10-15; Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 108-111; Xiaobing Xu, “On Conflict of Human 
Rights”, Pierce Law Review, Vol. 5, 2006, pp. 40-53. 
313 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 529-531. 
314 See Xiaobing Xu, op. cit., pp. 40-42. 
315 See Rita Joseph, op. cit., at 239. 
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completely) should not be allowed to prosper, because it is abusive and contrary to the 
foundation of the human rights framework and its goals. 
Sometimes, in conflicts of fundamental rights the opposing parties are public or private 
actors with such rights (as discussed in Chapter 5, infra). In those events, it is convenient for legal 
mechanisms that address the conflicts to take into account the fundamental rights of the private 
entities even when they are considered to provide public services, as for instance entities that 
operate in the health field are considered in some countries.316 This is so because even if 
internationally their acts can engage the responsibility of States in accordance with the law of 
international responsibility, those entities are not part of the State structure.317 That being said, 
their position makes those private entities prone to being burdened with several human rights 
obligations, as examined in Chapter 6.  
Nonetheless, to my mind human dignity and rights should be attached priority and 
prevalence in case it conflicts with other values and rights, such as those that benefit private and 
other actors different from individuals. 
Yet, when fundamental rights of private entities clash with human rights, sometimes a 
proportionality test may be conducted due to formal requirements (taking into account what was 
just said), especially when the fundamental rights of non-individual entities are recognized in a 
framework that protects both human rights and fundamental rights of non-state entities (that 
despite being called human rights sometimes are ontologically fundamental and not human rights 
because they benefit non-individuals), as happens in the European regional system318 or in the 
                                                     
316 Regarding this, one can argue that the State, that contingent construction, is not equated with society, being 
human relations and interactions rich and surpassing the walls of this cultural and social construct that can never 
pretend to subsume or be identified with the whole of society –and, in fact, in a globalized world, and even before it, 
allegiances, identities and links are not limited to the State, and the freedom of conscience of individuals must be 
respected, both directly and indirectly, i.e. without forcing them to do what goes against their firm beliefs that are 
respectful of human dignity by means of trying to coerce institutions they found or participate in into doing what they 
regard as evil-. On identities, see Alfred Van Staden and Hans Vollaard, op. cit., pp. 167-168. On the other issues 
see, for example, http://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/alfonsollanoescobar/ARTICULO-WEB-
NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-9929110.html (last checked: 16/12/2011). In my opinion, domestically considering private 
actors as State agents may lead to complicated situations in which the freedom of conscience of members and 
founders of a given entity is compromised by the imposition of the ideology and beliefs of the ruling party or political 
leaders in a given country on the private entity in question, thus being the ideological imposition detrimental to 
pluralism and indirectly affecting the freedom of association and conscience of some individuals, as confirmed by the 
possibility that attacks against the freedoms of legal or juridical persons can indirectly affect human rights, as 
accepted by entities such as the Human Rights Committee or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 
General Comment no. 31 of the former or the Case of Cantos v. Argentina decided by the latter, as explained above.  
317 Article 5 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts mentions that “[t]he 
conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of 
that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.” 
318 See articles 34 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
1 of the (first) Protocol to the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Cantos v. Argentina, Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 
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U.S. or Colombian legal systems,319 for instance. Such a test is also called for by substantive 
considerations when human rights can be indirectly affected in connection with the rights of 
collective entities, to ensure that they are not rendered ineffective. 
It is also necessary to consider that the separation of public and private dimensions is not 
always absolute, and that as expressed before, rights protected in the private sphere have public 
dimensions and consequences, something unavoidable since individuals enter into relationships 
with others, willingly or not, and may affect them. After all, we are political beings and have a 
social nature. In this regard, for instance, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
considered that the freedom of expression has both an individual and a social component.320 
In sum, it is necessary to protect individuals in their dignity from all aggressions, be it 
concerning the protection of aspects of privacy or of others, while at the same time prohibiting all 
abuses against that dignity given its comprehensive protection, even when committed in a private 
context, bearing in mind that sometimes fundamental rights may clash and those conflicts must 
be solved in a careful manner, ensuring that human rights are never fully limited.  
The idea that freedoms and rights of every individual ought to be protected against all 
threats, both public and private, and that thus individuals have a sphere of protection, which does 
not endorse abuses, is compatible with both the contemporary conception of human dignity and 
with the value-based Kantian conception of dignity. 
What has been explored in this section allows me to conclude that human dignity is 
currently the basic legal foundation of international human rights lato sensu and of human 
guarantees and demands protection from non-state abuses. If it were not their foundation, it 
should be adopted as such de lege ferenda, because it is the only one capable of ensuring a non-
conditioned comprehensive protection of all human beings that respects and recognizes them 
and calls for protecting them from all abuses. After all, the legal value and principle related to the 
                                                                                                                                                            
op. cit., para. 29; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Bernard Merens and Family v. Argentina, Report Nº 
103/99, 27 September 1999, para. 16 and footnote 2. 
319 Cf. John Finnis, op. cit., pp. 8-9 (where a critical analysis of the situation in the U.S. is presented); Constitutional 
Court of Colombia, Judgment T-201/10, 23 March 2010, section “i- Las personas jurídicas como titulares de la acción 
de tutela”, where the Court stresses that the mechanisms available under Colombian law to request the protection of 
fundamental rights can be employed by legal persons in regard to those rights that they can enjoy, since fundamental 
rights are not identical to human rights; Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment T-184, 4 March 2004, section 
“3.1 Los derechos fundamentales de las personas jurídicas y la acción de amparo”, where the Court holds that some 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Colombian legal system are exclusively enjoyed by human beings; that legal 
persons can enjoy some of those rights as well and request their protection; and that sometimes by protecting legal 
persons the fundamental rights of individuals are protected indirectly. 
320 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment, 6 February 2001, paras. 
146-155; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. 
Chile, Judgment, 5 February 2001, paras. 64-69; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 
Compulsory Membership in an Association prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (arts. 13 and 29 
American Convention on Human Rights), 13 November 2005, paras. 30-35. 
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protection of dignity has legal consequences that fully support and demand the protection of 
human beings against all threats. Norms based on human dignity must therefore be interpreted 
taking into account those implications (that exact goals to be achieved) and its features. 
However, it must be admitted that theories that propose alternative foundations have 
been proposed, such as some based on the concept of emancipation, as that put forward by 
Michael Goodhart and other authors. Some of these theories claim to seek the same goal sought 
herein: to protection of human rights from non-state (and other) violations, and will be examined 
in the next section. Yet, it must be said that from a theoretical standpoint certain interpretations of 
some of these theories would not ensure the protection of individuals from all threats, not even 
against some State abuses when individuals interact through an actor more powerful than the 
State.  
Some of the proposed alternative theoretical justifications of human rights, as 
utilitarianism or feminism, also fall short of the comprehensiveness and fairness that a system 
based on human dignity have, either because they overemphasize the role of the State, ignoring 
events when it has no ability to exert control over non-state violations, or because by focusing too 
much on one set of potential victims or some violation dynamics they may ignore some events 
that the dignity approach does address given its express universality and emphasis on the 
inherent and equal dignity of all individuals, which is contrary to leaving some victims unprotected 
or to recognizing the importance of only some victims while ignoring or underestimating others. A 
dignity-centered framework insists on protecting all human beings against all threats. 
Notwithstanding, I consider that while many of these theories partly satisfy the protection 
demands of individuals or are otherwise limited, excluding victims from a scope of protection, 
reason why the concept of human dignity is preferable as a legal foundation, they deserve to be 
studied and often have conclusions that must be accommodated or taken into account in the 
framework based on human dignity, in case they are compatible with it and are not as clearly 
stated in it. Besides, the concepts those theories handle can often complement the principle of 
human dignity, reason why they are neither to be understood as its alleged replacements nor as 
irrelevant. The next section will examine these issues. 
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1.2. Proposals about human rights foundations different from human dignity: functional 
approaches to human rights, emancipation, utilitarianism, and feminist approaches 
Taking into account the many problems posed by State-centered conceptions for the full 
protection of human rights,321 it is not surprising that authors have sought to defend protection 
from non-state abuses and discuss foundations, policies or theories capable of overcoming those 
conceptions. These theories are important because they try to defend suffering and vulnerable 
victims who would be unprotected under a State-centered scheme. 
One among the theories that have been sought to protect human rights from non-state 
actors and are not directly and expressly based on references to human dignity is that proposed 
by Michael Goodhart in his article on “Human rights and Non-State Actors: Theoretical Puzzles.”  
Reflecting on how unjustified it would be for human rights law to remain silent and fail to 
protect all victims, he considers that some prejudices of liberal paradigms of human rights may 
have led to the perception of some scholars and practitioners that human rights are supposedly 
concerned exclusively with individual-State relationships. Accordingly, the author argues that 
problems ensuing from this can be overcome with a change of perspective: instead of 
concentrating on relationships supposedly relevant for human rights, he suggests shifting 
attention to the functions of human rights. Goodhart considers that these functions are twofold: 
“guarantee[ing] freedom or emancipation322” (emphasis added). 
Elaborating on this pragmatic approach to human rights law, Michael Goodhart defines 
the aim of his idea of emancipation as follows: that “people are subject to no arbitrary or 
unaccountable authority323”. Consequently, he considers that whenever someone is subjected to 
illegitimate power, she ought to be entitled to claim human rights protection no matter what the 
identity of the offender is. While not necessarily adhering to Goodhart’s theory completely, the 
rationale he puts forward that human rights must protect individuals from abuses of power or 
authorities is certainly one advanced by many authors and supervisory bodies.  
In this way, for instance, Joseph Raz considers that while human rights can be invoked in 
relation to multiple actors, they are identified by their being opposable to States and exacting 
duties from them, thus upholding an element of their invocation vis-à-vis authorities.324 Anne 
                                                     
321 Some authors defend such a conception based on extra-legal and legal grounds, believing either that an 
extension beyond the scope of protection offered by this framework is unadvisable because it would empower 
illegitimate non-state actors or allow States to provide legal justifications to abuses of their own; or that such an 
extension cannot find room in the international legal system due to what they perceive as problems related to the 
subjectivity of certain actors or their having international obligations and other legal burdens. 
322 See Michael Goodhart, op. cit., at 36. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Cf. Joseph Raz, “Human Rights without Foundations”, in Samantha Besson and John Tasiou, The Philosophy of 
International Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 328-329, 332, 334-335, where the author argues that “human 
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Peters, in turn, considers that actors that exercise authority internationally, for instance because 
their powers are granted or transferred to them by States, are to be checked and regulated from a 
constitutionalist perspective.325  
I do not disagree with those conclusions: certainly, it is necessary that entities with power 
or positions of authority (formal or not) are obliged to respect human dignity (and, sometimes, to 
ensure its protection, as discussed in Chapter 6). However, the scope of the protection of human 
rights will be unduly limited if protection from authorities is regarded as their only concern. This is 
so because non-state entities can violate guarantees and rights founded upon human dignity 
without having either a normative or a de facto position of authority. Thereby, the basis of the 
protection of human rights cannot be limited to emancipation, because this would exclude some 
victims from legal protection and so run counter to the universal protection of human dignity. 
Rather, it must focus on protecting all victims and human beings, even when they are harmed by 
entities with no formal or informal authority whatsoever, as required and made possible by human 
dignity and the solidarity with all victims that is so dear to human rights ideas. 
Therefore, I believe that however well-intentioned the theory described above may be, 
while its conclusions must certainly be taken into account, it is unadvisable to fully adopt it as the 
only basis of human rights protection or as a full replacement of the implications of a theory 
grounded on human dignity. First of all, it inverts the logic that should guide the justification of a 
comprehensive protection of human dignity. Parting from this goal as an a priori statement, the 
proposal goes on to assert that emancipation and freedom do in fact provide a protection that 
Goodhart considers more inclusive than what the traditional State paradigm offers and, for this 
reason, he believes that it is by focusing on those functions that it is possible to come up with a 
better framework of human rights protection.  
Nonetheless, by starting from an emotional (understandable and laudable) goal, it 
ignores what constitutes the true starting point: human worth. Had this overarching goal been the 
express starting point, the syllogism would necessarily lead to the conclusion that however 
                                                                                                                                                            
rights [are] rights which set limits to the sovereignty of states […] I will continue to treat human rights as being rights 
against states. But I do not mean that human rights are rights held only against states, or only in the international 
arena. Human rights can be held against international organisations, and other international agents, and almost 
always they will also be rights against individuals and other domestic institutions. The claim is only that being rights 
whose violation is a reason for action against states in the international arena is distinctive of human rights, 
according to human rights practice […] Individual rights are human rights if they disable a certain argument against 
interference by outsiders in the affairs of a state […] setting limits to Sovereignty […] is the predominant mark of 
human rights in human rights practice […] Human rights are moral rights held by individuals. But individuals have 
them only when the conditions are appropriate for governments to have the duties to protect the interests which the 
right protect.” 
325 Cf. Anne Peters, “The Merits of Global Constitutionalism”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16, 2009, 
p. 46. 
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necessary it is to offer protection against abuse of all positions of power, this function is related to 
one of the many areas in which protection must be given, because individuals can be harmed in 
their essential entitlements not only when they are subject to de facto or normative authorities,326 
but also when individuals are the ones in a position of power or when such a kind of hierarchical 
relationship does not exist at all. Thus, in a deductive way, we must infer that if there is a legal 
purpose to protect human dignity, law has to grant protection from all violations of human dignity, 
which may take place in scenarios where there is no abuse of power involved (and also in them). 
Ironically, the approach being discussed may offer protection to more victims but end up 
with the same flaw of State-centered paradigms: being too limited by excluding some victims; and 
may also lead to thinking that entitlements not dealing with emancipation or certain freedoms are 
not human rights, despite their protecting dignity aspects. Moreover, there are risks that such 
theories could be invoked by authorities to elude some of their positive obligations, including 
those of protecting human rights from non-state abuses that are not committed by entities with 
power or authority. 
Actually, Michael Goodhart himself hints about the limitations of an exclusively 
emancipatory paradigm when he argues that his theory is useful in to distinguish human rights 
violations and crimes. In his opinion, crimes do not amount to violations when they do not 
address abuses of power.327 A legal and theoretical analysis dismantles this opinion, since some 
crimes committed outside of “systematic” patterns of subjection are considered human rights 
violations. Some human rights violations are contrary to domestic private law and non-criminal jus 
gentium, and crimes, torts and wrongful acts committed in situations of equilibrium of power may 
also amount to human rights violations, which as always must be tackled. Some appropriate 
responses found in domestic mechanisms can effectively protect the rights being affected.  
After all, the Human Rights Committee mentioned in General Comment no. 31 that while 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not have “direct horizontal effect” 
                                                     
326 Concerning this, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities acknowledges that in the current 
context there are some entities, such as some international organizations, that can have powers and capacities that 
impact directly on the enjoyment of human rights by persons with disabilities as a result of their scope and content, 
and accordingly permits them to be bound by it. While other non-state entities can act in a way that impacts directly 
on the enjoyment of those rights as well, the decision to permit the direct regulation of the conduct of those 
organizations answers perhaps to their role as functional authorities that have a position that is also shared by States 
sometimes and explains their direct duties in turn. This, however, does not imply that direct obligations cannot be 
imposed on other non-state entities, being international criminal norms that protect human dignity examples of the 
possibility of directly binding other entities. Additionally, indirect mechanisms of protection against other non-state 
entities may be put in place. Moreover, the Convention acknowledges that parties to it, be it States or international 
organizations, have duties to “ensure that public authorities and institutions act in conformity with the […] 
Convention” and to prevent and respond to State and non-state discrimination against persons with disabilities. See 
articles 4, 43 and 44 of the Convention. 
327 See Michael Goodhart, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 36-38. 
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and does not impose direct obligations on non-state entities, State parties to it are bound to 
prevent and respond to non-state abuses, which can be done for instance by mechanisms of 
“domestic criminal or civil law” with direct horizontal effect, as implicitly manifested by the 
Committee.328 
It is thus clear that international crimes may affect human rights, but the conception of 
when this happens held by Goodhart is narrow for reasons stated above. In any case, on the link 
between human rights and criminal law, some international supervisory bodies, as the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, state that while their competences under existing positive law 
are limited to examining the behavior of State parties (although some international supervisory 
bodies can oversee the actions of international organizations and bodies, as happens in the 
European regional system or concerning rights of persons with disabilities),329 the judgment of 
individual acts constitutive of human rights abuses may pertain to other -international or national- 
bodies, as criminal Courts and Tribunals.330 The Inter-American Court has even considered that 
there are “certain criminal acts that constitute […] grave violations of […] human rights”.331 
Likewise, concerning the link mentioned in the previous paragraph, certain norms 
protecting human rights call for the criminalization of some violations.332 Their underlying rationale 
                                                     
328 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 8. 
329 As permitted for instance by Protocol 14 to the European Convention of Human Rights, a proper interpretation of 
the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights or by the framework of the protection of persons with 
disabilities permit. See, among others, articles 1, 11 and 12 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, 33, 34 and 59 of the European Convention on Human Rights, or the amendment to 
article 6 of the Treaty on European Union provided in article 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community; Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, op. cit., para. 4. 
330 See, for instance, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, para. 56; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, 30 May 1999, paras. 89-90; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 122; 
Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Miguel 
Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment (Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 2 August 2008, 
para. 83; Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio García Ramírez to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the 
Miguel Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment (Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 2 
August 2008, para. 21. 
331 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, op. cit., 
para. 148. 
332 This is envisaged, inter alia, in articles 4 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 5 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 4 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Dissapearance, article 146 of 
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 3 of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, IV of the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 7.c of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, 7 of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear 
material, 3 of the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, 2 of the 
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents, 2 of the International Convention against the taking of hostages, or 1, 3, 8, 10 or 12 of the 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation of 2010, all of which require 
the enactment of domestic norms outlawing certain acts. 
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is that the conduct they address are to be criminalized because of how they threaten the 
enjoyment of certain human rights, violating human dignity; and that law should not be limited to 
sanctioning only violations attributable to an authority and protect only their victims, but rather 
focus on the content of rights in all relations. 
 Prejudices may lead some to think that only State agents can commit some conduct the 
criminalization of which is required by treaty-law. While this is sometimes true, they can frequently 
be also committed by non-state actors or be perpetrated with their assistance and cooperation.  
The Committee against Torture, for instance, righty considered in the case of Elmi v. 
Australia that in some situations non-state actors can commit torture as defined in the treaty it 
supervises, and likewise the European Court of Human Rights has concluded that non-state 
entities may act in a way that is contrary to the prohibition of torture “or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”333 Another international supervisory body, the Committee on Human Rights, 
estimated that it was competent to examine the conduct of international non-state entities in 
territories administered by non-state entities in light of human rights, arguing that the recognition 
of rights in favor of the population located in those territories is protected irrespective of changes 
of authorities therein, even if they are non-state (as happened with the UNMIK in Kosovo).334  
Some may think that since in cases as those just described the non-state actors 
resembled States in some ways and their conduct was examined, the emancipation theory is 
correct. However, this merely confirms that non-state entities can have power, which must be 
controlled. Yet, non-state human rights responsibilities are not limited to events in which they 
resemble States or have authority, as confirmed by the independent international commission of 
inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and in doctrine.335  
                                                     
333 Cf. Committee Against Torture, Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, op. cit., paras. 6.4-7, especially paragraph 6.5; Redress, “Not only the State: Torture by non-
State Actors: Towards Enhanced Protection, Accountability and Effective Remedies”, the Redress Trust, 2006, pp. 
17-18;  European Court of Human Rights, Case of N. v. Sweden, Application no. 23505/09, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 
51, 54-62; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, op. cit., para. 
213, where the Court held that “Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, Article 3 of the Convention 
may also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, 
it must be shown that the risk is real” (emphasis added). The European Court has also mentioned that “As regards 
the question whether the State could be held responsible, under Article 3, for the ill-treatment inflicted on persons by 
non-state actors, the Court recalls that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the 
Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken 
together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction 
are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment 
administered by private individuals”, as seen in: European Court of Human Rights, Case of Opuz v. Turkey, 
Judgment, op. cit., para. 159. 
334 See Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, op. cit., para. 
4. 
335 See Tilman Rodehäuser, “Progressive Development of International Human Rights Law: The Reports of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic”, EJIL: Talk!, 13 April 2013, available 
at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/progressive-development-of-international-human-rights-law-the-reports-of-the-independent-
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Turning to an analogous subject, some argue that domestic violence against women and 
children may be committed only in patterns of male-female or adult-child subjugation, being them 
the only ones in which protection from that violence may be given. Yet, this is not always the 
case: the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Right, 
among others, have considered that domestic violence can negatively affect the rights of 
individuals of both genders –and all ages-,336 and that violence is certainly contrary to the dignity 
of all those victims, who must therefore be protected.  
For example, isolated violent acts of one partner may violate the human rights of the 
other without the former necessarily being in a position of de facto power. Whatever the case, the 
violation demands that the victim is protected even if such a position is not found, because all 
human beings must be protected from outrages against their dignity, and cannot be excluded 
from that protection, as required by the principle of non-discrimination, which is peremptory and 
includes the prohibition of discrimination based on sex or age, among other conditions (the 
argument on non-discrimination is expanded upon in Chapter 3).  
This is the kind of logic that must guide the interpretation of measures and strategies that 
tackle patterns of violation, because while special measures may focus on specially affected 
persons, all the other individuals who do not belong to that category can still be victimized and 
must be protected, being some alternative of protection means acceptable if they are effective. 
After all, all violence must be condemned. According to Amnesty International: 
“The purpose of our campaign is not to portray women as victims and stigmatize men as 
perpetrators, it is to condemn the act of violence itself. That will require all of us to change, not only 
as organizations and institutions but as individuals […] Violence against women [and any other 
                                                                                                                                                            
international-commission-of-inquiry-on-the-syrian-arab-republic/ (last checked: 9 May 2013); Human Rights Council, 
Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/19/69, 22 
February 2012, para. 106. 
336 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, 
Merits Report, op. cit., para. 94, where it is mentioned that “[s]tudies and investigations […] reveal that women 
constitute the majority of domestic violence victims in the United States”, thus accepting that men can also be victims 
of such violence, characterized by the context where it takes place rather than being determined by gender, although 
it is to be accepted that women tend to suffer this form of violence more than men and thus special measures of 
protection must be designed, being it yet contrary to the human rights of male victims to ignore their plight and rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights has actually expressly mentioned that “The Court acknowledges that men may 
also be the victims of domestic violence and, indeed, that children, too, are often casualties of the phenomenon, 
whether directly or indirectly.” This remark is true and brave because some feminists deny its existence, which is 
actually either naïve or treacherous, and does not deny the possible need for special measures that protect women, 
which should never come at the expense of denying the rights of men lest they are discriminated against. The quote 
is found in: European Court of Human Rights, Case of Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment, op. cit., para. 132. Actually, some 
feminists have held that “men generally are not the victims of sex discrimination,  domestic violence, and sexual 
degradation and violence” (emphasis added), implying that they sometimes are or can be victims in those cases, as 
seen in: Hilary Charlesworth et al., “Feminist Approaches to International Law”, American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 85, 1991, at 625. 
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human being, I might add] will only end when each one of us is ready to make that pledge: not to do 
it, or permit others to do it, or tolerate it, or rest until it is eradicated”337 (emphasis added). 
Certainly, children and women abused domestically must be protected from human rights 
violations committed against them by private entities as individuals, as mentioned by the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights;338 but so must everyone else be 
protected, whether a violation takes place in the public or in a private context. Having all victims 
inherent worth, all of them must receive effective protection and the recognition of their rights and 
victimhood. If this is ignored, dynamics of victim competition and re-victimization, among others, 
can be generated.339  
Granted, as advanced above, special situations of vulnerability may call for special 
measures that tackle patterns of violations that affect especially vulnerable individuals, as 
discussed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and other entities.340 
Apart from justifying special measures of protection, vulnerability also serves as the basis 
of the development of specialized human rights norms that protect especially affected rights, 
individuals,341 or that offer protection from relevant actors that engage in violations. The design of 
such specific norms permits to take account of special needs of protection of some groups or 
against some offenders. 
                                                     
337 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 122. 
338 See European Court of Human Rights, Case of Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 74, 86, 132, 142, 144-
145, 147, 159, 187-191; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, 
Judgment, op. cit.; paras. 255, 395-396; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan 
(Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, Merits Report, op. cit., paras. 111-113, 122-134; European Court of Human 
Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 41, 45-46, 50. 
339 Cf. Luc Huyse, “Victims”, in David Bloomfield et al. (eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook, 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003, pp. 61-62, 64-65. 
340 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, 
Merits Report, op. cit., paras. 110-114, 127, 129, 130, 132-134, 168; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. cit.; paras. 252-255, 395; European Court of Human Rights, 
Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 45; European Court of Human Rights, Case 
of Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 159, 164, 200. Special measures of protection, as well as general ones 
that do not focus on the needs of vulnerable rights or groups, must include both measures to prevent violations and 
mechanisms to protect victims and address offenders if a violation takes place. Additionally, such measures must 
respect the principle of legality, and fundamental rights of alleged offenders. See Chapter 5 and its section 5.2, infra; 
and European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 185-
187; or Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, 
22 October 2002, para. 5, among others. 
341 Concerning the specialization of human rights, it has been mentioned, for instance, that “[t]he rights enumerated 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in a perfect world, would be enough to protect everyone. But in 
practice certain groups, such as women, children and refugees have fared far worse than other groups and 
international conventions are in place to protect and promote the human rights of these groups. Similarly, the 650 
million people in the world living with disabilities—about 10 per cent of the world’s population—lack the opportunities 
of the mainstream population”, as found at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/questions.shtml#one (last 
checked: 20/12/2011). 
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Returning to the analysis of some emancipation theories, if we consider that some 
violations may occur with there being no relationships of subjugation among those involved, and 
that there may be a balance of power between victim and offender, it is possible to conclude that 
emancipation is but part of the purposes of human rights, which must protect individuals in events 
beyond its scope given the inherent and equal worth of all victims. Curiously, ultimately every 
violation amounts to an abuse of some power (at least factual, understood as capacity). Yet, this 
is not what some ideas that seek to tackle hierarchical or unbalanced exactly relationships have 
in mind. 
On the other hand, international human rights supervisory bodies and norms have 
examined the vicarious responsibility and positive duties of the State, that must prevent and 
respond to non-state violations, even private ones,342 given the existence of a horizontal effect of 
human rights. In this regard, it has been considered that a State that fails to exercise due 
diligence will have its responsibility engaged in connection with non-state violations, which may 
be criminal or not and be responded to appropriately and proportionately. Were we to follow an 
approach based exclusively on the notion of emancipation described above, some could consider 
that private abuses do not qualify as human rights violations given the absence of a hierarchical 
relationship, which would undermine ambits of protection widely accepted nowadays. 
For example, according to Goodhart, some conduct that is contrary to the respect of the 
family are not really human rights issues, despite the recognition of the human right of protection 
of the family, simply because he stresses the absence of a hierarchical or power abuse against 
freedom or emancipation in connection with it.343 Such train of thought would be contrary to 
currently recognized human rights that protect ambits of dignity and ignores how human rights 
issues can manifest in different forms and be likewise tackled in various forms –idea defended by 
Goodhart himself-, including for example non-adjudicatory and extra-legal mechanisms (that 
nonetheless may have a positive impact on humanitarian legal goods) besides judicial 
mechanisms,344 some of which may take the form of civil action of innocent spouses, for instance. 
                                                     
342 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 87-91; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, op. 
cit., para. 140. 
343 Michael Goodhart, op. cit., pp. 35-38 
344 Cf. Ibid., p. 37; Part II, especially Chapter 8, infra; Oscar Schachter, op. cit., at 853-854; Amartya Sen, op. cit., at 
345; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, 
Principles 27 through 31; James Griffin, op. cit., at 355; or provisions that call for the use and adoption of legislative, 
administrative, judicial, social, educational and other measures to protect human rights and make norms that protect 
human dignity effectively, such as articles 4.1.a, 15 and 16 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 9 and 15 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 of the Convention against Torture 
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This rebuts his assertion that claims by those individuals are not relevant from a human rights 
perspective. 
Two additional ideas are worth considering. In the first place, as can be seen in the 
description of some cases examined by international bodies, the idea of protecting individuals 
from abuses of power regardless of who commits them is important. Among other reasons, this 
has allowed some international supervisory bodies, constrained by their limited competence 
under treaties drafted with a State-centered logic, to interpret their powers as allowing them to 
examine some non-state abuses, thus giving them the opportunity to increase the number of 
victims they can protect, which is quite significant for victims who would otherwise find no venues 
of protection due, for instance, to domestic incapacity or unwillingness to examine those abuses. 
Secondly, to be fair I do not criticize the whole theory of Michael Goodhart but those 
aspects of it that would lead to removing existing human rights protections (e.g. concerning 
criminal protections and family rights) and fail to protect some victims. However, it is worth 
stressing that he indicates emancipation alongside freedom as functions of human rights.345 To 
my mind, ensuring freedom can be understood in a way that is not limited to protection from 
abuses of power. The problem is his express exclusion of certain current guarantees, but it is true 
that emancipation is and must be one of the goals of human rights. 
Arriving at conclusions similar to those held by Goodhart, James Griffin considers that 
human rights are to be protected from all actors that have de facto authority over individuals, 
including for instance parents in relation to their children, especially because the value of 
personhood would be vulnerable in those relationships.346 Deeming that the notion of human 
dignity is too vague, Griffin attaches importance to the normative agency dimension of individuals, 
and argues that his theory offers an alternative proposal, including his conclusions on what 
entities are to respect human rights.347 
As discussed concerning the theory of Michael Goodhart, I do not challenge but actually 
endorse the idea that authorities –whoever they are- must respect human dignity. Different 
decisions confirm the idea that authorities, State or not, must abide by human rights standards. 
This can be concluded from the study of decisions addressing non-entities with administration 
functions in territories (as the UNMIK) or actors that exercise de facto authority and can mistreat 
individuals, who must be protected from all acts that inflict suffering and from actors with 
                                                                                                                                                            
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1 and 2 of the “Protocol of San Salvador”, or IV.b  
and VII of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 
345 Cf. Michael Goodhart, op. cit., p. 36. 
346 Cf. James Griffin, op. cit., at 343. 346-347. 
347 Ibid. 
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functional or factual authority or powers that enable them to abuse human rights. What I disagree 
with is the reductionism of the two theoretical constructions described above, because despite 
requiring protection from all actors with positions of authority, they tend to fail to demand that 
protection against abuses of other entities, which can also act against human rights and 
guarantees. The crux is whether dignity is disregarded, not by whom, be it a State or an authority 
or any other actor, as required by the universality of the protection of human beings.  
What is more, even if for the sake of discussion were I to say that I agree with James 
Griffin on his criticism of the alleged vagueness of the notion of human dignity due to difficulties of 
explaining what the inner worth of individuals is (truth be told, I disagree with this criticism for 
several reasons),348 the fact that the inner worth of individuals does not depend on circumstances 
or contingencies, as for instance the nature or identity of a potential offender against whom 
protection is to be given, proves that dignity is not an altogether vague or irrelevant notion, and 
that at least some elements of it offer some precision and/or guidance that permits to conclude 
that there is a need of practical ways in which its protection can be implemented. Moreover, I 
consider that insisting on the inner worth of everyone and his not deserving to be treated as 
means is neither irrelevant nor deals with completely empty considerations. 
Furthermore, with due respect I deem that the theory put forward by Griffin has some 
problems, because by stressing that human rights are to protect “normative agency,” even 
against all entities that can threaten it, including formal and informal authorities, something is 
missing. By endorsing his theory, what would be missing would not be the lack of clear content 
due to vagueness, which is what he criticizes about functional accounts,349 but rather the 
complete protection that human rights based on dignity can offer: the account he offers restricts 
some protections that human rights can offer, which is a shortcoming of some purely-functional 
accounts.  
It must not be ignored that human rights serve multiple purposes and dimensions of the 
inherent and non-conditional worth of human beings. Such protection would be incomplete if 
human rights and guarantees were only enforceable vis-à-vis authorities or only served to protect 
normative agency. 
                                                     
348 The alleged deficiency of this notion is questionable, because if it truly is an intuitive notion verbal descriptions 
may not fully explain it, despite which it may be understood in some level of perception. Additionally, difficulties 
concerning its comprehension do not detract from its relevance, as those who claim or benefit from human rights law 
will surely attest. On the intuitive understanding of human dignity, see Oscar Schachter, op. cit., p. 849; Roberto 
Andorno, op. cit., at 6; Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where it is said that “The way one can detect [human dignity] is often 
said to be by intuition as direct recognition […] there might be an independent justification for the contemporary 
paradigm [of human dignity] – be it commonly shared intuitions, or a plausible argument for an absolute value of all 
human beings.” 
349 Cf. James Griffin, op. cit., pp. 341-346, where the author holds that both substantive and functional elements are 
necessary in order to ascertain what claims can be made by invoking human rights. 
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For these reasons, for example, Kant’s account of dignity, placing too much emphasis on 
the willful generation of maxims and imperatives, or philosophical accounts that attribute 
foundational relevance to volitional aspects, may be manipulated by and lead some to ignore the 
protection needed and deserved by human beings that, due to mental illness or early stages of 
development, are precisely more vulnerable and in need of protection and do not display those 
aspects. Yet, their belonging to humankind makes them worthy of demanding and/or deserving 
the same respect and protection that other human beings are recognized to be entitled to claim, 
lest we endorse a selective system that incurs in contradictions and exclusions, which is contrary 
to the very values and goals that human rights law claims to endorse. 
Another alternative account of the foundation of human rights is utilitarianism, which has 
been described with both positive and negative conceptions. The former suggests that it is the 
role of law to serve public utility, in order to maximize the happiness or welfare of the greatest 
number of individuals subject to it; while the latter approach considers that this theory may prove 
to be too risky because States or authorities entrusted with implementing law may impose a 
viewpoint of happiness on individuals and commit abuses when doing so, and that for this reason 
what ought to be pursued is to make as many persons as less unhappy as possible.350 
Both theoretical models could serve as bases for claims of protection from non-state 
threats to a certain extent, because striving for the happiness or wellbeing of individuals likely 
requires eliminating the possibility of non-state violations or adopting measures against violations 
that are committed; whereas the negative approach certainly demands out of consistency 
eliminating the consequences of non-state threats, which increase the suffering and thus the 
unhappiness of persons.  
Some of the shortcomings of utilitarianism, however, are its generalizations and 
overemphasizing the consideration of the merely instrumental role of extra-legal considerations or 
the instrumentality of the ultimate duty holder, which the State and other lawmakers in a given 
legal system are: indeed, it is the State which usually must strive to deal with non-state violations 
for this theory, which could be reflected in the obligations of States found in human rights treaties. 
However, in the current global landscape States have lost part of their power and influence, and 
non-state actors having acquired hard, soft and systemic power, having some of them economic 
power that rivals that of many States. Thus, non-state actors are often in a position that permits 
them to pressurize for lower protection standards; are better suited to operate in a globalized 
                                                     
350 Cf. Suri Ratnapali, Jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 31, 37, 155-156; R. N. Smart, “Negative 
Utilitarianism”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 67, 1958, pp. 542-543.  
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landscape more freely than States; can evade controls of legal systems due to their formalities 
and separation from others; and may form alliances even to further illicit activities.  
For these reasons, States and international organizations alone are often unable to 
effectively protect individuals unless they operate in an integrated, cooperative and contributive 
manner.351 Yet, sometimes drug-cartels, guerrillas and other groups can commit violations with 
the State not having the power to prevent them from occurring or to hold them accountable.352 In 
those events, if they fail to address abuses with diligence despite having striven, States would not 
breach their positive human rights obligations (of means).353 The panorama is complicated since 
even informal groups as the G8 can have an impact on the enjoyment of human rights,354 and 
formalistic notions as their lack of personality, coupled with their influence, which facilitates their 
elusion of regulation of their conduct, certainly do not help.  
Insisting on a State-centered paradigm often implies making it impossible for victims to 
have access to effective remedies when they are abused by non-state actors, because the 
domestic system is not able to ensure effective protection in all cases. In consequence, instead of 
focusing on duty holders, it is by focusing on the rights-holder (the individual with inherent dignity) 
that a comprehensive and truly complete protection of human beings can be designed, and the 
                                                     
351 See Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 4, 34, 46; Celestino del Arenal, op. cit., pp. 27-28, 34, 52-53, 
64-66; Anna Badia Martí, supra, at 319-320, 324, 336-338, 342-343; Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126; 
Sandra Lavenex, supra, pp. 377, 388; Alexandra Gatto, supra, at 423. 
352 See Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126. 
353 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, op. cit., paras. 245-249, 255; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 243, 
252, 254, 258; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, 
op. cit., paras. 123, 126, 134; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et 
al. v. United States, Merits Report, op. cit., paras. 122-134; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Opuz v. 
Turkey, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 129-130; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Mastromatteo v. Italy, 
Judgment, 24 October 2002, para. 68; European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. 
Slovakia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 50; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 
Judgment, op. cit., paras. 219, 221, 249; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, 
Judgment, 24 February 2011, para. 184, where the Courts discuss the fact that positive obligations of authorities 
(States or others, it must be clarified, even if not expressly mentioned in those judgments, due to the 
acknowledgment in case law that those obligations also bind other actors) are duties of means and that resources 
problems are to be taken into account, alongside knowledge of risks and other elements, in order to ascertain 
whether the respective authority acted with due diligence regarding their positive duties against non-state threats and 
materialized violations. 
354 It can be said that powerful informal networks or groupings may factually impose their decisions on third parties 
(without an authority or legitimation to do so) by means of making their members operate in formal channels and 
pretend to elude liability by invoking their “informality” or legal “non-existence”. Their power and legal impact call for 
their accountability. About such groups, the problems they pose, some (insufficient) attempts at increasing their 
legitimacy in some cases, and the impact of the decisions adopted by these groupings in formal fora, see Benedict 
Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, op. cit., pp. 7-8, 21-22, 28; 
Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceiçao, Katell Le Goulven, and Ronald U. Mendoza, “How to Improve the Provision of Global 
Public Goods”, in Inge Kaul et al. (eds.) Providing Global Public Goods, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 27, 32, 
53-54; Celestino del Arenal, op. cit., pp. 56, 80; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso 
General, op. cit., at 56; Armin Von Bogdandi et al., “Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards 
a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities”, German Law Journal, vol. 9, 2008, pp. 1385-1386, 1389. 
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respective design must take into account a variety of demands and implications derived from 
human dignity, which may not be considered in utilitarian theories.  
Moreover, all individuals has dignity, and attaching priority to notions of general wellbeing 
may lead some to ignore their needs and entitlements, contrary to the fact that human rights and 
guarantees have among their functions the protection of human beings from all violations, 
including those attributable to majorities355 –and minorities as well-. On top of that, concepts as 
happiness may be even more elusive than that of the inherent worth of dignity (which must be 
respected and protected by policies and decisions eventually adopted on the basis of utilitarian 
considerations for them to be fair and legitimate). Moreover, as described in a persuasive manner 
in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, notions of general social ‘happiness’ (which may be 
understood as joy, pleasure, or in other ways, not being an unequivocal term) may be at odds 
with individual rights and freedoms. 
Being related to the previous ideas, it has been pointed out by authors as Amartya Sen 
that there is a difference about what is central for the utilitarian and the human rights-discourses. 
While for the former utility occupies a central position, the latter attaches central importance to 
“the basic importance of human freedoms and the obligations generated by that diagnosis.”356 
This difference in emphasis certainly is relevant, because only the dignity-centered discourse 
necessarily makes the individual the center of norms devised to protect her inherent rights 
through different mechanisms, including complementary non-legal mechanisms that can help to 
achieve that purpose. As a result, the human rights logic seeks to grant individuals complete 
protection and take the inherent and essential needs of every single human being always into 
account, something that is not ensured under a utilitarian stance. 
Lastly, it can be mentioned that utilitarianism places too much emphasis on benefiting 
majorities, and this may make their adherents forget that sometimes “benefiting” majorities can be 
harmful to individuals (belonging to minorities or not) and be contrary to their dignity. The fact that 
something serves interests of either a majority or a minority says nothing about the respect of 
human dignity and the enjoyment of guarantees founded upon it. 
Other authors have argued that autonomy can be considered an alternative or additional 
overarching principle of human rights, instead of or complementing human dignity.357 Rather than 
deeming it a foundational principle, I think that the respect of autonomy is a guarantee that flows 
from dignity, rather than being the general foundation of all human rights, and consider that the 
                                                     
355 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 16. 
356 Cf. Amartya Sen, op. cit., pp. 325-326. 
357 Cf. David A. J. Richards, “Rights and Autonomy”, in Carlos Nino (ed.) Rights, New York University Press, 1992, at 
210; Carlos Santiago Nino, The Ethics of Human Rights, Clarendon Press, 1991, at 187. 
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contrary assumption entails some risks: first of all, because attaching greater importance to the 
concept of autonomy or arguing that its protection by a right is a condition for it to be a human 
right may lead to considering that dignity-derived rights are not human rights if they are not 
directly based on autonomy. Therefore, the guarantees offered by the human rights framework 
may be narrower if lawmakers and authorities refrain from considering rights as human rights 
when they are not directly based on autonomy. 
Some risks of making autonomy a foundational value are risks of exclusion, because 
even though it is said that all human beings are potentially autonomous, some may take 
advantage of the concept to deny the human nature or basic entitlements of some human beings 
due to their not having an apparent or current autonomy,358 something contrary to the idea of 
rights founded on dignity and the right to have rights and recognition. For this reason, dignity 
proves again to be the best and proper foundation of a universal framework of the protection of 
the inherent and non-conditional worth of all human beings.359  
Certainly, autonomy does play a very important role in human rights law, as evinced by 
the analysis of several academic studies and of guarantees offered by multiple human rights, but 
rather than constituting the sole or prevalent foundation of those rights, it constitutes a value, 
principle and legal good that defends and flows from that dignity, which is the kernel and crux of 
the system: lack of manifestations of autonomy by human beings thus do not deny their dignity 
and human rights. 
Feminist theories, on the other hand, have also put forward ideas regarding the 
protection of human rights from non-state threats. I agree with some insights they offer, but 
consider that uncritically adopting a wholly feminist stance (especially concerning the most radical 
feminist opinions) would be problematic, and that is necessary to maintain human dignity as the 
foundation of the human rights framework. Some feminist proposals declare that they seek to end 
unjust aspects of law rather than to completely justify a comprehensive human rights defense of 
all human beings in practice, and thus do not offer complete bases of a human rights system, 
                                                     
358 To my mind, ideas of supporters of abortion that allude to the bond of the preborn with the mother to deny 
recognition to the latter (despite the fact that dependence does not equate with lack of independent existence) are 
properly considered by as contrary to the right to the recognition of personality that all human beings have and a 
treatment of the unborn as “objects”, and similar in logic to practices of Roman law concerning some human beings 
and of regimes that supported, permitted or condoned slavery. In my opinion, this highlights the importance of 
founding human rights on the inherent dignity of every member of humankind, whose belonging is not dependent on 
external recognitions, conditions, convenience of others, or any other external or relational consideration. 
Cf. Rita Joseph, op. cit., pp. 66-68, 78, 213-214-218, 228-230. 
359 This was discussed before, taking into account the insights found in: Emily Kidd White, op. cit., p. 7; John Finnis, 
op. cit., at 10; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 7. 
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while others put forward arguments that may be misleading, fallacious360 or even contrary to 
human rights. 
According to some feminist theories, some international norms, including human rights 
norms, would presumptively offer protection to individuals in situations in which men are likely to 
be victims, thus benefiting them, instead of granting protection to women when they are 
vulnerable. Because of this, they argue, international law favors men and “patriarchal” models.  
I would like to begin the analysis of some of those theories by saying that I agree with 
Fernando Tesón when he considers that the aforementioned feminist criticisms are partly 
unsound and unfair, but that still their insistence on the need to offer protection from private 
violations is valid and must be addressed.361 However, I consider that it must be clarified that 
such protection is needed not only when women are victims (holding so would be discriminatory, 
actually) and must be offered to any human being victimized by any entity.  
Concerning this, I deem it important to recall that some human rights and criminal norms, 
treaties and case law362 expressly address situations in which (currently) women are especially or 
frequently (but not exclusively) victimized, such as domestic violence, rape or sex-based 
discrimination; and that in other cases women have access to the same instruments of protection 
from victimization that men can invoke. In fact, prohibition of discrimination, of which protection 
from gender discrimination is a component, is part of jus cogens and a central component of 
human rights law that benefits all human beings, being it necessary to avoid temptations of 
                                                     
360 E.g. Some feminists say that women will rot in the streets if abortion is not legalized due to the risks of unsafe 
abortions: this argument ignores that “legal” abortions (contrary to human rights in any case, in my opinion) can be 
unsafe, and that abortion should not be procured (and may have negative repercussions on women), being there 
other alternatives that may help mothers and the unborn. This argument is like saying that the mafia should be left 
free to operate and protected in their vendettas, because otherwise they face risks, and that thus criminals should be 
allowed to kill safely. Cf. “How to magically make abortion “safe”, available at: 
http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/abortion/how-to-make-abortion-safe-like-magic/ (last checked: 22/12/2011); 
“Women who have had an abortion are three times more likely to have breast cancer”, available at: 
http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/abortion/women-who-have-had-an-abortion-are-three-times-more-likely-to-
get-breast-cancer/ (last checked: 22/12/2011); “Major study on abortion/mental health risk under attack, but criticisms 
baseless”, available at: http://www.lifesite.net/news/major-study-on-abortion-mental-health-risk-under-attack-but-
criticisms-base (last checked: 22/12/2011). 
361 Cf. Fernando R. Tesón, “Feminism and International Law: A Reply”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 
1993, pp. 655, 658-664. 
362 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 162-164, 175-176; articles 1 
through 3 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, among others, 7.1.g, 
8.2.b.xxii, and 8.2.e.vi of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 3.g and 4.e of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5.g of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 4.2.e of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 76 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
1), 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or 27 of the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, among others. 
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forgetting or not protecting some of them.363  After all, all violations of human dignity must be 
effectively dealt with, given its universality and required effectiveness. 
Additionally, to my mind the claims of some feminists that they either represent the 
opinion of women (being it doubtful that they represent all women) or that their ideas benefit all 
women are not always true.364 
Truly, paying special attention to the needs and circumstances of vulnerable victims is 
necessary, but this is valid not only concerning women but also migrants, children and other 
vulnerable persons; and at the same time every human being is still protected by norms and 
considerations on general human rights and guarantees. It is worth mentioning that, as 
mentioned above, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights have accurately declared that domestic violence can be committed by either men 
or women, and accordingly action and protection from all such and any other non-state abuses 
must be given. Excluding men from this protection, or giving them less effective protection, would 
be discriminatory and endorse their victimhood, favoring their re-victimization.365 Moreover, the 
principle of non-discrimination expressly demands taking into account special needs of women or 
any other category of human beings, being all of them equal, while calling for protecting everyone 
effectively.366 
To their credit, it must be said that it is correct for some activist groups to focus on 
women’s rights, just as others focus on the rights of indigenous peoples, children or persons with 
disabilities, since their expertise and focus may make them contribute to their promotion; but this 
over-concentration should by no means be adopted generally and systematically or normatively. 
Additionally, it is to be acknowledged that feminist theories have rightly pointed out how there are 
or may be practices or norms that exclude subjects from the scope of normative protection or 
recognition that accordingly ought to be addressed and modified, not necessarily in order to 
empower or protect only women.367 
                                                     
363 On these issues, cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and 
Rights of Undocumented Migrants, op. cit., paras. 86-88, 98-101.  
364 Additionally, some feminist claims are actually detrimental to the essential rights of some human beings while 
others employ charged terminology created or supported by that ideology to strengthen their viewpoints (sometimes 
employing ad hominem, argumentum ad verecundiam, or ad baculum fallacies, among others). 
365 Cf. Luc Huyse, op. cit., pp. 61-62; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. 
Colombia, Judgment, 15 September 2005, para. 238; Preamble to the Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal 
Court, where it is mentioned that the States Parties to that Treaty are “[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of [grave] crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”. 
366 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of 
Undocumented Migrants, supra, paras. 78, 85, 88-89, 102-104; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, 
Non-discrimination, 11 October 1989, paras. 1, 4, 7-10, 12-13; European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 
Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, 16 March 2010, paras. 149-150. 
367 See Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 62-63. 
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Thirdly, some feminist theories tend to be reductionist and one-sided, in the sense that 
they help to create an imaginary account according to which women apparently seem to be the 
exclusive or most vulnerable potential victims of violations that are not effectively addressed, a 
discourse that is imprinted in the subconscious of the public through repetitive messages. 
Discourses that overemphasize one side and lead to ignoring the other can prompt biased 
policies that do not consider the needs of all victims, who always, because of their human 
identity, are worthy of protection and entitled to it. Moreover, abuses committed in private 
contexts are already required to be prevented and sanctioned by international human rights law, 
which not only protects ‘male interests.” 
Fourthly, many feminists claim that women are necessarily best placed to evaluate their 
demands, and that thus arguments by others according to which feminist claims ignore other 
victims or endorse violations of rights are to be dismissed. This is nothing but an ad homine 
fallacy that defies logic and the capacity of critical evaluation by others, and also that all points of 
view must be contrasted and examined, including those of defendants of the rights of other 
persons that might be ignored by feminist claims. Additionally, this sort of reasoning ignores that 
arguments are not sound based on who expresses them but because of their content. 
Additionally, sometimes those who claim to defend the interests of affected persons may be 
partial, biased or wrong. 
Ironically, while some feminist arguments are certainly sound and truly seek to protect 
women and their equality, some feminists further proposals that make others vulnerable to 
violations by non-state actors, as happens when they selectively treat some interests and call for 
legalizing the killing of both preborn and newborn babies, both of whom are considered by some, 
myself included, to have human rights368 (while often rightly opposing –another- State-ordered 
death penalty).369 Thus, some feminist ideas do not offer an all-encompassing approach that 
protects all victims from all threats, and are not as inclusive as they pretend to be. The person-
centered approach that recognizes the inalienable worth of everyone, on the contrary, favors and 
demands protecting everyone, with no exclusions whatsoever and not being based on the 
protection of only some victims or to the detriment of others. 
                                                     
368 See the San José Articles, available at: http://www.sanjosearticles.com/?page_id=2 (last checked: 27/12/2011); 
article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights; “Does the International Right to Life Prohibit Abortions?”, 
available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/25/does-the-international-right-to-life-prohibit-
abortions/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+opiniojurisfeed+(Opinio+Juris) (last 
checked: 26/12/2011). 
369 Cf. Rita Joseph, op. cit., pp. 27, 94, 250, 285, 294; “Shock: No jail time for woman who strangled newborn 
because Canada accepts abortion, says judge”, available at: http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/judge-rules-no-jail-
time-for-infanticide-because-canada-accepts-abortion/ (last checked: 27/12/2011); How to magically make abortion 
“safe”, available at: http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/abortion/how-to-make-abortion-safe-like-magic/ (last 
checked: 27/12/2011). 
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When studying the horizontal effects of human dignity or the protection against non-state 
abuses, draft norms, decisions and authors as Reinisch or Clapham often insist that States retain 
their (positive and negative) obligations,370 which certainly benefit women and others. 
Additionally, according to the principle of equality, reasonable differential treatments are be 
allowed and may justify different measures designed for dealing with victims of different actors, as 
long as every victim is effectively protected by law.  
Feminism is ideological in many regards, and dignity should not be subject to political 
games,371 reason why I disagree with its adoption as an official human rights policy, not being it 
necessary to adopt it or share it to protect everyone from non-state and other abuses. However, it 
is true that some feminist theories have ideas defended in this text as well, such as seeking a 
greater legal inclusion and protection of human beings from multiple abuses.372  
To conclude this section, I consider that human dignity demands a comprehensive scope 
of protection, and that it is not only the current but also the best possible foundation of human 
rights and guarantees. Nevertheless, other proposals have interesting insights, some of which are 
complementary to or accommodated in the normative framework based on human dignity, reason 
why their examination is so important, even if some of their points are not shared by some.  
This being clarified, it is necessary to analyze one dilemma: if for one conception of 
dignity, as the Kantian one, individuals are not to be treated as mere means, how can restrictions 
of rights and other measures allowed or even required by human rights law against non-state 
threats be justified? Would this constitute ignoring the finalistic nature of men and women? On 
the other hand, is it convenient to explore if the legal protection of human dignity has something 
to do with what Myres McDougal called an international law of human dignity? Such questions 
are examined in the next section. 
 
                                                     
370 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., at 78-82; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, 
Judgment, 4 July 2006, para. 141; Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., at 339; Alfred Van Staden and Hans 
Vollaard, op. cit., at 181-184; Section A.1 of the Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12, 26 August 2003; Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, 
A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 70. 
371 Thus, I cannot agree with Andrew Clapham’s insistence on the idea that human rights “are” political. See Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., p. 130. 
372 Cf. Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 62-63; Fernando R. Tesón, op. cit., pp. 
657-661. 
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1.3. Dilemmas of the protection of human dignity from all threats and the normative 
character of the protection of human dignity 
As seen in the previous sections dealing with human dignity, several of its features make 
it not only admissible but also necessary to protect human rights and guarantees from non-state 
abuses. Still, States and other authorities retain their responsibilities and must be diligent and 
cooperate with different actors to protect individuals from non-state abuses, whether they have 
transferred competences of their own or not.373 Additionally, it is possible that their responsibility 
is engaged alongside that of other actors, out of complicity or due to their having simultaneous 
principal responsibilities.374  
Besides not entailing the elimination of State duties, creating non-state responsibilities 
and legal burdens, including those addressing individuals, with the aim of protecting human rights 
and guarantees, is not contrary to the concept of dignity and is allowed by law, as long as 
fundamental rights and peremptory law are respected and tenets of human dignity as not 
conditioning the enjoyment of essential rights are observed.  
From an ethical point of view, following Kantian ideas, Amartya Sen considers that 
human rights place both perfect and imperfect obligations on others, being a perfect obligation 
the duty to refrain from materially or factually violating the right, and the imperfect obligations 
duties derived from the responsibility to prevent or deal with violations committed against 
someone else.375 Breaches of the so-called perfect obligations are clearly contrary to the respect 
owed to human dignity (see section 1.1, supra), and legal and complementary mechanisms must 
deal with the problems they pose. 
(Inherent) Dignity of X  (Inherent) Rights of X  Ethical duties (perfect or imperfect) of all to 
respect the rights of X  necessity of discussing how to regulate those ethical duties 
Figure 2: Scheme of duties flowing from rights, which are based on dignity 
In fact, just as human rights flow from human dignity, from the existence of those rights 
and dignity arises the need to forbid and delegitimize acts contrary to them committed by anyone. 
Before analyzing in detail why law and theory permit and even demand some restrictive 
                                                     
373 See August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 78-82; European Court of Human Rights, Press Unit, Factsheet on Case law 
concerning the European Union, 2010, at 3, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA6F3298-FE75-
48E7-B8A7-F9C5FF5EB710/0/FICHES_European_Union_EN.pdf (last checked: 27/12/2011). 
374 Cf. Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, paras. 419-420; Antonio 
Cassese, “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. 
Belgium Case”, op. cit., p. 864; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, op. cit., para. 56; 
Article 16 of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
375 Cf. Amartya Sen, op. cit., pp. 321-322. 
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measures to protect rights without this contradicting human dignity, it is necessary to examine 
why they require measures against non-state violations in general terms. 
From a theoretical standpoint, if one considers that dignity is inherent to every human 
being and thereby independent of States and normative systems and their recognition, a State-
centered system that limits the relevance and effects of human rights to relationships with States 
must be dismissed. This conception certainly can be conceived from a natural law approach, one 
I ascribe to, or alternatively can be found in some liberal376 and political conceptions, as those 
enshrined in the American Declaration of Independence, that mentions that: 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed” (emphasis added). 
The conviction that protection from the multiple threats to the enjoyment of human rights 
must be ensured can be translated into normative terms, because the normative features of rights 
and guarantees protecting dignity require, out of consistency and due to requirements of 
effectiveness, to acknowledge that their content and enjoyment can be violated by non-state 
actors and that such (factual) violations constitute legally relevant facts, which must be addressed 
by law. In this sense, the capacity to affect legal systems and their interests must be addressed 
normatively. Moreover, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights mentioned in the Case 
of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. that non-state violations must be prevented and responded 
to by States,377 confirming their possible existence, their legal relevance and the need to respond 
to them effectively and appropriately. This can be inferred from the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, that considers that appropriate sanctions to human rights 
violations, even when attributable to non-state entities, must be implemented.378 
Concerning these ideas, the Preamble of the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance is both promising and disappointing, because it mentions that the 
General Assembly has been: 
“Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances 
occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise 
deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized 
groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or 
acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the 
                                                     
376 Cf. George Cardinal Pell, “Varieties of Intolerance: Religious and Secular”, Oxford University, 2009, pp. 6-7, 
available at: http://documents.scribd.com/docs/1aqyamje35bx7w1omesl.pdf (last checked: 27/12/2011) 
377 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, 
Merits Report, op. cit., paras. 119, 122, 128. 
378 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., 
paras. 226, 236, 245, 247, 254, 280. 
 
 
123
persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such 
persons outside the protection of the law” (emphasis added). 
The previous Preamble, belonging to a specialized regime with limitations that are not 
found in general human rights norms, also found in specialized norms against torture (the general 
regulation and criminal sanction of which recognizes direct violability by all non-state entities 
without State involvement being required, unlike some specialized norms, being it necessary to 
apply the norms that applicable offer greater protection from threats, as Cecilia Medina 
argues),379 accepts that non-state entities can carry out factual violations that are legally relevant 
and worth addressing, but unfortunately endorses a very narrow conception of what enforced 
disappearance is. This prevents it from fully achieving the aim of fully protecting human dignity, 
i.e. against all threats, given its non-conditional character, which does not depend upon the 
identity of an offender. The Committee on Accountability of Non-State Armed Groups (CALASAG) 
has expressed similar concerns.380  Fortunately, the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic considers that non-state actors are obliged to not commit any 
of the two violations referred to in this paragraph.381 
Conversely, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance has 
considered that it has no capacity to examine non-state acts resembling enforced disappearance 
and that they must be investigated and sanctioned by States.382  
However, the possibility that powerful or resourceful non-state groups elude deficient or 
even robust State controls makes it necessary to acknowledge that the liberties and rights can be 
directly protected from non-state entities. This helps to achieve two goals: a) sending a symbolic 
                                                     
379 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, 16 November 2009, paras. 5-7, 10-17, 20; European Court of 
Human Rights, Case of Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment, op. cit., para. 159; European Court of Human Rights, Case of N. 
v. Sweden, Application no. 23505/09, Judgment, 20 July 2010, paras. 51, 62; Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 20, para. 2 (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights orders protection from torture, 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment “whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, 
outside their official capacity or in a private capacity”). 
380 See Committee on Accountability of Non-State Armed Groups (CALASAG), “Not Only the State: Torture and 
Enforced Disappearance by Non-State Armed Groups”, Position Statement on the Proposed Laws Against Torture 
and Enforced Disappearance, 2009, 
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.southsouthnetw
ork.com%2Fcalasag%2FCALASAG%2520Position%2520Statement-
Petition%2520re%2520Torture%2520%26%2520Enforced%2520Disappearance%2520Bills.doc&rct=j&q=enforced%
20disappearance%20by%20non-state%20entities&ei=uJslTtPpBoqGhQeglKH6CQ&usg=AFQjCNFaj0lwcZyaL-
kSHb-1wD200u-u-A&cad=rja (last checked: 27/12/2011); http://southsouthnetwork.com/calasag_index.html. A 
relevant excerpt mentions that “From the point of view of the victims of acts of torture or enforced disappearance, 
there is no difference whether it is committed by a state or non-state perpetrator.” 
381 Cf. Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, para. 106; Tilman Rodehäuser, op. cit. 
382 Cf., Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances”, 
Fact Sheet No. 6/Rev.3, at 11, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet6Rev3.pdf (last 
checked: 27/12/2011), where it is considered that there is a principle according to which “States have the obligation 
to investigate and sanction acts similar in nature to enforced disappearance when committed by non-State actors.” 
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message that makes individuals feel recognized and protected instead of abandoned due to 
technical nuances even when domestic initiatives are not present, which sends a signal to 
potential non-state offenders about the wrongfulness of violations of human dignity; and b) 
entitling actors different from States (some of which in any case have obligatory jurisdiction) to 
cooperate in the promotion of legal guarantees of human dignity, as required by the common 
erga omnes interests and norms involved in that promotion and permitted by the fact that 
members of the world community have an interest in their integrity.383  
In turn, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court considers, in articles 7.1.(i) 
and 7.2.(i), enforced disappearance committed by non-state actors as an international criminal 
conduct that can be prosecuted by the Court, insofar as it addresses crimes committed with the 
participation of States or (other) political organizations. Compared with the position of the 
Working Group, the Statute provides a better understanding of the protection that human dignity 
deserves.384 Its position is consistent with the idea that actors different from States with 
compulsory jurisdiction over non-state violations, as the Court (which can be competent in cases 
of State failure to exercise its jurisdiction),385 can enforce or promote norms protecting human 
dignity from non-state violations.  
Paragraph 4 of the analysis of article 7.1.(i) of the Statute made in the Elements of 
Crimes confirms this consideration, although its content is somewhat limited as it only admits 
protection under the Statute from some non-state threats of enforced disappearance, namely 
those in which non-state political organizations participate.386 In practice, other non-state entities 
can engage in such conduct, not only political entities or de facto or normative authorities, as 
happens and is acknowledged regarding torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment and commented by the Commission of Inquiry on Syria.387 
                                                     
383 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, footnote 640; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 75, 77, 80-81, 83. 
384 Cf. the Preamble and articles 68, 8.2.b.xxi, and 8.2.c.ii of the Rome Statute of the ICC; Elements of Crimes 
(Elements of the Crimes of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, corresponding to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court), Elements of  article 7 (1) (i), paras. 4 and 5. 
385 Cf. article 17 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
386 Cf. Element 4 of Article 7(1)(i) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, found in the Elements of Crimes (Elements of the 
Crimes of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, corresponding to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court), where it is mentioned that the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance of 
persons is committed, among other conditions, when “[s]uch arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with 
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization.” 
387 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, op. cit., paras. 5-7, 10-17, 20; European Court of Human Rights, Case of 
Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment, op. cit., para. 159; European Court of Human Rights, Case of N. v. Sweden, Judgment, 
op. cit., paras. 51, 62; footnote 1209, infra. 
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The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance stipulates in article 3 that the State must investigate and bring to justice “persons 
or groups of persons acting without the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State” that 
commit acts of enforced disappearance as defined in that treaty. Yet, it does not declare those 
acts as non-state substantive transgressions in the international plane but orders domestic 
measures against them, reason why it is insufficient to ensure a lowest common denominator 
with which to empower international or transnational action against those violations. Naturally, the 
fact that the definition of enforced disappearance as requiring certain State participation “for the 
purposes of” that Convention is limited to that instrument makes broader general protection (both 
in substantive and procedural terms) possible, as argued above. 
When some non-state abuses, as the previous one or others, are not properly responded 
to by the international community, change is required, including changes in legal practice. As said 
in the statement in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action: 
“The acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as well as linkage in 
some countries to drug trafficking are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing 
legitimately constituted Governments. The international community should take the necessary steps 
to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism”388 (emphasis added). 
It is important to add that since from an ethical and extra-legal perspective there can be 
claims that invoke human rights even when they are not formally recognized in formal law,389 
changes of law as those referred to in the previous paragraph can be requested by claims of this 
sort with arguments de lege ferenda. It may be argued that in some events not all victims of all 
abuses are effectively protected, being it necessary for international substantive or procedural 
action to take place for that protection and make up for existing domestic law shortcomings, 
especially concerning serious abuses (see Chapter 4, infra). 
Furthermore, insisting on the alleged exclusive concern of human rights with State 
violations ignores that the State is a legal fiction, which operates through non-state actors, as 
disaggregated analyses can reveal. Additionally, throughout history, even in moments when 
theories supporting a supposed (but false) State exclusivist participation were prevalent, some 
non-state actors have had power and considerable impact on law and world society.390  
Additionally, denials of non-state human rights violations ignore that there are non-state 
entities with practices and capacities that can affect the enjoyment of human dignity-derived 
                                                     
388 Cf. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993, para. I.17. 
389 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 43-44; Amartya Sen, op. cit., pp. 326-328, 345. 
Other authors recognize a link between moral and human rights but distinguish them. See Joseph Raz, op. cit., pp. 
335-336; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., p. 17. 
390 See Pierre Calame, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
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rights and guarantees, as corporations, drug cartels, mafias or others.391 If it is accepted that 
States can violate human rights, and that those States operate through non-state actors, which 
can also affect human rights on their own and must thus be controlled, it must be concluded that 
human rights must also be protected from non-state violations. 
This is one of the reasons why an erga omnes paradigm that has effects towards all 
actors is preferable to a State-centered scheme of human rights, which is problematic and 
inconsistent with current legal demands. Revealingly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has expressed opinions that lend support to this argument, such as that according to which: 
“In an employment relationship regulated by private law, the obligation to respect human rights 
between individuals should be taken into consideration. That is, the positive obligation of the State to 
ensure the effectiveness of the protected human rights gives rise to effects in relation to third parties 
(erga omnes). This obligation has been developed in legal writings, and particularly by the 
Drittwirkung theory, according to which fundamental rights must be respected by both the public 
authorities and by individuals with regard to other individuals”392 (emphasis added). 
The need to protect individuals from all agents of violations seems to be an underlying 
assumption recognized in the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups 
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, which mentions that: 
“No one shall participate, by act or by failure to act where required, in violating human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and no one shall be subjected to punishment or adverse action of any kind for 
refusing to do so” (emphasis added). 
The previous considerations may lead to a theoretical question mentioned above: if 
individuals, who are entities different from States, can violate human dignity and their victims 
must be protected, does the creation of obligations that bind them or the restriction of their rights 
respect their human dignity? This question is related to the argument that many human rights are 
not absolute and to the fact that certain restrictions of human rights and suspensions of human 
rights obligations do not amount to suppressions or violations of those rights. 
Beginning with the notion of the non-absolute character of many rights, it is admitted that 
rights may clash or that the -abusive or not- exercise of a human right may affect the enjoyment 
of the rights of others, and that in some events balancing solutions that do not fully restrict the 
rights involved must be reached. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that some human rights, 
as the freedom of opinion and the prohibitions of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment393 and 
of international crimes against human dignity, are absolute. The other human rights without this 
                                                     
391 Cf. Ibid. 
392 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 140. 
393 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, op. cit., paras. 9-10; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto 
Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 153-157; European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 
Case of Gäfgen v. Germany, Judgment, 1 June 2010, paras. 107, 177. 
 
 
127
character can be restricted to some extent under strict circumstances for the sake of protecting 
some defined goals.394 
In fact, human rights law posits that sometimes it is necessary or possible to limit the 
exercise of some rights for purposes as protecting the rights of others or defending security and 
public order, general welfare, the existence of a political community or morals.395  
Several doctrines and principles, as the prohibition of the abuse of rights, expressly 
permit restrictions of rights, and along with the (misleadingly called) derogation (i.e. suspension) 
of human rights obligations during states of emergency, indicate that it is lawful to implement 
measures that seek to protect human rights and restrict to a certain extent some human rights 
guarantees of third parties, as long as strict conditions are met. These requirements include, 
generally: proportionality; necessity (which is not synonymous with indispensability); temporality; 
publicity; territoriality (geographical limitation to where measures are required); legality; 
notification; respect of humanitarian principles, of the formalities, and of absolute rights; and 
express permission to implement the respective restrictive measures, being there for instance 
some human rights obligations that can never be suspended.396  
Among absolute human rights it is necessary to include those with a jus cogens 
character, because they cannot be limited since no derogation or restriction of any of their effects 
is lawful and they have both procedural and substantive dimensions.397 On the other hand, it is 
                                                     
394 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 16, 83, 92, 97; Jonas Christoffersen, 
op. cit., pp. 109-110. 
395 See articles 13, 15, 16, 22, 27 or 32 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 or 18 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 4, 12, 18, 19, 21 or 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, or 11 and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,  among others; Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, op. cit., paras. 59, 64-67; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, OC-
6/86, op. cit., paras. 29-32; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., paras. 2-3; Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 34, op. cit., paras. 21, 22, 26, 28-33. 
396 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment, 16 August 2000, 
paras. 99-107; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, op. cit., paras. 36, 38, 41-47, 52; 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, OC-6/86, The word “laws” in article 30 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, 9 May 1986, paras. 13-14, 18, 20-37; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
18/03, op. cit., paras. 84, 89-93; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 83, 85, 119; 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 6; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
No. 29, States of Emergency (article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001; Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, 22 October 2002, paras. 50-55; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Judicial Guarantees in states of Emergency (arts. 
27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), 6 October 1987, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7/6) American 
Convention on Human Rights, 30 January 1987, paras. 20-40; 14-30, 42-43;articles 27, 29 or 30 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 15, 17 or 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights, or 4 and 5 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among others; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 
34, op. cit., paras. 21-36. 
397 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para. 11; articles 53 of the Vienna Conventions 
on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “La inevitable supremacía del ius cogens frente 
a la inmunidad jurisdiccional de los Estados”, Revista Jurídica de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, No. 18, 2009, 
pp. 60-61, 69-70, 74, where the existence of multiple effects of jus cogens and the constitutional, substantive and 
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interesting to note that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has mentioned that human 
rights are also protected from undue “private” restrictions.398 
Having mentioned peremptory law, while jus cogens trumps non-peremptory norms given 
their superior hierarchy, when different peremptory human rights conflict a proportionality test 
must be conducted to determine which right must give way in a certain form.399 This must be 
permitted because those are not cases in which dispositive law is invoked to restrict peremptory 
law, which is forbidden, and because if no proportionality is admitted all the clashing rights may 
end up being wholly or partially ineffective or one of them wholly denied, which is to be avoided.  
Concerning rights defended by obligations the derogation from which is not admissible 
even during states of emergency, it is necessary to determine if human rights law permits them to 
be restricted on a case-by-case basis. 
From a theoretical standpoint, it must be asked if the previous possibilities are consistent 
with the implications of human dignity. In my opinion, they are, as argued below. 
Saying that restricting someone’s human rights amounts to treating him as means is 
actually a never-ending tautological argument: if one considers that limitations are to be forbidden 
because they imply treating the rights-holder A as means to protect the dignity of another rights-
holder (B), one has but to accept that denying this restriction and entitling A to abuse B also 
implies treating B as means. The difference lies that the latter event endorses an abuse, while the 
former simply a restriction that takes into account all rights conflicts and does not fully deny rights. 
This is why lawful proportionate restrictions do not make someone an object of the other. In other 
words, in the example, denying protection from A permits A to treat B as an instrument and deny 
his dignity, something that not happens with necessary, proportionate and lawful restrictions that 
are careful to respect the dignity of all involved. After all, protection measures that restrict 
somewhat the exercise of rights are temporary and bear in mind the dignity of all. 
Moreover, when it comes to restrictions that seek to protect other human rights, the two 
complementary dimensions of human dignity, namely dignity as inherent worth and dignity as 
                                                                                                                                                            
procedural dimensions of peremptory law, that support the assertion offered here that its norms cannot be restricted 
or limited, are discussed; Kerstin Bartsch and Björn Elberling, “Jus Cogens vs. State Immunity, Round Two: The 
Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Kalogeropoulou et al. v. Greece and Germany Decision”, 
German Law Journal, vol. 04, 2003, pp. 486-488; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade to: International 
Court of Justice, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 3 February 
2012, paras. 296-299. 
398 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, op. cit., para. 48. 
399 While Jonas Christoffersen argues that conflicts between absolute norms are hard to solve, choices “may have to 
be made”, and certainly this may call for the use of a balance/proportionality analysis, in the context of which that 
author discusses these ideas. Nevertheless, it must be ensured that there cannot be a total denial of peremptory 
human rights, especially because not even total denials of dispositive human rights are permitted. Cf. Jonas 
Christoffersen, op. cit., pp. 109-111; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Fourth Progress Report of the 
Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and their Families, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, 7 March 2003, para. 99. 
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moral dignity, meet each other. This is because of the presence of the responsibility of someone 
and of the need that he recognizes the worth and rights of others, emphasized by theories 
considered as belonging to the so-called traditional understanding of dignity.400  
While these theories also talk of duties towards oneself, they should preferably be 
regarded as extra-legal to not condition the protection of human rights to compliance with such 
duties, which would run counter to the non-conditional protection of human dignity. In this sense, 
for example, I think that someone who knowingly engages in activities that put his health at 
serious risk and afterwards claims protection to his right to health should still be entitled to 
protection, but logically moral reproaches, and sanctions that do not deny the enjoyment and 
protection of that right, may take place according to law. 
Sometimes, nonetheless, certain prohibitions that seek to protect rights from the 
rightsholder and do not condition her rights may exist (e.g. concerning the right to health and its 
preservation). In relation to obligations towards others, the inherent character of the dignity of 
every human being demands the acknowledgement of the dignity of others, who share the same 
nature. As Immanuel Kant asserted, this recognition demands respecting others, as exacted by 
ethical considerations.401  
In this sense, it is convenient to remember that Kant calls for willingly subjecting oneself 
to axioms regarded as worthy of being ethical universal dictates. His theory considers that the 
respect of such imperatives is required by a complete conception of dignity, although it is 
important to note that this dignity does not disappear if someone fails to abide by its demands. In 
the words of Kant: 
“The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i.e., duty, does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, 
or inclinations, but solely on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation in which the will 
of a rational being must always be regarded as legislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived 
as an end in itself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will, regarding it as legislating universally, 
to every other will and also to every action towards oneself; and this not on account of any other 
practical motive or any future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, obeying 
no law but that which he himself also gives. 
In the kingdom of ends everything has either value or dignity. Whatever has a value can be replaced 
by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore 
admits of no equivalent, has a dignity. 
                                                     
400 Cf. Oliver Sensen, op. cit., where the author considers that “In the traditional paradigm it is therefore not dignity as 
an elevated position that grounds rights, but the further normative premise that is used to derive any duties, e.g. to 
fully realize one’s initial dignity […] One reason might be the perfectionism that is commonly connected with this 
paradigm […] In talking about human dignity, they highlight a privilege or capacity human beings have been given, 
and their emphasis is on how one should use that capacity. This emphasis stems from an underlying perfectionism.” 
401 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 536, 547; Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 22; Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and 
Realism, (2 edn.), Oxford University Press, 2008, at 45 (“on the responsibility of the individual for maintaining his/her 
personal health”); http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2012/council-of-europe/major-victory-for-life-in-europe-
euthanasia-must-always-be-prohibited/ (last checked: 30/01/2012). 
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[…] 
Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets before itself an end […] The 
principle: "So act in regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may always have place 
in thy maxim as an end in himself," is accordingly essentially identical with this other: "Act upon a 
maxim which, at the same time, involves its own universal validity for every rational being." For that in 
using means for every end I should limit my maxim by the condition of its holding good as a law for 
every subject, this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental principle of all maxims of action 
must be that the subject of all ends, i.e., the rational being himself, be never employed merely as 
means, but as the supreme condition restricting the use of all means, that is in every case as an end 
likewise. 
[…] 
Our own will, so far as we suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are potentially 
universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us is the proper object of respect; and the dignity of 
humanity consists just in this capacity of being universally legislative, though with the condition that it 
is itself subject to this same legislation” 402 (emphasis added). 
Thus, when one analyzes restrictions to rights that are necessary to protect the rights of 
others, who must be considered as ends in themselves, one must make sure that those 
restrictions do not condition their dignity but seek to defend the universality of human dignity. The 
features of the control and legality of such measures, which must protect others, presuppose the 
recognition and respect of human dignity, that generates duties of respect that must be heeded 
by third parties.  
Hence, notwithstanding the existence of some rights that cannot be restricted at all, in 
practice theories that rely on general absolute conceptions of all rights end up endorsing an 
absolutist sense of someone’s will that can disregard the dignity of others, and thus sow the 
seeds of the self-destruction and inconsistency of a human rights system that should be based on 
the dignity of every single human being. 
Apart from the previous considerations, it is convenient to also mention that theoretical 
studies have considered that it may be legitimate to prevent uses of freedom that are contrary to 
the freedom of others to protect the latter.403 Likewise, case law has recognized that some 
restrictions of rights may be lawfully resorted to in order to prevent individuals from harming other 
human beings. Regarding this, the European Court of Human Rights mentioned in the Stanev v. 
Bulgaria case that the: 
                                                     
402 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., pp. 50, 53-54, 56. 
403 See, Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice (Second Edition), Translated by John Ladd, Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc, 1999, at 31, where Kant argues that “[a]ny opposition that counteracts the hindrance of an 
effect promotes that effect and is consistent with it. Now, everything that is unjust is a hindrance to freedom 
according to universal laws. Coercion, however, is a hindrance or opposition to freedom. Consequenty, if a certain 
use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws (that is, unjust), then the use of coercion 
to counteract it, inasmuch as it is the prevention of a hindrance to freedom, is consistent with freedom according to 
universal laws; in other words, this use of coercion is just. It follows by the law of contradiction that justice [a right] is 
united with the entitlement to use coercion against anyone who violates justice [or a right].” 
 
 
131
“[D]etention of a mentally disordered person may be necessary […] where the person needs control 
and supervision to prevent him, for example, causing harm to himself or other persons”404 (emphasis 
added). 
Apart from the admissibility of restricting rights in some circumstances, it is also possible, 
as explained in section 5.2, to create correlative obligations of individuals and other non-state 
actors with the purpose of protecting fundamental and human rights of others.405 
The issue being examined is, however, more complex, because among the reasons 
expressly mentioned by human rights norms as justifiable causes of restrictions of human rights 
instruments usually do not mention exclusively the express aim of protecting rights of others, and 
it is necessary to consider if the other causes are legitimate.  
Human rights norms tend to indicate which rights can be restricted and when and how 
this may happen, either determining this in relation to concrete rights or in general norms 
addressing lawful restrictions.406 To provide some examples, it can be first mentioned that Article 
21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that:  
“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of 
this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (emphasis 
added). 
For its part, Article 16.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, dealing with the 
Freedom of Association, enunciates that:  
“The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions established by law as may be 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security, public safety or public order, or 
to protect public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others” (emphasis added). 
In turn, Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms declares: 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is 
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” 
(emphasis added). 
Some human rights treaties have general clauses that determine the conditions and 
situations in which human rights may be restricted, which are relevant when specific norms 
dealing with concrete rights do not fully regulate restrictions. When an article states requirements 
                                                     
404 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Stanev v. Bulgaria, Judgment, 17 January 2012, 
paras. 145-146. 
405 Concerning correlative duties that protect other rights, see John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., 
pp. 2, 7, 14-15, 18, 20, 27, 33-34, 37, 39-40, 47. 
406 Cf. articles 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 10.2, 11.2 or 18 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, inter alia. 
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for a particular right to be restricted, it is lex specialis and prevails over the general clauses. 
Likewise, the peremptory character of a right prevails over general clauses of restriction, which 
can never be invoked in relation to them. In its fifth Advisory Opinion, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights considered that one of the aforementioned general clauses, Article 32.2 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights: 
“[I]s [not] automatically and equally applicable to all the rights which the Convention protects, 
including especially those rights in which the restrictions or limitations that may be legitimately 
imposed on the exercise of a certain right are specified in the provision itself. Article 32(2) contains a 
general statement that is designed for those cases in particular in which the Convention, in 
proclaiming a right, makes no special reference to possible legitimate restrictions.407” 
In order to prevent abuses that could be committed taking advantage of restriction rules, 
Article 18 of the European Convention of Human Rights, for example, tries to rein in restrictions 
by declaring that: 
“The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied 
for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”  
Likewise, Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights stresses the condition 
that limitations must be in strict accordance with the purposes for which they are implemented.  
Rules of this sort seek to prevent States from relying on the invocation of a purpose with 
the intention of surreptitiously restricting rights for other reasons or abusing them. Concerning the 
problem of the protection of human rights from non-state threats, this means that it is unlawful for 
States to invoke the protection of a human right against non-state actors in order to actually 
abuse human rights or employ restrictions for purposes different from those invoked or being 
admitted by human rights law. 
The issue is complex because, as mentioned above, among the reasons that justify 
restrictions mentioned in human rights treaties there are some that do not expressly refer to the 
protection of human rights, and so it must be asked if restrictions based on those goals are 
consistent with the demands of human dignity.  
As seen in the articles cited above, apart from the protection of the rights of others, 
reasons as safety, security, public order, health or morals are envisaged in human rights treaties 
as possible justifications for human rights restrictions.  
To examine the question posited above, it is convenient to consider that justifications 
permit restrictions only when they are necessary. Furthermore, the interpretation of restriction 
clauses must take into account the context in which those articles are embedded and their 
purposes, as required by article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The 
                                                     
407 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, op. cit., para. 65. 
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protection of human dignity is the foundation of the system of the norms being examined, and 
therefore it is relevant and present even in relation to restrictions that do not expressly mention 
the rights of others, demanding that those measures respect that dignity. Moreover, those other 
justifications of permissions of restrictions can serve to protect human rights. At the very least, 
they cannot go against features and demands of human dignity (e.g. its non conditionality), 
because they form part of a system founded upon its protection. 
In this way, for example, it can be considered that situations of insecurity and civil unrest 
may permit, encourage or be conducive to violations of rights as the right to life and personal 
integrity, or that protecting the health of the inhabitants in a territory and of those who may enter 
into contact with them likewise serves to ensure their rights to life and health, among others. 
This analysis confirms the relevance of theories that condition the legitimacy of both 
States and legal systems on their respecting human dignity. Such theories consider the respect 
and protection of human beings as either the foundation, goal or condition of sovereignty, as 
Anne Peters does,408 or as the raison d’être, telos, justification and goal of States and law, as has 
been argued by Antonio Cançado and Domingo Oslé.409  
This analysis also stresses the persistent relevance of human dignity, because even 
when human rights are subject to restrictions, those measures must be consistent with human 
dignity. Moreover, these and other measures (as the ones examined in Chapter 8) can be used to 
protect the inherent worth of individuals, and usually work best when complementing other lawful 
effective measures. 
Because of how unacceptable it is to deviate from dignity through any act or legal 
manifestation, and because of the increasing reach of the legal demands it creates, that impact 
on many legal branches and actors, the protection of human dignity could be considered as part 
of jus cogens. In the end, human rights and humanitarian considerations always resort to 
considerations of human dignity; and all rights, even jus cogens human rights as the prohibitions 
of torture, inhuman or degrading treatments, slavery, enforced disappearance, or 
discrimination,410 are derived from it. Taking this into account, the legal permissibility of the 
                                                     
408 Cf. Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty”, op. cit., pp. 514, 543-544. 
409 See Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global?, op. cit., at 91, 110, 158-159, where he accurately says that (I 
would add “the wellbeing of”) individuals should not only be the end, but also the origin and center of law. Moreover, 
see Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 18-21; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 26, 38. 
410 Those rights have been recognized to belong to peremptory law, although others can also be encompassed in it 
and have superior hierarchy in relation to dispositive law. Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, op. cit., 86, 88, 97-101; ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 153-157; European Court of Human Rights, 
Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 21 November 2001, paras. 30, 60-61; Joint Dissenting Opinion 
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restriction of some human rights is not absolute, because its legality is temporary and limited, not 
being it possible for them to be used in a way that ignores the enjoyment of human rights in 
absolute terms.411 Those restrictions defend human dignity and are part of its protection, and thus 
do not deny its absolute character, just as self-defense does not deny the regulation of the use of 
force in jus gentium. 
Apart from questions of its normative hierarchy, it can be mentioned that because of its 
character and features, human dignity can be considered a value and its protection a legal 
principle,412 since the demand of that protection has a “general nature”,413 guides the 
interpretation and application of different norms, and constitutes their basis. At the same time, the 
demand of the protection of human dignity can have direct practical effects and implementation, 
such as when it is clear that a human being would be treated as means and when it can be 
clearly determined that a given conduct violates dignity, as for example concerning 
experimentations with human beings without the consent of the person subjected to them.414 
There are other events in which the solution of cases requires resorting to norms developing 
                                                                                                                                                            
of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch Joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and VajiĆ Furundzija to: 
European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 1-4; Nicolás 
Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-: la transformación de los derechos internacional y 
colombiano gracias al Ius Cogens internacional, Ibáñez, 2007, pp. 96-97; Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens 
Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 169-170 (where arguments of the identification of humanitarian 
peremptory norms similar but somewhat different from those offered in Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
No. 29, op. cit., para. 11 are offered). 
411 See, inter alia, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Fourth Progress Report of the Rapporteurship on 
Migrant Workers and their Families, op. cit., para. 99; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., 
paras. 4-5, 9-12; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, Judgment, 24 February 2011, 
para. 75. 
412 As mentioned in a note above, “Human dignity is a value, and its protection a principle.” 
413 Cf. Giorgio Gaja, “General Principles of Law”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford 
University Press, paras. 25-31 2008, available at: 
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e1410&recno=1&searchType=Quick&query=general+principles 
414 Cf. Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 5, where the author holds that “The primacy of the human being over science is 
indeed a direct corollary of the principle of respect for human dignity and aims to emphasize two fundamental ideas. 
First, that science is not an end in itself but only a means for improving the welfare of individuals and society. 
Second, that people should not be reduced to mere instruments for the benefit of science.” Additionally, see J.C. von 
Krempach, “The ECJ’s Judgment on Stem Cell Patents: a Tremendous Pro-Life Victory”, available at: 
http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/abortion/the-ecj%E2%80%99s-judgment-on-stem-cell-patents-a-
tremendous-pro-life-victory/ (last checked: 30/12/2011); J.C. von Krempach, “EU Advocate General: Human 
Embryos to be Protected as from Conception”, available at: http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/abortion/eu-
advocate-general-human-embryos-to-be-protected-as-from-conception/?s=stem+cell (last checked: 30/12/2011) –
both articles are related to: European Court of Justice, Case of Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace, Case C-34/10, 
Judgment, 18 October 2011, paras. 32-37, 48-52 (the Court said that “The context and aim of the Directive thus 
show that the European Union legislature intended to exclude any possibility of patentability where respect for human 
dignity could thereby be affected. It follows that the concept of ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) 
of the Directive must be understood in a wide sense.   Accordingly, any human ovum must, as soon as fertilised, be 
regarded as a ‘human embryo’ within the meaning and for the purposes of the application of Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Directive, since that fertilisation is such as to commence the process of development of a human being” (emphasis 
added). 
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human dignity, as those addressing rights and guarantees, given their more concrete and 
developed content, which must be interpreted in light of the implications of that dignity.415 
It is also useful to ponder upon whether the international protection of human dignity 
resembles what Myres McDougal conceived as an international law of human dignity.  
According to some, international law may be gradually becoming (at least partly) a 
system of human dignity, since the imperative of the protection of that dignity permeates many of 
its formally- and nominally-divided branches and finds expression even in some peremptory 
norms, countering fragmentation as a result.416 In turn, McDougal and Lasswell considered that 
over-relying on some doctrines of international law related to principles and norms different from 
the protection of human dignity may lead to undesirable results and abuses,417 as may happen for 
employing with exaggerated conceptions of the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, 
which have been invoked against human rights supervision by some States.  
McDougal and Lasswell’s theories can be understood to equate the concept of dignity 
more –but not exclusively- to a given way in which international relations are to be conducted 
than relating it to the direct protection of the inherent worth and inalienable rights of individuals, 
because McDougal conceived a system based on dignity as one based on persuasion and 
excluding coercion, seeking to address some of the problems of the then looming Cold War.418 
He advanced the theory of a policy approach to international law, conceived as a process that 
went beyond mere lawmaking, in which policy objectives are essential components.419  
In my opinion, human dignity is and must be beyond the uncertainties of policies that may 
be discarded in the future, and legal processes and policies ought to comply with its tenets. In 
consequence, starting from the recognition of the centrality of the non-conditional and non-
contingent demand to respect the dignity of individuals, one can identify international legal 
implications required by dignity, not only for human rights law but for the entire international legal 
system. 
As seen until now, human dignity demands protection from threats and violations. Can it 
also be considered that apart from empowering individuals human dignity also empowers other 
                                                     
415 Cf. Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 10. 
416 See, for instance, International Law Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
op. cit., paras. 10, 32-33, 42. 
417 Cf. Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, “The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public 
Order”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, 1959, at 4-5, 11, 21. 
418 Ibid., at 1, 3-6, 11, 21. 
419 Cf. Ibid., pp. 1, 5-6, 9-12, 14, 16-18, 21, 23, 28; Myres S. McDougal, “Some basic theoretical concepts about 
international law: a policy-oriented framework of inquiry”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, 1960, pp. 339-
353; Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., pp. 123-126; Math Noortmann, 
“Non-State Actors in International Law”, op. cit., at 62. 
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actors? It certainly can legitimize actions of actors that operate in the international, national and 
transnational contexts with the intention of protecting individuals. This will be explored in the next 
subsection. 
 
1.4. The legal legitimation of non-state actors that promote and defend human dignity 
The legal value-principle of the protection of human dignity, that is to be interpreted 
taking into account the principle of effectiveness, demands that the rights and guarantees based 
on it be protected completely and effectively protected. A critical analysis of lex lata in light of this 
principle indicates that human beings must be defended from non-state threats, and that 
remainders of State-centered paradigms found in norms or practice must give way to human-
centered ones. 
However, just as a system that fails to protect victims from non-state violations is 
deficient, the protection of human dignity may have few possibilities of success if it is limited to 
measures as prohibitions and duties against non-state abuses. In other words, just as protection 
must be complete from the perspective of the protected victims, it is also necessary to permit and 
encourage actions of promotion and protection of multiple private non-state actors that, besides 
States and international organizations, must be entitled to engage in such actions.  
After all, in practice non-state entities can have a positive or a negative impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights and guarantees –and law may regulate the effects and origins of such 
reality, which can also be taken into account by humanitarian actors and strategies-.420 Lest law 
fails to respond to human needs and to the maxim sic societas, sicut jus, it must be ensured that 
there are multiple options of defending individuals, especially because some measures may 
prove unsuccessful in one case and different actors must be permitted to try to support actual and 
potential victims. Therefore, contribution by non-state actors must be permitted. 
Logically, those actors are also bound to respect human dignity, since the possession of 
either rights or duties by a subject highlights how it can also have the others.421 At the very least, 
if entitlements and rights of participation are not granted in some aspects and contexts –e.g. in 
lawmaking processes-, actions of promotion are to be tolerated and not obstructed. This option is 
a valid one under international law, which is a system that may address conduct in different ways, 
not limited to the dialectic of permission and prohibition, as described by judge Simma of the 
                                                     
420 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 95-105; Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, “Looking beyond the State But Not Ignoring It”, 
op. cit., pp. 6-8, 17-18; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights 
Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights”, Fact Sheet No. 29, pp. 16-18. 
421 Cf. ASIL, Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting: The Challenge of Non-State Actors, The American Society of 
International Law, 1998, at 34. 
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International Court of Justice. Likewise, Jean-Marie Henckaerts mentions that there are 
“prohibitive, obligatory or permissive” rules.422  
That the contribution of non-state entities is to be permitted has been mentioned in the 
Programme of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance of 2001, that urges to “strengthen cooperation, develop 
partnerships and consult regularly with” civil society, and to “enable non-governmental 
organizations to function freely and openly […] and thereby make an effective contribution” to the 
protection of human rights. It also calls for expanding the role of those actors, stressing how non-
state entities can play an important role to confront violations and contribute to the respect of 
human dignity.423 Interestingly, this positive role of non-state entities and the importance of its 
permission are mentioned along with the need to make sure that private and public entities 
respect human rights.424 
That non-state entities can have a positive or negative impact on the protection or 
evolution of the humanitarian corpus juris is not only recognized in doctrine. In this regard, the 
United Nations has commented that: 
“[A]lthough some private actors are perpetrators of violations against human rights defenders, others 
provide fundamental support in addressing such acts. Transnational corporations can be a powerful 
force in assuring that rights are respected, and some corporations have adopted good employment 
policies and contributed to the economic and social rejuvenation of the communities in which they are 
established. Religious leaders have often been at the forefront of action to defend human rights and 
human rights defenders themselves. In some cases, there may be no clear-cut separation between 
positive and negative non-State actors. Business interests may contribute positively to some human 
rights but have a negative impact on others. It is essential, therefore, to look at how businesses and 
other actors respond to human rights defenders who draw their attention to the negative human rights 
impact of their activities”425 (emphasis added). 
For example, in practice an NGO can protect individuals or falsely accuse them or 
otherwise violate their rights.426 This is because ultimately any actor is a potential contributor or 
offender, and while legal burdens address non-state negative impacts, positive contributions must 
be acknowledged and permitted, given the necessity of parallel initiatives of protection (as 
explained in Chapter 4, infra). These forms of engaging non-state actors are also relevant 
because they can work as important persuasive strategies that seek to influence non-state culture 
                                                     
422 See Declaration of Judge Simma to: International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, paras. 8-10; Jean-
Marie Henckaerts, “Customary International Humanitarian Law: a response to US comments”, International Review 
of the Red Cross, vol. 89, no. 866, 2007, pp. 475-476. 
423 See Durban Programme of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance, 2001, paras. 210-214. 
424 Cf. Ibid., paras. 53, 95, 133-134, 215. 
425 Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the 
Right to Defend Human Rights”, Fact Sheet No. 29, pp. 17-18.  
426 Cf. Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. (eds.), International Law Norms, Actors, Process: A Problem-Oriented Approach, Aspen 
Publishers, 2006, pp. 214-215; Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, op. cit., at 260; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 
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and make it promote and respect human rights:427 their importance is great.  Altogether, the 
guarantees of the enjoyment of human rights and guarantees will be more robust with 
cooperating entities. 
On the other hand, just as the resources of State authorities and their closeness to 
victims, evidence and elements of a case make them important players in the protection of 
human rights from non-state abuses that can still fail, reason protection complementary to that of 
States must exist,428 non-state compliance of human rights principles out of conviction429 will 
often make it unnecessary to use certain protection mechanisms against them, which must 
nonetheless exist in case the need arises.  
As done in previous sections, to analyze the issues being explored it is convenient to 
start by studying the implications of the principle of the protection of human dignity, which has at 
least some indirect effects in multiple fields of international law. Despite the reluctant attitude of 
some international organizations, scholars and advocates have mentioned how human rights are 
to be taken into account by non-state entities as financial and trade institutions, which may as a 
result be prompted not only to respect but also to promote human rights.430 Additionally, the 
important principle of the protection of human dignity has links with different branches of jus 
gentium, such as labor law, humanitarian law, refugee law, or criminal law, among others,431 
having many of their norms the purpose of carrying out that protection.  
                                                     
427 See Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 27-32; Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 
347-348; Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 35. 
428 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through 
Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., at 38; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 2, 19, 
44. 
429 Conviction differs from coincidence or interest as factors leading to behaving as law dictates. See Harold Koh, 
"Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., pp. 2600-2601. 
430 Cf. Koen de Feyter, “The International Financial Institutions and Human Rights. Law and Practice”, in Felipe 
Gómez Isa and Koen de Feyter (eds.), International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges, 
University of Deusto, 2006; Koen de Feyter, “Globalisation and human rights”, op. cit., pp. 56, 68-76. 
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the law of the seas, or the law on the use of force, for example: the need to protect persons in distress at the seas, 
with the corresponding obligations of the coastal State, or the protection against evident threats to human dignity 
during armed conflicts, are but a couple of examples of those links. In fact, it can be considered that the practice of 
the Security Council highlights the existence of an undeniable link between peace and security and human rights, 
and that the Security Council may place obligations on non-state actors, as the International Court of Justice 
acknowledged in its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the declaration of independence of Kosovo, or permit self-
defense against them in order to secure peace and, indirectly, to protect human dignity. See Stephan Hobe, 
“Individuals and Groups as Global Actors: The Denationalization of International Transactions”, in Rainer Hofmann 
(ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, Duncker & Humblot (ed.), 1999, at 121-122; Malcolm 
MacLaren, Book Review -- Like Blind Men Feeling an Elephant: Scholars' Ongoing Attempts to Ascertain the Role of 
Non-State Actors in International Law, German Law Journal, Vol. 3, 2002, para. 27; International Court of Justice, 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, 22 July 2010, paras. 115-116, where the Court mentions that “it has not been uncommon for the Security 
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Additionally, some human rights and humanitarian guarantees have acquired the status 
of customary law or even of peremptory law. Thus, they are to be taken into account by all the 
actors that participate in any of the branches of international law, as can be inferred from the 
report on the fragmentation of international law issued by the International Law Commission.432 
The previous ideas suggest that the protection of human dignity, besides being a value 
endorsed by law that serves to evaluate law and determine changes to be made to it de lege 
ferenda, is an overarching principle and a common legal purpose and interest of the so-called 
international community, more properly called world or global community given the participation 
and relevance of both national and non-national non-state actors in the world level and their 
impact on common legal goods,433 which must be taken into account by all actors. Based on this 
conclusion, three different ideas indicating the importance of permitting the positive contributions 
and actions of non-state entities that can promote human dignity can be explored: 
a) Firstly, it must be considered that the existence of a goal of the international 
community justifies actions of actors and empower them when they contribute to achieve it. To 
my mind, this was an underlying rationale of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, that admitted 
that there may be implied powers of international organizations when they are needed to achieve 
their goals and the objectives that led to their constitution. On the other hand, the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon has mentioned that besides implied powers an international body, like a court or 
tribunal, can have inherent powers related to its mission and goals.434  
The obiter dicta and ratio decidendi of the cited judicial opinions are broad and admit the 
extension of their conclusions to other actors. For instance, the Court attached particular 
                                                                                                                                                            
Also see the Preambles to Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) and SC Res. 1373 (2001); Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, 
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10, 15-20, 31-33, 42. 
433 See Rafael Domingo, The New Global Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 53, 59, 61, 64, 76, 83-84, 100, 
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434 Cf. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 80-81; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo 
Blanch, 2007, pp. 235-236; International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
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importance to the (tautological or circular)435 consideration of what an international legal person 
is,436 which is a notion that is not limited to international organizations. 
For the Court, as international society evolves the number of actors considered as its 
legal subjects may vary, which permits dealing with its issues. This notion is reminiscent of the 
theories defending the possibility of non-state cooperation.437 I agree with the opinion of those 
who claim that some interpretations of the very concept of international legal personality may be 
misleading, confusing or overestimated,438 because entities can be bound and their conduct be 
regulated by norms addressing them even if some scholars do not consider them persons of law, 
despite which they may even be relevant participants of world and international relations.439  
When legal regulation is necessary because of the need to normatively address actors 
that can positively or negatively impact on the protection of human dignity, their conduct must be 
considered legally relevant.  
Those entities must act in accordance with the objectives of the world community, that is 
not limited to inter-State relations and interests and is concerned with international, transnational, 
domestic and world actors, dynamics and legal interests and issues, as has been recognized by 
authors as Philip Jessup and Harold Koh.440 When actors protect human dignity, they are 
furthering goals of the global community and their participation must be therefore legally 
recognized, permitted and unhindered. This logic should prevail over excuses of States and other 
actors that rely on formalistic or inaccurate interpretations of law and invoke extreme 
interpretations of notions of non-intervention, sovereignty or the absence of subjectivity or human 
rights obligations of other entities to try to delegitimize human rights non-state examinations and 
initiatives.441  
                                                     
435 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 19, 64, 74-75, where it is argued 
that holding that an entity is deemed to have personality when it has certain capacities, while holding that those 
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439 Cf. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford University Press, 
2004, pp. 49-50; Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., pp. 117, 129-131, 
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at 4-6, 21, 23; Felipe Gómez Isa, “International Protection of Human Rights”, op. cit., at 37. 
 
 
141
Additionally, what part of doctrine has considered as informal participation or participation 
outside the system by non-state entities442 when talking of actors as NGOs, is revealed to actually 
be part of the normative framework and dynamics, because their actions help to further the 
respect of legal principles and goals of the community dimension of global society. 
What happens, then, when non-state conduct is not expressly addressed by law, but may 
help to achieve and promote goals of the international legal community, including the protection 
of dignity? In those cases, such an actor operates as a participant of the system, and its 
contributions cannot be legitimately hindered, because they would be contrary to the purposes of 
the international normative system and would render its principles ineffective. In this case, the 
respective actor would be a de facto promoter of the system, substantively legitimized by it, and 
its participation ought to be protected from interference out of normative consistency. This is one 
of those cases in which absence of a prohibition does not necessarily reveal a right but perhaps a 
permission (toleration) to act unhindered, as mentioned by Simma and pointed out above. 
In any case, actors with de facto participation are in a basic position, and increasing the 
competences and formal participation of relevant actors that can contribute to protecting dignity in 
a significant way may be advisable. After all, non-state actors can not only be potential agents of 
violation but also valuable cooperators and contributors when it comes to the protection of human 
dignity. 
b) The necessity of permitting the participation of some non-state actors in the promotion 
and protection of human rights and guarantees is also based on the idea that for that protection to 
be complete and effective, there must be joint efforts of different actors and mechanisms, for the 
sake of ensuring that they complement each other and make up for the shortcomings of the 
others. Additionally, common efforts are more likely to have chances of accomplishing normative 
objectives, reason why scholars and practitioners have acknowledged how important it is to 
accommodate cooperative strategies.  
In this sense, in his theory of the international law of cooperation, the theories of 
Friedmann indicate that there may be a non-state dimension of cooperation, given the importance 
of the cooperation of several actors to further common international goals.443 Kofi Annan and 
others, in turn, have stressed that currently “uncivil” non-state actors can seize opportunities 
offered by globalization to commit unlawful acts and that it is mportant to take advantage of global 
opportunities to legally counter those violations.444  
                                                     
442 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 34-38; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First 
Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 4-6, 10-11. 
443 Cf. Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: A Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., pp. 133-134. 
444 Cf. Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, op. cit., pp. iii-iv; Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., at 320. 
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Concerning this, it can be said that one of the possibilities offered by globalization is the 
generation and operation of networks and informal associations, given the ease of 
communications and the possibility of overcoming territorial boundaries.445 From this, it follows 
that the State-centered paradigm also has to give way to a framework in which non-state actors 
increasingly cooperate in the promotion and protection of human dignity, acting jointly with States, 
international organizations and other actors. The features of many non-state actors make them 
natural allies in the protection of dignity, because some of them seek to help States fulfill their 
duties, have technical capacities that enable them to assist in the effective protection of dignity, 
and/or sometimes have greater freedom, flexibility, experience, and capacities to act in a 
globalized landscape and ignore territorial limits than States and other actors.446 
Naturally, the sort of non-state participation being examined is not to be unbound, and all 
entities must respect human dignity. In fact, the recognition of their participation would make it 
more likely for examination of non-state behavior to exist, because it is considered that the more 
rights and formal participation an entity has, the more responsibilities it has or can have. On the 
other hand, the universal standards that non-state entities demand others to comply with will be 
demanded from them out of coherency and non-hypocrisy;447 and as awareness of the possibility 
of dealing with all non-state violations increases, conscience of the need to also prevent possible 
abuses committed by those who claim to promote dignity will increase as well.  
Apart from this, given how many non-state actors that claim to act out of respect of 
human dignity argue that they represent civil society, it must be kept in mind that this is not 
always so. In fact, the representation and democratization offered by the participation of many 
non-state entities and found inside them are sometimes limited, questionable or uncertain.448 For 
instance, the standards required for participation in the United Nations allude only to democracy 
and representation towards members of NGOs. While this certainly permits many voices to be 
heard, it is necessary to bear in mind that society may not be truly or largely represented by some 
                                                     
445 See Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli and Carlos Espósito, “Los Jueces Nacionales como Garantes de Bienes Jurídicos 
Humanitarios”, REDI, Vol. LXIII, 2011, at 57; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state 
Actors”, op. cit., pp. 192-197; Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: a 
Framework”, op. cit., pp. 1-4. 
446 Cf. ASIL, Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting: The Challenge of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 21-23; Daniel 
Thürer, op. cit., at 47; Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 26; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 98. 
447 See Fred Halliday, op. cit., pp. 34-37; Pierre Calame, op. cit., at 18. 
448 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 103-104; Kenneth Anderson, “‘Accountability’ as ‘Legitimacy’: Global Governance, 
Global Civil Society and the United Nations”, Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2011-28, American 
University Washington College of Law, 2011, pp. 888-890; Daniel Thürer, op. cit., at 43, 58; “Explanation for 
Withdrawal from Amnesty and Establishment of the Benenson Society”, pp. 1, 3, available at: 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/31582041/Withdrawal-from-Amnesty-and-establishment-of-the-Benenson-Society (last 
checked: 05/01/2012). 
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of those entities, reason why it is convenient that their claims are checked by other actors,449  
both State and non-state in a critical and fair manner. 
Additionally, propaganda of non-state entities sometimes leads to confusion, and it must 
be kept in mind that there are disagreements among non-state actors concerning human rights 
issues. For example, the Benenson Society split from Amnesty International because it 
considered that the latter’s endorsement of a new policy was adopted with lack of transparency 
and democracy, and that the new policy was contrary to the philosophy of what should guide that 
NGO, and yet the new NGO claims to cooperate with Amnesty on some issues.450 This shows 
that non-state entities may check but also support each other: these dynamics strengthen the 
likelihood of protecting and promoting human rights and guarantees.  
Theories of global governance and notions of rule of law also point out how with 
increased participation, come greater responsibilities.451 Additionally, an analysis of dynamics of 
the protection of human beings indicates that it is not advisable to refuse the contribution of non-
state actors in a globalized context. Analogous ideas have been put forward in economic and 
social studies concerning global public goods, the supply of which often requires the participation 
of non-state entities during the productive and other phases.452 
Concerning those actors whose interests are mainly concerned with private, profit or 
other goals that differ from the protection and promotion of dignity,453 it can be said that nothing 
prevents them from accepting commitments and carrying out certain internally- or externally-
suggested policies that are conducive to the improvement of the protection of human dignity, as 
encouraged by initiatives as the Global Compact or some codes of conduct. Regulations that 
emerge from those initiatives may sometimes have binding legal effects or may produce legal 
effects indirectly, due to the expectations they generate for third parties and for other reasons, as 
discussed later in this text. In any case, whenever non-state regulations or actors may threaten 
human rights or guarantees, the need to protect victims is demanded by the implications of 
human dignity. 
                                                     
449 See Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1996/31, Consultative relationship between the United 
Nations and non-governmental organizations, 25 July 1996, paras. 10, 12; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 103-104. 
450 Cf. “Explanation for Withdrawal from Amnesty and Establishment of the Benenson Society”; 
http://www.benensonsociety.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=3 (“Membership and 
Structure) (last checked: 05/01/2012), where it is mentioned that “The Society would seek to cooperate on specific 
issues with Amnesty International (while not having any formal membership or link with the organisation).” 
451 Cf. Hans-Otto Sano, op. cit., pp. 137-141; Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: 
Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 9, 35-36, 39-40. 
452 See, among others, Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a  
Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 7, 9-10, 35-36, 47. 
453 Cf. Bob Reinalda, “Non-State Actors in International Relations: Do They Matter?”, in Bas Arts et al. (eds.), Non-
State Actors in International Relations, Ashgate Publ., 2001, at 2; Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: 
NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 12-15; Daniel Thürer, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 
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c) Finally, experience shows how beneficial the contribution of non-state actors has been 
for the effectiveness and evolution of the human rights system. This contribution has had an 
impact on different legal processes: regarding lawmaking, many international norms have been 
adopted as the result of campaigns and initiatives of actors as NGOs. Additionally, sometimes 
those actors can have a more direct impact on normative guarantees, as happens when non-
state actors can participate in the generation of customary law or when their opinions can be 
formally expressed in negotiations of international instruments, as happened in the lawmaking 
processes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court or the Anti-Personnel 
Landmines Convention, being there also one time in which they formally participated in drafting 
procedures, which is that of the drafting of the Convention on the rights of persons with 
disabilities.454  
Additionally, judicial, quasi-judicial and promotion human rights mechanisms have 
sometimes been effective thanks in large part to the contribution of non-state actors. This is so 
because they have provided evidence, opinions, assistance, arguments, and even triggered 
international mechanisms of supervision. In some systems, some non-state actors have certain 
degrees of jus standi or locus standi.455 Additionally, some joint-operations or bodies in which 
non-state actors participate can contribute to the implementation of the humanitarian corpus juris, 
just as they can contribute in other fields of jus gentium.456 
Even though legitimacy, expertise and flexibility allow some non-state actors to contribute 
in a relevant way to the promotion of human dignity, it must be kept in mind that non-state 
proposals in this and other contexts must be critically examined because they are not always the 
best.457 Still, previous arguments indicate that non-state initiatives that seek to protect human 
                                                     
454 See, for example, the following web pages: http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/questions.shtml#ten; 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=24&pid=151#neg1 (all checked for the last time on 05/01/2012), 
where it is mentioned that during the negotiation of the Convention “Delegates to the Ad Hoc Committee represented 
NGOs, Governments, national human rights institutes and international organizations. It was the first time that NGOs 
had actively participated in the formulation of a human rights instrument”, and that “the Ad Hoc Committee decided 
that representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accredited to the Ad Hoc Committee could also 
participate in meetings and make statements in accordance with United Nations practice.” 
455 Cf. article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Francisco Orrego Vicuña, “Individuals and Non-State 
Entities before International Courts and Tribunals”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 5, 2001; Luis 
Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 34-38; Stephan Hobe, op. cit., pp. 121-126; Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. 
Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et-al v. Peru, Judgment 
(Preliminary Objections), op. cit., paras. 24-29, 34, 42; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, 
First Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 15-17; article 5 of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure (A/C.3/66/L.66; A/HRC/RES/17/18). 
456 Cf. “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit. at 24-26; International 
Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 13-
14; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 65-66; article 32 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
457 Cf. ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, United Nations, 2000, at 13; Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The right to adequate food (art. 11), E/C.12/1999/5, 
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dignity should not be prevented. However, they are not to be blindly accepted either, especially 
because they can be mistaken in their analysis of human rights and related norms and issues.458 
This idea that non-state contributions must be admitted prima facie unless a critical 
analysis reveals them as contrary to the protection of human dignity or as actually making it less 
effective confirms the necessity of critically examining non-state input. This has two components: 
evaluation and the need to eventually attach importance to non-state ideas. This is something 
that has been done in practice, as in decisions of the Inter-American and European Courts of 
Human Rights, that analyze non-state opinions communicated in amicus curiae and in other 
ways, as in reports;459 and in Practice Direction XII of the International Court of Justice.460 
The facts that non-state entities can manipulate, depend on other actors or interests, or 
make mistakes when giving advises and carrying out activities and campaigns (being some 
mistakes unconscious and made due to processes of path dependency)461 call for caution. This 
does not equate with exclusion from participation but refers to subject non-state entities to the 
critical examination and the rule of law, which is relevant not only for States or governing and 
powerful actors or authorities, since it addresses all actors and “relationships.”462 Additionally, 
non-state opinions and actions must be open to evaluation and criticism by other actors, as 
demanded by the same democratic spirit that inspires openness of participation.463  
It must also be taken into account that some entities, for instance NGOs, have certain 
capacities to operate and some comparative advantages, but may lack abilities and advantages 
that States or other non-state entities have. This is why allowing the participation of different 
actors in the promotion of human rights and lawful checks and balances among them is relevant. 
                                                                                                                                                            
12 May 1999, para. 29; Elizabeth Kirk et al., “SUDS law: Non-State actors and the haphazard route to 
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International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors, op. 
cit., pp. 13-14, 16. 
458 See the pages of the article of Elizabeth Kirk mentioned in the previous footnote; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 103-
104; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 48-49; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, 
The right to adequate food (art. 11), E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 29; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli and Carlos 
Espósito, op. cit., at 56; Daniel Thürer, op. cit., at 46. 
459 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 37, 
80, 121, 128, 133, 140, 145, 152, 160, 170, 179, 187, 189, 190, 230-234; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. cit., paras. 119, 146; International Law 
Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 16-17; 
Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 187-190; Luis Pérez-Prat 
Durbán, op. cit., pp. 36-38. 
460 See Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 98; Practice Direction XII of the Practice Directions adopted by the International 
Court of Justice, as amended on 20 January 2009. 
461 See Cf. Elizabeth Kirk et al., op. cit.; Daniel Thürer, op. cit., p. 46, among others. 
462 See Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 4, 7-19, 39-40. 
463 Cf. Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 62-63; Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty 
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Some issues related to the comparative advantages and disadvantages of different actors are 
illustrated in the following passage of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Case of Sufi and Elmi v. The United Kingdom: 
“[C]onsideration must be given to the presence and reporting capacities of the author of the material 
in the country in question. In this respect, the Court observes that States (whether the respondent 
State in a particular case or any other Contracting or non-Contracting State), through their diplomatic 
missions and their ability to gather information, will often be able to provide material which may be 
highly relevant to the Court’s assessment of the case before it. It finds that the same consideration 
must apply, a fortiori, in respect of agencies of the United Nations, particularly given their direct 
access to the authorities of the country of destination as well as their ability to carry out on-site 
inspections and assessments in a manner which States and non-governmental organisations may not 
be able to do.”464 
On the other hand, human rights law recognizes the importance of the participation of 
multiple actors, which is indispensable for an effective and complete protection of human dignity, 
given both the factual limitations of States and the need to oppose their abuses; and also its 
usefulness, because of the expertise of some actors, as some NGOs, among others.465 This is a 
reasonable course of action, because non-state participation has bolstered international 
protection and promotion of human rights.466  
Some relevant forms of non-state participation in the human rights and related contexts 
include contributing to implement and enforce human rights law by exerting pressure for 
compliance, providing evidence and arguments to international supervisory authorities, 
representing and assisting victims, training, participating in the administration of protection 
regimes and mechanisms, and advocating changes de lege ferenda. They include formal and 
informal modes of participation, which can contribute to the improvement, robustness and 
evolution of the humanitarian corpus juris.467 
Acknowledgement of this contribution can be seen in the Declaration on the Right and 
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which even mentions a right of a wide 
                                                     
464 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, op. cit., para. 231. 
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array of actors to act and participate to protect and promote human rights. The following are 
relevant pertinent articles of this Declaration: 
“Article 1  
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the 
protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international 
levels.  
Article 5  
For the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, everyone has 
the right, individually and in association with others, at the national and international levels:  
( a ) To meet or assemble peacefully;  
( b ) To form, join and participate in non-governmental organizations, associations or groups;  
( c ) To communicate with non-governmental or intergovernmental organizations.  
Article 6  
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others:  
( a ) To know, seek, obtain, receive and hold information about all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including having access to information as to how those rights and freedoms are given 
effect in domestic legislative, judicial or administrative systems;  
( b ) As provided for in human rights and other applicable international instruments, freely to publish, 
impart or disseminate to others views, information and knowledge on all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms;  
( c ) To study, discuss, form and hold opinions on the observance, both in law and in practice, of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and, through these and other appropriate means, to draw 
public attention to those matters.  
Article 7  
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to develop and discuss new 
human rights ideas and principles and to advocate their acceptance.  
Article 12  
1. Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to participate in peaceful 
activities against violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
2. The State shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the competent authorities 
of everyone, individually and in association with others, against any violence, threats, retaliation, de 
facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of his 
or her legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in the present Declaration.  
3. In this connection, everyone is entitled, individually and in association with others, to be protected 
effectively under national law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful means, activities and 
acts, including those by omission, attributable to States that result in violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as well as acts of violence perpetrated by groups or individuals that affect the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
Article 13  
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize 
resources for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms through peaceful means, in accordance with article 3 of the present Declaration.  
Article 18  
1. Everyone has duties towards and within the community, in which alone the free and full 
development of his or her personality is possible.  
2. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have an important role to play 
and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms 
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and contributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions and 
processes.  
3. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations also have an important role 
and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone to a 
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be fully realized.”  
On the other hand, the relevance of non-state participation and its possible support of 
individuals is seen in procedural and substantive terms in treaties as the American Convention on 
Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The former grants 
the right to complain and denounce violations to “[a]ny person or group of persons, or any 
nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the [OAS]”, while the 
latter states in article 29(b)(i) that States shall promote the participation of persons with 
disabilities in private and non-governmental organizations that represent them, promote their 
rights or their public interests. This participation may be crucial for individuals to have more 
representation and influence in connection with their rights and to make their promotion more 
effective. 
Some non-state actors that engage in human rights promotion and advocacy, due to 
acknowledging the negative impact of some non-state conduct upon the enjoyment of human 
rights, have created codes of conduct they expect other entities to abide by (hetero-regulation) or 
to follow themselves.468 They have also sometimes tried to shame entities that threaten human 
rights and guarantees, and have adopted policies that admit the possibility of examining the 
human rights or humanitarian performance of other non-state actors (lest they are considered 
biased or not supporting all victims by focusing only on State conduct), as mentioned by Andrew 
Clapham469 and revealed in different statements of entities as some NGOs, among which 
sometimes condemnations of non-state violent acts and other acts that threaten human dignity 
are labeled as contrary to human rights.470  
                                                     
468 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, supra, at 33; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 99-100; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 42-53. 
469 See Andrew Clapham, Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 43, 49-51. 
470 See Chapter 8, infra; Human Rights Watch, Letter to Commander Manuel Marulanda, 10 July 2001 (“These 
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Human Rights Watch, for example, has considered that there can be “business-related 
human rights abuses”; has “documented a wide-variety of business-related abuses around the 
world”; and has exposed “targeted children for recruitment, forced marriage, and rape, and 
attack[s] [against] teachers and schools” attributable to the Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab, 
to which it has recommended to “cease recruitment of children”, hold commanders who permit or 
engage in such recruitments to account, cease indiscriminate attacks and attacks against 
civilians, not interfere with the right to education, not discriminate against women and girls, and to 
hold members to account for “violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
abuses.” Some of these recommendations were also addressed to AMISOM and the African 
Union, among other parties to the conflict in Somalia, with recommendations of promotion and 
protection (including sanctions to be adopted) being sent to international entities as well.471 
The importance of the cooperation of non-state actors when examining the negative 
impact of non-state entities on the respect of norms that protect human dignity is recognized in a 
statement on the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict, that 
contemplates the monitoring of non-state entities and says that: 
“[I]it must be stressed that an effective monitoring, reporting and compliance regime depends largely 
on the collaboration of a number of critical stakeholders, particularly Member States, United Nations 
system partners, NGOs and local civil society, in situations of concern. The Special Representative is 
committed to ensuring that the space and opportunity exist for the full participation of all partners and 
stakeholders”472 (emphasis added). 
It is important to recall that non-state actors can affect human rights in positive and 
negative ways, and that they can help to protect individuals from the latter and condemn non-
state abuses. NGOs, for instance, have considered that the United Nations (a public non-state 
actor due to its being an international organization)473 and other non-state entities may 
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sometimes contribute to the infringement of norms related directly or indirectly to human dignity, 
and have issued pronouncements to elicit a response and provoke a change in their behavior. In 
turn, actors as the UN have considered that they must abide by principles and norms that protect 
human dignity, that can bind other international organizations as well.474 
Besides allowing the participation of actors, the protection of human dignity has an 
additional effect concerning international organizations: given its nature as a principle of 
international law, endorsed by the communitarian dimension of the international society,475 which 
has to be taken into account by international organizations, these entities have implied and 
inherent powers to achieve the goal of protecting human dignity against non-state abuses, which 
is one implication of human dignity, even when their constitutive treaties or their internal rules are 
silent on the matter.  
This legal basis supports developments and trends in international legal practice, as the 
issuance of press releases or reports in which international bodies condemn or reveal non-state 
violations of actors as different as international organizations, criminals, terrorists or non-state 
armed groups, among others, expressing support or condolences to victims and/or calling for the 
cease of ongoing violations, apart from indicating to authorities that they must deal with those 
abuses.476 In other cases, applying a “lateral” protection of human rights,477 international 
                                                     
474 Cf. José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 128-132, 136-141, 153-157; articles 59 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights or 43 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, op. cit., para. 4; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 46-
47; Declaration of the European Union to its Formal Confirmation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
15&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last checked: 06/01/2012). 
475 In my opinion, humanitarian legal issues have a communitarian dimension that is not denied by the not-so 
integrated and synergic character of many layers of world (rather than merely international) relations, given the 
relevance of their common goals and foundations, that have a different logic and operate under dynamics that differ 
somewhat from general jus gentium ones. It must be taken into account that the international society can have 
communitarian traits when it is called to operate guided by solidarity. Therefore, the protection of human dignity is a 
common endeavor that forms part of the community layers of world (global) relations, reinforced by some of its norms 
being peremptory and generating erga omnes obligations. Concerning these issues, see: Manuel Díez de Velasco, 
Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público, Tecnos, 2001, at 61; International Law Commission, Conclusions of 
the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, op. cit., paras. 11-16, 31, 33, 38; Antonio 
Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 169-170; Nicolás Carrillo 
Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-, op. cit., pp. 31-34, 77, 80-85, 161; Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para. 11; articles 60.5 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969 and 1986, 50.1 of the articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 
2001, or 53.1 of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations in its 2011 version (A/66/10); 
Antonio Cassese, “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures in the World Community?”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 1999, at 26. 
476 Cf. Resolution 03/08 and the following Press Releases of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 
Press Release No 28/08, Press Release No 86/10, Press Release No 98/10, Press Release Nº 34/11, Press Release 
89/10; Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Press Release R42/12, Office of the Special Rapporteur Expresses Concern for Kidnapping of French Journalist in 
Colombia, 1 May 2012; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Press Release No. R49/12, Office of the Special Rapporteur Condemns Attack in 
Colombia, 16 May 2012. 
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supervisory bodies have examined non-state conduct when implementing measures of protection 
of individuals, including conduct of groups in failed States or of international bodies, for example 
when those actors operate as de facto authorities over a territory or have powers therein.  
Sometimes, the possibility of direct formal supervision of non-state conduct is expressly 
envisaged in international instruments; and in some cases it has been considered that 
international agents and bodies are permitted to contact non-state actors directly to protect 
human dignity (e.g. requesting the cease of their abuses),478 acknowledging the indispensability 
of contacting them to fully protect individuals. 
To conclude this Chapter, it can be said that the principle-value of the protection of 
human dignity is the foundation of human rights and guarantees and is legally binding. If it were 
not, it should become so, because it demands both the non-conditional and complete protection 
of human beings from all abuses and permits the participation of those actors that promote it. 
Other principles and normative considerations complement dignity because they also 
justify and demand a universal protection, taking into account the two roles that non-state entities 
can have, and will be examined throughout this thesis. Yet, human dignity offers a broader scope 
of protection and ensures that those other considerations are not distorted or interpreted in ways 
that may be contrary to the protection of some human beings, which would be unacceptable. 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
477 On the notion of the lateral protection of human rights, cf. Jennifer Corrin, “From Horizontal and Vertical to Lateral: 
Extending the Effect of Human Rights in Post Colonial Legal Systems of the South Pacific”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 58, 2009, pp. 67-69. 
478 Cf. Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, adopted in June 2008, op. cit., 
paras. 81-83. 
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CHAPTER 2. HOW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES DEMAND 
PROTECTION FROM NON-STATE ACTORS: NORMATIVE, CONSISTENCY AND 
TELEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
In the remainder of Part I, it will be argued that not only the value-principle of the 
protection of human dignity calls for preventing and responding to non-state abuses, because 
different norms and legal principles have features and implications that require this as well. That 
being said, it is true that a demand to give this protection is not always robust because there are 
gaps and problems related to procedural and specialized substantive aspects, reason why that 
demand often requires legal changes de lege lata, both to better protect victims and to overcome 
the normative contradiction of specific norms that fail to uphold underlying and general demands. 
This chapter will examine how some characteristics of international principles and norms 
on the protection of human dignity call for a protection that is greater in scope than the one 
suggested by adherents to State-centered paradigms of protection. 
 
2.1. The protection of jus cogens norms from non-state violations of human dignity 
When a norm of human rights and guarantees belongs to jus cogens, it is binding 
regardless of consent and de-legitimizes contrary manifestations from all legal systems, requiring 
thus that every normative manifestation is compatible with it.479 This effect, coupled with the fact 
that jus cogens creates non-state obligations,480 requires contrary international norms, 
interpretations or applications to be deprived of effects and to be modified, as required by the 
principle of effectiveness. 
To begin this analysis, it must be mentioned that one of the weaknesses of some 
conceptions of the international legal system is that they overemphasize the role of States. In this 
manner, for instance, some of them correctly point out that States have duties to prevent 
discrimination from taking place socially, individually and in their legal systems,481 but fail to 
address some cases of discrimination beyond the domestic level (e.g. concerning access of all 
victims to international remedies or from all violations). This is especially poignant because of 
many normative gaps, and States and their domestic law do not have the reach to address some 
                                                     
479 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-, op. cit., pp. 171-186. 
480 Cf. Tilman Rodehäuser, op. cit.; Chapter 6, infra. 
481 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, op. cit., 
paras. 72, 154-155, 178, 180-181; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., 
paras. 77-78, 113-114, 137-154. 
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conduct carried out extraterritorially or in non-domestic levels (transnational or international), thus 
creating vacuums of protection that could be taken advantage of by actors that commit abuses. 
As a consequence, a purely domestic-centered strategy is insufficient, and it has to be 
asked if different normative systems and actors can coordinate their actions to ensure that 
discrimination does not take place internationally and transnationally and all victims are protected. 
In my opinion, such extra-domestic dimension is partly addressed due to one feature of 
jus cogens: its prevalence over all contrary effects or interpretations. Let me describe this effect in 
some detail before formulating a conclusion.  
Apart from the effects of jus cogens mentioned in the Vienna Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties, related to the annulment and termination of norms contrary to them,482 authors, 
international courts and bodies as the International Law Commission mention that jus cogens has 
other effects. Firstly, peremptory law has relevance beyond treaty law, as in the fields of (State 
and non-state) responsibility, customary law, non-international norms, and other international 
legal dimensions.483 Additionally, it has been considered that termination or annulment are not the 
only possible effects of peremptory law in relation to contrary legal manifestations: in this regard, 
when some interpretations of a norm are contrary to jus cogens, they must be discarded; and 
when some but not all applications of a norm go against peremptory law, that norm remains in the 
legal system but cannot be applied in the event of conflict. This is an effect of the prevalence of 
jus cogens, that in events of non-absolute normative or interpretative contradiction, instead of 
terminating a norm or making it void, makes peremptory law prevail over contrary manifestations 
or interpretations and deprives them of effects.484 
Peremptory law haa an additional related implication: it conditions the way in which 
international law as a whole is to be interpreted, because of its enshrining essential goals of the 
international community as a whole.485 It must therefore be taken into account when interpreting 
any norm or interpretation of international law, according to the teleological principle of 
                                                     
482 See articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986. 
483 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-, op. cit., pp. 121-160; ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 153-157; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. 
Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 65-73. 
484 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “La inevitable supremacía del ius cogens frente a la inmunidad jurisdiccional de los 
Estados”, op. cit., pp. 60-63. 
485 Cf. Santiago Villalpando, “The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How Community Interests are 
Protected in International Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, 2010, pp. 389, 394-403, 418. Note 
how peremptory law has effects that trump individualistic interests of international actors in fields such as those of the 
sources of jus gentium or the regulation of responsibility. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 
December 1998, paras. 153-157; articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 
1986; articles 26, 40, 41 and 50 of the articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 
2001, or 26, 41, 42 and 53 of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations in its 2011 version 
(A/66/10). 
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interpretation of international law.486 This is further endorsed by the fact that international norms 
cannot be interpreted in isolation and ought not to be examined out of context but rather must be 
interpreted in the context of the corpus juris or the complete framework of international regulation, 
as considered in case law, treaties and doctrine.487 
Norms and principles based on human dignity that belong to jus cogens have an absolute 
character and play an essential role in international law, as indicated by the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, which said that: 
“[T]he principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination 
belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order 
rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws. Nowadays, no legal act that is in 
conflict with this fundamental principle is acceptable […] This principle (equality and non-
discrimination) forms part of general international law”488 (emphasis added). 
Jus cogens norms are not only found in norms and principles of human rights stricto 
sensu,489 and all legal content and interpretations rests on the respect of that law, which affects 
all aspects of international law, including its interaction with other legal systems.  
This, in conjunction with the effect of prevalence of jus cogens, makes dignity-based 
peremptory norms be applicable in regard to international legal norms, none of which can be 
discriminatory or otherwise contrary to jus cogens. They thus bind international organizations as 
well as other entities that behave in a way that is relevant because of how they affect the 
effectiveness of peremptory law. That all international legal manifestations must respect the 
principle of non-discrimination and other peremptory principles and norms means that the 
international protection of victims has to ensure the effective protection of all victims, as explored 
in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
On the other hand, some sound theories put forward that jus cogens binds subjects of 
international law regardless of whether they want it or not,490 that is to say regardless of their will 
or consent. This entails a welcome radical change from previous understandings, which assigned 
                                                     
486 Cf. article 31.1 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986. 
487 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, paras. 55-56; Antonio 
Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 83-84; Article 31 of the Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties; International Law Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on 
the Fragmentation of International Law, op. cit., paras. 17-21; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 24, 92; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, op. 
cit., para. 37; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, 7 January 2010, 
paras. 273, 276-282. 
488 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 101. 
489 Cf. José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 128-131; Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio 
histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 166-172; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 71-72. 
490 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 71; José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 124-129; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos 
del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-, op. cit., pp. 24, 109-121; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 
December 1998, paras. 155-156. 
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exaggerated importance to consent even if this was detrimental to overarching international legal 
purposes and principles. This change took place in the transformation from a horizontal system to 
a normative framework with hierarchical (vertical) dimensions given the prevalence of peremptory 
norms.491 For purposes of this research, this has some quite interesting effects, among which 
there is an implicit obligation that binds every entity capable of committing violations of human 
rights and guarantees and commands them to refrain from them, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
Thus, implicitly those entities are addressees and thus subjects of jus gentium. 
The previous implications are related to what can be called peremptory international 
implicit negative duties.492 Just as a positive dimension determines that subjects of international 
law as international organizations have implied powers that are necessary for them to accomplish 
their goals, as determined by its constituents, I consider that every subject and actor that can 
prevent the enjoyment of peremptory human rights and guarantees, even if international law has 
not addressed that actor directly and expressly, can thus engage in internationally legally relevant 
conduct that is serious and is automatically forbidden from violating those rights and guarantees, 
that must be wholly effective –as required by the general principle of effectiveness-. After all, jus 
cogens embodies essential goals of the community layer of the international or world society, in 
the formation of which the role of individuals and other actors is essential (process in which they 
have proven to be willing to participate by manifesting common goals they endorse in the so-
called lex humana).493 
Concerning the idea that just as there are implied powers based on legal goals there are 
implicit duties to respect jus cogens and its purposes, it can be said that this course of action is 
necessary to truly counter all manifestations contrary to peremptory law. To my mind, an intuitive 
logic similar to this one was followed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia when it considered that: 
                                                     
491 See Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., at 191; Nicolás 
Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-, op. cit., pp. 31, 163, 279; Concurring Opinion of 
Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., 
paras. 66-67. 
492 Concerning this, Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a  
Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
493 Cf. Andrew Clapham, “The Role of the Individual in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 29-30; International Law 
Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 
2001, Paragraph (18) of the Commentary to Article 25; Andreas Fischer-Lescano, “Global Constitutional Struggles: 
Human Rights between colère publique and colère politique”, in Wolfgang Kaleck et al. (Eds.), International 
Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes, Springer, 2007, pp. 19-20; International Law Association, Law Association, 
Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 9, where Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht is quoted as saying that “The international community of interdependence and solidarity which is…a 
significant factor adding to the legal character of international law is a community not only of States but also of 
individuals”. 
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“[T]he jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture articulates the notion that the prohibition 
has now become one of the most fundamental standards of the international community. 
Furthermore, this prohibition is designed to produce a deterrent effect, in that it signals to all 
members of the international community and the individuals over whom they wield authority that the 
prohibition of torture is an absolute value from which nobody must deviate […] The fact that torture is 
prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has other effects at the inter-state and individual 
levels. At the inter-state level, it serves to internationally de-legitimise any legislative, administrative 
or judicial act authorizing torture […] the national measures, violating the general principle and any 
relevant treaty provision, would produce the legal effects discussed above and in addition would not 
be accorded international legal recognition […] Furthermore, at the individual level, that is, that of 
criminal liability, it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed 
by the international community upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to 
investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a 
territory under its jurisdiction”494 (emphasis added). 
The Tribunal acknowledged that peremptory law has effects at various levels: at the 
individual level, at the level of Inter-State relations, and regarding the regulation of the 
relationships between different legal systems. Among these effects, the deterrence of breaches of 
jus cogens has a prominent place, and the unlawfulness of acts contrary to it implies that they are 
prohibited, because their prohibition is necessary for them to effectively have an absolute illegal 
character and for peremptory law to be protected.  
Another effect is the unlawfulness or inapplicability of normative manifestations that are 
contrary to the effectiveness of jus cogens, which is a consequence of the legal impossibility of 
those manifestations producing legal effects. In consequence, a discriminatory treatment of 
victims of non-state actors that fails to protect all victims from factual violations of peremptory 
rights and guarantees must not be supported by law, and alternative interpretations and/or 
mechanisms (including normative changes) of protection must be resorted to. Regarding the 
imperative that even international legal norms respect the principle of equality of all victims, just 
like domestic and (non-state) normative manifestations must,495 the Declaration of the World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance of 2001 
mentions that “everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which all human rights 
can be fully realized for all, without any discrimination” (emphasis added). Additionally, individuals 
can claim their rights against non-state conduct contrary to that guarantee. 
The notion of implicit obligations to respect jus cogens can also be found in case law 
because, as flows from the works of authors as Roland Portmann, domestic judges faced with 
questions of international law may intuitively adopt a position that endorses the idea that there is 
a “principle” according to which even individuals and other non-state actors, acting neither on 
                                                     
494 Cf. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 154-156. 
495 Cf. Ibid., para. 155; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-, op. cit., pp. 89-108, 
161-186; articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986. 
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behalf of any State nor as their accomplices (i.e. acting as purely “private parties”),496 may be 
responsible for breaches of international law (at least, in my opinion, and not only) when they 
violate the content of norms of “universal” concern, which Portmann identifies as international 
peremptory norms.497 Discussing the regulation of armed non-state actors, other authors, as 
Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, also uphold the idea that non-state entities are bound 
by jus cogens norms that protect human dignity.498 
That this rationale can be applied to any non-state actor, not exclusively to individuals, is 
hinted by the fact that judicial authorities have applied it for instance in relation to respondents 
with a corporate nature and not only when individuals are involved.499 
Some may consider that it is not clear what norms belongs to jus cogens and that the 
previous ideas are thus simply abstract theoretical discussions. Notwithstanding arguments that 
consider jus cogens as useless because of the difficulty of identifying its content, there are ways 
to identify it, and International Courts and Tribunals have identified some human rights norms as 
being peremptory.500 Additionally, peremptory law and its effects are clearly part of international 
law, and difficulties to identify would make it necessary to make an effort to define norms 
belonging to it, given its importance. 
Some scholars have proposed theories to identify human rights norms that belong to jus 
cogens and authorities have examined the aspects of norms to evaluate if they are peremptory. 
Usually, attempts to identify peremptory human rights norms take into account one or both of two 
sorts of criteria: legal criteria, based on formal and positive law considerations; or normative 
substantive criteria, based on theoretical or material qualities of rights and principles. This latter 
approach is employed by natural law, policy, and philosophical theories. Certainly, the two 
general categories are archetypes, and authors and authorities divert from them somewhat in 
practice or even resort to both. Most models, for example, take into account the content and 
features of a norm, thus having to a certain degree a normative dimension. 
                                                     
496 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, S. Kadic et al. v. Radovan Karadzic, Decision of 13 
October 1995 (“Karadzic contends that appellants have not alleged violations of the norms of international law 
because such norms bind only states and persons acting under color of a state’s law […] We do not agree that the 
law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms 
of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as 
private individuals. An early example of the application of the law of nations to the acts of private individuals is the 
prohibition against piracy”). 
497 Cf. Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 162-166. 
498 Cf. Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., at 187. 
499 Cf. Ibid., p. 166; Mireia Martínez Barrabés, op. cit., pp. 232-248; August Reinisch, op. cit., p. 55-56. 
500 Cf. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 153-154 (concerning the 
prohibition against torture); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 97-
101 (regarding the principle of equality and non-discrimination). 
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One scholar who has formulated a proposal to identify peremptory law is Eric Suy, who 
considered that human rights norms enshrining such rights are peremptory when: 1) no 
agreement or exception against them is legally admissible; 2) the obligations they generate 
cannot be derogated from (i.e. suspended) during states of emergency; or 3) their violation gives 
rise to an international crime. The Human Rights Committee considered that the second criterion 
does not always reveal the presence of a peremptory norm, because it may have been 
considered by drafters that the suspension of some dispositive obligations would not be needed 
during emergencies or, I might add, perhaps because it was considered that such a measure was 
not to be admitted without this implying a recognition of jus cogens elements and conditions.501  
Professor Suy’s criteria take into account elements of norms. Some criteria he suggests 
seem convincing because they are connected to the consideration that a peremptory norm, as 
the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties mention, is: 
“[A] norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character”502 (emphasis added). 
Discussing the three criteria offered by Suy, it can be said that certainly crimes are 
eminently prohibitory; that norms from which no derogation is possible even during the most 
stringent conditions reflect a normative decision to make them non-derogable; and that the 
prohibition of agreements contrary to them is almost a transcription of Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. However persuasive these criteria are, some doubts 
persist, which yet do not detract from their normative validity.  
First of all, what if there are no normative hints or indicia as to the possibility or prohibition 
of deviating from a norm, the content of which nevertheless seems to be of the utmost importance 
for the international community? Should the consideration that derogation from those norms is 
forbidden be derived from the opinio juris of States? But then, are these criteria applicable also to 
peremptory norms created through non-customary means?503 I think so, but again peremptory 
norms work as “trumps” of State and non-state will, and are not dependent on consent in some 
regards (their creation is yet dependent on it, though not on a consensual basis),504 so it can be 
asked whether the content of a norm is such that it suggests that no derogation is permitted.  
                                                     
501 Cf. Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 167-170; Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para. 11. 
502 Cf. article 53 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986. 
503 Cf. Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 79-89; Nicolás 
Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-, op. cit., pp. 48-55 (note that I have changed my 
mind concerning the opinion I expressed in that book, because now I consider that peremptory law may be enshrined 
in norms produced by sources different from custom and treaties).  
504 Ibid. 
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This consideration is close to extra- or meta-legal analyses of the role and substance of a 
norm, and so it may be asked whether jus cogens may act as a bridge between the legal and the 
meta-legal world (in a manner reminiscent of the dilemmas of the theory of Hans Kelsen as to the 
final Grundnorm and of theories according to which even though law and morality are not 
merged, they are not completely separated).505 On the other hand, some may consider that meta-
positivist criteria of identification of jus cogens are valuable because otherwise some could 
mention that a norm cannot be derogated from to make it peremptory despite its being contrary to 
ethical needs and demands that precisely led to the necessity of recognizing jus cogens to limit 
an otherwise unhindered power of the State’s will.506 
Another take on the normative identification of jus cogens seems to be adopted 
sometimes by International Courts and Tribunals, when they conduct what can be called a semi-
intuitive normative identification of jus cogens. In this regard, it can be said that judicial authorities 
sometimes pay attention to the analysis of whether the content of a norm is reiterated in a 
multiplicity of international (universal and regional) norms, and to the importance of a norm for the 
protection of human dignity. This happens when judgments mention the jurisprudential or 
normative absolute character of a norm, to say that it admits no derogation at all, for example 
concerning the prohibitions of torture and discrimination. 
Interestingly, if examines the subject carefully, some dilemmas concerning some well-
established peremptory norms can be identified. Let us take the case of the prohibition of the use 
of force, for instance, on whose peremptory character there is almost universal agreement.507 It 
can be asked if it is possible to consider that institutions as that of self-defense constitute 
                                                     
505 Cf. Hans Kelsen, op. cit., pp. 201-205, in light of the consideration that some persons advance the notion that 
some religious norms are or ought to be legally binding, as some muslims think happens or should happen with the 
Sharia, which proves how in the end the notion of the “Basic Norm” put forward by Kelsen opens the door to meta-
legal and/or extra-legal considerations that can exert an influence in law if so permitted by those authorities and 
addressees that believe in a given legal system (if they rebel –peacefully, hopefully-, they will not necessarily be 
coerced into obeying, or will do so reluctantly, and believe in a different normative system, considering the one they 
challenge either unfair/illegitimate or non-existent (as many authors claim regarding non-state law). Moreover, see 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Forgotten Books, 2007, pp. 101-103, 116-117, 123-124; Kristen Walker, “The 
silliest pro-abortion argument ever (is one you hear all the time)”, LifeSiteNews.com, 17 January 2012, available at: 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/the-silliest-argument-ever-is-one-you-hear-all-the-time (last checked: 19/01/2012), 
where it is argued that “There are two types of laws: malum in se and malum prohibitum. Malum in se is a Latin 
phrase meaning “wrong in itself.” Most of us feel that murder is wrong, therefore there is a law against it […] Malum 
in se laws are based on morality. Our laws here in the U.S. grew out of English Common Law, which in turn was 
based on Judeo-Christian morality.”  Moreover, cf. Mario G. Losano, op. cit., pp. 329-330 (on the influence of extra-
legal disciplines on law). 
506 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-, op. cit., pp. 31-34, 167, 279; 
Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 67. 
507 Cf. Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 83-84, 156-157, 
159-162, 167; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, footnote 641 (related to paragraph 7 of the commentary to Chapter III, at 
112). 
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exceptions to that prohibition, which would therefore not forbid all exceptions in absolute terms 
and would therefore not be part of jus cogens. Such dilemmas can be solved by considering, for 
example, that self-defense does not constitute an exception but is rather part of the content of the 
prohibition of the use of force (which determines when and how it can or cannot be employed), 
and that the prohibition refers to using force in events that are different from self-defense or from 
acts of collective use of force authorized by the Security Council –being there debates as to 
whether a norm of humanitarian intervention could be evolving customarily.508 The same could be 
said of the right to life, which to my mind is also peremptory. 
This reasoning is persuasive, but also reveals that the material importance of a 
prohibition certainly plays a role in the identification of jus cogens; and opinio juris can be relevant 
as well. When it comes to jus cogens under the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, there 
is a reference to the community of States, which differs from references to an international 
community the membership of which is not limited to States (that can be more properly called 
global or world community), made in some scholarly articles and in instruments as the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.509 This distinction may 
suggest that in the current state of legal affairs, the creation of peremptory norms takes into 
account mainly the opinio juris cogentis of States (for the time being). 
Using a different method, Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent follow a meta-legal train 
of thought, and part from the assumption that in the legal framework there are relationships 
between individuals and States, being the State a fiduciary entity that ought to protect individuals 
and is therefore subject to respecting and promoting human dignity, which legitimates it and 
justifies its legal powers and attributes. According to the authors, norms that sustain this legality 
are peremptory norms.510 This proposal is interesting in many respects, and shares the 
assumption held by other authors regarding the centrality of human beings in the legal system, 
the subjection of authorities and principles to the respect and promotion of human beings, and 
State legitimacy as dependent on that.  
                                                     
508 Cf. Antonio Cassese, “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?”, op. cit., pp. 26-30. 
509 It can be considered that the expression international community of States merely stresses the way in which 
international law is traditionally formally created, whereas the expression international community can encompass a 
broader set of actors. This is one of the possible interpretations of: International Law Commission, Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, Paragraph (18) of the 
Commentary to Article 25. On the other hand, cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First 
Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors, op. cit., where it is said that “some distinguished scholars do not limit 
the concept of ‘international community’ to States.” Certainly, the proliferation and relevance of non-state entities in 
world social and legal life cannot be ignored and must be acknowledged and addressed for it to be properly regulated 
(especially regarding humanitarian values). 
510 Cf. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, op. cit., pp. 361-380. 
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That theory, however, over-focuses on the role of States and their relations with 
individuals, and thus may fail to reflect the complete attributes and dimensions of rights and 
guarantees that go beyond this limited dimension. 
Alternative meta-legal proposals on the question of the identification of peremptory law 
include natural law theories and theories that highlight the policy-role played by a norm.511 
Some other approaches seem to adopt elements of both a legal and an extra legal 
character, such as the social-communal theory, according to which jus cogens norms are those 
that protect interests of the international community, which therefore ought to prevail over private 
interests of some States, being the identification of those norms dependent on whether the issues 
they regulate protect community interests or not.512 In my opinion, this is a determination that 
seems mandated by the normative definition of peremptory law, considering it as law established 
as peremptory by the international community as a whole.513 Under this theory, essential human 
needs would be peremptory, given their inherent and inalienable character and the interest of the 
world community to protect human beings even from the whims of majorities.514 
Perhaps because of these alternative approaches, authors as Lee M. Caplan have a 
skeptical attitude, considering it especially difficult to identify peremptory norms. This position 
could seem to be confirmed by contradictions of judicial findings related to the identification of 
peremptory norms, as revealed for example by disagreements with the opinion of the Court of the 
First Instance of the European Union in the Kadi case.515 
However, skepticism diverts attention away from two important facts: first, jus cogens is 
part of international law for a reason, and unrestrained power of State volition is dangerous and 
unacceptable, because crucial issues cannot be left to its whim. There are outrageous practices 
that cannot be tolerated or legally endorsed and considered legitimate or allowed simply because 
lawmakers support them. The importance and benefits of jus cogens far outweigh difficulties 
related to its identification, which is thus encouraged. 
                                                     
511 Ibid., pp. 332, 342-345. 
512 Cf. Santiago Villalpando, op. cit., pp. 402-403. 
513 See article 53 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986. 
514 It must be recalled that democracy is but a component of a framework where human rights are also present, that 
some of these rights are peremptory and cannot be opposed even when it is so consented by State legislative 
bodies, and that democratic institutions and doctrines exist on the condition that human rights and minorities are 
respected and protected. Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, OC-6/86, op. cit., paras. 30, 32, 34; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, paras. 24, 26; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 
Judgement, 10 December 1998, para. 155. 
515 Cf. Lee M. Caplan, “State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: a Critique of the Normative Hierarchy 
Theory”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, 2003, pp. 772-773; Court of First Instance of the European 
Union, Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, Judgment, 21 September 2005, paras. 242, 286-288; Court of First Instance of the European Union, 
Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, 21 September 2005, paras. 293, 341-343. 
 
 
162
Secondly, the existence of peremptory norms is an accomplished fact, and the 
international legal system is no longer a horizontal but a vertical one. Therefore, what must be 
done is to identify jus cogens. Some of its norms have already been identified, among which 
there are norms that protect human dignity, such as the prohibitions of torture and discrimination. 
Still, the ICTY and doctrine have considered that some but not all norms of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law have a jus cogens character.516 
It is certainly possible to identify norms that meet normative criteria that identify them as 
part of jus cogens, as defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. For 
example, I consider that the following analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, while not 
mentioning its peremptory character, provides indications that the normative features -reminiscent 
of Eric Suy’s criteria- of the prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labor, 
which are violated on many occasions by non-state actors as traffickers of human beings, hint to 
their belonging to jus cogens: 
“The Court considers that trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is 
based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as 
commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, often for little or no payment, usually in 
the sex industry but also elsewhere […] It implies close surveillance of the activities of victims, whose 
movements are often circumscribed […] It involves the use of violence and threats against victims, 
who live and work under poor conditions […] 
There can be no doubt that trafficking threatens the human dignity and fundamental freedoms of its 
victims and cannot be considered compatible with a democratic society and the values expounded in 
the Convention [...] 
The Court reiterates that, together with Articles 2 and 3, Article 4 enshrines one of the basic values of 
the democratic societies […] Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 4 
makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even 
in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation […] 
Article 4 entail[s] a specific positive obligation on member States to penalise and prosecute effectively 
any act aimed at maintaining a person in a situation of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory 
labour”517 (emphasis added). 
In my opinion, it is not contentious that there are norms founded upon human dignity with 
a peremptory character, and they have special effects that reach the plane of individual-non-state 
relations, establishing prohibitions of disrespecting these norms, conditioning the entire legal 
system and its effects, and imposing on the international and domestic levels the implicit exigency 
of recognizing the need of the effective protection of human dignity from non-state violations, 
which cannot be ignored because of the prevalence effects of jus cogens, which conditions the 
                                                     
516 Cf. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 137, 153; Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para. 11; Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: 
Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 166-172. 
517 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, 7 January 2010, paras. 
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interpretation and implementation of law, can even fill gaps or, in extreme cases, require changes 
in law (mandated by lex lata, interestingly). 
 
2.2. Implications of legal principles related to the protection of human dignity concerning 
protection from non-state violations 
Ascertaining that a human right or guarantee is addressed in a principle of law implies 
that it has certain normative features, some of which display effects in the realm of its protection 
from non-state violations.  
Apart from filling gaps in a subsidiary fashion when other sources insufficiently regulate 
one situation, as recognized in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and in 
the same article of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, principles perform 
other functions in international law, as revealed by how they are used by international authorities: 
they may influence the interpretation of norms, and sometimes they can be implemented directly, 
for instance to help determining if a conduct is lawful or how a norm is to be applied. These 
functions been used in connection with principles such as those of effectiveness, equality, or pro 
homine protection, for example.518 
Those effects of principles are permitted by the legal system and are not the product of 
overtly creative implementations because, as Fabián O. Raimondo comments, there are three 
functions that are “manifestations” of the subsidiary character of general principles:  
“(i) [F]illing legal gaps, (ii) interpreting legal rules, and (iii) confirming a decision based on other legal 
rules, in order to reinforce the legal reasoning.”519 
Case law confirms that legal principles can have interpretive functions and not only serve 
to fill gaps. In this sense, for example, the International Court of Justice has considered that the 
principle of equity –that has an interpretive function-520 can be employed infra legem, that is to 
say, to interpret applicable law that is pertinent in a controversy, even absent of the consent of 
                                                     
518 Cf. Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc 
Gaja to the Preliminary Objections Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 1 April 2011 in the Case 
concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), para. 22; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v 
Panama, Competence Judgment, 28 November 2003, paras. 66-67; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-19/05, Control of Due Process in the Exercise of the Powers of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (Articles 41 and 44 to 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights), 28 November 2005, para. 
13; Álvaro Francisco Amaya Villarreal, op. cit. 
519 Fabián O. Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, at 44. 
520 Cf. Wolfgang Friedmann, “The Uses of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law”, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 57, 1963, pp. 287-290. 
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the parties to that effect, being such consent necessary to apply principles contra legem or 
praeter legem, as mentioned in the Case of the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali)521. 
As recognized by the International Court of Justice in the case of the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the fact that the content of a norm is the product 
of a given source of international law, such as custom, does not prevent that content from being 
contained in the products of other sources of international law.522 Hence, for instance, protected 
content of human rights lato sensu or humanitarian guarantees can be, to the same of to different 
degrees, included in the content of principles and customary or treaty norms simultaneously. 
As Bruno Simma and Philip Alston pointed out, general principles may be similar to 
customary law in the sense that they are the product of general agreements based on the 
conviction that one proto-principle must be binding or have legal effects. For them, however, 
unlike in the case of custom, practice is not determinative. This makes a difference, because 
principles can thus emerge even when there is no general practice coupled with conviction, or 
when practice contradicts them; and can easily be present when regulations requiring abstention 
of conduct are necessary.523 Another interesting idea suggested by those and other authors 
considers that general principles can originate either in the domestic level, out of the similar and 
coincidental recognition of principles in different legal systems; or in the international plane, when 
they appear there in response to international dynamics, having even the potential to impact upon 
domestic law, case in which they would have a dynamic that would be opposite to that of general 
principles in foro domestico.524  
Certainly, as long as principles meet the requirement of having a wide consensus 
concerning their legality, they can be considered general principles of international law because, 
contrary to the assumption of some authors that consider that Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice alludes to principles in foro domestico, Philip Alston and Bruno 
Simma mention that: 
“[T]here is no necessity to restrict the notion of 'general principles' in this way. For the drafters of the 
Statute the decisive point was that such principles were not to be derived from mere speculation; they 
had rather to be made objective through some sort of general acceptance or recognition by States. 
Such acceptance or recognition, however, may also be effected on the international plane. The 
emphasis on acceptance in foro domestico was simply caused by the necessity to validate general 
                                                     
521 Cf. International Court of Justice, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, 22 December 1986, 
paras. 28, 149. 
522 Cf. International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, 27 June 1986, paras. 174-175, 177-179. 
523 Cf. Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, op. cit., pp. 85, 92-93, 102-103, 105-106. 
524 Cf. Ibid., at 102; Fabián O. Raimondo, op. cit., at 41-42; Giorgio Gaja, op. cit., para. 32. 
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principles in a reliable way; it cannot be read as closing the door to alternative means of objective 
validation.”525 
This idea is endorsed by other authors, as commented by Fabián O. Raimondo, who 
goes on to mention that he however considers that the notion of general principles of law alludes 
to principles “derived from national legal systems”, whereas “general principles of international 
law” would encompass “legal principles entirely derived from international conventional and 
customary rules”, a distinction that he believes is held by a large sector of doctrine.526 
Whatever the correct position is, it is beyond question that there are general principles 
derived from national and from international legal systems, being both of them capable of 
displaying effects and operating in the international legal level (taking into account adjustments 
that must take into account the peculiarities of international law and the international society).527 
As Giorgio Gaja comments, the International Court of Justice refers to general principles as a 
whole when applying principles even if they “do not find a parallel in municipal laws.”528 
That being said, the nature of dignity-related guarantees as principles make them have 
an impact on the interpretation and application of international norms, being this effect intensified 
when the principle is part of jus cogens. In other words, the interpretation and application of 
international norms must be guided by principles; and all legal manifestations must be compatible 
with jus cogens principles. This entails that cases are in the end examined in light of humanitarian 
principles (at leaset of peremptory ones), directly or at least indirectly. In consequence, it is 
necessary to assess if international substantive and procedural regulation is consistent with 
peremptory principles, and that regulation must also always be interpreted in a way that is 
compatible with those peremptory principles that protect human dignity (among others), whenever 
possible. If this is not feasible, such regulation must change de lege ferenda. 
 
2.3. Implications of the normative content and logic of human rights and guarantees: 
material human rights breaches and their independence from non-state duties 
The content and logic of norms that protect human dignity demand that, out of 
consistency and according to the principle of effectiveness, their effects go beyond the sphere of 
domestic regulation and that individuals are protected from non-state abuses, demanding 
compatibility of international regulation with these requirements. 
                                                     
525 Cf. Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, op. cit., at 102. 
526 Cf. Fabián O. Raimondo, op. cit., at 41. 
527 Ibid, pp. 58-59, 187. 
528 Cf. Giorgio Gaja, op. cit., para. 17 (the autor mentions that “When the ICJ referred to principles of international law 
or to general principles it often considered principles that do not find a parallel in municipal laws.”) 
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This idea is related to the fact that principles protective of human dignity may have many 
manifestations and can assume different forms, all of which belong to one same protective 
principle. One of those forms in which dignity-protective principles can materialize is as rights. 
Nevertheless, a human right may not derive from a principle or be connected to one. In addition 
to the effects and implications of principles for being such, there are implications of human rights 
based on their nature as rights, which (also) require protection from non-state violations out of 
internal logic and normative coherence. 
The inherent character of rights implies that they can be invoked by individuals against 
threats that impair their enjoyment or negatively affect their content. Such claim is unqualified, 
being based simply on the condition of rights as entitlement.529 Furthermore, human rights must 
be based on dignity (see Chapter 1, supra) and generate prohibitions of (all) violations against 
them, following this scheme: dignity  human rights  measures of protection, such as creation 
of duties prohibiting violations. The logic of human rights as entitlements, in sum, must allow 
claims to protection from all violations, State and non-state alike, regardless of other factors, as 
the legal personality of offenders, among others.  
In consequence, as soon as international law imposes a duty ordering States to adjust 
their domestic law to effectively protect and respect a right, recognizing it as such, it gives an 
entitlement to individuals, who can also validly demand that international law fully ensures the 
respect of their human rights. This conclusion is reinforced by the principle according to which 
regulation must be made consistent with human rights. While this is usually predicated of 
domestic law, the underlying logic is valid elsewhere. How this claim is made is a different matter: 
it can be made formally or informally, directly or with the representation or support of actors 
different from the individuals that exert pressure on the lawmakers and authorities,530 especially 
because there can be rights without remedies.531 
Even though human rights and guarantees are based on human dignity, which makes 
them have some implications, two trends determined to a great extent some common features of 
the interpretation or even regulation of norms on human rights stricto sensu. They have 
generated confusion and may be misleading, making some forget that the effects of norms 
dealing with human dignity must take into account and realize the implications of their foundation 
and ultimate purpose: the protection of human beings, rather than following accidental historic-
                                                     
529 Cf. Jack Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 303-305, 311; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 11; Oliver Sensen, op. cit. (“[i]n 
justifying human rights, the good (dignity) is prior to a principle stating what is right; and human rights as 
entitlements—which are justified by the good—are prior to the duties of the agent). 
530 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 34-38. 
531 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 74-75; Andrew Clapham, “The 
Role of the Individual in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 28-29; Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 27, 34. 
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legal models of the regulation of relationships between individuals and some actors (States) that 
may affect the enjoyment of those rights. This has led many to (in my opinion) wrongly consider 
that rights, as the right to equality and non-discrimination, have no relevance vis-à-vis non-state 
entities. This, however, is not the case. 
The two trends mentioned in the previous paragraph are, firstly, a tradition according to 
which human rights have since their origins had one function: to protect individuals from States, 
given the risk of abuse of State powers; and secondly, the excessive predominance of the State 
in former stages of international law.  
The first trend is not consistent with what the foundation of human rights demands. This 
is so because human dignity calls for a full protection that does not depend on the existence of 
relations with the State, which would be a relational argument that would limit the enjoyment of 
rights to a limited sphere of human life. However, its multidimensionality far exceeds the realm of 
individual-State relations, and insisting on a State-centered approach to protection is reductionist 
and fails to address practical, social and individual needs of protection. This approach also insists 
too much on the relevance of an entity that despite its powers may be manipulated or superseded 
by other actors.532 This first trend is not unique to the international landscape, and has in some 
respects been overcome even in domestic settings, that were originally charged with the 
protection of human rights before their internationalization533 and now frequently offer protection 
from non-state abuses. 
The second trend that explains why some believe that human rights are only concerned 
with State abuses is related to the excessive and almost predominant relevance that was 
attributed to States in international law in other times in relation to different legal processes 
(including lawmaking and enforcement). Perhaps as a result, at first only States were permitted to 
be parties to human rights treaties. This shortcoming has been identified and is slowly being 
overcome by permitting other entities to become parties to those treaties, such as the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, that allow some international organizations to become parties to them, 
or by directly imposing duties to non-state actors or punishing certain non-state violations. That 
flaw is also being overcome by the creation of direct international responsibilities, as happens 
                                                     
532 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through 
Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 22, 39-40, 42. 
533 Regarding the internationalization of human rights, cf. Francisco Javier Ansuátegui Roig, “La Historia de los 
Derechos Humanos”, in R. Soriano, C. Alarcón and J. Mora (eds.), Diccionario crítico de los derechos humanos I, 
Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, 2000, 71-78, p. 75; Felipe Gómez Isa, “International Protection of Human 
Rights”, op. cit., pp. 24, 31; Carlos Villán Durán, op. cit., pp. 68-75; Stephan Hobe, op. cit., at 120; Thomas 
Buergenthal, op. cit., pp. 787, 789-790. 
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with international criminal law. The following passage of the fourteenth Advisory Opinion of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights illustrates the tension between the two paradigms: 
“As far as concerns the human rights protected by the Convention, the jurisdiction of the organs 
established thereunder refer exclusively to the international responsibility of states and not to that of 
individuals. Any human rights violations committed by agents or officials of a state are, as the Court 
has already stated, the responsibility of that state […] If these violations were also to constitute 
international crimes, they would, in addition, give rise to individual responsibility”534. 
The two trends described above exerted an influence on the draft of human rights 
obligations and mechanisms of protection found in human rights treaties. This has induced many 
to believe that States are the only entities that can have human rights obligations or have their 
conduct examined by international authorities on the subject. However, norms can address any 
actor in order to promote human dignity if they are properly created by sources of law and respect 
substantive and formal conditions,535 as evidenced by human rights lato sensu norms that can 
and do contemplate non-state responsibilities or permit a wide array of actors to commit to 
respect human rights, as happens in international humanitarian law, for example.536 It is not only 
possible but also advisable to address non-state conduct to ensure that human dignity is fully 
protected. 
Because of that possibility, norms based on traditional and narrower understandings 
must be changed, because they hinder the potential and goals of the protected content and 
implications of human rights and guarantees. After all, States are obliged to diligently protect 
victims from non-state abuses, having human rights horizontal effects of human rights. 
Obligations of this sort protect the content of human rights from non-state abuses, which 
presupposes that –as hinted in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
                                                     
534 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, para. 56. 
535 See Chapter 5, infra. 
536 See, for instance, common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of IHL of 1949 (for an example of imposed 
obligations) and 96.3 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), with the commentary to that article made by the 
ICRC (concerning facultative acts of non-state entities to be bound by IHL treaty-norms), available at: 
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that it considers that “for a very large majority of States the route of acceptance of the Conventions in accordance 
with their common Article 2, paragraph 3, remains open to authorities representing peoples fighting for self-
determination against a State which is a Party to only the Conventions. (37) In the same case a declaration of 
acceptance of [p.1092] the Protocol would only count as a unilateral undertaking of obligations in matters which are 
not covered by customary law.” Furthermore, see Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law, op. cit., 
pp. 40-41; Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War (3rd edn.), International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2001, pp. 69, 85-86, 134 (regarding the applicability of Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions to non-state entities); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. 
cit., at 73; Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 35. 
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Human Rights Committee or the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-537 non-state 
actors can commit violations of the content of human rights.  
For this reason, when non-state actors commit human rights abuses and the obliged 
State(s) have no responsibility because they behave with due diligence to prevent or respond to 
them, but still fail to protect victims and sanction offenders despite their not committing a wrongful 
act, it is undeniable that human rights are violated. Non-state human rights abuses are always 
legally relevant facts, because they affect the protection of human dignity, mandated by law.  
This explanation is illustrated by what I have called the Mastromatteo paradox. The 
European Court of Human Rights examined a case in which criminals killed someone (a non-
state violation of the right to life). The applicant argued that the respondent State (Italy) had failed 
to comply with its obligation to prevent that crime, but the Court held that the State acted with due 
diligence. Thus, it was considered that the State did not breach its respective human rights 
obligation. Despite this, it cannot be contested that there are victims: the murdered individual and 
his father (the applicant). 
After all, the content and enjoyment of human rights explain the need ot State obligations 
to protect, and not the other way around. Contrary interpretations would ignore the foundational 
and non-conditional character of dignity. This logic was confirmed by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in its decision in the Cotton Field case, in which it mentioned that non-state entities 
can violate human rights even when State responsibility is not engaged in connection with their 
misdeeds.538 
Concerning non-conditionality, the Preamble to the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man states: 
“The American States have on repeated occasions recognized that the essential rights of man are not 
derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of his 
human personality” (emphasis added). 
In my opinion, three of the essential rights of victims are the rights to be recognized as 
such, to have access to effective remedies (ensured and implemented at least in the national 
                                                     
537 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, 
Merits Report, op. cit., paras. 119, 122, 128. 
538 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Mastromatteo v. Italy, Judgment, 24 October 2002; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v.  Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 236, 247-248, 
252-253 (where it is clarified that not every violation engages the responsibility of functional authorities, in case they 
act with due diligence). 
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level, as recognized in international instruments539), and to have full protection. The logic of legal 
analysis must be based on the protection of their rights rather than on accidental relationships. 
In fact, when explaining what justifies and explains the existence of positive duties of 
protection against non-state violations, even private ones, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and other supervisory bodies have implicitly or expressly acknowledged that non-state 
entities can violate human rights, and that States have a duty to prevent or respond to non-state 
conduct that factually threatens to violate or violates the content of norms that protect human 
dignity.540  
Therefore, obligations of prevention and protection acknowledge and are based on the 
possibility of non-state violations. Moreover, if protection were limited to victims of non-state 
violations when States are negligent or assist offenders, other victims whose rights are equally 
violated would be discriminated against and be left unprotected. For this reason, international law 
permits States and other entities to devise means to protect human rights and guarantees from 
non-state entities; sometimes it determines exactly how protection from non-state must be in 
substantive or procedural terms; and in some cases gives that protection directly.541 The following 
words of the United Nations illustrate how State participation (proactive or in the form of 
assistance) or the lack thereof does not determine if violations and victims exist: 
“While the State bears the primary responsibility to protect human rights defenders, it is essential to 
recognize that non-State actors can be implicated in acts committed against them, both with and 
without State complicity.  
Armed groups have used killings, abduction and death threats, among other acts, as regular tactics to 
silence human rights defenders. Some of these groups operate in active collusion with Governments, 
for example as a paramilitary force, while others are in conflict with the State as armed opposition 
groups” (emphasis added).542 
Since it cannot be denied that non-state actors can act against human dignity and the 
rights based on it –being their conduct in those cases legally relevant in negative terms-,543 
                                                     
539 Cf. articles 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 25 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or 7 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
540 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. 
cit., paras. 172, 176-177; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 87-
91; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 140-148; Theodor Meron, 
The Humanization of International Law, op. cit., pp. 466-470 (where the author holds that “[a]lthough contemporary 
human rights law focuses on the duty of governments to respect the human rights of individuals, human rights 
violations committed by one private person against another […] cannot be placed outside the ambit of human rights 
law if that law is ever to gain significant effectiveness”). 
541 See John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 18-31. 
542 Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 29, op. cit., at 16. 
543 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through 
Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., at 42; Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of 
law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 36, 40, where it is argued that there 
ought to be international regulation of entities with certain capacities, which calls for their being addressees of jus 
gentium. Undeniably, negatively affecting human rights and human dignity, which entails attacking communiarian 
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assertions to the contrary544 are not only false but also dangerous because may persuade some 
to exclude individuals from protection they deserve and have a right to. What I call the Nuremberg 
syllogism complements these ideas. According to it, if States (legal and social constructions) 
violate human rights, then, as the Military Tribunal mentioned (and is supported by a 
disaggregated analysis), it is through individuals that those violations are committed in practice. In 
factual and ontological terms, individuals have the capacity to attack the enjoyment of human 
rights, and given the possibility of their belonging to non-state groups or acting on their own, non-
state entities can also violate human rights (acting through individuals).545 Ergo, individuals and 
their human rights and guarantees must be protected against their threats as well.546 
Furthermore, the essential right of the recognition of victimhood is, to my mind, an 
expression of the right to the recognition of the personality of individuals, recognized in articles 6 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, XVII of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, and 3 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The effects of this right 
should not be limited to the national sphere and have a universal vocation, which is the purpose 
of the right. The Universal Declaration, for example, states that “[e]veryone has the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law” (emphasis added), whereas the American 
Convention declares that “[e]very person has the right to recognition as a person before the law” 
(emphasis added), without it being proper or required to equate the reference to law with 
                                                                                                                                                            
goals and meta-legal foundations endorsed by law (both de lege lata and de lege ferenda), presupposes the capacity 
to engage in acts that have legal relevance. 
544 Such as the one offered in: http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/qna/alston.asp (last checked: 
11/01/2011), where Philip Alston held that “[f]rom a technical legal point of view governments violate human rights 
and people commit crimes.” Fortunately, he later engaged in studies that explored how human rights are relevant vis-
á-vis non-state entities, as can be seen in: Philip Alston, “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human 
Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?”, op. cit. (note that, additionally, not every violation of human dignity 
attributable to a non-state entity amounts to a crime). 
545 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-
cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, pp. 30-31; Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 40-43. 
546 Concerning these issues, see Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., at 340; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 34-35, 38, 41, 43-46, 58; Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, “Looking beyond the 
State But Not Ignoring It”, op. cit., pp. 6-8, 17-18; John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (“[t]he injury and the 
crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain”); Chris Jochnick, op. cit., pp. 57-
58; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 19-20, 64-65, 117-118. Altogether, the 
assertion of Alston in the reference mentioned in the last paragraph cannot be agreed with: non-state entities, 
individuals included, can and do violate human rights, and something (lawful and proportionate) must be done about 
it perforce, as demanded by the protection of human dignity legally and meta-legally. The Judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals mentioned that “[c]rimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities [States], and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”. If State agents can violate human rights and 
are human beings who have the same capacities of other individuals, then it cannot be denied that these other 
individuals can also violate human rights. A syllogism would then say: human beings can violate human rights. 
Individuals may be State agents or may not be affiliated with a State. Then, State agents and individuals not affiliated 
with States can violate human rights. Logically, a violator does not necessarily breach law, and this often reveals a 
flaw in law that does not offer complete protection. 
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domestic law, given the inherent character of dignity and the teleological interpretation of the cited 
articles, which must be construed so as to maximize the protection of human dignity. 
Moreover, according to the insights of John Finnis and Rita Joseph, it can be said that 
the recognition of the personality of human beings is an essential guarantee that must be 
provided by legal systems, lest they are tainted with an exclusionary character that fails to give 
human beings the central place they deserve to have.547  
Concerning this recognition, international law cannot be an exception. One of the 
guarantees to protect and ensure the right of recognition is by acknowledging that individuals 
have inherent rights of various sorts: first-tier rights, which can be considered as the analogous of 
primary rules and encompass the rights to be respected and protected, given their links to dignity; 
and second-tier rights, which in some respects resemble general secondary international rules,548 
but refer to more than just responsibility and are centered on individuals: these second-tier rights 
are those that are triggered or have applicability once a first-tier right has been violated.  
The right to reparation is one of these second-tier rights, and the right to protection owed 
to all victims partly belongs to this category of rights but alslo deals with entitlements of protection 
before violations take place. In my opinion, denying that victims of non-state actors have these 
rights is contrary to their rights, given their personality and how law must recognize them. The 
right of individuals that all actors and legal systems acknowledge their inherent rights and the 
need to protect them are based on that recognition. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has considered that the human right to 
recognition is related to the protection from non-state abuses, and that it is not satisfied by mere 
social participation. According to it: 
“Every person has the right to be recognized everywhere as a person having rights and obligations, 
and to enjoy the basic civil rights. The right to the recognition of juridical personality implies the 
capacity to be the holder of rights (capacity and exercise) and obligations; the violation of this 
recognition presumes an absolute disavowal of the possibility of being a holder of such rights and 
obligations 
[…] 
[T]he failure to recognize juridical personality harms human dignity, because it denies absolutely an 
individual’s condition of being a subject of rights and renders him vulnerable to non-observance of his 
rights by the State or other individuals. 
[…] 
                                                     
547 Cf. Rita Joseph, Human Rights and the Unborn Child, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 66-68; John Finnis, 
op. cit., pp. 1, 6-10, 13-15. 
548 On the distinction between primary and secondary rules, cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, pp. 31, 34-35, 54, 60-61, 63, 75, 
85, 92, 94-95, 141. 
 
 
173
[maintaining someone] in a legal limbo in which, even though the [person] exist[s] and [is] inserted 
into a particular social context, [implies that his/her] existence [is] not recognized juridically; in other 
words [he/she does] not have juridical personality”549 (emphasis added). 
Certainly, the recognition that individuals have legal entitlements to rights entrenched in 
personality is essential for the respect of human dignity by a legal system, and its absence makes 
individuals “vulnerable” to non-state violations. At the very least, the recognition of the condition 
of someone whose rights have been curtailed and violated by a non-state actor as a victim is an 
indispensable prerequisite for his protection, and calls for State duties of protection and demands 
international or transnational actions if State mechanisms of protection are ineffective or 
inadequate.550 This recognition is thus implicit in human rights norms and must guide their 
interpretation. 
Because of its being non-conditional and a human right, the entitlement to recognition is 
violated when human rights are not recognized by the international (or another) legal system. 
Rights must be recognized even in case of doubt, due to the pro homine principle and the need to 
avoid the risk of ignoring a human being. Positions that ignore this551 ultimately condition the 
recognition of personality, ignoring that recognition is a non-conditional right of every human 
being. After all, pro homine considerations require not only the election of most favorable norms 
but also of the interpretations most favorable to the protection of human dignity, as can be 
identified in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Moreover, paraphrasing 
Blackstone’s formulation, it can be said that it is better to possibly protect a possible victim than to 
possibly prevent a violation of human dignity from taking place or from not being tackled.552 
In light of the previous ideas, assertions that non-state actors do not or cannot violate 
human rights are not only unsound, but also amount to denials of the recognition of entitlements 
                                                     
549 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Judgment, 
op. cit., paras. 176, 179-180.  
550 Cf. Ibid., paras. 208-211; Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Las 
reparaciones ordenadas y el acatamiento de los Estados”,  in Juan Carlos Gutiérrez-Contretas (ed.), Memorias del 
Seminario Los Instrumentos de Protección Regional e Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2004, Programa de 
Cooperación sobre Derechos Humanos México – Comisión Europea, pp. 186, 188-189. 
551 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Vo v. France, Application no. 53924/00, Judgment, 8 July 2004, 
paras. 81-82, 84-85, where the Court considered that “[a]t best, it may be regarded as common ground between 
States that the embryo/foetus belongs to the human race. The potentiality of that being and its capacity to become a 
person – enjoying protection under the civil law, moreover, in many States, such as France, in the context of 
inheritance and gifts, and also in the United Kingdom […] – require protection in the name of human dignity, without 
making it a “person” with the “right to life” for the purposes of Article 2 […] the Court is convinced that it is neither 
desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a 
person for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention”. I cannot but disagree with the Court, because every single 
human being, member of the human race, has the right to juridical personality (cf. article 3 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights), precisely because of her dignity and worth and the imperative of her protection, which 
cannot depend on the whim or negligence of legal systems, State or otherwise. 
552 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. cit., 
para. 33 (“norms should also be interpreted based on a values-based model that the Inter-American System seeks to 
safeguard from the perspective of the “best approach” for the protection of the individual). 
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that victims deserve in legal terms, especially because those denials may prevent some from 
employing legal mechanisms that could be employed to deal with violations of human dignity. 
Furthermore, insisting on theoretical affirmations according to which non-state actors 
“cannot” violate human rights ignores that violations occur whenever the content or enjoyment of 
a right is negatively affected. 
Concerning this, just as human dignity is non-conditional, so are the implications of 
dignity non-conditional. The need to respond to material or factual violations is not qualified, since 
there can be no requirements as to what actor can engage in them, and this affectation of legal 
interests and human beings should be effectively and properly responded to in legal terms. In all 
those cases, victims must be protected and violations prevented from taking place, through 
obligation-based and/or other precautionary and ex post facto measures of protection –e.g. 
fostering a culture of respect of human dignity, etc.-, that can complement each other.553 
As a result, it is necessary to reinterpret expressions and adjectives that have been used 
in international instruments or by different entities (such as bodies of international organizations 
and others), including the terms “destruction” or “abuse” of human rights,554 that according to 
some authors may have been employed sometimes to avoid clearly declaring that non-state 
actors do violate human rights.555 Expressions as these must be considered as acknowledgments 
of violations committed by non-state actors. In fact, case law shows how reference to human 
rights abuses by non-state groups is made recognizing their being contrary to the content and 
guarantees of enjoyment of those rights. In this sense, for instance, the European Court of 
Human Rights mentioned in the case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom that: 
“[R]ecent reporting ha[s] consistently identified an increase in human rights abuses in [Somali] areas 
controlled by al-Shabaab, based largely on that group’s extreme interpretation and application of 
Sharia law […] The Court observes that the situation of general violence is not the only risk that a 
returnee might have to face if he were to relocate to another part of southern and central Somalia. 
According to the country reports, the areas with the lowest levels of generalised violence are the 
areas under the control of al-Shabaab […] which are also the areas reported to have the worst 
human rights conditions […] Consequently, even if a returnee could travel to and settle in his home 
area without being exposed to a real risk of ill-treatment on account of the situation of general 
                                                     
553 Well-founded fear of threats that the victim perceives can be materialized is different from potential victimization, 
because the former is considered to make the victim an actual rather than a potential victim. Both types of victims, in 
any case, deserve and are entitled to demand measures of protection, that functional authorities have a duty to 
provide. Concerning these issues, cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-
Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment, 19 November 1999, para. 165; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 142; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-
Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. cit., para. 177. 
554 Cf. articles 5.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 30 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 13.3 of the American Convention on Human Rights (talking about abusive private acts that are 
contrary to the freedom of thought and expression), or 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Ilias 
Bantekas and Susan Nash, op. cit., at 14; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United 
Kingdom, Judgment, op. cit., para. 262. 
555 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., at 37. 
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violence, he might still be exposed to a real risk of ill-treatment on account of the human rights 
situation” (emphasis added). 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for its part, has declared that 
terrorism threatens the “protection of human rights”.556 
Furthermore, as discussed below, expressions as ‘human rights abuses’ are also 
employed in regard to States, whose human rights responsibilities are settled and uncontroverted 
by some of those who oppose non-state human rights responsibilities.557 Likewise, international 
human rights entities have employed such labels or even the term ‘violation’ to refer to situations 
in which both authorities with State features and non-state entities are accused of having acted 
contrary to the respect and protection of human dignity.558 Therefore, those expressions do not 
suggest in themselves that an entity cannot violate human rights, but quite the contrary. 
In this regard, it is telling that in statements of international authorities abuses attributable 
to different parties involved in conflicts are equated in their reproachfulness. The following 
declaration of Navi Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations, made on 
March 10th of 2011 concerning “human rights violations against civilians in Côte d’Ivoire”, said for 
instance that: 
“Human rights abuses, including rapes, abductions and killings are being committed by people 
supporting both sides”.559 
Similarly, but employing language that clearly indicates the presence of human rights 
violations attributable to non-state entities, Human Rights Watch considered that:  
“During the conflict, and especially just before the fall of Tripoli in August [of 2011], Gaddafi forces 
executed prisoners in their custody […] Anti-Gaddafi forces also committed human rights and 
humanitarian law violations during the conflict, though they also pledged not to use landmines”560 
(emphasis added). 
In its World Report on the events of 2011, that same NGO expressed that “[r]ebel forces 
also committed human rights and humanitarian law violations during the armed conflict.” 
Interestingly, the International Commission on Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council in 
February 2011 considered that both parties to the latest internal conflict in Libya committed 
                                                     
556 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, 
22 October 2002, paras. 2-3; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment, op. cit., paras. 262 and 272. 
557 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 33-35, 55-56. 
558 See Human Rights Watch, “Southern Sudan: Abuses on Both Sides in Upper Nile Clashes”, 19 April 2011, 
available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/19/southern-sudan-abuses-both-sides-upper-nile-clashes (last 
checked: 12/01/2012).  
559 See “Human Rights in Côte d’Ivoire deteriorating, warns top UN official”, 10 March 2011, available at: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37733&Cr=ivoire&Cr1= (last checked: 12/01/2012). 
560 Cf. Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Lagging Effort to Build Justice System: Security Needs Working Courts, Legal 
Reform”, 22 January 2012, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/libya-lagging-effort-build-justice-system 
(last checked: 23/01/2012). 
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“human rights violations and war crimes”, that NATO had to investigate civilian casualties, and 
that the United Nations and the international community should follow some recommendations.561 
Likewise, State practice seems to equally oppose acts contrary to human dignity 
committed by States and non-state entities. This highlights how they are equally heinous and 
contrary to legal goods. See, for instance, the following excerpts from the report on Colombia in 
the 2010 human rights reports of the U.S. Department of State: 
“[S]ocietal problems and governmental human rights abuses were reported during the year […] 
The FARC and ELN committed the following human rights abuses: political killings; killings of 
members of the public security forces and local officials; widespread use of landmines; kidnappings 
and forced disappearances; massive forced displacements; subornation and intimidation of judges, 
prosecutors, and witnesses; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of 
movement; widespread recruitment and use of child soldiers; attacks against human rights activists; 
violence against women, including rape and forced abortions; and harassment, intimidation, and 
killings of teachers and trade unionists. 
New illegal armed groups, which included some former paramilitary members, also committed 
numerous human rights abuses”562 (emphasis added). 
NGO practice reveals a similar pattern, demonstrated for instance in the section on 
Colombia in the World Report 2012 of Human Rights Watch, that mentions that there have been 
“serious violations by all actors”, human rights abuses, atrocities and attacks, and violations of 
IHL (some of whose norms protect dignity) attributable to non-state entities and to the State.563 
Notwithstanding existing criticisms of human rights foreign policies of some States and 
political advocacy due to possible double standards, manipulations or misconceptions,564 it is 
worth noting that the cited report assimilates State and non-state abuses in their reproachfulness 
and in their being contrary to human rights. This way of reasoning is found in other documents, as 
in a report on the situation of human rights in Sudan in a previous year,565 and is sound, since all 
acts against human dignity are reproachful. 
                                                     
561 Cf. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012, Events of 2011, 2012, at 598; Human Rights Council, Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68 (Advance Unedited Version), 2 March 2012, paras. 39, 
576, paras. 134-136 of the recommendations, and Summary (the Commission of Inquiry had a “mandate “to 
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya […] [and concluded that] international 
crimes, specifically crimes against humanity and war crimes, were committed by Qadhafi forces in Libya […] [and 
that] the thuwar (anti-Qadhafi forces) committed serious violations, including war crimes and breaches of 
international human rights law, the latter continuing at the time of the present report.”); Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the UN, “Human rights violations and war crimes committed by both sides—the 
latest report on Libya”, 8 March 2012, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/LibyaReport.aspx 
(last checked: 08/03/2012). 
562 Cf. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010 Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices, Report on Colombia, 8 April 2011, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160452.pdf. 
563 Cf. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012, Events of 2011, 2012, pp. 228-235. 
564 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 63-64. 
565 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
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Whenever non-state entities violate human guarantees or rights lato sensu, it is correct 
and convenient to declare that such breaches are contrary to human dignity and human rights (in 
the case of rights lato sensu). This highlights the need to do what law requires as a consequence 
of the existence of violations, including prevention, sanction and protection. In this sense, for 
instance, authors, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Law 
Commission have considered that some crimes, as crimes against humanity violate human 
rights.566 
Refusing to accept that non-state actors can violate human rights is not only contrary to 
the logic of human rights but also negative in many respects: it is unfair with victims, and may 
constitute a discriminatory treatment (as discussed in Chapter 3, infra); secondly, it denies in 
practice that some victims have rights, the content of which is utterly ignored against some 
actors; and thirdly, because of this, denying that non-state entities can engage in violations of 
human rights or guarantees is a performative action,567 completed as soon as the lack of 
recognition takes effect, and is contrary to the right to have one’s legal personality recognized, 
depriving the rights of victims of non-state actors of effectiveness and international recognition. 
The following questions must be asked: what if State is ineffective, unable or unwilling to 
prevent a non-state violation? Do human rights norms have nothing to say in that case, even from 
a symbolic perspective? They sure do play very important roles in such an event. 
Saying that recognizing non-state violations and rights of their victims is unnecessary 
because of the possibility of States being responsible if they are negligent is not satisfactory.  
Apart from the rebuttals of the Mastromatteo paradox, explained above, this claim ignores that 
States can be simultaneously responsible with non-state actors in different ways: as main 
violators, accomplices, coauthors or else. This was recognized by the International Law 
Commission, doctrine,568 and the International Court of Justice, which in its 2007 judgment on the 
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide considered that: 
“Although [Article 16 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility], because it concerns a 
situation characterized by a relationship between two States, is not directly relevant to [a case where 
a non-state actor is involved], it nevertheless merits consideration. The Court sees no reason to make 
                                                     
566 Cf. Ibid., at 42; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, op. cit., para. 56. 
567 This expression is based on the notion that performative acts are performed by an utterance. In my opinion, 
extending the notion from mere utterances to assertions and implicit denials, one can see how mere denial of the 
condition of victims and of the existence of a legally relevant violation when non-state violators are involved brings 
about a state of affairs that is at odds with the foundations of humanitarian (encompassing and not limited to IHL) 
law. Cf. http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/performative (last checked: 12/01/2012). 
568 Cf. articles 1.2, 14, 15, 17.3, 18, 42.2, 48, 58, 59, 61, 62, and 66 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
international organizations, A/66/10, 2011; Antonio Cassese, “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for 
International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case”, op. cit., at 864. 
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any distinction of substance between “complicity in genocide”, within the meaning of Article III, 
paragraph (e), of the Convention [on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide], and 
the “aid or assistance” of a State in the commission of a wrongful act by another State within the 
meaning of the aforementioned Article 16 ⎯ setting aside the hypothesis of the issue of instructions or 
directions or the exercise of effective control, the effects of which, in the law of international 
responsibility, extend beyond complicity. In other words, to ascertain whether the Respondent is 
responsible for “complicity in genocide” within the meaning of Article III, paragraph (e), which is what 
the Court now has to do, it must examine whether organs of the respondent State, or persons acting 
on its instructions or under its direction or effective control, furnished “aid or assistance” in the 
commission of the genocide in Srebrenica, in a sense not significantly different from that of those 
concepts in the general law of international responsibility.”569 
The previous considerations related to the recognition of non-state violations and their 
victims make it necessary to ask if the content of all human rights is can be violated by non-state 
entities or, in other words, if there are rights can only be abused by States. This is a question that 
has been made before and is related to others. In this regard, in the context of the relationship 
between corporations and human rights, it has been asked if it would be preferable to have an 
exhaustive list of the rights that must be respected by such entities or if, on the contrary, such a 
list, if it existed, should preferably be open ended and not exhaustive -i.e. exemplary-, or even if it 
should not be adopted at all, given the possibility of those non-state actors eventually violating 
any human right. 
Concerning this question, John Ruggie, former Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, considered that while projects as the draft Norms on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2) of 26 August 2003 opt to include lists of rights from the violation of 
which violation a non-state actor (corporations, in this case) must abstain, it is preferable to not 
employ such lists. 
The Special Representative based his opinion on the argument that those non-state 
actors (and others, I might add) may virtually impact negatively upon the enjoyment of any human 
right. This idea was also expressed in the Commentary to Principle 12 to the Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights.570 Thereby, exclusion of protection from non-state violations of 
any human right is undeserved and lowers standards of protection. Additionally, hypothetically 
speaking, if a right were not prone to non-state violations, non-state actors could still assist in 
State violations, and protection against that form of participation should also be granted, 
                                                     
569 Cf. International Court of Justice, Case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, op. cit., para. 
420. 
570 Cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 6, 
51, 52; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, at 13. 
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especially to ensure full reparations, which are only possible if all participants in violations 
participate in reparations schemes (see Chapter 7, infra). 
Criticisms as that of Ruggie may be understood as being directed against lists of an 
exhaustive nature but not against merely exemplificative open-ended lists that indicate some of 
the rights that can be or are more likely to be violated by non-state actors, perhaps due to how 
frequently violations occur. As the Special Representative acknowledged, it may be helpful for 
actors to be mindful of risk situations to avoid, and it must be added that it may be also useful to 
indicate areas and activities of risk or concern to stakeholders, third parties and authorities, in 
lists or in other ways.571 In my opinion a third option, that of lists of rights excluded from protection 
against a given actor, is undesirable, because this would exclude rights potentially targeted by an 
actor intentionally or not from legal protection from it, and future realization that they can be 
violated by a non-state entity will have to deal with the hurdles of processes of normative change. 
I wholly agree with John Ruggie that non-state actors can impair the enjoyment of all 
rights. At first glance, this may seem dubious because some rights tend to be described in 
instruments taking into account the relationship between individuals and the State, as happens 
with political rights. Some also question this idea because of norms that portray the State as a 
qualified and necessary agent of violation, as happens with the right to not be subject to torture, 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments, or to enforced disappearance, as 
enshrined in articles 1 and 16 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment or 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, respectively.  
When examined in detail, those objections are revealed as false because non-state 
actors can affect the enjoyment of all rights, even those described in the previous paragraph, 
despite what some specific norms suggest. First of all, just as States can participate in human 
rights violations as accomplices of non-state violators or failing to prevent abuses, non-state 
actors may be secondary agents of violation, with States being the principal agents of violation. 
For example, non-state actors can contribute to State conduct that prevents individuals from 
exercising political rights and, as expressly mentioned in the articles of the two Conventions cited 
above, when a non-state actor commits torture or enforced disappearance crimes with the 
support or acquiescence of a State, those particular forms of violation are prohibited by norms 
with narrow definition of violations. 
What is more: non-state actors may affect the enjoyment of the rights that are close to 
models of relationships between individuals and authorities (State or not) even when no breach 
                                                     
571 Ibid. 
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can be attributed to a State at all. This happens, for instance, when non-state actors sabotage 
elections and threaten those who intend to suffrage.572 In those cases, if States attempt to 
counter the conduct of non-state actors that may impair the enjoyment of a given right with due 
diligence, their own responsibility will not be engaged but individuals will be affected nonetheless.  
On the other hand, individuals may even have rights to political participation in relation to 
international organizations and other entities, as revealed in the Matthews case. Likewise, the 
due process guarantees are applicable in non-judicial procedures, which in my opinion implies 
that they must be present in procedures conducted by non-state entities.573  
Additionally, specialized treaties with narrow definitions of violations are complementary 
to general human rights treaties, which unlike them may protect the same rights without requiring 
specific agents of offence for violations to exist. As commented above, international human rights 
bodies have found that torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments, for 
example, may be committed by non-state actors, against whom States must protect individuals. 
For the sake of discussion, if eventually a given right or guarantee could ever be violated 
only by States,574 non-state entities could still find ways to violate it in the future or cooperate with 
State violations, and thus protection against them should be given too. Altogether, potentially all 
human rights and guarantees could be exposed to non-state violations and must be protected 
against them, as required in evolutionary systems such as international law and international 
human rights law.575 In consequence, all of them must be legally protected against all threats. 
                                                     
572 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102. 26 February 1999, paras. 31-38, 46-48 of Chapter IX (Freedom of Association and Political 
Rights), where the Commission manifested that Colombian non-state armed groups engaged in acts that “interfere[d] 
with the free exercise of the right of Colombians to vote and to participate in politics”, and that their attacks may “lead 
to a situation in which the Colombian citizenry does not have effective access to the right to vote and direct or 
representative political participation.” Likewise, see Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012, Events of 2011, 2012, 
pp. 229, 231. Moreover, see how the foundations of political rights demand their protection from all threats, State or 
not, as can be inferred from: Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25, The right to participate in public 
affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service (art. 25), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, 12 July 1996, 
paras. 19-20. 
573 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Matthews v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 34, 39-
44, 52-54, 63-65; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Judgment, 2 
February 2001, paras. 124-131; Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment T-083/10, 11 February 2010, paras. 8-
14, where the Court explained why the right to due process is applicable in relations between private entities and 
how that right can be protected by the Colombian judiciary in fundamental rights procedures in some cases. 
574 Cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 52. 
575 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, op. cit., paras. 37-38; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment, 19 
November 1999, para. 193; Marko Milanovic, “The ICJ and Evolutionary Treaty Interpretation”, EJIL: Talk!, 14 July 
2009, available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icj-and-evolutionary-treaty-interpretation/ (last checked: 16/01/2012); 
International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 25 
September 1997, paras. 112, 140. 
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Another point worth considering is that the recognition of the victim status of individuals 
whose human rights and guarantees have been violated by non-state entities has an important 
symbolic function and is demanded by guarantees as the reparation of victims.  
Concerning this, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognizes and soft law 
principles expressly acknowledge, satisfaction is very important role for victims and is a 
component of reparation. Satisfaction is, in fact, deeply entrenched in the international legal 
system, being a central category and modality of reparations under general international law. For 
this reason, in the articles on the responsibility of States and of international organizations, the 
International Law Commission included it as one component of the duty to repair, and human 
rights instruments acknowledge its relevance and the right of victims to receive satisfaction.576  
Satisfaction requires the restoration of the honor of a victim and the recognition of this 
situation, which is why its analysis is important here. Failing to recognize victims of non-states is 
at odds with the requirements of satisfaction and dignity, and is thus contrary to legal norms and 
principles because all victims have a right to be repaired577 –from both State and non-state 
abuses- and thus to be satisfied and recognized. In this way, for instance, I consider that an 
evolutionary and teleological victim-centered interpretation demands considering that human 
rights protect everyone from all threats no matter who perpetrates them. Principle 18 of the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power seems to 
confirm this by saying that: 
“’Victims’ means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental 
rights, through acts or omissions that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws but of 
internationally recognized norms relating to human rights” (emphasis added). 
                                                     
576 Cf. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, paras. 18, 22; articles 34 
and 37 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts drafted by the International 
Law Commission (A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4), or 34 and 37 of the version of the draft articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session in 2011 (A/66/10). 
577 Cf. Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, pp. 2-3, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/ga_60-147/ga_60-147_e.pdf (last checked: 16/01/2012), where it is said that “[i]t 
was generally felt that non-State actors are to be held responsible for their policies and practices, allowing victims to 
seek redress and reparation on the basis of legal liability and human solidarity”; Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, paras. 11 through 26; articles 63 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights and 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “Las 
Reparaciones en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos”, pp. 2-4, available at: 
http://www.usergioarboleda.edu.co/instituto_derechos_humanos/material/cv/reparaciones.pdf (last checked: 
16/01/2012); Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Las reparaciones 
ordenadas y el acatamiento de los Estados”, op. cit., pp. 187-189. 
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Let me offer my interpretation of that Principle: in my opinion, the allusion to human rights 
must be understood as referring to human rights lato sensu. All victims suffer harm, irrespective 
of the identity of participants in a violation; and reference to human rights violations must be 
understood as including all material or factual violations. Understood in this way, the cited soft law 
instrument calls for protecting victims of non-state entities and recognizes both their victimhood 
and, in consequence, that they have a right to reparation and thus to satisfaction. As to the use of 
the term abuse of power in the aforementioned principles, it could be understood in the sense of 
abuse of power to do or not to do something, which can be attributed to any actor, especially 
since the transcribed definition of victims is not limited to those negatively affected by States. 
Returning to norms dealing with human dignity that refer to satisfaction, it can be seen 
that Principles 18 and 22.d of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law acknowledge the importance of satisfaction when 
they mention that: 
“In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of individual 
circumstances, victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation 
and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective reparation, as laid out in 
principles 19 to 23, which include the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition 
[…] 
Satisfaction should include […] An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the 
reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim” (emphasis 
added). 
The case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has considered satisfaction 
as important for victims, and that it requires recognition of victimhood. According to judge Sergio 
García Ramírez, satisfaction is an essential part of reparations insofar as it is crucial to the 
creation of a “new situation that is as similar as possible to” that existing prior to a violation, being 
purposes of this element of reparation “the moral satisfaction of the victims or their successors, 
[and] the recovery of the honor and reputation” of victims,578 among others.  
To my mind, essential to satisfaction is honoring and acknowledging the value and 
importance of victims, something that is ignored if (not even) his own condition as a victim is 
recognized. Thus, recognition of victimhood is an essential element of reparations, and operates 
even when States fail to protect human rights in accordance with their horizontal effects. Worse, 
ignoring the suffering of victims of non-state actors may constitute secondary victimization.  
                                                     
578 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio García Ramírez in the Judgment on Reparations in the Bámaca-
Velázquez Case (concurring opinion to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Bámaca-Velásquez v. 
Guatemala, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 22 February 2002, pp. 1-3. 
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In psychological terms, acknowledgement of her suffering is dear and important for a 
victim because if this recognition is refused she may perceive that her image, worth and 
reputation are not recognized. 
Victims often feel the needs to be dignified and recognized579 and to feel that law and 
legal agents sympathize with them, recognize their suffering, and strive to help them, as is just 
and fair. After all, people also need to feel supported and protected by law,580 and they tend to 
value legal statements according to which all victims have inherent worth and that the violations 
they suffer are unlawful, contrary to their inherent rights and unacceptable. They are important 
measures, especially when victims feel that they have suffered an injustice and their self-esteem 
is wavering. To my mind, this explains why it has been said that victims may seek “recognition 
and respect […] to restore their sense of justice and reduce their suffering”581.  
An empathic treatment, that recognizes the importance of victims, is dear to victims, but it 
can only be achieved if the violations of the rights of victims are first recognized and branded as 
unacceptable and to be addressed by law, due to its task of addressing social and human 
problems no matter who violates human rights. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the system will end 
up being questioned due to selectiveness, irrelevance and/or insufficiency.  
For many victims, to forgive and/or get over their problems and trauma, it is necessary 
that their situation is acknowledged and considered as wrong and that offenders are identified 
and apologize. This is analyzed in detail Chapter 7, which examines why reparations must be 
victim-centered and offer protection from all violations. Additionally, feelings of injustice due to 
lack of legal remedies and legal indications to everyone that non-state violations are 
unacceptable and must be properly addressed may aggravate the suffering of victims. Such a 
                                                     
579 Cf. Gina Donoso, “Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ reparation judgments. Strengths and Challenges for a 
comprehensive approach”, Revista IIDH, Vol. 49, 2009, pp. 35, 65-66; Luc Huyse, op cit., pp. 55, 58-59, 61-65; 
Eimear Wynne, “Reflections on Recognition: A Matter of Self-realization or a Matter of Justice?”, Thinking 
Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vol. 9, 2000, 5, 7-11 
580 In that regard, the story found in the book El coronel no tiene quién le escriba (No One Writes to the Colonel) by 
Gabriel García Márquez is exemplary, as well as the passage found in his work Cien años de soledad, where it is 
told that “En un cierto momento, el coronel Gerineldo Márquez era en verdad el único que habría podido mover, aun 
desde su mecedor de paralítico, los enmohecidos hilos de la rebelión. Después del armisticio de Neerlandia, 
mientras el coronel Aureliano Buendía se refugiaba en el exilio de sus pescaditos de oro, él se mantuvo en contacto 
con los oficiales rebeldes que le fueron fieles hasta la derrota. Hizo con ellos la guerra triste de la humillación 
cotidiana, de las súplicas y los memoriales, del vuelva mañana, del ya casi, del estamos estudiando su caso con la 
debida atención; la guerra perdida sin remedio contra los muy atentos y seguros servidores que debían asignar y no 
asignaron nunca las pensiones vitalicias.” Cf. Gabriel García Márquez, Cien años de Soledad, Mondadori – Leer-e 
(ebook version), 2012, at 533. 
581 Cf. Jo-Anne Wemmers and Katie Cyr, “What Fairness Means to Crime Victims: A Social Psychological 
Perspective on Victim-Offender Mediation”, Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, 2006, pp. 102, 109, 123, 
125, available at: http://www.apcj.org/documents/2_2_fairness.pdf (last checked: 16/01/2012). 
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treatment would be at odds with the idea that law ought to strive to prevent persons from feeling 
dejected and tempted to take justice into their own hands.582 
In consequence, it is necessary to make them everyone be aware of the worth and 
entitlements of victims, something that is bolstered by official (legal) recognition of the importance 
of their rights and the unacceptability of violations, indicating everyone (in international, domestic, 
private and transnational societies) that a violation should never take place and will be tackled.  
This is why it is crucial to acknowledge that violations of human rights can be committed 
by any actor, lest victims perceive that law simply protects some persons but not them583 and 
some cease supporting human rights or humanitarian norms or consider them as irrelevant, 
ineffective, discriminatory, narrow or selective.584 These features are openly contrary to the 
philosophy of a human rights system founded on the complete and effective protection of dignity. 
In sum, to prevent victims wronged by non-state actors from feeling abandoned by law 
due to “theoretical” notions of human rights, which could worsen their suffering and risk the 
legitimacy of human rights law, it must be recognized that their rights were violated, and legal 
measures must deal with this accordingly. In fact, it has been considered that refusing to 
recognize a victim as such may constitute a form of re-victimization, because it can cause 
“additional hurt after the direct cause of victimization has disappeared”585, as commented by Luc 
Huyse. It can also encourage future non-state violations due to impunity, which is something to 
be avoided. 
Conversely, the recognition of the status of victimhood and other identities of victims may 
be a first (but not sufficient) step “in respecting that person’s dignity”,586 given how this recognition 
triggers actions to protect rights of the victim and enforce duties of other entities, including State 
or non-state authorities and offenders, which are dependent on the recognition of victimhood.  
Related to this, Valerie Meredith mentions how the recognition of “the identity projected 
by a person” is linked to dignity given how the latter “relates partly to one’s own sense of identity 
and worth.”587 As a consequence, she argues that it is important to recognize the different roles of 
                                                     
582 It must be recalled that “One of the most important and significant goals of reparations for victims of political 
violence, is that it allows them to channel their frustration, aggression and feelings of revenge through language and 
symbolic acts. Well-processed reparations can bring closure or the beginning of mourning and can serve as symbols 
of healing.” Cf. Gina Donoso, op. cit., at 37. 
583 Cf. Chris Jochnick, op. cit., pp. 57-65. 
584 Cf. Ibid.; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 28, 44. 
585 Cf. Luc Huyse, op. cit., at 61. 
586 Cf. Valerie M. Meredith, “Victim identity and respect for human dignity: a terminological analysis”, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, 2009, pp. 259-274. 
587 Cf. Ibid., at 270. 
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victims, including active ones that are not properly described by the label ‘victims’, usually 
associated with passive connotations.588  
Apart from considerations of convenience, the legal recognition of the violation of human 
rights is a task of authorities and normative systems. If they fail to acknowledge someone’s 
victimhood, they will fail to treat them as rights-bearers who should never be offended. Official 
reactions on the subject will be perceived by others, who may react according to this signal. 
Authorities and law may fail to trigger or permit the use of mechanisms and norms on the 
protection of victims if they do not recognize them as such. 
It is worth examining how only by involving all participants in violations, be them agents of 
the State in their individual capacity or else, as having a responsibility that is different from and 
complementary to that of States or other actors, it will be possible to truly and effectively protect 
and repair victims and discourage future violations. For instance, for apologies –a form of 
satisfaction- to be relevant, they must come from all the actors that committed or participated in a 
violation; and non-state actors must have accountability towards their victims. Interestingly, in 
practice non-state actors that violate human rights have sometimes recognized the need that they 
recognize and repair their victims, as was declared by representatives of the non-state armed 
group FARC from Colombia.589 
Failing to recognize the existence of non-state violations of human dignity and ensuing 
rights and responsibilities would also make international law send a negative message: it would 
refuse individuals the moral satisfaction of claiming their having a right which any other actor has 
to respect, which is fundamental for victims also from a personal and ethical perspective.590 
In fact, individuals, groups and movements can and have resorted to criticize non-state 
behavior even when it is not clear that such entities have breached a norm that binds them, as 
has happened with certain claims of corporate complicity with human rights abuses.591 Underlying 
these claims is the consideration that the enjoyment of a human right or humanitarian guarantee 
has been impaired or is in peril. Denying the existence of non-state abuses and the possibility of 
invoking and showing that a human right or guarantee has been violated denies the possibility of 
pointing out wrongs and injustices and of demanding protection and eventually the modification of 
law or legal practices.  
                                                     
588 Ibid., pp. 259, 261-262, 265, 269-271, 273-274. 
589 See http://www.espectador.com/noticias/271750/farc-admite-haber-causado-vctimas-y-dolor-en-colombia (last 
checked: 23/08/2013). 
590 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 43-44; Amartya Sen, op. cit., pp. 326-328, 345  
591 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 347-348. 
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Amartya Sen describes how many of these actions are often based on ethical 
considerations.592 The strength of those initiatives is weakened if the possibility of non-state 
abuses is rejected. Furthermore, recognition in ethical and legal terms is important because there 
may be links between human rights in the ethical realm and human rights law, even if they are 
independent593 (and so demands in one could be requested in the other realm). It is also relevant 
because of the symbolic or expressive function of law,594 that consists in sending messages by 
law to society, which impacts upon the beliefs and attitudes of addressees and members of 
society (even if not addressed by law).  
If non-state entities feeling bound by human rights standards they may behave 
accordingly or claim to observe them to avoid criticism and responsibilities. Fred Halliday has 
explained, for example, how the mere claim that non-state actors should respect international 
humanitarian law brought upon a change in the mindset of some of them that made them begin to 
feel the need to justify their behavior by arguing how it complies with those norms.595 This 
dynamic is necessary in relation to all norms and principles protecting human dignity. 
Likewise, it has been explained that several actors, such as corporations, may adjust 
their behavior or policies in response to human rights ethical, social or legal expectations placed 
on them; and that they can react and be subject to pressure to conform to those expectations, 
being it possible for such pressure to be exerted by outsiders or by those who are close to those 
actors, including for instance investors,596 who in turn may have pertinent responsibilities. 
Change of attitudes of non-state entities can be brought about by multiple dynamics, 
including the legal acknowledgment that human rights can be violated, because it can have 
expressive symbolic and educative effects.597 Because of it, members of society may change 
their perceptions and be convinced of the importance of the protection required by law. If 
offenders do not heed this signaling, they may still be subject to social and individual reactions to 
their violations, and may thus face boycotts, social pressure, and opposition from others.598  
In relation to the possibility of members of society invoking claims supported by law to 
bring about changes in the mindset or conduct of abusers, some may consider that they may 
sometimes engage in conduct described as (a controversial concept called) lawfare (which can 
                                                     
592 Cf. Amartya Sen, op. cit., pp. 325-328, 342-345, 349, 355-356. 
593 Ibid., pp. 326-327, 342-345. 
594 Cf. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law”, op. 
cit., at 735; Mauricio García Villegas, op. cit.; at 40. 
595 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 35. 
596 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 339, 341, 347-348; Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., pp. 428-431. 
597 Cf. Barbara Ann Stolz, “Russia, Crime, and the Moral Educative Function of Law”, Demokratizatsiya, The Journal 
of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 6, 1998, pp. 88-90. 
598 Cf. Daniel Thürer, op. cit., pp. 46-47; Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 347-348; August Reinisch, op. 
cit., pp. 53, 68, 77; Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 428-429; Menno T. Kamminga, op. cit., at 186. 
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be used in a hypocritical way).599 Proponents of this concept argue that law may be employed as 
an instrument to achieve political ends, suggesting that it may be abused or manipulated, and 
that even non-state entities may blame others while remaining silent on their violations of human 
dignity.600  
The problem with the concept is that while it tries to highlight possible manipulations of 
law, it allows others to claim that someone engages in ‘lawfare’ to divert attention away from their 
own abuses and their own strategic invocations of law. Yet, it is true that law can be invoked to 
achieve political ends, sometimes manipulating it in order to make it say what it doesn’t truly say. 
As a result of the social and psychological factors based on normative considerations that 
pressurize or persuade actors to respect human dignity, non-state entities may be willing to 
commit to observe human rights standards in binding or declaratory and non-binding standards, 
such as codes of conduct601 or the Global Compact. They may do so because of selfish or 
unselfish interests, deceitfully or honestly. Regardless of the true intentions of those entities, 
others may feel further entitled or legitimized to urge them to respect their commitments, and non-
state legitimacy will be further checked and constrained by human rights standards. Additionally, 
legal effects of declaratory commitments are not to be lightly dismissed, because they may exist 
in connection with legal principles such as good faith, or as the result of the reception of the 
content of non-binding standards in binding norms of international or domestic law.602 
Moreover, regulation of non-state human rights responsibilities can not only be invoked to 
pressurize non-state conduct, but can also trigger processes of acculturation and internalization. 
This means that it can make an actor reluctantly or willingly conform to standards of what is 
expected from it in its social context (acculturation); and/or receive the content of norms due to 
reiterative procedures enunciating normative contents,603 which can for instance declare the 
unlawfulness of non-state violations. These processes are more effective if they are supported by 
                                                     
599 Cf. Gabor Rona, “Legal Issues in the ‘War on terrorism’—Reflecting on the Conversation Between Silja N.U. 
Voneky and John Bellinger”, German Law Journal, Vol. 09, 2008, at 712, available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol09No05/PDF_Vol_09_No_05_711-736_Developments_Rona.pdf (last 
checked: 17/01/2012). 
600 Cf. Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st 
Century Conflicts”, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, 2011, available at: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf (last checked: 
17/01/2012), pp. 5-6, 11, 36; “Rights Group Lists Abuses by Guerrillas in Colombia”, The New York Times, 10 July 
2001, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/10/world/10COLO.html 
601 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 42-53; Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., pp. 425-430. 
602 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, Report: Preliminary issues for the ILA Conference 
in Rio de Janeiro, August 2008, 2008, at 3. Moreover, domestic or international norms can incorporate the content of 
soft law or even regulations created by non-state actors or aimed at the regulation of their behavior. For an example, 
cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., pp. 452-454. 
603 Cf. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law”, op. 
cit., pp. 726-729; Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., at 2645-2659. 
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initiatives of promotion and enforcement addressing non-state violations, and if coupled with 
psychological and perception dynamics. 
From the opposite perspective, that of victims, failure to legally recognize the existence of 
legal importance or existence of non-state violations of human dignity may make (actual or 
potential) victims feel that law does not correspond to what they (rightly) consider that human 
rights are.  
This is illustrated in the popular expression according to which “the reach of someone’s 
rights ends where the rights of others begin”, that assumes that the latter rights can be violated by 
non-state actors as individuals, and that they must therefore be protected accordingly, without the 
effects of these rights being limited to the sphere of State-individual relationships. This is why in 
war-torn countries or places where non-states entities engage in heinous violations, many claim 
that international agencies that criticize States but not non-state actors are biased or, worse, may 
have a hidden agenda and take sides, as some said in Colombia, for instance.   
Conversely, if law signals the unlawfulness of and stigmatizes violations of human dignity 
committed by all actors, individuals will feel better protected and believe that law is proper and not 
discriminatory or ineffective concerning non-state-sponsored or -committed violations. That is why 
people may feel baffled by “wise” statements of scholars that, contrary to what axioms, reality and 
practice reveal, argue that human rights “cannot” be violated by entities different from States. 
For all these reasons, in spite of how solid theories of rights may seem to those who hold 
them in reduced circles that sometimes are self-contained and hold self-repeated or intertextual 
discourses, without paying attention to reality, ordinary people, and even those who uphold those 
discourses when they are wronged by a non-state, will reject them as flawed. Narrow theories of 
human rights protection thus can and must be overcome through non-reductionist interpretations 
whenever possible, and by legal modification and complementation otherwise. 
In fact, from a practical perspective, quite many of the acts that are contrary to the 
content of human rights, even serious ones, are committed by non-state entities, and even when 
a State has its responsibility engaged, non-state actors are often involved: either a purely non-
state entity, whose violation was not prevented or addressed by the State, or (always) a State-
agent, who may have separate a responsibility. In both cases, future violations must be prevented 
and individuals protected and repaired from them, even entitling States that pay victims to ask 
non-state offenders to compensate them later.604  
                                                     
604 Cf. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, paras. 3.c, 3.d, 12, 15-16, 
18, 23 (“those who claim to be victims of a human rights or humanitarian law violation [must be provided] with equal 
and effective access to justice, as described below, irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility 
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After all, States are artificial entities composed of and operating through organs and 
individuals,605 and thus commit their breaches through individuals or other actors, who may have 
violated norms that bind them as well. For this reason, in the Judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals it was considered that: 
“[I]ndividuals can be punished for violations of international law. Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”606 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the International Law Commission acknowledges that the regulation of the 
responsibility of an entity -as a State or an international organization- does not prejudge “any 
question of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of 
an international organization or a State”.607 
In sum, failing to recognize the entitlements and situation of victims of non-state actors 
and to protect them accordingly, even if no State has its responsibility engaged due to its having 
complied with its international duties, amounts to ignoring the needs and opinion of stakeholders 
and victims themselves, thus making the (nonexistent) legal response illegitimate.608 Additionally, 
denying that there are non-state entities that can violate human rights generates a sense of 
impunity and can stimulate similar future abuses, in part due to the implied message that such 
abuses are allegedly not unlawful. This message is false, because it is unlawful for a State to not 
deal with those them. Authors609 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have correctly 
pointed out that there is a connection between impunity and perpetuation of victimization. In this 
regard, this Court considered that: 
                                                                                                                                                            
for the violation”, and guarantees of non-repetition must be put into place –emphasis added-); Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, paras. 12-17 (“[w]hen compensation is not fully 
available from the offender or other sources, States should endeavor to provide financial compensation” and may 
use “national funds for compensation to victims”. It also mentions that “Victims should receive the necessary 
material, medical, psychological and social assistance through governmental, voluntary, community-based and 
indigenous means”); Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, op. cit., 
A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 82. 
605 Cf. Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 40-42, 44-45, 71. 
606 Cf. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals. 
607 Cf. articles 57 and 58 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001 
and 66 of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations (A/66/10) as of 2011. 
608 See research that points to the relevance of the opinion of stakeholders from an economic and political 
perspective, such as that found in: Inge Kaul et al., “Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today?”, op. cit., at 5; Inge 
Kaul et al., “How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods”, op. cit., pp. 27, 33, 35, 47; Inge Kaul and Ronald 
U. Mendoza, “Advancing the Concept of Public Goods”, op. cit., at 91. 
609 Cf. Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Las reparaciones ordenadas y 
el acatamiento de los Estados”, op. cit., pp. 198, 200-203; Gina Donoso, op. cit., pp. 30-32, 35; Theo van Boven, 
“The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, op. cit., at 1; 
Commission on Human Rights, Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims 
of gross violations of human righst and fundamental freedoms, Final report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, 
Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July 1993, paras. 126-130. 
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“[W]hen the State conducts or tolerates actions leading to extra-legal executions, not investigating 
them adequately and not punishing those responsible, as appropriate, it breaches the duties to 
respect rights set forth in the Convention and to ensure their free and full exercise, both by the 
alleged victim and by his or her next of kin, it does not allow society to learn what happened, and it 
reproduces the conditions of impunity for this type of facts to happen once again”610 (emphasis 
added). 
States have a duty to prevent non-state violations from remaining in impunity. 
Additionally, jus gentium must recognize that the existence of non-state violations is independent 
of State compliance with its duties to tackle them. That acknowledgment flows from the 
recognition of the personality of human beings and the nature of their inherent human rights as 
entitlements, and is a legal acknowledgment with the potential to call for guarantees when States 
are unable or unwilling to deal with non-state violations.  
Regarding this possibility, many States lack the interest or power to deal with non-state 
offenders out of diverse reasons, such as a desire to attract foreign investment, or having lesser 
economic, material or political leverage, among others. These situations can sometimes be 
reflected in differences between legislations and decreases in standards of protection (as race to 
the bottom phenomena) given the pressure of influential entities. Those dynamics, in turn, permit 
and encourage negative non-state forum shopping and abusive practices. Additionally, even 
though the jurisdiction of States can be extended with universal or broad civil or criminal 
jurisdictions, the reach of domestic legal systems is frequently limited. 
These realities have been acknowledged and addressed by some international law 
institutions, including notions similar to the one that holds that norms protect refugees from non-
state persecutors; the consideration that cases are admissible in procedures such as those of the 
International Criminal Court when States are unable or unwilling to deal with crimes under their 
jurisdiction, as mentioned in Article 17 of its Statute; or by demands that individuals attach greater 
importance to certain commands of international law than to domestic norms, among others. In 
this fashion, for instance, the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals mentioned in its judgment that: 
“[I]ndividuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed 
by the individual State. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in 
pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorising action moves outside its competence 
under international law”611 (emphasis added). 
This, coupled with the inconsistency of the arguments that refuse to admit the conclusion 
that the horizontal effects of human rights prove that non-state violations exist because they 
                                                     
610 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Judgment, op. cit., 
para. 238. 
611 Cf. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminal, available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp (last checked: 17/01/2012). 
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indicate that States have obligations to deal with such “events”, explains the importance of 
recognizing that the nature of human rights makes them vulnerable to abuses of any actor, from 
which they must be protected. Fortunately, this has been accepted by some authors612 and by 
international bodies. For instance, in judgments as its decision on merits in the Case of 
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights considered that: 
“States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention 
and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as 
warranted for damages resulting from the violation […] An illegal act which violates human rights and 
which is initially not directly imputable to a  State (for example, because it is the act of a private 
person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international 
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention […] the violation can be 
established even if the identity of the individual perpetrator is unknown […] The State has a legal duty 
to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to 
carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those 
responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation 
[…] The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights protected by 
the Convention. If the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished and the 
victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to 
comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons within its 
jurisdiction.  The same is true when the State allows private persons or groups to act freely and with 
impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by the Convention […] Where the acts of private 
parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense 
by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the international plane” (emphasis 
added).613 (emphasis added). 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights confirmed in Report No. 80/11 that the 
positive obligations to protect human rights in their horizontal dimension vis-à-vis private or public 
non-state entities recognize the violability of human rights by non-state actors. This same idea is 
recognized by the Human Rights Committee, that acknowledges that non-state actors can “impair 
the enjoyment” of human rights and that private entities can attack the enjoyment of human 
rights, generally and concerning the guarantees of some rights.614  
Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission condemned in Press Release R105/11 the murder of persons attacked by 
criminals because of their expressing their opinion and transmitting information online. The Office 
recalled that the ninth Principle of the IACHR Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
states that violence against communicators “violate[s] the fundamental rights of individuals and 
                                                     
612 Cf. the following texts, among others: Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit.; 
August Reinisch, op. cit.; Chris Jochnick, op. cit.; Jordan J. Paust, “The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under 
Human Rights Law”, op. cit.; Elena Pariotti, op. cit.; George J. Andreopoulos et al., “Rethinking the Human Rights 
Universe”, op. cit.; Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, “Looking beyond the State But Not Ignoring It”, op. cit.; Michael 
Goodhart, op. cit. 
613 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, 29 
July 1988, paras. 166, 172-174, 176, 177. 
614 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, op. cit., para. 7; also see Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 8. 
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strongly restrict freedom of expression.” Moreover, UNICEF has condemned actions allegedly 
attributable to non-state entities, such as the kidnapping of a girl in Colombia, mentioning that it 
“violates” her “human rights”, without UNICEF having required the act to be attributable to a State 
to do this.615 Likewise, Amnesty International has considered that the non-state group ETA has 
committed “human rights abuses”,616 that as mentioned before may be understood as human 
rights violations. 
Furthermore, in my opinion obligations to protect individuals from non-state threats must 
not only bind States, but also other actors with functional or de facto publicly relevant functions or 
authority or when legitimate expectations demand them to give that protection. This is confirmed 
by the possibility of international organizations becoming parties to human rights treaties that 
have positive obligations that can bind them; by the possibility that they exercise powers to 
prevent violations or respond to them, whether these powers are expressly envisaged or must be 
necessarily enjoyed by organizations to fulfill their tasks; or by the fact that non-state armed 
groups must prevent and deal with violations they have the power to control,617 among others. 
Therefore, non-state entities can and must sometimes be obliged to protect individuals 
from non-state entities,618 as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Cases in which non-state 
                                                     
615 Cf. http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/oriente/secuestro-de-la-hija-del-alcalde-de-fortul_10482384-4 (last 
checked: 17/01/2012), where it is reported that “la directora de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la 
Infancia (Unicef) en Colombia, Myriam Reyes, hizo un llamado ‘muy fuerte y contundente’ a los secuestradores y al 
país en general, ‘para que entiendan que los niños tienen derecho a estar protegidos y no ser involucrados de 
manera alguna en tanto delito’; http://noticias.unicefcolombia.com/repudio-secuestro-nora/ (last checked: 
17/01/2012), where UNICEF states that “El Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia- UNICEF -, se suma al 
repudio generalizado que ha provocado el secuestro de la niña Nora Valentina Muñoz de 10 años de edad […]Este 
acto deplorable viola de manera flagrante los derechos humanos de Nora Valentina. El secuestro de niñas/os, bajo 
cualquiera de sus motivaciones, resulta manifiestamente contrario a la Constitución Nacional y a tratados 
internacionales”. 
616 Cf. Amnesty International, “Spain: End to ETA violence presents opportunity for human rights reforms”, Press 
Release, 21 October 2011, according to which: “Amnesty International has waited a long time for ETA to announce 
an end to violence," said Nicola Duckworth, Director of the Europe and Central Asia programme. “We have 
consistently condemned the serious human rights abuses it has carried out in the Basque country and other parts of 
Spain, including attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks. ETA must now live up to its word by ending human 
rights abuses definitively and permanently. All perpetrators of past abuses must be brought to justice.” 
617 In this sense, for instance, Human Rights Watch declared that “[r]ebel forces in Libya should protect civilians and 
civilian property in areas they control [...] rebel authorities have a duty to protect civilians and their property, 
especially hospitals, and discipline anyone responsible for looting or other abuse […] Opposition forces say they are 
committed to human rights, but the looting, arson, and abuse of civilians in captured towns are worrying”, as found in: 
Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Opposition Forces Should Protect Civilians and Hospitals”, 12 July 2011, found at: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/13/libya-opposition-forces-should-protect-civilians-and-hospitals (last checked: 
18/01/2011). 
618 Concerning this, e.g. some Organizations have delegated powers and functions that have been traditionally 
performed by States, including regulatory powers, and in this context it is possible to find cases in which the 
“guarantee and promotion” of the rights found in the general corpus juris of human rights law and in the specialized 
sub-regime of the protection of persons with disabilities cannot realistically and effectively rely on the exclusive 
imposition of direct international duties on States. Some organizations can be parties to the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities and, consequently, be bound by it to ensure and promote the enjoyment of the rights of 
persons with disabilities. Interestingly, the extent to which they are obliged depends on the “limits of their 
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entities have positive duties concerning human rights include: when they create a risk of a 
violation; sometimes when an individual is in a situation of vulnerability; when they have a 
guarantor position; when they operate as authorities –as expressly recognized regarding the 
UNMIK-; or when certain legitimate expectations protected by principles (as that of good faith) 
demand this possession of obligations.619 
Additionally, the positive duty to protect from non-state violations evinces how the legally 
relevant facts against which it must be exercised, i.e. potential or actual non-state or State 
violations, are contrary to law and legal goods. In this sense, the following excerpts of statements 
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and its former judge Antonio Cançado are 
relevant. The Court said that: 
“In an employment relationship regulated by private law, the obligation to respect human rights 
between individuals should be taken into consideration. That is, the positive obligation of the State to 
ensure the effectiveness of the protected human rights gives rise to effects in relation to third parties 
(erga omnes).  This obligation has been developed in legal writings, and particularly by the 
Drittwirkung theory, according to which fundamental rights must be respected by both the public 
authorities and by individuals with regard to other individuals”620 (emphasis added). 
Judge Cançado, in turn, has commented that: 
“In my view, we can consider […] obligations erga omnes from two dimensions, one horizontal and 
the other vertical, which complement each other. Thus, the obligations erga omnes of protection, in a 
horizontal dimension, are obligations pertaining to the protection of the human beings due to the 
international community as a whole. In the framework of conventional international law, they bind all 
the States Parties to human rights treaties (obligations erga omnes partes), and, in the ambit of 
general international law, they bind all the States which compose the organized international 
community, whether or not they are Parties to those treaties (obligations erga omnes lato sensu). In a 
vertical dimension, the obligations erga omnes of protection bind both the organs and agents of 
(State) public power, and the individuals themselves (in the inter-individual relations).”621 
Likewise, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has expressly mentioned 
that non-state entities can violate human rights, as seen in the following passages from its 
Preliminary Observations after the Visit of the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Afro-Descendants 
and against Racial Discrimination to the Republic of Colombia and from Press Release No. 
31/12: 
“In recent decades Colombia has been assailed by an armed conflict that has affected hundreds of 
thousands of people.  The armed actors in the conflict -- guerrilla groups, security forces, and 
                                                                                                                                                            
competence”, as mentioned in article 45. Furthermore, cf. articles 4 and 43 of the aforementioned Convention; José 
Manuel Cortés, op. cit., at 228. 
619 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through 
Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 32-33; Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., at 187 
(“there seems to be a broader agreement among scholars that human rights norms could be applicable to ANSAs in 
specific circumstances, in particular when they exercise element of governmental functions and have de facto 
authority over a population”); Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), 
CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 2006, paras. 8-22. 
620 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 140. 
621 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 77. 
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paramilitary groups -- have committed human rights violations and serious breaches of international 
humanitarian law against the civilian population” (emphasis added) 
[T]he conscription or voluntary enlistment of children or adolescents in armed conflict, whether by the 
State or by other armed actors, places the children in situations of danger for their life and integrity, 
and violates their right to education as well as other rights recognized in the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child”622 (emphasis added). 
State practice also confirms the understanding that non-state actors can and do violate 
human rights and, therefore, human dignity. For instance, human rights reports issued by the 
United States of America describe human rights abuses attributable to non-state entities.623 
Likewise, State practice reflected in domestic law and legal actions shows that there are States 
that understand that protection from non-state violations may (and must) be granted under 
domestic regulations, which may be interpreted in light of international law or be designed to 
ensure compliance with it or to implement it.624 
Note how among the passages cited above the Inter-American Commission clearly 
considered that non-state actors could commit both human rights and international humanitarian 
law violations. This endorses the idea that it is fallacious to hold that they can only act contrary to 
the norms regulating armed conflicts. In fact, that their IHL duties are clear is interesting, because 
as Andrew Clapham has said, recognition of the need to protect human beings from non-state 
IHL violations shows that it is unreasonable to deny such protection in the field of human rights. 
After all, recognition that an actor can violate some norms founded upon human dignity reveal the 
capacity of that actor to violate others norms sharing the same foundation, being the protection of 
human dignity (and some core rights) shared by those two branches, as confirmed by the 
Commission.625  
With a similar idea, concerning the possibility of human rights violations being caused by 
non-state entities, in the Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights expressed its opinion that: 
“In order to determine the violation of Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the Convention, which was examined in 
the preceding paragraphs, suffice it to say that the Court finds that the investigations into the Pueblo 
                                                     
622 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Preliminary Observations of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights after the visit of the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Afro-Descendants and against Racial 
Discrimination to the Republic of Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134, Doc. 66, 27 March 1999, para. 46; Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Press Release No. 31/12, IACHR Welcomes First Verdict of International Criminal 
Court: Case on Recruitment of Child Soldiers. 
623 Cf. the following documents described pages before: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Report on Colombia, 8 April 2011; Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 64-65. 
624 Cf. Alejandro Valencia Villa and María José Díaz-Granados M. (eds.), Compilación de jurisprudencia y doctrina 
nacional e internacional, Vol. IV, Oficina en Colombia del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los 
Derechos Humanos, 2003, pp. 13-27. 
625 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 73; Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, Report No. 112/10, Inter-State Petition IP-02, Admissibility, Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, op. 
cit., para. 117. 
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Bello events conducted in Colombia, in proceedings conducted by the ordinary and the military 
criminal justice system, and by the disciplinary and administrative justice systems were seriously 
flawed, and this has undermined the effectiveness of the protection established in the national and 
international norms applicable in this type of case, and resulted in the impunity of certain criminal acts 
that constitute, in turn, grave violations of the human rights embodied in the provisions of the 
Convention cited in this paragraph.  
[…] 
The Court must emphasize that the facts that are the object of this judgment form part of a situation in 
which a high level of impunity prevails for criminal acts perpetrated by members of paramilitary 
groups […] The Judiciary has failed to provide an adequate response to these illegal actions of such 
groups in keeping with the State’s international commitments, and this leads to the establishment of 
fertile ground for these groups, operating outside the law, to continue perpetrating acts such as those 
of the instant case”626 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has expressly found some infringements 
on the enjoyment of human rights caused by non-state actors, as in the Case of Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia, where it found that there was a “deprivation of liberty” contrary to the “right to 
liberty” when the victim “was detained by private individuals”627. 
Concerning the plausibility of there being human rights violations committed by non-state 
actors, one widespread misconception holds that States are the entities that by far or almost 
always commit most violations. To rebut this, one has but to look at everyday violations 
attributable to non-state entities. Regarding them, Henry J. Steiner has mentioned some 
examples when saying that: 
“[O]f course non-State actors […] themselves fail to respect others’ rights. The rapist or the abusing 
spouse violates the right to physical security; the discriminatory employer violates equal protection 
norms; partisans of the dominant political party curb the right to political participation by threatening 
harm to those supporting the opposition.”628 
While it is increasingly accepted that non-state actors can violate human rights and 
victims must be protected from them, some still focus too much on States. Among others, this 
may be due to two factors: firstly, to the need of protecting individuals from abuses of State power 
and breaches of positive duties they are expected to comply with (factual element). Secondly, 
considering States as exclusive or predominant duty-bearers may be explained by beliefs in the 
State-centeredness that for (too) long permeated international law. This paradigm was thankfully 
gradually overcome due to factors as the emergence of jus cogens and human rights law.629 
Steiner himself acknowledged that human rights law contributed to overcoming the inter-State 
character of international law. In my opinion, this was always possible, as shown by the fact that 
                                                     
626 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, 31 
January 2006, paras. 148-149. 
627 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, 7 January 2010, paras. 
314, 318-319. 
628 Cf. Henry J. Steiner, op. cit., at 803. 
629 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes, op. cit., pp. 31-33. 
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human rights law was created mostly through traditional sources of international law and protects 
persons previously considered irrelevant for it by some authors and authorities.  
The fact that States were for too long the only possible parties to human rights treaties 
and therefore to supervision mechanisms enshrined therein may have made some think that they 
were the only possible human rights duties bearers in the international legal system. However, 
this was an election that could have been different one, and recent developments show that even 
non-state entities like international organizations –as the EU- or armed groups can be parties to 
pertinent treaties and agree to be bound by them and interact with other sources of jus 
gentium.630 
Consequently, while States may certainly pose a threat that must be addressed in legal 
terms, there may be legally relevant factual non-state violations (always important for their victims 
and law, a factor never to be forgotten), which are equally problematic. In fact, many domestic 
norms –that protected human rights prior to their internationalization- seek to tackle them, in civil, 
criminal and other terms. That is why human vulnerability before both State and non-state entities 
should never be ignored and left unaddressed, for the sake of coherence and respect of human 
dignity and to have solidarity with victims, which is a staple of human rights activism. 
The idea that human rights can be violated by non-state actors and that this implies that 
such violations also take place from a legal point of view is reinforced by a study of the travaux 
preparatoires of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, specifically of Article 30, according to 
which: 
“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein” (emphasis added). 
The discussions that led to the adoption of that article reveal that the drafters were 
mindful of the fact that States were traditionally considered the “chief offenders against human 
rights”. Yet, it was thought that allusion to individuals as potential offenders, who should be 
warned not to engage in acts contrary to human rights, was also necessary, as the debates 
between Malik and William Hodgson reveal.631 Furthermore, the experience of World War II made 
the drafters of the Declaration consider that it was also important to highlight how frequently it 
was groups which were agents of human rights violations, and that those groups could act “on the 
                                                     
630 Cf. articles 59 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 43 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, or 96.3 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), along with the commentary to the last article made 
by the ICRC; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-
State Actors, op. cit., pp. 8-13; Chapter 5, infra. 
631 Cf. Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting & Intent, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999, at 87. 
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instructions or with the connivance of states”632 and could try to exert influence on States or 
infiltrate them, as happened in Germany and Italy.633  
Concerns about those and other groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, 
paved the way for the final version of Article 30 of the Universal Declaration -and probably of 
article 5.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-, which refers to three 
potential agents of human rights “destruction”,634 which is a label that must be construed as an 
acknowledgement that the acts in question amount to violations of human rights. To my mind, the 
reference to ‘States, individuals and groups’ is merely indicative and by no means exhaustive. 
The fact that international human rights stricto sensu treaties usually place obligations on States 
is not an expression about the nature of the rights being protected or the impossibility of 
obligations of other actors existing, but rather about a policy designed to make it possible for 
entities as States, deemed powerful, to consent to commitments that are legally binding, given 
the beliefs that they are entities able to accept those obligations and that protection from their 
abuse is necessary. These bases still hold true but are complementary and not exhaustive, as 
demonstrated by the current possibility of other entities having some explicit human rights 
obligations -either voluntarily or because they are imposed on them-.635 Obligations of potential 
abusers, State or not, constitute one type among others of measures that can be employed to 
protect human rights. 
State obligations are thus one of the consequences of the protection of rights instead of 
the center or paradigm of that protection. What is more, as explained in Chapter 5, there are 
cases in which even international treaties prohibit States and non-state actors from committing 
certain violations of human dignit. Additionally, the current incapacity of an actor to being party to 
some treaties is not an impediment to its having other treaty or different international obligations 
in the present and future, and law can perfectly create such obligations if necessities of protection 
so demand. This is the case, for example, of the international regulation of the prohibition of 
genocide.636 
                                                     
632 Cf. Ibid. 
633 Cf. Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
634 Ibid.; article 30 of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. 
635 Cf. common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions on IHL of 1949 compared with article 96.3 of their First Protocol; 
article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; European 
Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 185-187, 205-213, 
236. 
636 Cf. article IV of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, that states that 
“Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals” (emphasis added); General Assembly of the 
United Nations, Resolution 96(I), The Crime of Genocide, A/RES/96(I), 11 December 1946, that mentions that 
“genocide is a crime under international law […] for the commission of which principals and accomplices—whether 
private individuals, public officials or statesmen […] are punishable”; Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 27-29, 33-35. 
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International legal issues can often “be interpreted in different ways depending from what 
theoretical positions one starts”, as Roland Portmann comments.637 This implies that a theoretical 
position can have an impact on legal practice, as pointed out by Mario G. Losano.638 By focusing 
on the importance and non-conditional dimensions of rights and guarantees and those who 
benefit from their recognition and protection, important practical and normative developments, 
interpretations and normative changes can be prompted. 
Rights and guarantees are, indeed, the cornerstone of the international protection of 
individuals, and so focus must be placed on their content and effectiveness, according to which 
not only States can violate them. Protection mechanisms and interpretations must accordingly be 
based on this recognition. This understanding must pervade all aspects of human rights law. 
Concerning the idea that all violations of human rights are legally relevant, it is possible to 
consider, as Lauterpacht, that there is no “event of international policy [that is not] amenable to 
legal analysis”639, because all factual or material violations of human rights affect international 
legal goods and must thus be legally addressed. As examined in Chapter 8, measures of 
promotion and protection can be based on duties (or quasi-duties) or not (e.g. strategies based 
on contacting entities), be adjudicatory or not, and be applicable prior to the violation (preventive 
measures), afterwards, or both. 
The question of how to protect individuals also involves determining which normative 
systems and actors (private, international or domestic) must strive to protect. As judge Sergio 
García Ramírez of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights commented concerning the 
Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits and Reparations in the Case of the Miguel Castro Prison 
v. Peru: 
“In its request for interpretation, the State requested a ruling from the Court regarding the 
responsibility of non-state groups for the violation of human rights and crimes against humanity. 
Therefore, it invokes the “systematic, dynamic, and evolving nature of international human rights law.” 
Of course, this is not a matter of interpretation of the judgment on merits, in the strict sense, and that 
latter has not referred to this matter because it is not within the contentious jurisdiction exercised by 
the Court in hearing and solving the case of the Castro Prison. Evidently, whoever incurs in crimes 
that imply a violation of human rights, must respond for its behavior and receive the corresponding 
punishments. In what refers to the case that occupies us, the matter in question is not that of the 
criminal responsibility of people who violated criminal law, but the definition of the body called upon to 
hear of these violations and apply the corresponding punishment”640 (emphasis added). 
                                                     
637 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., at 10. 
638 Cf. Mario G. Losano, op. cit., pp. 327-335. 
639 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, “Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law”, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 8, 1997, at 233. 
640 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio García Ramírez to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the 
Miguel Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment (Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 2 
August 2008, par 21. 
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As indicated above, the fact that all non-state violations are legally relevant and must be 
tackled by law does not mean that every single one of those violations amounts to a breach of 
international obligations (but some do and must, as seen in Chapters 5 and 6). John Knox argues 
this clearly by saying that: 
“The question is not whether corporations and other nongovernmental actors can be accused of 
violating human rights, but whether they should be directly bound by the body of international human 
rights law. One does not necessarily imply the other, as Amartya Sen has explained. 
To say that one has violated a human right does imply that one has breached a duty correlating to 
that right, but it does not state where the duty is situated, whether in morality or in law, or (if in law) 
whether in domestic or international law. A corporation or other private actor that does not have a 
direct duty under international human rights law may be legitimately described as violating a human 
right if it is subject to a horizontal duty indirectly imposed by international human rights law (through 
the imposition of an obligation on governments to ensure that private actors respect the right), or 
even if it is subject to a duty that is "merely" moral” (emphasis added)641. 
The only thing I would add to the previous excerpt is that being legally relevant, while not 
all non-state violations of human rights imply breaches of non-state legal obligations, they are not 
exclusively ethical matters. This is because their legal relevance always demands legal measures 
of protection of victims. It is important for victims to have the possibility of claiming that human 
rights were violated by an actor regardless of the existence of legal duties, given the power of 
those claims (which may call for law changes), which are strengthened when the illegal character 
of a violation is recognized. Those claims may also legitimize and elicit responses from actors 
interested in protecting common legal goods of the world community across levels of governance. 
Despite its not always being mandated, absence of non-state legal obligations to respect 
human dignity must be closely examined, for the following reasons: firstly, because absence of 
direct international enforcement of legal duties or sanctions and duties to repair may encourage 
potential abusers to pay mere lip service to dignity when it suits their interests without having 
regard to it in practice,642 as has been criticized concerning some codes of conduct, being it 
necessary in many cases to back-up exhortations with legal sanctions or at least with the 
possibility of declaring that an entity has breached a binding duty in order to bring about a change 
of practice and behavior. Possible weaknesses or uncertainty about the outcome of domestic 
measures reinforces this argument. 
As mentioned before, just as binding non-state armed entities to observe International 
Humanitarian Law brought about a change in their discourse and attitude,643 given the impact on 
their reputation and interests, signaling someone as a violator of law, especially of norms related 
to dignity, has a strong influence, and may change non-state attitudes. This signaling also makes 
                                                     
641 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
642 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 431. 
643 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 35. 
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others aware of their possibility to criticize non-state conduct based on standards and of conduct 
boycotts or otherwise exert pressure to make offenders heed human rights standards when they 
fail to abide by them (this process may exist without legal duties existing, but is stronger with 
them); and uthorities are ordered to react to wrongful acts or urged to cooperate with authorities 
with jurisdiction. Thirdly, the absence of enforceable duties or alternative effective measures may 
leave victims unprotected, something unacceptable for law, which must serve human beings. 
In consequence, if lack of express international obligations or of effective alternative 
international measures of protection leaves a victim unprotected, her dignity is violated and the 
international legal system would disregard its peremptory principles (equality of victims) and one 
of its foundations (dignity). Therefore, that law would have to be modified, as urged both de lege 
ferenda, as dignity and equality seen from an ethical consideration demand; and de lege lata, 
because legal principles, values, norms and mandates of protection would be violated. 
Because of their not being always mandated, it is important to mention that the absence 
of international obligations of non-state actors in one case does not imply that these actors 
cannot violate human rights. They can, and their abuses are legally relevant facts that must be 
addressed. This is confirmed by the fact that in the international legal system there can be rights 
without remedies and duties without enforcement.644 
Moving on to a different subject, it can be considered that there is a legal requirement to 
adjust international regulation to ensure the protection of victims of non-state violations. 
According to international human rights case law, the domestic legal system of a State itself can 
violate human rights either in concreto or in abstracto, that is to say with or without an application 
of a norm contrary to human rights taking place, respectively.645 This is coupled with the 
existence of an obligation to adjust law in order to ensure that it does not contradict and conforms 
to international human rights law, which is an obligation a concrete manifestation of a general rule 
of international law.646  
International law is under an analogous duty to be compatible with the demands of 
human dignity. Its scope of application ratione loci and ratione personae exceeds that of domestic 
                                                     
644 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State 
Actors, op. cit., pp. 20-21; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 27-31. 
645 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Judgment, 12 November 1997, 
paras. 96-99; articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. 
Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-
Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Judgment, 5 February 2001, paras. 1-5; article 4.1 of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (A/56/49(Vol.I)/Corr.4). 
646 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. 
Chile, Judgment, 5 February 2001, para. 87; Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade to the previous 
judgment, para. 12; article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 31, op. cit., paras. 13-14. 
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norms, and its standards often have effects towards entities as international organizations (both 
with a general vocation and with specialized missions as financial, economic or health-related 
purposes and functions),647 reason why in principle different actors and issues may be 
internationally relevant. Add to this the existence of jus cogens and foundational standards, that 
determine goals and objectives of the international community and generate implied powers and 
duties to ensure respect and seek promotion of those goals; and it can be considered that 
international law must perforce incorporate a demand that its norms must be compatible with 
those foundations and peremptory norms and their demands (including that of effectiveness), with 
no territorial or personal restrictions, and must be adjusted to achieve this.  
In consequence, if jus gentium fails to respect or ensure the respect of those tenets, 
those entrusted with its interpretation and application must strive to find lawful interpretations and 
implementation consistent with them. If this is not feasible, those endowed with treaty-making 
powers must be made aware of the situation and asked to bring contradictions or insufficiencies 
to an end, just as it is recommended to national authorities concerning their legal systems, as 
mentioned for example in Principle 8 the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of 
International Human Rights Norms648. 
After examining why the features of human rights make non-state violations legally 
relevant and requiring legal responses, it is convenient to explore if soft law, directly or indirectly, 
expressly or implicitly, reinforces the imperative that human dignity can and must be protected 
from non-state violations, which is not simply an exhortation de lege ferenda. If so, it should be 
examined why that dimension of soft law is relevant for the purposes of a full protection of dignity, 
notwithstanding its lack of obligatoriness ab initio. The next section and Chapter 5 will examine 
this. 
 
2.4. The reinforcement of the protection of human dignity from non-state abuses by soft 
law and principles of equity and good faith 
Normative elements and purposes of “hard law” human rights and guarantees, and 
implications of the value-principle of the protection of human dignity, demand the protection of 
                                                     
647 Cf., apart from the references to the responsibilities of international organizations of a regional or 
economic/financial nature mentioned throughout this Part, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 14, op. cit., paras. 39, 42, 50, 64, 65. 
648 Cf. Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms and on Government 
under the Law, 1988, para. 8, according to which “where national law is clear and inconsistent with the international 
obligations of the State concerned in common law countries the national court is obliged to give effect to national law.  
In such cases the court should draw such inconsistency to the attention of the appropriate authorities since the 
supremacy of national law in no way mitigates a breach of an international legal obligation, which is undertaken by a 
country.” 
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human rights and guarantees from all violations. Developments and contributions on the subject 
have not stopped at hard law, however. Thus, an examination of resolutions, declarations, 
agreements, exhortations and other instruments that belong to soft law according and recognize 
that non-state actors can violate human rights, suggesting that measures must be taken to 
respond to them, is convenient. Moreover, it must be asked what legal effects, if any, those soft 
law provisions may have (even from an informal perspective), because those effects could 
strengthen the protection of human dignity from all threats, which requires different strategies. 
This analysis can be conducted in three ways, the first of which consists in asking what 
effects international law assigns to hetero-normative soft law regulations, such as those adopted 
by private or public entities that directly or indirectly address the protection of dignity from non-
state violations. A second and complementary question must posit what effects, if any, 
international law attaches to public (adopted by States or international organizations) or private 
soft law self-regulations, including codes of conduct, label policies, declarations and 
commitments, or manifestations of the so-called global law, among other possibilities. A third 
complementary question should seek to determine the legal effects of mixed-regulations, i.e. soft 
law manifestations in whose formation or endorsement public entities (States or international 
organizations) and private non-state entities (i.e. all except international organizations)649 
participate jointly, as happens with some memoranda of understanding or the Global Compact, 
for instance. 
Before examining soft-norms that can have an impact on the protection of human rights 
from non-state threats, it is important to examine what can be considered “soft law.” For this 
purpose, it is useful to employ the distinctions made by Jean d’Aspremont, who distinguished 
between “rules with a soft instrumentum and rules with a soft negotium”. The latter are described 
as those rules found in legal instruments, produced by the sources of international law, that have 
an ambiguous, vague or indeterminate content or fail to “lay down any specific obligation.”650 
Conversely, rules with a soft instrumentum would be soft law norms properly speaking, given their 
non-obligatoriness (in direct terms), produced by their not being the product of sources of law, 
which makes them not be considered “legal acts”.651 
Alternative definitions have been proposed by authors as Anthony D’Amato, for whom 
“[t]he essence of any soft law rule is that it is not enforceable.” This notion puts emphasis on the 
effects of a given rule. That definition is not very useful for purposes of distinguishing legal rules 
                                                     
649 Cf. Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
650 Cf. Jean d’Aspremont, “Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials: A Rejoinder 
to Tony D’Amato”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, 2009, pp. 914-915. 
651 Cf. Ibid. 
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from non-legal ones, i.e. rules incorporated in legal acts from others. d’Aspremont seems to be 
aware that both sorts of rules, legal and non-legal, can “lead to the same result”: the lack of 
restrictions placed on a given addressee,652 but considers that it is necessary to determine 
whether a given norm belongs to the international legal system or not, something I agree with. 
As a result, when analyzing what the impact of soft law on the protection of dignity 
against non-state actors is, I will refer to soft law as that set of standards not produced by the 
sources of international law that are hence not binding per se. Nevertheless, even though soft law 
does not include binding rules, it would not be correct to say that they cannot produce any legal 
effects at all. According to Roberto Andorno: 
“[I]t is somehow misleading to affirm that soft law only creates moral or political commitment for 
states. This is only true if we consider the immediate effect of soft law instruments.”653 
Indeed, doctrine has recognized that there are multiple effects that soft law can have, and 
they are certainly relevant for this study concerning soft law that calls for protecting human rights 
from non-state actors. 
A first set of standards found in non-legal acts is that of hetero-regulation soft law, 
encompassing soft law standards produced by an entity different from that whose behavior the 
standards address. While any actor different from the addressee can produce them, they are 
often adopted in international organizations. Standards of this type that demand protection of 
human dignity from non-state threats can be adopted in resolutions of the General Assembly or in 
principles and recommendations adopted by human rights bodies (as the Human Rights Council) 
that lack a binding character according to the constitutive documents of the international 
organization or its internal rules –that would have legal effects vis-à-vis the organization itself and 
its members and could sometimes impose obligations on them-.654 
Recommendations and standards of this sort are also adopted by non-state actors 
(directed to other non-state addressees in a hetero-regulatory fashion),655 as happens with codes 
of conduct adopted by NGOs and other entities, that seek to address the conduct of other non-
state entities.656  
                                                     
652 Ibid. 
653 Cf. Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 3. 
654 Cf. José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 159-168; International Law Commission, Draft articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations, with commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, at 3, (para. 8 of the General commentary); articles 
10.2, 22, or 32.2 of the aforementioned draft articles. 
655 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 33-34; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 44-45, 46-49. 
656 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., at 33. 
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In light of the definitions of soft law, and considering that non-state actors that operate in 
the international level or in a transnational manner657 participate in a world society, these and 
other normative manifestations of non-state actors can be considered internationally relevant soft 
law. The question of whether non-state actors can contribute to the creation of international hard 
law is explored in Chapter 5. Interestingly, some authors consider that non-state actors can 
produce law that is not dependent on support or confirmation by legal systems or norms 
controlled by public lawmakers -domestic law or international law-, as has been put forward by 
Günter Teubner regarding his theory of Global Law and by others.658  
According to this last idea, legal standards created by private actors could be 
simultaneously considered binding in a framework of non-state regulations and non-binding under 
international law. On the other hand, the content of lex privata and other non-state regulations 
can be included in international norms or given effects indirectly. 
Indeed, nothing prevents international law (or, usually, domestic law either) from 
attaching greater or lesser legal effects to standards and declarations adopted by non-state 
actors.  
On the other hand, it is important to mention that soft law can have a very important 
function: that of paving the way for changes in hard law or prompting changes in conduct and 
beliefs about proper behavior. The fact that a rule does not belong to hard law says nothing about 
how it is perceived in terms of its fairness and legitimacy, and the public at large, addressees and 
stakeholders may consider that it reflects a just and necessary regulation.  
Thus, soft law standards that are widely supported, besides possibly contributing to the 
generation of opinio juris or to the formation of general principles (in conjunction with other 
factors),659 can support and reinforce claims or serve as benchmarks concerning non-state 
behavior, and can even subtly modify their culture, convictions or attitude if they are persuasive or 
convincing, being those dynamics quite important to make the complete protection of human 
dignity effective, which requires a combination of legal and other factors. Just like their 
                                                     
657 There are various conceptions of transnationality. See Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs 
in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 12-13 (where transnationality is conceived as allusive to operations 
“across boundaries”, whereas international acts are those that take place in the context of “international affairs”, 
mostly regarding cooperation issues); article 3.2 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, according to which an offense is transnational in nature if “(a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is 
committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another 
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more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.” 
658 Cf. Gunther Teubner, op. cit., pp. 12-19; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global?, op. cit., pp. 108, 159; Luis 
Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., op. cit., pp. 31-33; Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative 
Law”, op. cit., pp. 52-55. 
659 Cf. Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, op. cit., pp. 90-97, 105; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: 
Curso General, op. cit., pp. 224-229. 
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addressees, soft law standards can be taken into account by lawmakers, who may feel inclined to 
adopt their content in custom, treaty law or through other sources of jus gentium, out of conviction 
or of the desire to avoid criticism related to insufficient protection.  
Soft law can also have effects in an even more remote and indirect fashion, as when the 
good faith of third parties who legitimately expect an entity to abide by certain standards is to be 
protected.660 Furthermore, mechanisms to “monitor” or “follow-up” soft law standards and their 
implementation, including reporting mechanisms, may be created. This will make non-state 
conduct more prone to being examined, and with or without those mechanisms the identification 
of failure to do what is expected from non-state entities, even from a non-legal perspective, may 
lead to reactions and consequences, stimulated perhaps by the expressive functions that all 
regulations can have. Concerning the Global Compact, for instance, failure to report progresses 
on the application of its content can lead to a removal, which constitutes a public signaling. This 
possibility has taken place in practice. Concerning this, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
mentioned:  
“To date, we have removed more than 2,400 companies from the Compact for failing to report to their 
stakeholders on progress they have made. Of those that are active, we know that most are still at the 
beginner to intermediate level.”661 
For these reasons, soft law is not to be underestimated, especially because the 
independence and autonomy of sources in international law662 make it possible that contents 
found in a soft law instrument appear in hard law simultaneously or later. These considerations 
also explain the importance of adhering to non-binding instruments that regulate corporate or 
other non-state conduct and seek to strengthen the protection of human dignity. These ideas 
provide the backdrop and framework with which to examine the following declaration of UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon: 
“It is important that the principles of the Global Compact are accepted by more businesses around 
the world […] Reaching a critical mass will be essential if we are to help retool markets and 
economies towards sustainability […] While it is important for more businesses to join the initiative, 
the Compact can only make a real contribution if these companies embrace and advocate its 
principles.”663 
Moreover, it has been recognized that some non-state actors have had an impact on the 
content and formation of international law, not necessarily as lawmakers, but as participants 
whose opinion can be taken into account given their formal or informal participation in discussions 
                                                     
660 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, Report: Preliminary issues for the ILA Conference 
in Rio de Janeiro, op. cit., at 3. 
661 Cf. UN News Centre, “Crucial for more businesses to join UN corporate responsibility pact, says Ban”, 21 June 
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related to lawmaking processes and implementation, as explained by Andrea Bianchi and Luis 
Pérez-Prat.664 
On the other hand, hetero-regulation can be “official” or public, including manifestations 
of soft law issued by international organizations or under their auspices; and private, when it is 
not supported by legal systems whose lawmakers have a public nature and is created by the so-
called non-state actors with a private nature, understood as those with a private origin or 
constitution, that do not necessarily have private functions and/or goals.665 Private hetero-
regulation may have effects that are similar to those of self-regulation norms adopted by entities 
that are private in origin or constitution.  
I will now turn to examine the effects and features of soft law created in public contexts. 
In doctrine, it is considered that despite not being directly binding, soft law standards can 
eventually produce some legal effects. Roberto Andorno, for instance, advances the idea that soft 
law can become treaty or customary law in the future, being its germ if it is widely supported with 
an opinio juris that asserts the need of its standards to become binding. This persuasion may 
prompt practice that endorses it, or its content may be adopted by the sources of jus gentium. For 
this reason, for Roberto Andorno soft law may pave the way for customary or treaty law by virtue 
of indicating what the content of those sources should be like.666  
In my opinion, soft law may also lead to normative changes in relation to all sources of 
international law, not merely treaty and customary law. For example, soft law can interact with 
unilateral acts that operate as sources of jus gentium.667  
Concerning this, obligations that emerge from unilateral acts of a State or an international 
organization, among other entities, will bind them and do not have a hetero-regulatory character. 
Those obligations can deal with the protection of human dignity from non-state threats. Certainly, 
commitments of those actors created by this source of law may be related to duties to protect 
individuals from non-state threats: their own or those of other actors. Therefore, indirectly 
potential non-state aggressors may feel exposed to an increased examination of their acts. 
Moreover, a non-state actor bound by its unilateral acts may be bound by human rights 
obligations they create. 
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international organizations, see José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp 141, 151-158. 
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Professors Philip Alston and Bruno Simma believe that soft law can have effects in an 
additional way, by becoming authoritative interpretations of international treaties if they are widely 
supported, especially by a “virtually unanimous practice”.668 This theory is reminiscent of the rule 
of interpretation found in article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, 
which mentions that, along with the normative purposes and text of a treaty, its internal (e.g. other 
provisions of an agreement) and external contexts must also be taken into account when 
interpreting it. That Convention also mentions that: 
“3.There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation”. 
According to Alston and Simma, the aforementioned authoritative interpretation is not to 
be confused with customary law, which is a formula consistent with that of the Vienna 
Convention, which does not equate authoritative interpretation (by means of practice or 
agreements) to customary law. 
The previous ideas emphasize that, if persuasive and relevant, the content of soft law 
has a potential for being included in binding norms.  
Despite the relevance they can have if persuasive, which can make them have 
expressive functions or be adopted in hard law, or their indirectly having effects to protect good 
faith, when it comes to soft law standards an additional idea must be discussed: that hegemonic 
States or other actors may resort to invoking soft law to circumvent lawmaking processes in 
which other actors participate, and to enshrine their will in that soft law in order to further their 
policies given the possible impact of soft law.669 That is why the content of soft law must be 
critically evaluated. 
Possible international legal effects of soft law adopted by private entities by means of 
self-regulation or hetero-regulation must be examined. 
One first thing worth mentioning is that nothing prevents the content of private non-state 
regulation from being endorsed or made produce effects by international law, either by soft law or 
hard law dynamics, that could attach some legal effects to it. In this sense, for instance, doctrine 
and international jurisprudence have considered that the content of non-state declarations without 
a binding character may be incorporated or referred to in treaties or be adopted in customary 
                                                     
668 Cf. Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 
669 Cf. Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International 
Legal Order”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, 2005, pp. 379-380, 391-392, 398. 
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law.670 Such incorporations and remissions may also take place in connection with other sources 
of jus gentium. 
Regarding non-state regulation, its incorporation in international law may be 
accomplished, for example, when the content of a code of conduct adopted by a corporation that 
declared to commit to labor rights and environmental protection is included in an international 
norm, case in which the new norm would attach international legal effects to content that 
originally appeared partly or completely in a code of conduct or other non-binding standards.  
Concerning this, some suggest that a proposed treaty between Chile and the European 
Union envisaged the endorsement of social corporate responsibility rules. Those rules on 
corporate responsibility were developed by an international entity, the OECD,671 but nothing 
impedes a treaty or other source of international law from including norms addressing the same 
or other subject matters that have been produced by other entities, even private ones. For 
example, the WTO refers to standards issued by the international organization for 
Standardization (ISO), a private entity, conditionally ascribing some effects to pronouncements of 
this non-state actor.672 
Logically, if soft law standards adopted by a public entity (e.g. a State or international 
organization) are the ones that endorse or adopt the content of private regulation, the content of 
the new standard would have the effects that soft law adopted by that entity can have. 
Nevertheless, norms that adopt the content of soft law standards may modulate its 
effects and extent, for instance only adopting part of that content or conditioning its application, 
among other possibilities. This is made possible by the independence of standards and their 
sources. 
The possibility that soft law that protects individuals from non-state actors has legal 
effects, explored until now, is usually contingent and indirect, operating mainly when its content is 
purposefully endorsed, and it is the norm replicating its content which generates those effects. 
Even though private norms do not produce effects in international law directly and 
automatically, this legal system may have principles and rules that, when triggered, demand that 
the content of some standards adopted by private actors has relevance or effects. For example, 
the principles of good faith, protection of legitimate expectations, or the duty to repair harm, found 
in international law, may sometimes make it necessary to take into account or attach some value 
                                                     
670 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, op. cit., paras. 33-37; Antonio Remiro 
Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 226-228; Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, op. cit., 
pp. 84, 90-96. 
671 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., pp. 451-454. 
672 Cf. Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law”, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
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to private normative acts and regulations. International legal rules and private regulations will thus 
interact with each other, with the content of the latter being given effect by the former, triggered 
due to the legal relevance of expectations generated or situations created by the latter. 
This idea has been recognized by the Non-State Actors Committee of the International 
Law Association, in which it was discussed that: 
“Many non-State actors, e.g. corporations and armed opposition groups, commit themselves to 
upholding international law. However, they tend to do so as a matter of policy/soft law than as a 
matter of hard law. In so doing, they may avoid legal accountability. There may nevertheless be 
doctrines and principles that could be used to harden these soft commitments into hard law (duty of 
care/negligence/corporate organization/legitimate expectations/good faith/unilateral act...)”673 
(emphasis added). 
Principles that can make non-state declarations and standards have some international 
legal effects generally protect legitimate expectations of third parties or protect those who would 
suffer harm as a result of the negligence or contradiction of an actor. General principles may thus 
contribute to the protection of individuals from non-state actors in this way.  
To my mind, legitimate expectations deserving protection can exist not only because of 
the public trust in a “private regulation”, but also in relation to statements or acts of a public 
nature, such as that of becoming a member of an international organization whose goals and 
functions include the promotion and protection of human rights. Since certain non-state entities 
can become members of some of those organizations, the public may legitimately believe that 
such membership is a sign of commitment on the subject. 
I will now explore how international law already has legal principles capable of endowing 
privately-adopted regulations with legal effects, which is pertinent because this may strengthen 
the protection of human dignity by forbidding conduct against non-state commitments. 
In general terms, there are two broad sets of principles that can entitle victims to request 
protection from abuses that constitute deviances from statements, commitments and regulations 
of non-state actors: principles that protect innocent third parties who are led to believe in the 
declarations of a non-state actor, which revolve around the more general principles of equity and 
good faith; and principles that protect from harm, centered on the responsibility of authors of 
violations, their duty to repair and the rights of victims to full and effective reparations.  
The second group is certainly pertinent to protect victims when regulation addressing 
non-state conduct has been violated or ignored, but its applicability is not dependent on the 
existence of this. This happen happens with principles derived from and related to the principle of 
good faith as well, inasmuch as innocent third parties can rely on expectations that are not 
                                                     
673 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, Report: Preliminary issues for the ILA Conference 
in Rio de Janeiro, op. cit., at 3. 
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necessarily generated by non-state “regulations”. Legal elements that protect from the effects of 
harm will be examined Chapter 7. 
Concerning principles that protect legitimate expectations of innocent parties, it can be 
said that they are related to the general principles of good faith and equity, because this 
protection constitutes an object of the principle of good faith, as commented by Markus Kotzur. 
He also mentions that this principle may have effects in relation to non-state actors, even those 
with a private constitution, making “unilateral statements of […] international actors [have] a 
binding effect if, given the concrete circumstances, bona fides requires so,” and also considers 
that it is proximate to the principle of equity.674 
According to Markus, the principle of good faith can be “concretized in specific applicable 
rules such as acquiescence, estoppels, or duties of information and disclosure”.675 However, 
Wolfgang Friedmann contends this. For him, rather than being derived from good faith, these 
more concrete principles are “related” to equity, but not derived from it.676 It is interesting to note 
that Friedmann considers that principles and rules connected with equity may be applicable “to 
legal relationships of all kinds”,677 thereby opening the door to its application to legally-relevant 
relationships where non-state actors are involved, as those in which human rights are affected –
negatively or positively-. 
As Giorgio Gaja notes, international arbitration has recognized that good faith is among 
the general principles of law that operate in the international legal system and have a 
fundamental character, as was discussed in “the arbitration award in the Case concerning the 
Loan Agreement between Italy and Costa Rica”.678 This has been confirmed in doctrine, with 
many scholars recognizing the international applicability of the aforementioned principle, which is 
mentioned even in international treaties, as in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.679 
According to the previous considerations, the principles of good faith and equity can 
either produce or be related to principles or normative considerations that may play a role in the 
protection of victims of non-state violations of human dignity, especially because, as mentioned in 
the Non-State Actors Committee of the International Law Association, as shown in an excerpt 
quoted above, commitments of non-state actors can be made have some legal effects in 
                                                     
674 Cf. Markus Kotzur, “Good Faith (Bona Fide)”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford 
University Press, paras. 22-23, 26, available at: http://www.mpepil.com/. 
675 Ibid., para. 23. 
676 Cf. Wolfgang Friedmann, op. cit., pp. 286-290. 
677 Cf. Ibid., at 287. 
678 Cf. Giorgio Gaja, op. cit., para. 26. 
679 Cf. the Preamble and articles 31.1, 46.2 and 69.2.b of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969; the 
Preamble and articles  31.1, 46.3 and 69.2.b of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
international organizations or between international organizations of 1986; and Markus Kotzur, op. cit., paras. 19-26 
for the discussion of some effects, functions and implications of good faith in jus gentium. 
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connection with those principles, idea that is endorsed by the consideration that good faith 
protects legitimate expectations.  
Some of the principles and considerations connected with good faith and human dignity 
that are relevant for giving legal effects to private regulation are: the existence of unilateral 
obligations; acquiescence; duties to inform; the protection of legitimate expectations; estoppel; 
the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium; and the principle of the prohibition of the abuse 
of rights,680 among others. 
It is interesting to ask if the principles of good faith and equity may operate 
autonomously, which would make it possible for victims to invoke them directly and to 
independently attribute some effects to non-state conduct and commitments, including soft law 
promises; and also if they may only operate in order to interpret existing duties of an entity.  
Confusion may arise from the fact that one of the effects of the principle of good faith is 
the interpretation of rights and duties in its light,681 but this does not preclude other effects from 
existing. In fact, the considerations and principles related to good faith mentioned above 
sometimes operate with the inexistence of a previous right or duty or with the impossibility of 
invoking any such a right or duty. This may be the case, for example, with some unilateral 
obligations, which appear as a result of the behavior of a single entity that had no prior duties; or 
with acquiescence and estoppel, that give importance to the attitude and behavior of an actor. 
Moreover, it has even been considered that good faith may operate in relation to 
preexisting soft law, whose character is not binding in itself. In this sense, in the Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law of the Max Planck Institute, it is commented that: 
“Even non-binding recommendations, such as UNGA resolutions, or other forms of → soft law might, 
to a certain extent, require to be considered in good faith.”682 
According to these considerations, regulations of non-state conduct that can impact on 
the enjoyment of human rights may generate expectations of third parties and, where appropriate, 
may produce certain legal effects. Their emergence depends on different factors, as the precise 
content of the non-state standards; perceived intentions (whether others believe that an obligation 
is assumed even though officially international or domestic law does not envisage one), which 
may not coincide with the actual intention of the creators of standards; or the reasonability of 
expectations. Since principles and rules related to good faith are abstract, whether they have 
                                                     
680 Cf. Markus Kotzur, op. cit., para. 22; Wolfgang Friedmann, op. cit., pp. 287-289; at 3; International Law 
Association, Non-State Actors Committee, Report: Preliminary issues for the ILA Conference in Rio de Janeiro, op. 
cit., at 3. 
681 Cf. articles 31.1 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986; Wolfgang Friedmann, op. 
cit., at 289; Markus Kotzur, op. cit., paras. 19-21. 
682 Cf. Markus Kotzur, op. cit., para. 25. 
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effects in each case is determined examining concrete aspects and cases, and are therefore 
rules and principles that require concretization.683  
In this sense, for example, agreements between non-state entities that declare to 
undertake certain duties, or instruments made by an entity that are endorsed and undertaken by 
another actor, can have the appearance of being binding, for example, if they provide detailed 
contents of duties and/or refer to mechanisms and guarantees of supervision.684  
Therefore, if some non-state instruments are not considered directly binding because of 
not being produced by the sources of international or domestic law, they may still produce legal 
effects (either directly or indirectly), due to factors as adoption of their content by hard law or the 
protection of legitimate and reasonable expectations generated by their publicity and content. To 
my mind, this may happen with the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations 
and the group Justice and Equality (JEM) in Sudan. This agreement contains provisions that 
specify duties, guarantees and mechanisms of supervision, as seen especially in articles 1, 3 and 
4, which overall give the impression of the existence of duties with a well-defined content, and 
provide mechanisms of compliance, having also provisions of duration and scope spelt out. 
Another example of private regulation that may generate effects by virtue of equity or 
good faith principles and related rules is that of unilateral statements that lead third parties to rely 
on them and trust them, as can happen if the content of unilateral acts expresses apparent 
duties, mechanisms of supervision, or rights of third parties to be respected, among other 
elements. In this sense, the underlying logic of the effects of unilateral instruments resembles that 
of agreements between non-state actors. Concerning both sources, it is not necessary that all 
factors are found or have the same intensity and precision for them to generate effects; and 
whether they exist is determined by a joint and overall examination of the content of the relevant 
instrument and other factors, in light of the reasonable legitimate expectations of third parties. 
 This resembles what international human rights bodies have concluded concerning 
reasonable periods of time in relation to procedures, which are evaluated considering different 
elements jointly and globally.685  
Relevant unilateral private instruments may include resolutions, statements, instruments 
that recognize principles and standards of non-state conduct concerning some legal goods, 
codes of conduct, or labels about the quality of a product or compliance with certain standards by 
an actor. They may generate expectations, some of which can be protected by norms such as 
                                                     
683 Ibid., paras. 22-23. 
684 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 336-338. 
685 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Judgment (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), 29 January 1997, paras. 77-81. 
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those that protect consumers, and some that can be directly protected by the principle of good 
faith.686 
In turn, norms adopted by an actor that seek to regulate the conduct of another actor may 
be endorsed or given indirect effects by hard law if they are persuasive enough for lawmakers to 
endorse them or if the addressee reacts in such a way as to lead others to believe in the 
emergence of an obligatory standard of conduct. 
While hetero-regulation dynamics can involve all sorts of non-state regulation and soft 
law, it is important to note that by pointing out standards they may have a social and/or 
psychological impact, especially if they are persuasive. Private norms -and soft law in general687- 
can reflect necessary or convenient rules.  
Additionally, demands of compliance with those regulations -as happens, for example, 
with condemnations of breaches of standards of corporate complicity with a dubious binding 
character-688 may elicit responses from their addressees, that in order to avoid negative effects 
upon their reputation and interests derived from boycotts, social or other forms of pressure, will 
try to justify their behavior in light of the regulations in question or may even uphold them publicly. 
This, in turn, may end up protecting the good faith of third parties and make that regulation be 
indirectly binding or have legal effects. 
Therefore, due to acculturation, socialization, persuasion and normativity strategies,689 
public image relationships690, and/or processes of internalization of rules in a transnational 
context involving reiterative legal conduct,691 soft law may find its way into the realm of hard law 
through quasi-extra-legal processes (i.e. processes not entirely alien to hard law partly operating 
outside it). 
On the other hand, as noted by Andrea Bianchi and others, in the human rights 
landscape, where numerous non-state actors interact, there are some (unconscious or dishonest) 
claims that lead to confusion between existing obligations and normative or ideological 
                                                     
686 Cf. José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 136-143, 151-158; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 46-49, 52; Alexandra Gatto, 
op. cit., pp. 429-432; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 42-53, 68; International Law Association, Non-State Actors 
Committee, Report: Preliminary issues for the ILA Conference in Rio de Janeiro, op. cit., at 3. 
687 Cf. Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 3, concerning the practical effects of persuasive norms, even if they are regarded 
as belonging to “soft law”. 
688 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 347-348. 
689 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., pp. 34-35; David Capie, op. cit. 
690 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 431; August Reinisch, op. cit., at 53. 
691 Cf. In my opinion, it is perfectly possible to transplant in most regards the description of dynamics of internalization 
to group non-state entities, especially because they share the group and disaggregated traits with States and lack 
their formal endowments. Therefore, cf. Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., pp. 2645-
2659. 
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aspirations desired by some actors692 –not necessarily widely representative ones-. Actors 
engaging in those dynamics may resort to intertextuality and autopoietic processes, where those 
who agree on something cite each other to generate the illusion of wide acceptance of alleged 
binding standards that may actually not be so, among other possible misleading strategies.693 
Therefore, while the participation of non-state actors can generate a greater 
democratization of world relations by permitting more voices to be represented therein, some of 
which can promote human dignity standards, those entities may be tempted to circumvent 
legitimate democratic discussions and decisions and seek to subtly impose partisan positions 
(which may distort human rights discourses) seemingly or truly adopted in the international level 
to local sovereign entities behave appropriatel.694  
The emergence of joint participatory mechanisms where non-state actors contribute in 
processes, some of which may lead to the adoption of legally relevant acts, is a phenomenon that 
confirms that various voices can be expressed in international official for a. This happens with the 
codex alimentarius, among other cases –albeit the participants in those processes are not always 
representative enough, reason why their conduct must be examined respecting liberties-.695 
Paraphrasing Fred Halliday, romantic overt idealizations of non-state actors must end, 
recognizing that they may certainly contribute to the promotion of human rights and guarantees 
but may also fail to abide by universal standards and may act against those rights.696 They are 
thus not to be either demonized or overtly idealized. Moreover, as said before, some actors may 
lack the representativeness they claim to possess and demand others to have or fail to truly 
represent civil society. For this reason, different voices and actors must be heard.697 
                                                     
692 Cf. Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 185, 191-195, 
201-203; Iona Institute, Ireland, the UN & Human Rights: How UN treaties are misinterpreted to drive a radical 
agenda, available at: http://www.ionainstitute.ie/assets/files/Human_Rights_centre%20spread%20to%20view.pdf 
(last checked: 20/01/2012); Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 56-57. 
693 Cf. Terrence McKeegan, “Live Blogging from the World Youth Conference in Leon, Mexico”, 24, 26 and 27 of 
August, 2010, available at http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2010/abortion/live-blogging-from-the-world-youth-
conference-in-leon-mexico-4/, http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2010/abortion/live-blogging-from-the-world-youth-
conference-in-leon-mexico-3/, and http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2010/abortion/live-blogging-from-the-world-
youth-conference-in-leon-mexico/ (all last checked on 20/01/2012); Timothy Herrmann, “Who Represents the Youth 
Voice at the UN Conference on Sustainability?”, 27 January 2012, available at: 
http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2012/turtle-bay-un/who-represents-the-youth-voice-at-the-un-conference-on-
sustainability/ (last checked: 30/01/2012). 
694 Cf. Iona Institute, op. cit.; John H. Jackson, op. cit., 73-76; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global?, op. cit., 
pp. 204-208, 217; Andreas Fischer-Lescano, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
695 Cf. Nico Krisch, “The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, 
2006, pp. 255, 260; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 
op. cit., pp. 22, 35, 38. 
696 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 36. 
697 Cf. Daniel Thürer, op. cit., at 46; Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law”, op. cit., at 255; Elena 
Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 103-104. 
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Taking into account the opinion of a wide array of actors may enrich debates related to 
the content of human rights standards, and democratic checks and balances among different 
actors must be permitted. For instance, even NGOs can compete with and check each other, as 
commented by Elena Pariotti.698 
The arguments examined in this and previous sections indicate that the value-principle of 
the protection of human dignity and the normative features of standards based on it demand legal 
protection from non-state threats. How such protection can be implemented is examined in 
Chapter 8. Apart from normative arguments, meta-legal and extra-legal arguments about that 
protection exist and are so persuasive that if it was not demanded under international law it would 
have to be accommodated in it de lege ferenda.  
There are different international and non-international principles and legal elements that 
call for protecting human dignity from non-state violations. Altogether, failure to offer reasonable 
and effective international legal protection to victims of non-state threats is contrary to 
international obligations of protection, that contemplate guarantees in favor of all human beings, 
who possess them in all relations: public or private, with States or with other entities. Such failure 
is also contrary to the duty to adjust law to human rights demands. Some of he principles and 
elements referred to in this paragraph will be examined in other sections of this text, beginning 
with the next one. 
 
  
                                                     
698 Cf. the reference to the text of Elena Pariotti mentioned in the previous footnote. 
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CHAPTER 3. EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION AND THE NEED TO PROTECT 
VICTIMS FROM ALL AGENTS OF VIOLATIONS 
 
The principle of equality and non-discrimination is amongst the most important elements 
in international human rights law. It is peremptory and operates both as a guiding principle and as 
a right, which in turn is sometimes enshrined in norms that regulate it as an autonomous 
entitlement while other times it is treated in strict connection to other human rights, prohibiting 
discrimination in their enjoyment.699  
The interpretation and application of any human rights provision must be in accordance 
with this principle, which requires that every person be guaranteed the enjoyment of her human 
rights without being discriminated against for any reason whatsoever.700 When applied as an 
autonomous right, it demands that an individual is not discriminated against in any way, even 
when no other human rights are involved. Additionally, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has considered that the absolute and non-derogable content and nature of this right, as enshrined 
in international instruments, make it part of jus cogens.701 Certainly, human rights law leaves no 
room for exceptions to the unrestricted application of equality and non-discrimination, which has a 
central role and is based on the equal worth of every human being, reason why that conclusion is 
convincing. Moreover, that Court has mentioned that this guarantee is applicable to relations 
between non-state entities,702 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights confirms 
this dimension by saying that “[e]very individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his 
fellow beings without discrimination”. 
It is important to recall that this principle and right (it has both natures) does not demand 
identical treatments in absolute terms: reasonable differentiated treatments may be lawful, since 
individuals in different situations can be treated differently without there being a violation of 
                                                     
699 Compare articles 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, that prohibits discrimination on the enjoyment 
of human rights recognized therein, and 1 of Protocol No. 12 to that Convention, that extends protection from 
discrimination as encompassing any right “set forth by law” and granting protection against discrimination “by any 
public authority”, offering thus a more autonomous entitlement. A similar distinction is seen in articles 2 and 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as expressed in: Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
No. 18, Non-discrimination, 10 November 1989, para. 12. 
700 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 82-96, 102-110; articles 14 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 2.1 and 26 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, op. 
cit., paras. 1-3, 12. 
701 On the peremptory character of equality and non-discrimination, cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 97-101. 
702 Ibid., paras. 140, 146, 152. 
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equality if different treatments pursue legitimate objectives and are proportional,703 which implies 
that restrictive measures cannot be used less restrictive ones are available. However, some 
authors consider that all measures can have an impact on multiple rights and protected 
interests,704 reason why there is no unanimous agreement on the features of this last element. 
Furthermore, in case law it has been considered that temporary different treatments may 
sometimes be required in order to bring about effective equality and improve the conditions of 
people whose rights are violated or not as enjoyed by them as by others, to make it possible for 
everyone to equally enjoy his human rights.705 For this reason, so-called affirmative actions can 
be lawful if legal conditions are met, and are sometimes even considered mandatory by some,706 
although they must be temporary lest they end up treating a previously disadvantaged group in 
an advantageous way over previously advantaged persons who become discriminated against. 
Since the principle of equality and non-discrimination permeates and conditions the entire 
human rights framework, it must be taken into account when analyzing if victims of non-state 
threats must be as protected as victims of State abuses. Such analysis must address all relevant 
aspects: basic considerations as the recognition of victims of non-state human rights violations as 
such, and more complex issues as remedies and reparations or mechanisms of protection.  
In this section, I will briefly examine possible manifestations of equality in human rights 
law in order to analyze what the position of victims of non-state violations is, and will argue that a 
complete and non-discriminatory system cannot be limited to protecting victims of State abuses. 
 
3.1. Manifestations of equality and non-discrimination and their effects towards protection 
from non-state actors 
There are at least four manifestations of equality and non-discrimination in legal terms: 
first, as an overarching principle, equality conditions the way in which norms protecting human 
dignity are interpreted and applied. Often, these operations take place in the State level, and 
oblige States to comply with their human rights duties in accordance with the principle of equality, 
                                                     
703 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, op. cit., paras. 8, 13; Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 89-94. 
704 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, op. cit., para. 46; European Court of 
Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 156; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 84, 90-91, 119; Jonas Christoffersen, op. cit., 
paras. 111-114, 129-135. 
705 Cf. articles 1.4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and 4 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 18, op. cit., para. 10; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., 
paras. 81, 104, 144; European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, 
Judgment, op. cit., par 149. 
706 Ibid. 
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that is to say without discriminating and striving to eliminate unfair differences in the enjoyment of 
rights by those subject to their jurisdiction, even if they are the product of actions of non-state 
actors, as has been maintained by the Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights707. 
A second manifestation of the principle of equality and non-discrimination is the 
recognition of a right of equality, which is usually worded as equality under the law. It entitles 
every individual to be treated without discrimination in a given legal system.  
A third dimension is related to a specific aspect of the first manifestation, stressing that 
States cannot discriminate and must uphold equality when using available legal mechanisms as 
restrictions of rights or suspension of obligations. The fourth manifestation consists in reinforcing 
the protection of equality of certain rights by expressly reminding that their enjoyment must be 
ensured in a way that is compatible with the equality of all human beings, who have the same 
dignity. The last two dimensions are but concrete manifestations of the first two. 
The existence of multiple legal dimensions or manifestations of equality does not imply 
that they are separate and completely independent from each other. On the contrary, all those 
manifestations are related to the same principle, as acknowledged by international bodies as the 
Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The former declared 
on its General comment No. 18, for instance, that:  
“Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any 
discrimination, constitute a basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights”.708 
The Inter-American Court arrived at the same conclusion, evidenced in its consideration 
that:  
“Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law, are 
elements of a general basic principle related to the protection of human rights. The element of 
equality is difficult to separate from nondiscrimination”.709 
While discussion of the previous manifestations generally involves States, this is because 
of the competence of the bodies examining them and not because they have no substantive 
effects or applicability in relation to non-state entities: they do. First of all, there is a relevant 1) 
indirect effect because, given the obligations of States to protect human beings from all violations, 
embedded in the horizontal effects of human rights, the mandated effective protection of the 
principle of equality is only possible if social, individual and legal forms of discrimination are 
fought against. In other words, States have the duty to also prevent and respond to discrimination 
                                                     
707 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 140-153; European Court 
of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 150-155, 180; 
articles 4.1.e and 9.2.b of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and 1, 3 and 8.of the Convention 
of Belém do Pará. 
708 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, op. cit., para. 1. 
709 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 83. 
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by non-state actors. This implies that those actors can violate the principle being commented. In 
this sense, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has considered that: 
“States are obliged to take affirmative action to reverse or change discriminatory situations that exist 
in their societies to the detriment of a specific group of persons. This implies the special obligation to 
protect that the State must exercise with regard to acts and practices of third parties who, with its 
tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain or promote discriminatory situations […] 
The State is obliged to respect and ensure the labor human rights of all workers, irrespective of their 
status as nationals or aliens, and not to tolérate [sic] situations of discrimination that prejudice the 
latter in the employment relationships established between individuals (employer-worker). The State 
should not allow private employers to violate the rights of workers, or the contractual relationship to 
violate minimum international standards […] 
In labor relations, employers must protect and respect the rights of workers, whether these relations 
occur in the public or private sector […] 
The State is thus responsible for itself, when it acts as an employer, and for the acts of third parties 
who act with its tolerance, acquiescence or negligence, or with the support of some State policy or 
directive that encourages the creation or maintenance of situations of discrimination” (emphasis 
added).710 
Secondly, 2) the principle of equality may also directly bind non-state entities and/or 
require international law to protect victims of non-state violations because of three factors: its 
emergence as a norm of jus cogens (hierarchy); its customary nature or its condition as a general 
principle, among other possibilities related to sources; and its individual dimension, different from 
the State dimension, that emphasizes the content of protection and effectiveness of a right, which 
is different from the burdens of those with obligations towards it.  
All the manifestations and effects of the principle of equality and non-discrimination vis-à-
vis non State actors are related to each other and belong to one single general principle, in 
whose light it is necessary to examine how international law treats victims. 
Interestingly, both indirect and direct mechanisms are complementary. Without both of 
them, it would be impossible to fight against discrimination completely. This is because, as 
recognized in doctrine and jurisprudence, discrimination can materialize in different ways, e.g. it 
can be normative, factual, State-sponsored, social, individual, or else; and many manifestations 
of discrimination involve non-state entities.711 Non-state discrimination can operate alone or 
together with State discrimination, and must always be tackled. 
Additionally, as indicated above, its nature as a principle and its own content make the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination guide the entire interpretation and application of 
human rights law.712 This is confirmed, for example, by the command to not disregard this 
                                                     
710 Cf. Ibid., paras. 104, 140, 148, 151-152. 
711 Cf. Ibid., para. 104; European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, 
Judgment, op. cit., paras. 151, 154-155; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., 
para. 103. 
712 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 85, 88, 94, 96, 100, 102; 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, op. cit., paras. 1, 12. 
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principle in any aspect of human rights law, including the possibilities of resorting to measures of 
restriction and suspension, as indicated in the case law of the Human Rights Committee and in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.713 
The two general effects of the principle under discussion seek to address one same 
problem: that of acting against discriminatory treatments of human beings, which are against their 
common inherent worth. In this regard, it is telling that the first Article of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights mentions that: “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” 
(emphasis added). 
Now, I will explore how manifestations of equality are enshrined in some international 
instruments, and then analyze if they are directly applicable to non-state entities in addition to 
having indirect effects towards them. 
The European regional system of protection of human rights provides a clear example of 
how there are different manifestations of non-discrimination, despite which one same logic 
underlies all of them, which are complementary. In the original 1950 European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 14 states: 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status” (emphasis 
added). 
Additionally, the demand of equality and non-discrimination has also been translated into 
human rights law as an autonomous right that offers broad protection from discrimination in 
relation to an almost (and perhaps even) unlimited set of rights and situations, since that 
protection is not restricted to groups of some rights protected from discriminatory treatment. In the 
European system, that has obligations that can bind a non-state actor (the European Union), this 
concrete manifestation is formulated in terms of a single right, distinct from as a principle that 
conditions all the universe of human rights law. In this respect, Article 1 of Protocol number 12 to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states: 
“General prohibition of discrimination  
1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.  
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those 
mentioned in paragraph 1” (emphasis added). 
A comparison of the articles quoted above reveals that a general approach based on an 
overarching principle is complementary to the formulation of a concrete right on the same matter, 
                                                     
713 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, paras. 26, 32, 39, 44, 48; article 4.1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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that may cover a great range of rights but not operate as a principle. In other regions and in the 
universal system of human rights, there are provisions that resemble the two cited articles. It is 
necessary to determine what their effects are concerning protection from non-state violations. 
In the Universal system, the two 1966 Covenants determine in Article 2 that States are 
obliged to refrain from committing violations and to ensure the enjoyment of human rights in 
accordance with the principle of equality, that is to say without discrimination. This command 
imposes obligations on formal, functional and de facto authorities, which are often but not always 
States.714 Additionally, as indicated before, it indirectly affects other entities, because authorities 
have duties to eliminate obstacles to the enjoyment of human rights and ensure an equal 
enjoyment of human rights by every individual subject to their jurisdiction or power, which given 
the indirect “horizontal” effects of the Covenants call for acting against non-state discrimination. 
This is confirmed by the Human Rights Committee, according to which the Covenant obliges 
authorities to address non-state violations.715 When seeking to comply with their duties, 
authorities must not discriminate any victim, including victims of non-state violations.  
In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is expressly stated that 
measures adopted during public emergencies must respect the principle of equality and non-
discrimination; and the special application of that principle in relation to some rights is also 
addressed, being Articles 20 and 26 noteworthy because the former orders States to prohibit 
advocacy of discrimination, which can be committed by non-state actors, and the latter deals with 
the right of equality before the law and the correlated prohibition of discrimination, which has 
universal applicability within domestic legal systems.  
In sum, like the European system, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
requires that all the rights “provided for in the Covenant”716 are enjoyed by persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of a State party with no discrimination; and additionally prohibits discrimination in 
domestic legal systems, having this duty a different scope that complements the former one’s. 
Additionally, that treaty includes specific guarantees to reinforce the respect of equality.717 All of 
those manifestations have applicability vis-à-vis non-state actors: States must ensure that 
persons are not prevented from enjoying internationally recognized rights comprised in the 
                                                     
714 Cf. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 
2006, para. 4, in light of article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 43 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in light of articles 3 and 4 of the said Convention; article 59 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights in light of articles 1 and 14 of that Convention and Protocol No. 12 to that 
Convention. 
715 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 8. 
716 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, op. cit., para. 12. 
717 Ibid. 
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Covenant as the result of non-state discrimination, and they also must design their domestic 
norms in a way that does not foster but rather impedes non-state discrimination. 
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in turn, stresses that positive 
measures of protection shall be implemented without discrimination and following the principle of 
equality, and concretizes this principle in relation to measures that have to be designed to protect 
“children and young persons.” The Protocol of San Salvador also requires rights to be guaranteed 
“without discrimination”, as ordered in article 3. 
The American Convention on Human Rights follows the model of directly regulating State 
behavior in Article 1.1., that includes a general prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of 
human rights, which also has indirect horizontal effects, as declared by the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in Advisory Opinion 18.718 Those effects have been described as entailing the 
obligation of States to prevent and deal with non-state threats.719  
The American Convention, following the model of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, also contains concrete regulations on the applicability of non-discrimination 
throughout its Articles, and includes an autonomous right to “equal protection” by the law as well 
in Article 24, that also has horizontal effects, as all the Convention does. It must be noted that the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man is equally applicable to State parties to the 
American Convention and to those OAS members that are not parties to it, and that they form 
part of the American regional system’s corpus juris of human rights protection. Article II of that 
Declaration has an interesting redaction, which reads:  
“All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor” (emphasis added).  
According to the content of this article, one may infer that one implication of the principle 
of equality and non-discrimination is that victims of non-state actors have the same inherent rights 
as victims of States. Therefore, differences concerning the protection and promotion of those 
rights are lawful if different treatments of those categories of victims are justified and proportional. 
This requires not leaving victims of non-state violations utterly undefended when States are 
unable or unwilling to protect them, among others. The effectiveness of alternative measures of 
protection of human rights and guarantees of victims of non-state violations is therefore a 
condition of their legality; and the lack of a proportional, pertinent and effective response to those 
violations is discriminatory and violates their dignity. Sometimes, for protection to be effective, the 
                                                     
718 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 140-153. 
719 Cf. Ibid.; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 87-91; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. cit., para. 
172. 
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protection of victims of non-state violations must be akin to that of victims of States or be a 
directly international protection, because not all differential treatment of victims of different actors 
are consistent with equality and allowed. 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in turn, has some pertinent 
interesting features. Apart from recognizing the equality of persons before the law in Article 3 and 
reinforcing some rights with the prohibition discrimination concerning them, the Charter declares 
that peoples are equal to other peoples in article 19, states that individuals have a duty to refrain 
from discriminating other human beings in article 28, and calls for States to ensure that women 
are not discriminated against in article 18. The last two articles are clearly applicable to non-state 
entities: article 18 does nothing but refer to a duty to ensure that women, who are and have been 
victims of discrimination by public and private actors, enjoy equality, demanding a concrete 
application of general manifestations of equality that seek to protect vulnerable individuals.  
Therefore, this article forms part of a trend that aims to protect persons who are 
especially vulnerable from both State and non-state actors, as required by their being equal to all 
human beings. This is reflected in other specific provisions and in specialized instruments as well, 
such as those dealing with the protection of women against discrimination, of persons with 
disabilities, or of persons that can be victims of racial discrimination, among other cases.720 
Article 28 of the African Charter contains a right of individuals to not be violated by 
others, since the Charter mentions the duty to not discriminate other individuals. The counterpart 
of such a duty in a human rights instrument is the right to not be discriminated against by other 
individuals. This is a norm that directly mentions non-state duties, recognizing that they can 
violate the right to equality derived from human dignity. This confirms that human rights 
instruments can envisage non-state duties that can be invoked by victims against offenders. 
Apart from the African Charter, other instruments of human rights or general international 
law itself contemplate express mentions of non-state responsibilities related to the principle of 
equality, the existence of which is independent of State duties (albeit their simultaneous existence 
will enhance their protection). Even if no other instruments regulated them, they could be 
perfectly created.  
                                                     
720 Cf. http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/questions.shtml#one (last checked: 23/01/2012), where it is 
mentioned, as indicated above, that “certain groups, such as women, children and refugees have fared far worse 
than other groups and international conventions are in place to protect and promote the human rights of these 
groups”; Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with 
Disabilities; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women; 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; Convention on the Rights of the Child; among others. 
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The Inter-American human rights system has recognized the need to protect human 
equality from non-state entities. In that regard, article III.1.a of the Inter-American Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities mentions that the 
parties to that treaty undertake to adopt: 
“Measures to eliminate discrimination gradually and to promote integration by government authorities 
and/or private entities in providing or making available goods, services, facilities, programs, and 
activities such as employment, transportation, communications, housing, recreation, education, 
sports, law enforcement and administration of justice, and political and administrative activities” 
(emphasis added). 
In turn, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, belonging to the universal system of the United Nations, 
envisages a particular manifestation of the protection of equality and non-discrimination when it 
mentions in article 25 that: 
“It shall not be lawful to derogate in private contracts of employment from the principle of equality of 
treatment referred to in paragraph 1 of the present article. 
3. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that migrant workers are not deprived 
of any rights derived from this principle by reason of any irregularity in their stay or employment. In 
particular, employers shall not be relieved of any legal or contractual obligations, nor shall their 
obligations be limited in any manner by reason of such irregularity” (emphasis added). 
As commented in advance above, different factors make the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination be relevant to protect individuals from non-state threats. Apart from indirect 
effects requiring action of authorities, direct applicability of substantive duties to respect the 
equality of all human beings to non-state actors is important, because of the possibility that States 
comply with their duties but victims are insufficiently protected, as examined in Chapter 2.  
Concerning indirect effects, apart from the general duties to address non-state violations, 
in relation to vulnerable individuals and rights the demands of international norms often go 
beyond general indications and regulate in more detail how authorities must protect from non-
state threats, sometimes not only specifying duties that non-state entities must have but also 
other measures that must be resorted to for the sake of protecting the human dignity. For this 
reason, different manifestations of horizontal human involvement effects are not limited to dealing 
with obligations, because they can also deal with protection measures that differ from the creation 
of duties (of authorities or direct non-state international obligations, for instance). 
Concerning direct effects, three different considerations suggest that the principle of 
equality may be directly applicable to non-state actors, which means that they can be bound by 
that principle. 
a) The first consideration is related to the hierarchical nature of the norm: the fact that the 
principle of equality is peremptory makes it non-derogable, with a content that cannot be 
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restricted, and makes it have a mandatory application that admits no exceptions. Concerning the 
jus cogens character of the principle and some of its implications, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights considered that: 
“[T]he principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination 
belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order 
rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws. Nowadays, no legal act that is in 
conflict with this fundamental principle is acceptable, and discriminatory treatment of any person, 
owing to gender, race, color, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, nationality, age, economic situation, property, civil status, birth or any other status is 
unacceptable. This principle (equality and non-discrimination) forms part of general international law. 
At the existing stage of the development of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and 
non-discrimination has entered the realm of jus cogens”721 (emphasis added). 
The Court thus not only found that the principle of equality cannot be restricted, but also 
that it exerts influence on the entire international legal system and on domestic legal systems as 
well. To this it must be added that there are duties to implement it internally and that it must be 
taken into account in relation to every legally relevant act from a human rights perspective. 
I agree with the opinion of the Court, which identifies the features of the principle of 
equality that make it meet the conditions of Article 53 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties, because it cannot be derogated from in any aspect under any circumstances. The jus 
cogens character of the principle attests to the relevance of human equality. Therefore, 
discriminatory treatments give unreasonable preferential treatment to some individuals merely 
because of their accidental status, without having regard to the inherent worth of every human 
being, reason why artificial and unacceptable subcategories of human beings with different 
treatments are contrary to human rights law. Denying protection and recognition to victims of non-
state actors, in truth, is an example of attaching more importance to secondary and contingent 
aspects than to the necessity of protecting essential entitlements of all individuals. This is why 
norms that engage in such discrimination must be modified whenever they are identified. 
The superior hierarchy of the principle of equality and non-discrimination is, to my mind, 
one of the characteristics that make this principle have effects beyond the domestic system of 
States and direct effects towards non-state actors. This is because the peremptory nature of he 
principle of equality implies that it must be respected by non-state entities and that interpretations 
or applications contrary to it cannot produce effects, because those entities have implied duties to 
not breach it, as seen in Chapters 2 and 6. Moreover, the existence of jus cogens obligations to 
respect is not dependent on the consent of entities bound by them.  
While some non-state actors can always be subjects of international obligations, even 
dispositive ones, regardless of consent, some non-state entities can formally interact with the 
                                                     
721 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 101. 
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sources of jus gentium, but not even they can avoid being bound by peremptory law, as the one 
that protects the equality of all human beings, all of who have the same worth.722  
Apart from which actors must respect it, jus cogens also imposes burdens and conditions 
on norms and rules, and require international and domestic law to be consistent with equality and 
non-discrimination. If a compatible interpretation or application is not possible and contradiction is 
not limited to one case (in which case contrary manifestations must be unapplied), norms and 
rules contrary to the equality of all human beings must be removed from the legal system. In case 
the application of norms on human rights or guarantees discriminate against victims of non-state 
entities, they must be adjusted or interpreted in a way that is consistent with the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination. 
b) The legal sources of the principle of equality and non-discrimination may sometimes 
also make this principle be applicable to different actors and regulations without the 
intermediation of the State, regulating their behavior directly. Several ideas support this 
consideration. 
In the first place, besides having a jus cogens character and being recognized in treaty 
law, the principle of equality and non-discrimination seems to have attained customary nature. In 
this regard, it must be said that the principle, along with some of the rights and guarantees 
derived from it, are found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, some parts of which, at 
least, have attained the character of customary international law.723 The importance of the 
principle, its non-derogable nature, and the fact that besides granting rights it determines how 
rights and international law are to be applied and interpreted, due to its overarching character, 
strongly suggest that it is among the norms and principles of the Declaration that have become 
part of customary international law. Therefore, it is important to examine the Declaration in order 
to find some clues as to the applicability of the principle to the regulation of non-state conduct and 
to confirm that it imposes conditions on the content of international law. 
At the outset, it must be kept in mind that the Declaration is in some respects unlike 
human rights treaties and similar in others. Whereas human rights treaties have been traditionally 
designed to impose obligations on States (being there some that regulate non-state duties as of 
late), the Universal Declaration, despite not having binding effects originally (which is no longer 
the case due to the fact that part of its content has become customary law and also to its 
                                                     
722 Cf. José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 124-133; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius 
Cogens-: la transformación de los derechos internacional y colombiano gracias al Ius Cogens internacional, op. cit., 
pp. 109-121; article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
723 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 226-228; Bruno Simma and 
Philip Alston, op. cit., pp. 84, 90-94. 
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reception in treaty and domestic norms), forms part of the international Bill of Rights and directly 
addresses some pertinent non-state conduct,724 as do some human rights treaties. In the 
Declaration, the emphasis was laid on the rights, freedoms and guarantees enjoyed by human 
beings rather than on the duties of States concerning those rights, freedoms and guarantees. 
Both types of instruments (declarations and treaties) form part of the same corpus juris of human 
rights law, and must in consequence be examined in conjunction to interpret human rights issues, 
that must be examined taking into account the system those instruments are embedded in.725 
Interestingly, Principle 12 of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and its 
commentary mention that there is a: 
“[R]esponsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights refers to internationally recognized 
human rights  – understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human 
Rights”, with that Bill “consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the main 
instruments through which it has been codified”.726 
From its preamble onwards, the Declaration contains many revealing references to 
equality, the first of which is of great importance: it recognizes that there are “equal and 
inalienable rights of all” human beings (emphasis added). An implication of this recognition should 
be that all victims must be granted the same rights and protection, since conditioning them to 
accidental aspects such as the identity of an offender cannot be reconciled with that recognition. 
In Article 1, the Declaration contains a reference to the right to equality and non-
discrimination that materializes the previous recognition, stating that “[a]ll human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights”. Article 1 has a broad applicability: it is neither limited to a 
certain legal system nor to an exhaustive or defined set of rights. In consequence, victims, as 
individuals who deserve and are entitled to legal protection, should be recognized to have the 
same essential –inherent, inalienable, unconditional- rights that other victims also have, due to 
their being in the same situation of vulnerability and to the existence of a common mandate to 
protect all non-conditional rights, among which the right to have one’s position as a victim of a 
human rights violation recognized and the right to receive a remedy are included.  
                                                     
724 Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “The International Bill of Rights”, Fact 
Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), at 1, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf; 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, at 13; article 
30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. 
cit., pp. 33, 44-45, 49-50. 
725 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, paras. 55-56; Antonio 
Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 83-84. 
726 Cf. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, at 13. 
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However, since differential treatments are permissible, as mentioned earlier, law does not 
always require a completely identical treatment of all victims. Therefore, offering certain remedies 
only to victims of States, as a result of their being in a position different from that other victims, 
may be lawful if that treatment is proportionate and other conditions are met. Additionally, it is 
required that at least other effective measures and actions be used to protect the essential rights 
of victims of non-state actors treated differently. Some mechanisms of protection that can be 
offered to all victims are examined in Part II. 
On the other hand, the fact that Article 1 contains a reference to the equality of rights, 
enjoyed by individuals, means that the content of the guarantee is susceptible of being violated 
by any actor, with no indication to the contrary being made. As a result, the right to be treated 
equally (not identically) and without discrimination is inherent to human beings, and they can thus 
claim and demand respect of that right from State and non-state entities and request its 
protection from authorities. 
Additionally, the Declaration contains other references to equality and non-discrimination, 
such as those found in Articles 10, 16, 21, 23 or 26, that reinforce the protection of equality in 
relation to some rights. Article 23 is noteworthy: it recognizes the right to “equal pay for equal 
work”, which is a right that has an evident applicability to relations with both States and non-state 
actors, being its opposability to non-state entities thus essential. Concerning that and related 
aspects, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights asked States in its Advisory Opinion number 
18 to protect workers from non-state abuses attributable to their employers.727 
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration is worth being examined as well. It refers to the right 
to equal protection by the law. It stipulates:  
“All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. 
All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and 
against any incitement to such discrimination.”  
An effective and teleological interpretation, that takes into account the objective of 
protecting human dignity, can be construed as indicating that there are two guarantees in this 
article: 1) equality before the law, without specifying or limiting to which law it applies, referring 
thus in my opinion to equality before any law (international, domestic, global-transnational or lex 
privata, for instance), as the pro persona principle requires; and 2) the right to be protected 
against discrimination generally, in the sense that all individuals are to be protected against any 
discriminatory treatment in relation to their human rights. This is a right that is opposable to non-
                                                     
727 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 140, 146-153. 
 
 
229
state entities, since to be meaningful and effectively protect individuals from any human rights 
discrimination it cannot be a right exclusively operative against State discrimination.  
Besides addressing relations between actors, the aforementioned guarantees have an 
impact on the content of law, requiring that no law or regulation allows or engages in 
discrimination. This means that victims of non-state actors cannot be unrecognized and 
unprotected. Such tolerance or endorsement would generate an additional violation of human 
rights. Considering that States may sometimes be unable to protect individuals from certain 
actors despite their diligent efforts, international remedies and mechanisms should be available to 
victims in serious cases to protect victims from serious harm. Leaving them in a position of 
extreme disadvantage would amount to discrimination against them, generating an additional 
wrongful act. 
Apart from the study of the broad principle of equality and non-discrimination as a 
peremptory and customary principle, with part of its content being indicated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, specific general principles of law and international law also deal 
with the protection of the equality of human beings and may complement that content.  
The recognition that equality and non-discrimination is a principle of international law is 
implied in its being treated as such by international bodies and other entities.728 It is a principle 
found in many legal instruments of both soft law and hard law,729 upheld in statements of different 
actors, and invoked when violations of it are condemned.730. Additionally, this principle is found in 
Constitutions and norms of many States and implemented in their legal systems, in such a 
general and strong way that discriminatory treatments are conceived as illegal and illegitimate, 
making equality thus have the condition of a general principle of law in foro domestico as well. 
In adjudication procedures, international supervisory bodies have treated equality and 
non-discrimination as a guiding principle and not as a mere subsidiary mechanism of 
interpretation. In some cases, they have striven to make the norms they examine compatible with 
the inherent equality of all victims of human rights violations, when their competences and 
functions so allow. In those cases, they have granted protected claimants and allowed their 
petitions against non-state actors to succeed, in a way that is analogous to the way in which 
victims of States are protected. Those supervisory bodies have understood that they were entitled 
to grant that protection due to the presence of factors as the role, functions and/or power of such 
                                                     
728 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, paras. 71, 72, 82-88; Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 18, op. cit., paras. 1-4, 10, 12; European Court of Human Rights, Grand 
Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 139. 
729 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, paras. 71, 83, 86. 
730 Cf. e.g. articles I and II of of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid. 
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entities, considering that the underlying rationales and principles of the remedies and actions 
available in some international instruments can be used to protect victims of some non-state 
abuses, as when their dynamics are similar to those of State violations. This is a way of treating 
persons in similar conditions alike.731  
International authorities have considered that some of the ways and situations in which 
victims of non-state actors can be protected under human rights treaties are: first, a) offering 
indirect precautionary protection. This implies prohibiting States from exposing individuals to 
potential abuses attributable to non-state actors. Risk situations in which an actor has the 
capacity to violate the content of a given right given its de facto authority, ability or power to 
violate human rights, have been understood as deserving attention. Therefore, for instance, when 
someone can be expelled to places where he faces risks of serious non-state violations and 
States cannot guarantee protecting him despite their efforts, the prohibition of non-refoulement 
has been considered as applicable, to not expose that someone to non-state threats.  
b) Victims of non-state abuses can also be protected by means of implementing a 
conditioned direct protection. For instance, if the condition that a territory is administered with a 
State, which always has human rights obligations over it, is not met, relevant human rights 
standards have been considered to be relevant to guide the conduct of non-state entities that 
administer that same territory (replacing the State or with the State having no effective control 
over that conduct due to normative or factual events). Furthermore, the conduct of those entities 
has been considered prone to direct international human rights examination. This has been done 
under the assumption that the entitlement to effective protection of those located in a territory is 
not waived and cannot be diminished due to State absence or limitations (as discussed in the 
case of the UNMIK, presented before).  
Logics of that sort are human-centered. Some international bodies have also considered 
themselves entitled to directly protect individuals from non-state abuses if other conditions are 
met. 
There are other ways in which international bodies can order protection from non-state 
violations, including: c) indirect and contingent protection, by way of enforcing obligations of 
States or de facto or functional authorities regarding the horizontal effects of human rights, 
requiring the prevention and sanction of non-state abuses and the full reparation of victims.  
                                                     
731 Cf. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 
2006, para. 4; Committee Against Torture, Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, op. cit., paras. 6.5-7. 
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However, given jurisdictional and competence limitations of international bodies, this 
option does not always have the capacity to make all victims be treated alike, because if 
supervised States comply with their obligations with the required appropriate diligence, 
international protection is not granted to victims of actors that get away with their violations. If the 
non-state offenders elude domestic controls, the situation of victims may not be addressed at all.  
Transnational non-state actions to condemn and shame offenders in those and other 
events may complement international public measures, but cannot fully replace them because, 
despite their influence, they may lack some of the incentives and resources of public action. 
Therefore, lack of fully effective legal mechanisms to protect victims makes it necessary to devise 
complementary mechanisms de lege ferenda. Indirect exams of non-state conduct that are 
conducted to examine State compliance with positive duties or to determine if authorities are 
obliged to do or refrain from doing something are measures of protection different from those 
involving direct supervision of non-state obligations. 
d) Fourthly, the examination of allegations that a non-state actor has cooperated with or 
otherwise participated in the violation of norms protecting human dignity, that were perpetrated by 
another actor –State or non-state-, can also serve to protect victims and defend their equality. 
This is so because this permits to offer remedies, whether domestic or international, to victims 
against participants and accomplices in violations, regardless of their nature.  
That non-state actors can be responsible due to complicity is widely accepted. Authors 
and international bodies acknowledge that States have the capacity to be accomplices in 
violations attributable to non-state violations –private ones or international organizations-; that 
private and public actors can be accomplices of State or non-state violations, as was declared by 
judge Leval of the United States and is recognized in criminal law;732 or that someone has 
responsibility due to his participation in a criminal organization of which he was a member, as 
envisaged in articles 9 to 11 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, adopted in 
London on August 8 of 1945. 
Possible problems include that substantive or procedural norms may fail to address the 
responsibility for perpetration of non-state actors in addition to their responsibility for 
                                                     
732 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit.; articles 25.3 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
16, 17, and 41.2 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001, or 14, 
15, 17, 18, 42.2, 61 and 62 of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations in its 2011 version 
(A/66/10); Concurring Opinion of Judge Leval to: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, pp. 7, 12, 17, 37, 57-
58, 62, 68, 73-74. 
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assistance,733 or that someone may consider that an actor lacks the capacity to incur in 
secondary liability as a result of its supposedly not being bound by duties prohibiting its 
contribution to a primary violation. I disagree with this idea, but it has been implicitly endorsed 
before, as in the case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.734 
f) International criminal procedures are adjudicatory in nature and permit to address 
several violations in ways that respect the equality of multiple victims somewhat, because they 
allow for the prosecution of individuals involved with States or with collective entities or operating 
on their own. However, despite progresses,735 the narrow scope of victim participation and 
reparations present in the current stage of international criminal law,736 the existence of non-
criminal violations of human dignity,737 and the fact that not even all serious non-state crimes are 
addressed internationally, make it difficult to consider those procedures a full replacement of 
other procedures, because they do not ensure all victims of non-state violations an effective and 
equal protection. Needless to say, some cases must have no criminal nature. 
g) Lastly, the possibility that some non-state entities become parties to certain treaties 
protecting human dignity, that apart from regulating substantive duties can regulate contentious 
jurisdiction and competence of supervisory bodies to examine their conduct, can increase the 
protection of victims from those actors. This happens with the possibility of the European Union 
becoming a party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, with the possibility that some international organizations become parties 
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and to the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, with the consent that certain non-state 
entities may consent to be bound by Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or with the 
jus ad tractatum of some actors to celebrate arbitration agreements.738 Yet, these possibilities 
                                                     
733 Ibid., along with articles 4.3 and 7.1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
2.3 and 6.1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001 and 4 of the ILC draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations in its 2011 version. 
734 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-
cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, pp. 21-43, 48-49. 
735 Cf., for instance, the new version of article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights pursuant to article 1 
of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring 
the control machinery established thereby; Rules of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Legal 
Assistance Fund of the Inter-American Human Rights System; Rules for the Operation of the Victims’ Legal 
Assistance Fund of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
736 Cf. Avril McDonald, “The Development of a Victim-Centered Approach to International Criminal Justice for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, in John Carey et al. (eds.), International Humanitarian Law: Prospects, 
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2006, pp. 262-265, 267-272, 275-276. 
737 Cf. Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 169-170; Claire de 
Than and Edwin Shorts, op. cit., pp. 12-13; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 18. 
738 Cf. articles 59.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 43 and 44 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 11 and 12 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
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may or may not be used, and they leave many other potential non-state offenses unaddressed 
(despite which their contribution and importance is significant). 
All the previous possibilities improve protection to victims, but their intensity, 
effectiveness and likelihood of treating victims differ. The previous classification does not deny 
that other possibilities of protecting individuals from non-state actors that also overcome ideas 
and obstacles about alleged competence and jurisdictional constraints or the subjective scope of 
human rights may exist. Some mechanisms of a non-adjudicatory nature are explored in Chapter 
8. The importance of contentious-adjudicatory mechanisms lies in their obligatory character when 
they are jurisdictional (judicial and arbitral),739 possibility of examination of non-state conduct in 
light of standards, and the possibility that some of them be triggered by victims, not depending on 
the initiative or acceptance of other entities. Restricting the defense of human dignity to such 
mechanisms would, however, be insufficient and incomplete, because they have some 
shortcomings, and other strategies have different advantages, as the greater possibility of 
tackling both causes and consequences of non-state threats.740 Reporting mechanisms without 
an adjudicatory character, for instance, have upheld that even actors without State-like powers 
and features must respect essential human rights.741 
Examples of some situations described above, in which organs have interpreted their 
powers in a way that allows them to overcome apparent jurisdictional limitations and grant greater 
protection to individuals from non-state threats, can be found in the jurisprudence of United 
Nations human rights Committees.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Disabilities, or 96.3of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Commentaries of the ICRC to the 
aforementioned Protocol, paras. 3764-3769, 3774, where the ICRC mentions that “The declaration which the 
authority concerned must make is unilateral since it produces its effects irrespective of the conduct of the Contracting 
Party. On the other hand, it does notcreate merely unilateral obligations; it brings into force rights and duties between 
the two Parties to the conflict which flow from the Conventions and the Protocol  […] [the declaration involves] right 
tochoose whether or not to submit to international humanitarian [p.1090] law, insofar as it goes beyond customary 
law […]ny reservations the Contracting Party may have made will affect the relations between that Party and the 
authority making the declaration insofar as they are compatible with the object and purpose of the Conventions and 
of the Protocol […] [the first effect of the declaration is that] The Conventions and the Protocol immediately come into 
force between the Contracting Party and the authority.” Moreover, on the capacity of non-state entities to be parties 
to international treaties, cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, 1996, pp. 188-190; International Law Commission, First 
Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Yearkbook of the International Law 
Commission, vol. II, A/CN.4/144 and Add.1, 1962, pp. 31, 36; John R. Crook, “Abyei Arbitration—Final Award”, ASIL 
Insights, Vol. 13, Issue 15, 2009, in conjunction with: Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso 
General, op. cit., at 622. 
739 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 607-608. 
740 Cf. Amartya Sen., op. cit., at 345; A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, A/59/565, 2004, paras. 21, 22, 27, 59, 148, where persuasive, 
educative and other non-coercives measures embedded in a comprehensive strategy are mentioned as crucial for 
maintaining peace and security; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release 53/11, 7 June 2011 
(where it is mentioned that citizen security, which is a human rights issue, must be preserved and brought about 
through prevention and addressing the “underlying causes” of crime and violence); Chapters 4 and 8, infra. 
741 Cf. Tilman Rodehäuser, op. cit. 
 
 
234
The Committee Against Torture, for instance, granted indirect protection that upheld the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination in the case of Elmi v. Australia, where it considered 
that: 
“The Committee does not share the State party's view that the Convention is not applicable in the 
present case since, according to the State party, the acts of torture the author fears he would be 
subjected to in Somalia would not fall within the definition of torture set out in article 1 (i.e. pain or 
suffering inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity, in this instance for discriminatory purposes). The 
Committee notes that for a number of years Somalia has been without a central government, that the 
international community negotiates with the warring factions and that some of the factions operating 
in Mogadishu have set up quasi-governmental institutions and are negotiating the establishment of a 
common administration. It follows then that, de facto, those factions exercise certain prerogatives that 
are comparable to those normally exercised by legitimate governments. Accordingly, the members of 
those factions can fall, for the purposes of the application of the Convention, within the phrase "public 
officials or other persons acting in an official capacity" contained in article 1 
[…] 
The Committee further notes, on the basis of the information before it, that the area of Mogadishu 
where the Shikal mainly reside, and where the author is likely to reside if he ever reaches Mogadishu, 
is under the effective control of the Hawiye clan, which has established quasi-governmental 
institutions and provides a number of public services” (emphasis added).742 
Another example of the protection of potential victims from non-state threats to their 
human rights is the case of N. v. Sweden, decided by the Third Section of the European Court of 
Human Rights. This case is of the utmost importance because, contrary to the limitations 
concerning the scope of protection present in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, that limits the definition of the acts prohibited 
therein to the condition of involvement of States and a few other actors, the Third Section applied 
a norm that prohibits those same acts without having the limit that those violations be committed 
by or with relevant State or similar participation. Thereby, the Third Section provided protection to 
the applicant, who faced a risk of non-state violations if sent to Afghanistan, with no need of 
ascertaining whether the potential non-state offenders de facto resembled a State in some 
respects. In that regard, a relevant passage of the judgment mentions that: 
“[I]n the special circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that there are substantial grounds 
for believing that if deported to Afghanistan, the applicant faces various cumulative risks of reprisals 
which fall under Article 3 of the Convention from her husband X, his family, her own family and from 
the Afghan society. Accordingly, the Court finds that the implementation of the deportation order 
against the applicant would give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”743 (emphasis 
added). 
The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee provides one example of the 
conditioned direct protection that treats victims of non-state violations in a way more consistent 
                                                     
742 Cf. Committee Against Torture, Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, op. cit., pars 6.5-7. 
743 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of N. v. Sweden, Application no. 23505/09, Judgment, 20 July 2010, 
para. 62. 
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with the principle of equality and non-discrimination. It is found in its concluding observations on 
the situation of human rights in Kosovo on 14 August 2006 (‘the UNMIK case’), which said: 
“The Committee notes that certain problems resulting from the role of UNMIK as an interim 
administration and, at the same time, a United Nations body whose staff members enjoy privileges 
and immunities, the gradual transfer of competencies from UNMIK to the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government (PISG), the existence of Serbian parallel court and administrative structures in 
some parts of Kosovo, and the uncertainty about the future status of Kosovo raise questions of 
accountability and impede the implementation of the Covenant in Kosovo. However, the Committee 
recalls general comment No. 26 (1977) on continuity of obligations which states that the rights 
guaranteed under the Covenant belong to the people living in the territory of a State party, and that 
once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection 
devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding changes in the 
administration of that territory. The protection and promotion of human rights is one of the main 
responsibilities conferred on UNMIK under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). Moreover, as 
part of the applicable law in Kosovo and of the Constitutional Framework for the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government, the Covenant is binding on PISG. It follows that UNMIK, as well as 
PISG, or any future administration in Kosovo, are bound to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within the territory of Kosovo and subject to their jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant”744 
(emphasis added). 
The previous logic extends supervision of human rights compliance to non-state 
performance. However, the reference to the human rights responsibilities of actors as the UNMIK 
and the PISG should not be understood as implying that unless an entity has express human 
rights obligations its conduct cannot be internationally supervised. The broad competence that 
the Committee recognized it had should be construed as existing when the entity controlling or 
administering a territory ought to have human rights duties or has implied duties. Those arise 
precisely with the status of an actor in a territory whose inhabitants have internationally 
recognized inherent rights and guarantees, which remain regardless of changes of actors with 
powers over or functions in that territory.  
A teleological interpretation could indicate that, at least when an actor exerts control over 
a territory with preexisting human rights guarantees, it implicitly consents to human rights 
obligations and/or has to abide by them as a burden that comes with power and administration, 
which ought to be exercised in accordance with the respect owed to dignity and its protection 
when normative and factual expectations to this effect exist.745 This generation of duties does not 
prejudge about the lawfulness of the control, because it is an entirely different matter. This is 
analogous to what happens in International Humanitarian Law, according to which non-state 
armed actors must comply with its norms but do not have their status altered as a result. It is 
convenient to mention that common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 declares that: 
                                                     
744 Cf. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 
2006, para. 4. 
745 Cf. Anne Peters, “The Merits of Global Constitutionalism”, op. cit., pp. 402, 405, 407, 410. 
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“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions:  
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid 
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other 
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.  
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons […]  
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict” (emphasis added). 
Sometimes, extended protection corresponds to what has been called the lateral human 
rights protection.746 It is different from indirect and intermediate horizontal effects because it is 
directly triggered against actors with authority or superior power, and such protection is not 
subject to a State being responsible for breaching its obligations.747 In other cases, what is 
enforced is a State duty to not expose someone to State or non-state threats. Still, direct 
protection not dependent on formal or de facto authority is permitted by some other mechanisms 
and norms. 
Since all victims and not only victims of States must be protected, the different categories 
of protection examined above are important, because they permit more victims to be effectively 
protected.748 The combination of lateral, horizontal and vertical (against the State) remedies and 
actions of protection can lead to what I call a transversal or complete protection of human rights, 
covering all spheres of relations, be them with individuals or collective, formal or informal, public 
or private entities, in different situations, relations and roles.749 
The content and effectiveness of the concrete right to equality and non-discrimination, 
which is an offspring of the principle with the same name, must be protected from non-state 
violations and requires that international law respects and protect it, due to human rights 
implications concerning non-state entities and international law and the consistency they demand. 
Therefore, it is necessary to assess if the content of international human rights law is compatible 
with the principle and right of equality of all victims or not. 
                                                     
746 Cf. Jennifer Corrin, op. cit., pp. 67-70. 
747 Cf. Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
748 Besides ex post facto remedies and preventive/precautionary protection from non-state threats, that can be 
offered through judicially-ordered and other mechanisms, there are quasi-direct supervisions and measures of 
protection, i.e. that offered when non-state behavior is closely examined in order to command a functional authority 
(State or otherwise) to do something or to assess compliance with its duties. Additionally, a more intense and direct 
evaluation of non-state conduct is also possible, either when ascertaining responsibility due to complicity of an entity 
with State or non-state misdeeds or to perpetration. 
749 The transversal or comprehensive approach operates as a framework that includes horizontal, vertical and lateral 
effects of humanitarian (not just IHL) law across levels of governance and legal systems, with the aim of offering 
effective protection to all victims and properly responding to threats or violations in light of their seriousness and the 
needs of human beings, taking into account resources and some criteria (cf. Chapter 4, infra). 
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3.2. The equality of all victims and its incompatibility with State-centered protection 
paradigms 
The hierarchy, content and features of the principle of equality and non-discrimination 
make it have effects in relation to non-state actors and the international and domestic legal 
systems, which must be compatible with it. In turn, the right with the same name must be 
effectively protected from every violation against it by law, and therefore so must be protected all 
human rights and guarantees, which must be respected and protected in light of those principle 
and right. 
One relevant notion in light of which normative compliance with the principle of equality is 
to be assessed is that of indirect discrimination. It serves to describe how measures or actions 
that are adopted without the intention of discriminating against a group or individual may 
nevertheless lead to situations that are contrary to equality and non-discrimination, in which case 
those measures or attitudes would be discriminatory and must cease. This concept has been 
recognized by regional human rights Courts and by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. It refers to measures that generate or support unjustified inequalities even if this 
effect is not intended or the measures are apparently neutral. Concerning this, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has mentioned that: 
“States must abstain from carrying out any action that, in any way, directly or indirectly, is aimed at 
creating situations of de jure or de facto discrimination. This translates, for example, into the 
prohibition to enact laws, in the broadest sense, formulate civil, administrative or any other measures, 
or encourage acts or practices of their officials, in implementation or interpretation of the law that 
discriminate against a specific group of persons because of their race, gender, color or other 
reasons.”750 
Likewise, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights mentioned that 
“[i]ndirect discrimination occurs when a law, policy or programme does not appear to be 
discriminatory, but has a discriminatory effect when implemented”.751 In more detail, the 
European Court of Human Rights, quoting the definition offered by the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance752, acknowledged this notion, explained by some of its judges in 
the following manner: 
“[I]ndirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons of an ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
                                                     
750 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, par 103. 
751 Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16, para. 13. 
752 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, op. cit., 
para. 85. 
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persons, unless it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate, necessary and proportionate.”753 
When examining compliance with duties on the way in which victims of different actors 
are treated, the peremptory principle of equality is relevant for different reasons. First of all, even 
if the existence of differences concerning measures to respond to different violations does not 
seek to discriminate against some victims, it may still be discriminatory if reasonable distinctions 
that are necessary and proportional do not exist. Secondly, as was explained by the European 
Court of Human Rights in the Case of Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, it is possible to consider that 
in some cases indirect discrimination exists prima facie, placing the burden of proof on the 
authors of a measure, or is deemed to be present “without statistical evidence” when it is evident 
that a difference of treatment in respect of some victims exists, case in which its proportionality 
must be examined.754 
Concerning this, many human rights mechanisms treat victims quite differently, permitting 
only those affected by States to use them. This differential treatment is justified by some due to 
the scarcity of resources available to international bodies or by arguing that “only” States can be 
bound by human rights obligations. The latter argument is false, and the first is an objective 
criterion according to which the scarcity of international resources would make it necessary to 
choose some victims to be protected by certain mechanisms. Still, those victims that can resort to 
them should be chosen with reasonable criteria that grant effective protection to at least core 
rights and victims in serious cases. Additionally, limiting international remedies to victims of 
States will be contrary to human rights principles and foundations whenever this leaves them with 
no effective and accessible remedies of protection whatsoever or when this election expressly or 
implicitly denies the recognition of victimhood of those who cannot enjoy human rights due to 
non-state abuses, for the reasons studied in the previous chapters. 
Moreover, only allowing State conduct to be examined often impedes a fair or effective 
operation of even traditional mechanisms. For instance, some authors argue that the excessive 
state-centeredness of many judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms of human rights protection 
make it difficult to properly examine cases in which actors as international organizations 
participate in violations,755 and also that this can lead to artificial decisions or to the impossibility 
                                                     
753 Cf. Joint Party Dissenting Opinion of Judges Jungwiert, Vajić, Kovler, Gyulumyan, Jaeger, Myjer, Berro-Lefèvre 
and Vučinić to: European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, 
16 March 2010, para. 2. 
754 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, op. cit., 
paras. 153-155. 
755 Cf. José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 41-43; Nicolás Carrillo, “The Links between the Responsibility of international 
organizations and the Quest towards a More Reasonable and Humane International Legal System”, op. cit., at 448. 
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to fully protect victims due to the lack of jus standi of main or relevant offenders or because of the 
lack of accessory responsibility of States in some cases.756  
On the other hand, while sometimes it may be justified to limit the jus or locus standi of 
certain mechanisms to some victims if conditions are met, this assertion cannot be used to ignore 
that international legal mechanisms can certainly address non-state abuses directly, reason why 
distinctions of how victims are treated must thoroughly respect equality and non-discrimination.  
This is exemplified by the actions of International Criminal Tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court, which are international entities that supervise compliance with international 
criminal norms that frequently criminalize non-state violations of human rights, protecting them in 
this manner. Those criminal law strategies and norms are simply one of the multiple dimensions 
of the legal protection of human dignity, and different remedies may be found in them. 
As commented by the European Court of Human Rights, criminal norms and measures 
deter violations that sometimes are contrary to human rights and therefore protect those rights, 
even if private entities are the ones participating in a violation.757 Additionally, according to 
Santiago Villalpando, categories as that of crimes against humanity “became the cornerstone of 
the protection of human rights through international criminal law”758. These arguments confirm 
that international legal mechanisms of protection may directly respond to non-state abuses. To 
not be discriminatory, at least serious cases, criminal or not, that are similarly worrisome 
regardless of who participates in them, should always be so addressed. 
Certainly, in general terms international direct protection against non-state abuses has 
not been and cannot be limited to international criminal measures, the scope of which is limited. 
As examined before, in non-criminal scenarios international supervisory bodies have examined 
the conduct of a non-state actor from a human rights perspective, as in the cases of the UNMIK, 
the Elmi v. Australia case or in the case of N. v. Sweden. 
In sum, victims can be entitled to or permitted to request international legal protection 
from non-state abuses, which responds to the exigency that no individual is left utterly 
unprotected and has hope of legal protection. Additionally, every differential treatment of victims 
must be lawful and consistent with equality and non-discrimination, and therefore be reasonable, 
distinguish different situations, and be proportionate, which implies that distinctions pursue a 
                                                     
756 This problem is even more serious when a State is wrongfully acquitted of alleged breaches of humanitarian 
norms, as in my opinion happened in: European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Behrami and 
Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, Applications no. 71412/01 and 78166/01, 
Decision as to Admissibility, 2 May 2007, paras. 29, 121, 141, 149-152; Draft articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations, with commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, pp. 20-24 –especially paras. 8-10 regarding article 7- 
(where the notion of effective control is properly considered more proper than that of “ultimate control). 
757 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, op. cit., pars 218, 285. 
758 Cf. Santiago Villalpando, op. cit., at 398. 
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legitimate aim, such as for instance the protection of the victims of abuses of power or serious 
violations, without denying the recognition of other victims or precluding their protection, which 
must be given by alternative effective mechanisms.  
To my mind, this demands that domestic protection is always available and that (unlike 
what John H. Knox considers)759 all non-state violations are (either expressly or implicitly in light 
of legal foundations and principles) branded as unlawful under jus gentium from a substantive 
point of view. Additionally, in my opinion there are events in which international law must 
procedurally deal with non-state violations directly. They are serious violations, i.e. violations of 
peremptory law, systematic or massive violations, violations that amount to criminal offenses, or 
violations that are worrisome due to their effects, features, or other elements. Additionally, those 
violations in which offenders operate as authorities over victims, either formally or de facto, must 
prima facie be addressed through strong procedural mechanisms that can protect victims. Those 
strong mechanisms are domestic and sometimes international. 
Apart from all non-state violations necessarily being unlawful and considerations about 
indirect protection from them and direct protection by non-state authorities, there are events in 
which non-state international obligations and responsibilities must not only exist but be regulated 
in detail: violations committed in a transnational manner or by actors operating transnationally; 
violations against frequently or otherwise specially vulnerable individuals and rights; and 
violations by powerful actors that have a serious risk of impunity, are some of them, among other 
cases.  
Being legal obligations necessary to ensure that all violations are unlawful and responded 
to in different legal systems, non-state social responsibility is not a satisfactory replacement of 
legal responsibility, given its shortcomings concerning access to remedies and other elements 
that are relevant for the protection of victims, including how many of its initiatives are entirely 
defined by non-state actors and/or may not address all relevant issues.760 This does not mean 
that public legal responsibility of non-state entities is always effective or the only strategy needed 
to protect human rights. 
As argued before, completely denying any international legal protection (substantive or 
procedural) to some victims discriminates against them, at the very least indirectly, and is thus 
contrary to jus cogens. This demands interpretations that make law respect the equality of all 
victims or, if this is not possible, its modification. 
                                                     
759 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 18-30. 
760 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 52-53; Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., pp. 429-432; Joanne Bauer, “Does Human 
Rights Language Matter?”, CSRWire, 2013, available at: http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/850-does-human-rights-
language-matter (last checked: 17 May 2013). 
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About mechanisms of protection, it is also convenient to add that theyshould be designed 
taking into account the whole framework of global spaces761 of interaction between different 
actors, mechanisms and legal systems, to determine which mechanisms are needed and how 
they must complement others.  
In this regard, authors as Janne Nijman, Wolfgang Friedmann, Anna Badia Martí and Kofi 
Annan, among others, agree that in order to further global and common goals and protect victims 
of actors as transnational criminal groups, States must not act in isolation but cooperate with 
other States and actors, as international organizations or NGOs, legitimately taking advantage of 
opportunities offered by globalization, especially because some offenders take advantages of 
them.762 This is endorsed by theories of Global Public Goods and other legal studies, that indicate 
that some services and guarantees, including the protection of human rights, require the 
participation of multiple actors; and that joint-actions (related to normative, administrative, 
implementation and other issues) in which several actors participate are relevant and possible.763 
Likewise, public and private actors and normative systems must cooperate with others and must 
not operate alone in isolation for them to have chances of effectively protecting victims of abuses 
of non-state entities, that frequently operate in a global and transnational manner or otherwise act 
in ways that that allows them to avoid isolated controls.  
Since the protection of victims cannot be isolated, victims cannot be considered to only 
be able to seek domestic protection. This would amount to making them lack effective prospects 
of protection in multiple important cases, given the inability of States in some circumstances to 
                                                     
761 On global spaces of legal interaction, see Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative 
Law”, op. cit., pp. 24-25, 27, 30, 34; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in 
a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 15, 17-19, 28, 32, 34, 40, 45, 47. 
762 Cf. Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., pp. 133-134, 141-144; Kofi A. 
Annan, “Foreword”, op. cit., pp. iii-iv; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The 
right to adequate food (art. 11), E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 29; Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., pp. 334-338, 342-
343. 
763 Cf. Inge Kaul et al., “Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today?”, op. cit., pp. 4-6, 9-10, 16; Meghnad Desai, 
“Public Goods: A Historical Perspective”, in Inge Kaul et al. (eds.), Providing Global Public Goods, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, pp. 63-64, 66, 74; Inge Kaul et al., “How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods”, op. cit., pp. 
29, 44; Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza, “Advancing the Concept of Public Goods”, op. cit., pp. 83-86, 97-98, 100, 
106; Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit.; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 
2003, pp. 65-66; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-
State Actors: Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and Scope of Project and Legal Issues, The 
Hague Conference, 2010, pp. 8-17; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, Report: Preliminary 
issues for the ILA Conference in Rio de Janeiro, August 2008, 2008, pp. 2-3; Pierre Calame, op. cit., at 19-20. On the 
possibility of the participation of non-state entities in the promotion of the enjoyment of human rights, see also: 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, paras. 37, 42, 56; Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, The right to education (article 13 of the Covenant), 
E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999, paras. 4, 50; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 15, op. cit., paras. 27, 49, 50; Programme of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 2001, para. 104. On the need to check and complement non-
state initiatives and provision of goods required by the public, cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights, op. cit., A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 2. 
 
 
242
protect individuals no matter how hard they try, and because of the fact that offenders often 
escape the reach of domestic legal controls due to factors as: their excessive power –often 
possible due to globalization-, a transnational modus operandi that permits them to go abroad to 
flee from prosecution, the comparative weakness of States in relation to some groups and 
entities, or even to the chance of failure of domestic action, deliberate or not. This is why 
substantive and procedural international action is required (at least in the cases explored above, 
related to serious and other violations) to operate, in accordance to criteria of subsidiarity and 
complementarity. 
From the perspective of victims, when international law does not engage with non-state 
abuses in procedural terms, it must still brand them as contrary to human dignity, recognizing 
victims as such for them to have access to and claim from States and other authorities 
reparations and protection they are entitled to (including transnational litigation or extraterritorial 
jurisdiction).  
From the perspective of those authorities, they are under an obligation to protect victims 
even if they do not request this, and the recognition of non-state violations alerts them to act. By 
doing so, authorities fulfill a role of protecting international and common legal goods. After all, 
States and other actors can act as agents of the implementation and guarantee of international 
law, as recognized by Kelsen, Scelle or Cassese, among others.764 
 From the perspective of potential offenders, the identification of agents of violation as 
such, with the negative symbolic impact and exposure to sanctions this involves, is not to be 
underestimated, given its dissuasive character, which can enhance the protection of rights. All of 
the previous three perspectives must be taken into account when determining if legal protection 
treats all victims in accordance with their inherent equality. 
What I call the Rantsev paradox serves to illustrate this. In the Rantsev case, the 
European Court of Human Rights found that even though Cyprus, one of the respondent States, 
had breached procedural human rights duties incumbent upon it to protect the right to life, the 
death of a victim was caused by another entity and that therefore the State did not have to repair 
the material damages arising from this violation765 (I disagree with this consideration insofar as I 
hold that States that are responsible for breaching procedural duties have the duty to repair 
damages as well). 
                                                     
764 Cf. Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International 
Law”, op. cit., pp. 220-221, 225-231. 
765 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 234-235, 
241-242, 341. 
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Because of how events happened, the father of the deceased, who was the applicant, 
received no reparations for material damages caused by the death of his daughter, and yet 
domestic mechanisms proved to be ineffective,766 with the applicant having had no proper 
complete and integral reparation, to which he was entitled.767  
In that case, the State did not carry out investigations diligently but, even if it did, given 
the frequently transnational operational nature of the violations (trafficking of human beings),768 it 
could have been unable to secure reparations to the indirect victim. In both scenarios, the victim 
is not completely protected and repaired. This confirms that mere State responsibility of a 
vicarious nature, based on notions of due diligence or stricter obligations (arising out of risks 
created by the State, the vulnerability of a victim, or the guarantor position of the State), is a 
necessary but insufficient means of protecting victims from non-state violations, that must be 
complemented by other measures. A critical analysis also indicates that all those involved in a 
violation, even accomplices, must repair victims, especially when this is indispensable for the full 
and effective reparations victims are entitled to. 
The Rantsev paradox illustrates how domestic law alone cannot always fully protect 
victims of non-state violations, especially in a globalized, multi-actor and interdependent world,769 
due to factors as unwillingness or inability of States to protect.770 This is one of the reasons why 
international criminal tribunals and courts have been set up: to respond to internationally relevant 
crimes that attack the enjoyment of human rights given the possibility that they are not properly 
tackled domestically. As Antonio Cassese rightly said:  
“An international criminal tribunal may […] do justice where national jurisdictions are unable to do so 
and where victims would otherwise have no remedy.”771 
                                                     
766 Cf. Ibid. 
767 Cf. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Preamble and paras. 15-
18; Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, at 4; Commission on Human Rights, Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human righst and fundamental freedoms, Final report submitted by Mr. 
Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July 1993, paras. 19, 28, 30, 33, 48, 88, 90, 128. 
768 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, op. cit., pars 146-155, 
199, 272-289, in light of articles 3 and 4 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime.  
769 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State 
Actors, op. cit., at 4; Celestino del Arenal, op. cit., pp. 32-40, 62-66; Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, op. cit., pp. iii-iv; 
Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., at 319; Eric Suy, “New Players in International Relations”, in Gerard Kreijen et al. (eds.), 
State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford University Press, 2002, at 382; Gunther Teubner, op. cit., 
at 7. 
770 Cf. article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, that recognizes and addresses this reality. 
771 Cf. Antonio Cassese, “On the Current Trend towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 1998, at 9. 
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In consequence, absolute lack of international condemnation (at least implicitly) of non-
state violations goes against the equality of victims, and lack of international procedural reaction 
is also contrary to it regarding serious cases. Such omissions place disproportionate risks and 
burdens on victims, ignoring that the legitimacy of norms and actors depends on consistency with 
human dignity. As a result, even though resource difficulties and even extra-legal considerations 
may suggest that protection of some victims at the international level can be limited in some 
cases,772 that protection cannot be fully absent in substantive and sometimes procedural terms, 
and it must be guaranteed that alternative effective measures are always available, as required 
by human rights and jus cogens demands. 
In relation to the link between the protection of all victims and equality and non-
discrimination, Jessica Almqvist has considered that human rights norms tend to protect victims 
of State violations and ignore others, whereas counter-terrorism norms tend to benefit victims of 
terrorists and not so much victims of counter-terrorist measures (which is ironic, since those 
measures can and must be compatible with human rights).773 She convincingly argues that for the 
sake of the equality of all victims, these inconsistencies must be carefully examined and 
addressed.774 In my opinion, this is necessary to determine if they are discriminatory, in which 
case they must be modified to adjust law to peremptory demands. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, for its part, has also considered that the protection of victims 
against some non-state violations is intimately related to the principle of and right to equality and 
non-discrimination, as commented in its Report No. 80/11.775 
The cases examined by Almqvist illustrate the problems of distinctions in the treatment of 
victims in different branches or “parcels”, which may be exclusively concerned with protecting 
some victims, leading to disparaged and contradictory practices, which make the prospect of 
international protection, sometimes the only one left, highly dependent on having the “fortune” of 
being attacked by the entity against which protection is given in one branch. A unified vision 
centered on human dignity that counters fragmentation would be preferable. The cases examined 
by Almqvist also serve to highlight how different measures found in multiple regimes and 
branches should complement each other to promote and seek achieve the purpose of effectively 
                                                     
772 Cf. Avril McDonald, op. cit., at 276. 
773 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, 
22 October 2002, paras. 2-5; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, 
Judgment, 30 May 1999, para. 89. 
774 Cf. Jessica Almqvist, “Facing the Victims in the Global Fight against Terrorism”, FRIDE Working Paper 18, 2006, 
pp. 8-17. 
775 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, Case 
12.626, Merits Report No. 80/11, op. cit., paras. 118-120. 
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protecting human dignity in universal terms, eliminating gaps that can leave any victim 
unprotected. 
The underlying logic of the equal protection of all victims, that goes against discriminating 
some of them, is that all victims of similar violations must have at least an essential or minimum 
effective level of protection, the exactxa content of which depends on factors as seriousness or 
probability of protection in one level of governance or legal system. Additionally, every single 
violation must be at least recognized internationally and protected domestically, and non-state 
reactions against it permitted.  
This minimum includes: (1) the recognition of all victims and unlawfulness of non-state 
abuses; (2) measures to seek the cessation of an ongoing violation and non-repetition, which 
require contacting non-state actors involved in violations to be effective, especially because they 
must be prevented from behaving in this manner the future and must repair victims; and (3) 
measures to ensure that authorities and actors seek to prevent all violations and repair victims 
and sanction offenders when they occur. This requires involving non-state offenders, principal or 
accessory, in a direct or at least indirect manner, because otherwise reparations will never be 
complete and effective. For example, concerning the right to know the truth, only some non-state 
actors involved in an abuse may know some information about a violation, with States not being 
aware of it. 
Nonetheless, the requirement of universality in the dimension of protecting all victims is 
not limited to the factor of the State or non-state identity of actors against which protection must 
be given. In this fashion, for example, judges of the European Court of Human Rights have 
declared that protection must be given to victims under both civil and criminal proceedings, in the 
sense that defendants should not be able to rely on immunity to evade responsibility when the 
violation of peremptory norms is at stake in any of those proceedings, because otherwise victims 
would be left unprotected.776 Altogether, the exclusion of any victim from access to and the 
prospect of meaningful and effective protection, whatever her situation is, amounts to 
discrimination. 
The full protection of all victims largely benefits individuals and is required by victims. It 
helps victims not only in material but also in psychological and other ways, preventing that on top 
of their original suffering they feel abandoned by law. And, as said before, not protecting some 
victims may generate the phenomenon of competition between various victims that clash with 
                                                     
776 Cf. Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch Joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto 
and VajiĆ Furundzija to: European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 21 
November 2001, para. 4. 
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others to be the ones that receive reparations or symbolic and legal recognition,777 to which all 
are entitled, let it be said.  
Besides re-victimizing victims of non-state violations, not recognizing the violation of their 
rights and their suffering prevents actions that can be used when violations are identified from 
working, and perpetuates a status quo in which some victims do not have access to remedies 
available to “officially recognized” victims, embittering them and prompting disavowals or rejection 
of the legitimacy of human rights law, perceived as unfair and its interpreters as biased for not 
addressing their plight. To prevent this from happening, at least a minimum level of effective 
protection must be ensured, given in a way that respects the equality of all victims, as argued in 
this Chapter. 
International practice demonstrates how abhorrent discrimination is considered. The 
existence of vulnerable rights and persons explains why there are specialized norms and 
mechanisms that seek to protect certain dimensions of rights exposed to certain violations and 
vulnerable persons that are usually discriminated against. This includes specialized human rights 
protecting migrants and women, or specialized norms protecting individuals from racial 
discrimination, slavery, apartheid, or certain crimes, among others, that seek to bring about a 
situation of equality.  
For the international legal system to truly offer a complete non-discriminatory treatment, it 
must do what it exacts from other legal systems: it must not have norms or practices that incur in 
discriminatory treatments. Refusing to address all violations (measures beyond the recognition of 
all violations can often be subject to differential treatment) is contradictory and contrary to jus 
cogens, especially because it is recognized that peremptory law demands protection from non-
state discrimination and other violations by States, functional or de facto authorities and from 
other actors; and those with positions of authority must treat victims of its own agents and third 
parties in accordance with the principle of equality and non-discrimination. 
It is necessary to recognize that non-state entities can discriminate or engage in human 
rights abuses. Given the possibility of States or other authorities being unwilling or unable to 
properly deal with this problem, victims must be protected in effective ways, which must always 
include at least an international legal recognition of all violations and authorization and command 
to domestic authorities to protect victims from abuses that are internationally relevant due to the 
legal goods they impact on. As explained in this Chapter, certain violations must receive a more 
intense international protection for international norms to not discriminate against its victims. To 
insist on different treatments of victims that are disproportionate, as the refusal to recognize 
                                                     
777 Cf. Luc Huyse, op. cit., at 64. 
 
 
247
victims of non-state entities and the unlawfulness of non-state violations, is therefore 
unacceptable and outdated. 
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CHAPTER 4. FEATURES AND OPERATION OF A MULTI-LEVEL AND MULTI-ACTOR 
FRAMEWORK OF PROTECTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY FROM NON-STATE ABUSES 
 
4.1. Necessity and conditions of the creation of legal capacities of non-state actors 
required to protect human dignity 
Whether obligations or other legal capacities of non-state entities created in international 
law will be respected or taken into account by them is related to questions about the effectiveness 
of law. This explains why authors as Marth Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert have examined if 
those duties can be effective and modify the behavior of non-state actors.778 
Notwithstanding its relevance, it would be convenient to reformulate it. Rather than 
asking at the outset if those and other pertinent legal capacities of non-state entities will be 
effective, it ought to be asked first whether such capacities can be created, are pertinent, 
necessary, fair, legitimate and offer reasonable prospects of protection (i.e. their creation is a 
pertinent measure of protection).779  
If the answers are affirmative, then questions of the practical effectiveness are to be 
asked. In those events the importance of the capacity would have been established already, 
because they seek to address pressing legal and social problems and abuses of power (structural 
or on a case-by-case basis). Therefore, questions about effectiveness asked later should not be 
meant as suggesting the elimination or lack of creation of a capacity if it is not effective, but 
should seek to ascertain how to make them effectively contribute to the protection of human 
dignity. For instance, it can be asked if addressees will heed regulations or if persuasion or 
enforcement mechanics should be in place.  
That being said, the analysis of prospects of effectiveness and pertinence must 
necessarily be performed, lest simple distractions are not created. 
Certainly, capacities of non-state actors in this field must be designed to protect human 
dignity fully in a way that is not fallacious and simply permits actors to take advantage of their 
existence for propagandistic or partisan purposes. It is also important to recall how the protection 
of human dignity, which must be universal and respectful of the equality and non-conditional 
character of the inherent and inalienable worth of all human beings, demands defending 
individuals from all threats against their essential rights, be them State or non-state threats. 
                                                     
778 Cf. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, “Introduction: Non-State Actors: International Law’s Problematic Case”, 
in Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds.), Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law, Ashgate, 2010, at 2. 
779 Cf. Chapter 5, infra. I consider that the conditions on the legality of restrictions and suspensions of duties 
regarding human rights are applicable to the placement of obligations on non-state entities when they can affect their 
human or fundamental rights. 
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In connection with these ideas, it is useful to mention, as commented by Thomas Franck, 
that there are both (procedural) legitimacy and (substantive or material) fairness criteria with 
which to evaluate international law. He employed the term legitimacy to refer to the openness, 
adequacy and publicness of processes leading to legal decisions (lawmaking ones or otherwise, 
in my opinion), and considers that substantive fairness alludes to the material justice of a norm 
(which he analyzes in terms of redistribution, considering that naturalistic or dogmatic assertions 
of justice may be problematic, idea with which I disagree because law can have substantive 
problems unrelated to redistribution).780 It is certainly convenient to distinguish between the 
procedural and the correctness of the content of a norm from the perspective of meta-legal 
considerations and also from a legal standpoint (taking into account publicness, rule of law, and 
human rights considerations, at the very least).781 
In light of the distinction between procedural and material justice, those norms and 
practices according to which only States can violate international law and human rights are both 
illegitimate and unfair: they disempower individuals who could otherwise invoke international 
norms to claim protection; discriminate against some victims; fail to reflect reality and to address 
its problems and the real needs of individuals, facilitating the impunity of violations against it; 
foster partisanship and strategic manipulations of the human rights discourse for strategic 
purposes (for instance, when those that oppose a State condemn it but refuse to admit that those 
opposing it can also violate human rights, which entails double standards); and lead to normative, 
factual and axiological contradictions due to the state-centeredness of that discourse, that cannot 
be reconciled with the universalist foundations and values of human rights and guarantees.  
Therefore, the dignity of all human beings must be protected from all potential abuses (at 
the lawmaking and precautionary levels) and from all entities that violate norms and principles 
founded upon it (at the ex post facto implementation level). Concerning procedural legitimacy, 
individuals as stakeholders, and non-state entities interested in the protection of dignity, must 
have a say in the matter and some input and participation in the human rights lawmaking and 
implementation mechanisms; and those who voice for equal protection should not be excluded. 
Moreover, it is necessary to regulate the conduct of non-state entities, which may be 
powerful or influential enough to merit this attention in general terms,782 whereas other actors not 
so powerful or that do not violate human rights frequently must also have duties and legal 
                                                     
780 Cf. Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, op. cit., pp. 17-18. 
781 Cf. Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law”, op. cit., pp. 31-33; Janne E. Nijman, 
“Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal personality”, op. 
cit., pp. 10-11, 13-16. 
782 Cf. Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 3-4, 9-19, 40. 
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capacities so as to protect human dignity from their potential abuses, which affect international 
legal goods. This must be done in accordance with the principle of legality and other conditions.  
Global governance and global administrative law theories, along with some human rights 
and international legal scholars, have defended the necessity of regulating relevant non-state 
conduct.783 For instance, Elena Pariotti mentions how attention paid to the protection of human 
rights vis-à-vis non-state threats that takes into account the contribution of non-state entities has 
shifted focus from formality and government (which is just one of the possible offenders or 
promoters of those rights) to governance, taking into account new global realities.784 
It must be added that failing to regulate relevant non-state behavior directly or (in some 
cases) at least indirectly is not only contrary to legal principles but may also encourage those 
misdeeds and make it difficult to protect legal interests and properly tackle real problems.785 It is 
necessary to take account, for instance, that States can be manipulated by non-state actors, 
perpetrate abuses in conjunction with them, or be weaker than them.786 
Just as the principle of equality and non-discrimination may permit a reinforced protection 
of some victims, not all possible violations attributable to non-state actors will addressed by 
express specialized obligations and procedural burdens that complement their general duties 
(discussed in Chapter 6). Indeed, according to John Knox, the horizontal protection of human 
rights can have different levels of international legal involvement with varying intensity: the first 
level encompasses general State obligations to prevent and respond to non-state threats to 
human dignity; the second one comprises international obligations and mechanisms on the 
subject with a more detailed content. Thirdly, there may be direct international obligations or legal 
burdens of non-state actors; and the most intense level deals with fora and mechanisms that 
permit a direct international examination of non-state conduct.787 In my opinion, there is a parallel 
or fifth dimension, related to promotion and protection activities carried out by non-state actors, 
which must be permitted, that complements the previous mechanisms and obligations.  
The role of local authorities in the protection of individuals from all abuses is important 
not only because of possible resource constraints in the international level, but also because of 
                                                     
783 Ibid. 
784 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 96, 105. 
785 Analyze in light of: Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 37; Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, “Introduction: Non-State 
Actors: International Law’s Problematic Case”, op. cit., at 3; Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international 
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786 Cf. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, “Introduction: Non-State Actors: International Law’s Problematic Case”, 
op. cit., at 3; Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126; Alexandra Gatto, supra, at 423; August Reinisch, op. cit., 
pp. 54, 74-75. 
787 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 27-31. 
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the immediacy of their actions and their being in principle better suited to examine complaints due 
to their proximity with cases, victims and offenders.788  
However, it is necessary that domestic action is complemented by international and 
transnational mechanisms, because those authorities or their legal systems may ignore or be 
unable to live up to the demands of global and international legal values and guarantees, despite 
the need to give a real hope of effective protection to victims even if domestic authorities are 
negligent or cannot respond to abuses (being hopelessness and despair enemies of peace and 
dignity).789 In sum, domestic action can represent global interests,790 but complementary 
alternative effective legal protection must be available (how it is provided may differ in some 
cases), as required by the human right to an effective remedy.791 
This reasoning makes it necessary to explore when direct international non-state 
obligations (the fourth or more intense level of horizontal protection) must exist and complement 
other strategies. 
Just as they can affect interests of the world community for better or worse and this 
makes them relevant actors,792 non-state entities can impact on the protection of human dignity in 
a positive or negative manner. Being their violations legally relevant, their contribution to the 
protection of dignity benefits an essential legal good and is thus equally relevant.  
That relevance is due to the fact that the respect and protection of human dignity is a 
central international legal goal that must determine the work and content of international law. This 
makes it necessary for international law to prevent all violations through education, deterrence 
and enforcement, among others, and for all victims to be repaired. Since no victim can be 
ignored, which would be illegitimate and unjust, leading to loss of support, that law cannot permit 
its selective use or its being a tool to further partisan, ideological, theoretical or political ends of 
some groups in ways that are detrimental to some victims.793 Therefore, theoretical constructions 
                                                     
788 Cf. Thomas Buergenthal, “The Evolving International Human Rights System”, op. cit., at 806; August Reinisch, op. 
cit., pp. 53-54; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., paras. 8, 13-15. 
789 Cf. Statement by Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian National Authority, before the United Nations 
General Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, 23 September 2011 (http://gadebate.un.org/66/palestine; 
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/PS_en.pdf, both last checked on 30/01/2012). 
790 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through 
Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 21, 35, 45. 
791 Cf. articles 2.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 25 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, or 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
792 Cf. Math Noortmann, “The Quest for Unity in Empirical and Conceptual Complexity”, in Bas Arts et al. (eds.), Non-
State Actors in International Relations, Ashgate Publ., 2001, pp. 301-302. 
793 Cf. Peer Stolle and Tobias Singelnstein, “On the Aims and Actual Consequences of International Prosecution of 
Human Rights Crimes”, in Wolfgang Kaleck et al. (Eds.), International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes, 
Springer, 2007, pp. 46-50; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., 
pp. 201-202; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 
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must not prevent the design of mechanisms to protect victims in the level of intensity of horizontal 
protection that is necessary for that protection to be effective. 
Certainly, the essential and non-conditional inherent worth of human beings must be 
protected effectively, as has been manifested in doctrine and international case law,794 and that 
unless it is protected from all threats, it will be at least partly ineffective and incomplete.  
However, while all victims must be protected in an effective way that can achieve the 
purposes of the protection of their dignity, this does not necessarily mean that all victims are to be 
treated in an identical manner because, as explained in Chapter 3, differential treatments that are 
reasonable and proportional, and thus respectful of equality, can be employed.  
For instance, there can be some specific differential treatments between those affected 
by violations with a serious nature and others, provided that the latter are not ignored. Such a 
distinction has been made in some soft law instruments and international decisions. This idea can 
be inferred from the title of the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (emphasis added), and was handled by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in the Barrios Altos case, in which it considered that: 
“This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of 
measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent 
the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations such as 
torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of them prohibited 
because they violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights law”795 
(emphasis added). 
After mentioning in general terms that self-amnesties are incompatible with human rights 
law, the Court argues that those measures are contrary to the legal consequences of serious 
human rights violations. That passage should be interpreted in a way that is not limited to self-
amnesties and covers all serious violations. This interpretation has been confirmed by the Inter-
American Court itself, which has endorsed the viewpoint that serious violations of human rights 
be treated in ways that respond to their seriousness even when no self-amnesties are involved.796 
Note that distinction with the treatment of other violations is related to the nature of 
violations and not to their existence or to differences regarding actors participating in them. Yet, 
this last difference admits some lawful differential treatments, except when some violations, as 
serious ones, are involved. Just as it has been considered in international human rights case law 
                                                     
794 Cf. Carlos Villán Durán, op. cit., pp. 89-91; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Las Palmeras v. 
Colombia, Judgment of Merits, 6 December 2001, paras. 58-60. 
795 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, 14 March 2001, para. 41. 
796 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, Judgment, 24 February 2011, paras. 183, 
194, 195, 198-199, 202, 205-206, 209-214, 225-229 (“The incompatibility with the Convention includes amnesties of 
serious human rights violations and is not limited to those which are denominated, ‘self-amnesties’”). 
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that in some events different treatments are suspicious and their lawfulness must be assessed 
with a more stringent examination,797 all different treatments of human rights victims must be 
thoroughly evaluated. 
Therefore, serious or gross violations of human dignity that are not properly examined 
and addressed in the national level must receive complementary international action, in 
accordance with the criterion of subsidiarity and the need to offer a “final [or another] hope” to 
potential or actual victims. Simultaneously, non-state actors must be permitted to contribute to the 
protection of victims harmed by those (and all other) violations, according to the criterion of 
complementary non-state actions and the principle of effectiveness interpreted in the light of the 
pro homine principle. After all, an effective protection system must encompass multiple levels, 
strategies and actors.  
In consequence, all victims should have access to preventive and ex post facto 
mechanisms of protection in the international level when they are victims of serious violations of 
human rights and guarantees. The exact content and dynamics of that international action can 
vary taking into account available resources, effectiveness and appropriateness of the responses 
to violations. Differential treatments can thus exist if they are lawful and are international. 
That being said, it is necessary to explore which violations can be considered as serious. 
a) Firstly, as can be deduced from the violations mentioned in the passage of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights cited above, violations of peremptory law must be considered to 
be serious. Note how the Court chose the expression “non-derogable rights”. This coincides with 
the wording of article 53 of the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties concluded by 
States and concluded by international organizations, which define jus cogens as comprising 
norms “from which no derogation is permitted”, wording that expresses the impossibility of lawful 
exceptions to their absolute effectiveness. 
An interesting question ensues: if one reads article 40 of the articles of the International 
Law Commission on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, one may get 
the (to my mind, mistaken) impression that for a violation to amount to a serious one, it must not 
only violate peremptory law but also be gross or systematic, due to the fact that the second 
paragraph of the aforementioned article reads as follows:  
“A breach of [an obligation arising under a peremptory norm] is serious if it involves a gross or 
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.” 
                                                     
797 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Oršuš and other v. Croatia, Judgment, op. cit., 
para. 149. 
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To my mind, the previous definition is not applicable in regard to human rights violations 
generally. Human rights norms and considerations operate as a lex specialis in the field 
concerning primary and secondary rules. The fact that human rights case law considers that a 
violation of peremptory law muse be regarded as serious, without mentioning additional 
conditions, thus implies in my opinion that the other elements handled in the ILC articles are not 
applicable. 
In fact, the massive or systematic character of a violation of any human right has been 
taken into account in human rights practice and case law for different purposes –e.g. concerning 
standards of proof798 or features of crimes, as mentioned in article 7 of the Statute of the ICC 
concerning features of crimes against humanity- and, as will be said below, is an independent 
cause of serious violations. Moreover, the ILC mentioned that the lex specialis character of the 
humanitarian corpus juris makes it prevail over more general regulations when they differ.799 
Examples of peremptory human rights lato sensu norms, the violation of which is thus 
automatically serious, include the prohibitions of torture, enforced disappearance and 
discrimination. Additionally, common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibits some 
violations of human dignity “at any time”, thus admitting no exceptions whatsoever, reason why in 
my opinion they protect human rights and also have a peremptory character. 
b) Secondly, I consider that the category of serious violations also encompasses those 
that are committed in the context of massive or systematic violations. As mentioned above, these 
features make violations serious even if they are not contrary to jus cogens and the other way 
around. 
For instance, without alluding to jus cogens, in the Velásquez-Rodríguez Case the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights declared that it “cannot ignore the special seriousness of finding 
that a State […] has carried out or has tolerated a practice of disappearances” (emphasis added).  
Similarly, in article 7 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court mentions that 
some violations of human dignity amount to crimes against humanity “when committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack”. Pursuant to that article, the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the ICC mention 
that “crimes against humanity as defined in article 7 are among the most serious crimes of 
                                                     
798 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. 
cit., para. 188. 
799 See articles 55 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and 64 of the 
ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations adopted in 2011 (A/66/10); International Law 
Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 2006, paras. 5-9, 11-14.  
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concern to the international community as a whole” (emphasis added), confirming that massive or 
systematic violations of human rights can be regarded as serious. 
c) Thirdly, given their appalling nature and their reproachfulness, international crimes 
contrary to human dignity must be considered to seriously violate it. In this sense, for instance, 
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law mention that there are “gross violations of international human rights law and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law [that] constitut[e] crimes under international 
law”.  
Concerning this, it is convenient to consider that criminal law can protect humanitarian 
legal values and interests protected by norms of other branches of international law, such as e.g. 
human rights, humanitarian law, or refugee law. 
An international crime does not necessarily have to be committed in the context of 
systematic violations for it to be considered as such. Nothing requires this in general terms, and 
the content of article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC constitutes a choice concerning some 
crimes (crimes against humanity under the Statute). This idea seems to be confirmed by the 
wording of article 8 of the Statute, insofar as it lists war crimes and declares that the International 
Criminal Court has jurisdiction in respect of them “in particular [but not exclusively] when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.” 
According to this, the substantive consideration that a conduct is criminal and the procedural 
possibility that the ICC can examine it are distinguished. Moreover, the ICC can have jurisdiction 
even over non-systematic war crimes. 
As a result, international crimes that violate dignity are serious violations of human rights 
or guarantees. In consequence, their victims require special and reinforced protection. This is 
required by the criterion of the special protection of persons in a vulnerable position,800 regardless 
of to whom or to what entity threats can be attributed. The fact that some authors consider that 
international crimes may protect peremptory human rights or humanitarian norms does not 
detract from their being an independent category of serious violations of human dignity (their 
independent existence is important, for instance if someone challenges the assertion that a given 
crime violates peremptory law). 
d) Fourthly, even when a given violation does not have the features presented in the 
previous three categories, it can be a serious violation if it seriously prevents the enjoyment of 
                                                     
800 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, Judgment, 30 November 
2010, paras. 41, 45-46, 50. 
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human rights to a large extent, if it affects essential humanitarian interests, if it is implicitly or 
expressly considered as serious by the sources of law or in the protection framework, or if it can 
be considered that it has that character inherently due to its dynamic and effects. 
Concerning the express or (normatively) implied indication that a violation of human 
rights and guarantees is serious, participants in legal processes, lawmakers or law-enforcers, all 
of whom are relevant,801 may pinpoint or declare that some factual or normative characteristics 
indicate that a breach is serious. For instance, it can be thought that the Geneva Conventions on 
International Humanitarian Law and their Protocols explicitly mention that some violations –grave 
breaches or serious violations- must be considered to be gross. This is seen in articles 146 and 
147 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; 13, 
129 and 130 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; or 11.4, 85 
and 86 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1).  
Altogether, given the values affected by serious violations, and the need of enhanced 
protection of their victims, the logic and the purposes of humanitarian norms require their 
recognition, whether they are expressly or implicitly serious. That seriousness may be due to the 
way in which they are carried out, the legal goods (interests and values) affected, or other 
aspects. That some violations are serious is confirmed in the Preamble of the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, that 
mentions that there are: 
“[G]ross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which, by their very grave nature, constitute an affront to human dignity” (emphasis 
added). 
The previous consideration seems to point out that some violations are inherently grave 
given the way in which they affront human dignity.  
Classifications of violations concerning their concern have been made in other contexts. 
For instance, in the European human rights systems it is considered that there are violations that 
merit ordinary supervision and some that require an enhanced supervision by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe.802 In any case, it must be said that all or at least most 
                                                     
801 On those processes and the participation of non-state entities as lawmakers and law-takers, cf. Math Noortmann 
and Cedric Ryngaert, “Introduction: Non-State Actors: International Law’s Problematic Case”, op. cit., pp. 1, 3; Myres 
S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, “The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order”, op. cit., 
pp. 9-10; Myres S. McDougal, “Some basic theoretical concepts about international law: a policy-oriented framework 
of inquiry”, op. cit., pp. 341-342, 345-346. 
802 Cf. Council of Europe, “Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: First meeting of the Committee of 
ministers of the Council of Europe to supervise their execution”, 8 March 2011, available at: 
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violations are serious for victims, which does not detract from the convenience of distinctions 
about the level of seriousness, which has practical purposes, such as the permissibility of 
amnesties or the need of their being addressed by international action no matter who participates 
in them. 
Additionally, I consider that there must be a presumption that non-state actors have an 
international obligation to not commit serious violations. Given their seriousness, their impunity 
must be especially prevented, and victims must receive an intensified protection even if domestic 
action fails. This means that victims have a correlative right to international protection from those 
violations. If this is not recognized, the effectiveness of the rights of victims would be precluded 
by the legal system, and its norms would be inconsistent with its principles. 
Because of the pro homine principle, found in international human rights law, which 
requires choosing the interpretations and norms that most favor individuals, if a legal system or 
branch that is pertinent in a case considers a violation to be serious and others do not, the 
violation or abuse is to be considered as a grave one. 
Based on the previous considerations, it can be concluded that serious breaches of 
human dignity must be addressed by international action, and that everyone who can commit 
them has a duty to refrain from doing so (to prevent potential offenders from eluding domestic 
controls). This is because serious violations are contrary to essential interests and legal goods of 
the world community in such a way that they must be the object of special attention.  
Nevertheless, apart from the procedural implications of the recognition of serious 
violations, in my opinion it is especially necessary to consider every violation of human dignity as 
unlawful under international law in substantive terms, whoever commits them: to ensure that 
authorities and actors are authorized (and sometimes obliged) to tackle them; that victims are 
entitled to protection even if domestic law fails to recognize it (requiring it to change in such a 
case); and also that the symbolic and expressive functions of law brand those violations as 
unlawful. This is no irrelevant thing. For instance, some domestic actions may depend on 
identifying a conduct as contrary to substantive international law (as may happen with the ATS). 
On the other hand, the parallel cooperation of non-state actors to protect victims and 
shame or bring offenders to justice is to be always permitted in relation to all violations. In other 
words: the fourth level of Knox’s pyramid of international involvement in horizontal human rights 
                                                                                                                                                            
https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=PR195(2011)&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=F5
CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE; http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/enhanced-
supervision-by-committee-of.html (last checked: 01/02/2012), where two tracks for the supervision of the execution of 
judgments issued by the European Court of Human Rights are introduced: a standard an an enhanced supervision. 
The latter includes cases “meriting priority attention”, such as those involving urgently needed measures of 
protection, structural or complex problems, or other special circumstances.  
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protection must be present whenever there are potential or actual serious violations of human 
dignity, and the first three and the fifth level of complementary measures, related to the dimension 
of non-state contribution, must always be possible. This is depicted in figures 3 and 5, infra.  
As argued in this section, the possibility of procedural international legal involvement in 
serious violations is necessary, because they attack essential legal interests of the world 
community and are contrary to the inherent worth of individuals in a shocking way. For this 
reason, given how human dignity is and must be at the center of law, which has as one of its 
essential purposes its respect and promotion, no additional requirements are necessary for those 
violations to have an intense international response.  
The necessary procedural international legal response to serious violations is related to 
other considerations that are relevant for other violations as well: that it is unsustainable to hold 
that the protection and respect of human rights and guarantees are exclusively domestic affairs, 
given the interests of the world legal community in their protection803 (being this community 
broader and more inclusive than an international one);804 and the idea that threats against human 
dignity can also endanger the integrity of other global legal goods, such as peace and security,805 
even if the effects of violations that materialize them are local. Indeed, serious violations have 
international or, more precisely, global relevance, affecting global legal interests and goods and 
beings whose relations are not limited to links with a State. 
It is convenient to repeat that, while a procedurally intense international response to 
serious violations is required and non-negotiable, its exact content may vary if this is not 
discriminatory, and so alternative effective mechanisms of an equivalent level of protection806 
                                                     
803 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., pp. 56-66; Christian Tomuschat, Human 
Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, (2 edn.), Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 269-270; Anne Peters, 
“Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty”, op. cit., at 543; Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 254-257; United Nations, A 
more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
A/59/565, para. 200. 
804 Note how the fact that interactions lead to subtle and unofficial exchanges that help to transform international law, 
and that a myriad of actors is affected by this law and is interested in its content and implementation, justifies having 
this broad conception. From a legal standpoint, even traditionalists acknowledge the role and importance of 
international organizations. Some hold that States have yet a quasi-monopoly on the formation of essential rules -
peremptory ones-, although the input and interest of other participants concerning them is undeniable. It can be 
considered that the expression international community of States merely stresses the way in which international law 
is traditionally and formally created, whereas the expression international community can encompass a broader set 
of actors, although its wording (international) is misleading and ought to be replaced by another such as world or 
global community (being it also important to call international law jus gentium). This is one of the possible 
interpretations of: International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, Paragraph (18) of the Commentary to Article 25. 
805 Cf. Stephan Hobe, op. cit., pp. 121-122; Emma McClean, “The dilemma of intervention: Human Rights and the UN 
Security Council”, in Marco Odello and Sofia Cavandoli (eds.), Emerging Areas of Human Rights in the 21st Century: 
The role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Routledge, 2011, pp. 24, 27, 30-34, 37-39; Anne Peters, 
“Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty”, op. cit., pp. 538-540. 
806 Cf. The European Court of Human Rights has resorted to the notion of equivalent levels of protection when 
deciding whether a State that has transferred capacities to other entities has made sure that human rights are 
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different from express international action with a detailed content and subjection to adjudicatory 
procedures are admissible as long as they have an international dimension and equivalent 
effectiveness.  
Additionally, nothing prevents non-serious violations from also being addressed by 
intense procedural international legal involvement (all must be internationally unlawful). 
Sometimes this may be recommended, as when victims cannot find justice and protection in other 
levels of governance and violations, while not serious in the sense described above, are grave or 
cause of particular concern for different reasons, since the four (non-exhaustive) examples of 
grave violations mentioned in this discussion pretend after all to cover a vague legal notion, that 
acknowledges that other violations may be serious to their victims. 
Undeniably, the scarcity of resources available in the international plane, the absence of 
effective cooperation, the importance of offering States and authorities the opportunity to address 
threats in the first place, and the closeness of some authorities with elements of violations 
(evidence, etc.), are factors that not only make it advisable that national remedies against non-
state violations be prior to international involvement, as happens with serious violations, but also 
makes it advisable to not only permit but also request complementary non-state promotion.  
Yet, unless it is decided otherwise in legal terms, generally the fourth level of intensity of 
international legal involvement (direct international procedural action) would not be mandatory 
concerning “non-serious” violations. This helps to prevent congestion of international procedures, 
problem that some international authorities suffer from.807 However, if needed or advisable, those 
mechanisms can also be used and solutions to the aforementioned problem must be found.  
Concerning these ideas, I think that the existence of direct international obligations of all potential 
agents of violation of human dignity is justified, because it is just a substantive engagement that 
spends no resources (treaties are but one possible source of those duties) and has the 
advantage of having expressive functions and of supporting or founding domestic or other action. 
                                                                                                                                                            
protected by the latter. I borrow that expression but differ with its use in this context, especially because I consider 
that the respect of human rights must always be thoroughly examined, and thus presumptions of that respect are 
dangerous, being therefore a proof of equivalence necessary and not assumptions that must be rebutted, placing a 
burden that is perhaps sometimes excessive on the shoulders of applicants and victims. On the concept as used by 
the ECHR, see European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Behrami and Behrami v. France and 
Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, Applications no. 71412/01 and 78166/01, Decision as to Admissibility, op. 
cit., para. 145; European Court of Human Rights, Press Unit, Factsheet on Case law concerning the European 
Union, 2010, pp. 2-3. 
807 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 46; Alicia Cebada Romero and Rainer Nickel, “El 
Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos en una Europa asimétrica: ¿Hacia el pluralismo constitucional?”, in Pablo 
Antonio Fernández Sánchez (ed.), La obra jurídica del Consejo de Europa (en conmemoración del 60 aniversario del 
Consejo de Europa), Ediciones Gandulfo, 2010, pp. 1-2, 31, available at: http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/l_Personal/wiss_Ass/nickel/Publikationen/Cebada_y_Nickel_ECHR_and_constitutional_pluralism_Sevilla
_final.pdf (last checked: 01/02/2012). 
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For those who do not agree with the implied existence of some of those international non-state 
obligations (see Chapter 6, infra), I would answer that, at the very least, they should be created 
de lege ferenda.  
The following graphic illustrates the preceding ideas on the international protection of 
human dignity from non-state actors (i.e. horizontal protection), based mostly on the remarkable 
study of John H. Knox, with some adjustments of my own: 
 
 
Figure 3: Levels of international involvement in the horizontal protection of human dignity 
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or sometimes even direct international protection to its victims. Apart from cases of direct 
supervision of non-state conduct, other possibilities of intense control will be mentioned below. 
First, the principle of non-refoulement can have a horizontal dimension. Concerning this, 
for instance, the Committee Against Torture has accepted that claimants can request a State to 
refrain from expelling them to places where State control is ineffective and non-state entities with 
power or control over individuals can commit violations that amount to torture, inhuman, cruel or 
degrading treatment as understood in the treaty it supervises (the Convention Against Torture),808 
whose definition of those violations is narrower that the one found in general human rights law. 
Needless to say, agents of the territorial State, no matter how weak, still have duties of protection 
and should behave diligently, although those are obligations of means.809 
Thus, the application of the non-refoulement principle can be used to protect individuals 
from non-state threats, even under a Convention that is more State-centric in its definition of a 
violation that other human rights treaties. That protection, which tends to be granted under some 
circumstances,810 is direct concerning its effects and the evaluation of non-state conduct (in the 
end, it protects individuals from non-state threats), albeit the focus is on State duties, and thereby 
actions are brought procedurally against the State. Thus, this mechanism is indirect against 
threats of non-state entities in procedural terms, but recognizes that non-state actors can commit 
human rights violations. 
Other bodies, as the European Court of Human Rights, have also granted protection in 
the dimension just explained even when it is completely private entities as individuals (such as 
relatives of a potential victim) who can de facto control or have power over someone and likely 
injure her.811 
The previous examples shows that the boundaries between the levels of the framework 
of international horizontal human rights protection are often blurred, because even though in this 
case States have a duty to protect individuals from non-state violations, that corresponds to a low 
level of intensity of international engagement with non-state actors, which is indirect, supervision 
                                                     
808 Cf. Committee Against Torture, Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, op. cit., paras. 6.4-7. 
809 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 79-82; Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., at 339; Norms on the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003, para. 1. 
810 Cf. Regrettably, some decisions have denied protection to victims of non-state entities alleging limitations of the 
supervised treaties with interpretations that in my opinion, sometimes, are questionable. Cf. Redress, “Not only the 
State: Torture by non-State Actors: Towards Enhanced Protection, Accountability and Effective Remedies”, op. cit., 
pp. 7, 17-18, 22-23, 30. 
811 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of N. v. Sweden, Application no. 23505/09, Judgment, 20 July 2010, 
para. 62. 
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of that duty entails the evaluation, recognition and direct prevention of non-state threats,812 with 
the aim of prohibiting an authority from exposing someone to them.  
Moreover, the identification of non-state threats permits third States to protect individuals 
(e.g. invoking the aut dedere aut judicare/aut punire principle or extraterritorial protection of 
human rights), in which case they can protect interests of the world community. Their action is not 
always mandatory, except (in my opinion) in some cases, such as when States create risks of 
non-state violations taking place abroad. Given the internationally unlawful character of non-state 
violations of human dignity and the international legal interests affected, States are permitted 
(and sometimes required) to act in this way, even by virtue of norms on transnational or universal 
jurisdiction, against actors that operate and are located abroad.813  
In my opinion, this presupposes an acceptance of the idea that non-state actors have 
implicit duties as potential offenders. 
Due to elements such as the fact that in practice many legal mechanisms have features 
that correspond to the description of different levels of international engagement with non-state 
conduct, described above, and that non-state contribution must be always permitted in relation to 
all of those levels, an analysis that focuses on the legal goods protected –human dignity in our 
case-, must accept that mechanisms found in different normative systems and contexts (private 
or public) form part of the same framework.  
This was hinted by a President of the European Court of Human Rights, who asked non-
state entities (applicants) and domestic authorities to cooperate with the (European) international 
level of protection of human rights for the latter to be effective and able to achieve its goals.814 
This constitutes and admission that in practice initiatives and actions of multiple actors and levels 
of governance share legal goods and can belong to one same framework of protection of human 
dignity.  
                                                     
812 Cf. Ibid.; Redress, “Not only the State: Torture by non-State Actors: Towards Enhanced Protection, Accountability 
and Effective Remedies”, op. cit., pp. 16-20. 
813 Cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 14, 19, 27; Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, op. cit., 
pp. 9-10; articles 5, 7 and 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 146 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, or 129 of 
the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, among others; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., 
Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., at 824. Furthermore, cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case 
of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, 31 January 2006, para. 126; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., 
Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 91-93, 821-822. 
814 Cf. Statement issued by the President of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Requests for Interim 
Measures (Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court), available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B76DC4F5-5A09-
472B-802C-07B4150BF36D/0/20110211_ART_39_Statement_EN.pdf (last checked: 02/02/2012), where it is 
mentioned that “For the Court to be able effectively to  perform its proper role in this area both Governments and 
applicants must co-operate fully with the Court.” 
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Certainly, different normative systems and branches, actors and authorities may 
contribute not only to protect but also to shape the protection of common legal goods that operate 
as lowest common denominators, including legal goods related to human dignity. This is crucial, 
because without cooperation of norms and actors in a common legal space of interaction, actions 
to promote legal goods are usually ineffective in a global context when global actors threaten 
them. 
This also echoes the idea that national authorities can and must protect international law 
for it to be effective in practice and achieve its full potential. What is more: apart from protecting 
interests of a different legal system, those and other actors can also protect normative contents 
shared by legal systems, including their domestic ones.  
This shared normative content can be created and stimulated through cooperation, 
internalization of legal interests, similar interpretations and creation of norms by authorities and 
other actors,815 especially when they protect and promote the same interests, which become 
global with the interaction of those activities, entities and norms in a shared legal space.  
In relation to the international legal system, the promotion of global human legal goods 
implies creating burdens, obligations and other legal capacities of non-state entities. This is 
necessary because their international character helps to prevent impunity and counter the 
deficiency of domestic measures, caused by: i) the weakness or inability of States to control non-
state actors due to their power or States limitations; or the ii) priority attached to other interests by 
State and other authorities, for example to maximize profit and investment even if this implies 
attracting investors with relaxed standards and supervision or with lack of domestic duties,816 
among others. 
Countering this, international capacities of non-state entities that highlight their 
responsibilities can be invoked by others to demand protection from State authorities or to 
empower pressure against threats and their condemnation or extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
Indeed, foreign States may be entitled to protect international human rights norms thanks 
to the existence of international substantive duties and burdens of non-state actors. For instance, 
according to the ideas of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed in 
the case of Boimah Flomo, et al. versus Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, substantive legal 
considerations differ from procedural ones and international law may create obligations of non-
                                                     
815 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli and Carlos Espósito, op. cit., pp. 52, 57, 62, 64-65, 67-71; Andrea Bianchi, 
“Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 183-204. 
816 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, at 15 (where the example of the difference between “countries that have and enforce 
laws against child labor” and those in which it is condoned is offered). 
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state entities, the breach of which can be examined by national authorities whose legal systems 
allow them to supervise breaches of international law. In the words of the Court of Appeals: 
“‘Prosecutorial responses to international crimes have occurred at both the national and international 
levels’ […] [If an entity has not been prosecuted for violating international law] [t]hat doesn’t mean 
that [it is] exempt from that law […] [There is a] distinction between a principle of that law, which is a 
matter of substance, and the means of enforcing it, which is a matter of procedure or remedy […] 
International law imposes substantive obligations and the individual nations decide how to enforce 
them [...] [There are] treaties that explicitly authorize national variation in methods of enforcement, 
allowing civil and administrative remedies as alternatives to criminal liability if the imposition of such 
liability would be inconsistent with domestic law.”817 
Logically, in case substantive duties and burdens of non-state actors are reinforced by 
international mechanisms that supervise compliance with then, domestic remedies should be 
exhausted before the former can operate, as long as domestic remedies are accessible, effective 
and exist and State action is diligent.818 Simultaneous non-state cooperation that seeks to 
promote compliance with capacities that seek to protect human dignity should always be 
permitted, as argued before.  
In turn, action undertaken by States that are not obliged to protect and seek to provide 
extraterritorial protection of victims sometimes operates according to considerations of forum non 
conveniens, comity or the presence of some link with the accused or accusation;819 and can be 
based on the principle aut dedere aut judicare/punire, that imposes some duties to protect. 
Certain of the prior elements and how they are used in practice may vary from country to country 
and be modified through legislative and other initiatives.820 In this regard, for example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit considered that the Alien Tort Statute permits to protect victims 
from non-state violations of jus gentium saying: 
“[There are] two arguments by the defendant against liability that we reject. The first is that plaintiffs 
must exhaust their legal remedies in the nation in which the alleged violation of customary 
international law occurred. The implications of the argument border on the ridiculous; imagine having 
been required to file suit in a court in Nazi Germany complaining about genocide, before being able to 
sue under the Alien Tort Statute. What is true is that a U.S. court might, as a matter of international 
comity, stay an Alien Tort suit that had been filed in the U.S. court, in order to give the courts of the 
nation in which the violation had occurred a chance to remedy it, provided that the nation seemed 
                                                     
817 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, pp. 7, 11-13. 
818 Cf. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection of the International Law Commission, A/61/10, 2006, articles 14 and 15; 
article 46 of the American Convention on Human Rights; European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of 
Hajduová v. Slovakia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 36-38; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Las 
Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment of Merits, 6 December 2001, paras. 58-60; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, op. cit., paras. 14-17, 31, 34-36. 
819 Cf. Carlos Espósito Massicci, Inmunidad del Estado y Derechos Humanos, Aranzadi, 2007, pp. 102-105, 259; 
Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 91-93, 824, 828-831; Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John 
Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 89. 
820 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 825-831; Andreas Fischer-
Lescano, op. cit., pp. 21-23. 
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willing and able to do that […] And second, the defendant argues that the statute has no 
extraterritorial application […] Courts have been applying the statute extraterritorially (and not just to 
violations at sea) since the beginning; no court to our knowledge has ever held that it doesn’t apply 
extraterritorially”821 (emphasis added). 
Taking into account the foregoing considerations, a graphic portrayal of the dimensions of 
the protection of human dignity from non-state violations is offered below. It reflects that apart 
from vertical protection against States, there are the following dimensions of indirect and direct 
protection: horizontal, i.e. based on the fact that human rights have effects in relations between 
individuals and non-state entities; lateral, i.e. protection given against abuses committed by non-
state entities with power, control or authority over individuals; and a vertical dimension of human 
rights erga omnes obligations, by which both States and non-state actors are bound.822  
All those dimensions complement each other and must lead to a transversal protection of 
individuals, that is to say to protection from all violations and in all the scenarios in which it is 
needed. The protection of human dignity must encompass both human rights and guarantees 
(e.g. duties, legal capacities, etc.), since the latter also seek to protect dignity and strengthen and 
complement human rights. 
The comprehensive legal protection of human dignity from all violations in all levels and 
with the contribution of different actors can be illustrated as follows:          
                                                     
821 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, pp. 23-24. 
822 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 140; Concurring Opinion of 
Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., 
paras. 77-78; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 1-2; Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 8; Department for Constitutional Affairs, A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998: 
Third Edition, op. cit., at 37. 
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Different considerations must be taken into account to determine when it is advisable or 
convenient for direct international action to deal with non-state violations. 
First of all, previous explanations indicate that if there is absence of effective State 
control in a given territory, for instance due to an international decision or operation that lawfully 
decrees so, or to armed non-state groups that control it, in practice the respective State will not 
be able to ensure the enjoyment of human rights therein.823 According to international law, the 
State’s duties will remain, due to its vicarious responsibility and position as guarantor,824 but its 
responsibility will not necessarily be engaged in connection with violations if it behaves diligently.  
On the other hand, the conduct of non-state entities that operate as authorities or 
administrators in that territory for normative or factual reasons, for instance due to their having an 
international mandate or for having wrest control by force, ought to be supervised by human 
rights bodies, either with the possibility of issuing recommendations to those entities and order or 
recommend them to comply with human rights standards in that territory, or of indicating that the 
                                                     
823 Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The right to adequate food (art. 
11), op. cit., para. 15; Christian Tomuschat, op. cit., pp. 43-45, 53-54. 
824 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 78-82; Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., at 339; Norms on the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003, para. 1. 
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examined non-state conduct imposes a prohibition on States to expose individuals to them. If this 
direct examination of non-state conduct (the respondent entity is not necessarily non-state but 
non-state conduct is examined) does not take place, the rights of victims, which remain and are 
inalienable, would be rendered ineffective.  
According to the previous analysis, stringent international control of non-state conduct, 
that involves direct analysis of that behavior (but can have different outcomes) should take place 
not only when there are formal authorizations of non-state authority or control over a territory, but 
also in relation to actors that de facto control a territory or operate as authorities therein. If alleged 
violations are serious, it is always required that such conduct is internationally examined, even if 
its authors neither operate as authorities nor control a territory.825 
Taking into account the previous considerations, I consider that one criterion among 
others that can help to determine when non-state conduct should be directly supervised in judicial 
or quasi-judicial international procedures is the existence or lack thereof of a legal/formal or 
factual impossibility for the State in whose territory a violation takes place or is about to take 
place to protect potential or existent victims. Accordingly, be it because international law prohibits 
a State from acting in a given part of its territory (e.g. when ordered by the Security Council), or 
due to the considerable power of a non-state entity, that enables it to oppose and effectively 
prevent State control to a meaningful degree,826 among other possibilities, the prospect of direct 
international review of the non-state conduct (ideally subject to the principle of subsidiarity) 
makes it more likely that individuals can be protected from the respective non-state actors.  
Conversely, in cases in which States can protect individuals, if they behave negligently or 
are unwilling to protect individuals from non-state conduct, their responsibility will be engaged and 
they can be ordered to repair victims of non-state violations. In those cases, individuals will have 
access to effective remedies, so perhaps direct international action against a non-state conduct 
can be made subsidiary to the determination that a State could not effectively protect an 
individual. However, when serious violations are involved, it is convenient to sanction all abusers, 
and so this analysis of subsidiarity would be unnecessary.  
                                                     
825 Cf. Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, para. 106; Tilman Rodehäuser, op. cit. 
826 As may happen with non-state armed groups that effectively control a territory to the exclusion of a State, event 
mentioned in Protocol 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for reasons different from the ones discussed herein, 
which are to lay the conditions of the applicability of that instrument. Cf. article 1.1 of the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II). On the other hand, cf. Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, op. cit., at 3. 
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When States repair victims of non-state abuses, soft law indicates that they may be 
entitled to demand compensation from the non-state offenders in accordance with domestic 
law.827 This possibility has a positive implication: it serves to encourage States to repair victims 
even if they lack legal responsibility, given their being entitled to ask responsible entities to 
compensate them afterwards. Interestingly, article 79 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court serves a similar purpose, because it determines that victims of non-state or State-
affiliated criminals may receive funds from the Trust Fund even when the persons that attacked 
them do not provide those funds. 
Another clarification must be made concerning non-state authority: reference to formal or 
de facto resemblance with State roles and functions is but one way in which actors can have 
relevant control over a territory or victims. Thus, the previous considerations are also relevant if a 
non-state entity does not control a territory but has considerable power over individuals to the 
exclusion of effective State protection. In other words, while in a sense every violation of the 
content of human rights and guarantees by non-state entities presuppose that they have power or 
control over individuals,828 when State (or other applicable) protection is made almost impossible 
by them they should be directly accountable and subject to actions in the international plane. This 
is strongly advised lest human rights guarantees are not effective in practice. Still, a similar 
course of action is also advisable in other cases without these features. 
The previous considerations are related to debates on the foundation of human dignity 
examined in Chapter 1. Certainly, while the unconditional inner worth of human beings is the 
proper foundation of human rights and guarantees, and it demands a complete and effective 
protection from all threats, the power and authority held by non-state entities makes it necessary 
to effectively protect individuals from their abuses. This consideration is not intended as a 
replacement of the general foundation of human rights but as a special factor that must be 
particularly addressed.  
After all, violations that are attributable to non-state entities in a position of power or 
authority are more likely to displace effective State control and so intense international action may 
prove to be indispensable for victims to be protected,829 as has been examined above. 
                                                     
827 Cf. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, para. 15. 
828 Factual considerable power, nonetheless, does not exhaust the cases in which an entity is to be deemed to have 
power regarding the enjoyment of human rights, as revealed by the fact that every violation to such enjoyment 
demonstrates the power to affect it. 
829 It must be said that authority and positions of power are relevant as one of the events in which protection to actual 
or potential victims must be offered, but not as the only one, as revealed by other criteria that help to analyze 
whether domestic or other actions are necessary or convenient from both a legal and a non-legal point of view. 
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The factor of power or authority that demands a more intense international protection 
even if a violation is not serious can be functional or factual; general or related to some important 
aspects, such as the power to prevent an individual from having access to essential services for 
the enjoyment of her human rights. The criterion that such power is a basis of special protection 
is handled in the practice of some States, which grant heightened defense to individuals 
threatened by non-state entities with authority or power. For example, the Colombian acción de 
tutela, that can be used to protect the content of international human rights law,830 can be 
resorted to in order to protect fundamental rights of individuals when non-state entities provide a 
service that is relevant for the enjoyment of their human rights, when those actors threaten 
certain rights, or when individuals are subordinated or defenseless in relation to them and the 
enjoyment of some rights is threatened.831  
In turn, the Human Rights Act 1998 of the United Kingdom permits legal action against 
any entity that “carries out some functions of a public nature”.832 In those cases, actors exercise 
normatively-sanctioned power over individuals that, if abused or neglected, can prevent the 
enjoyment of human rights (see articles 6.3.b, 7 or 8 of the Act). Additionally, that Act demands 
indirect protection against non-state threats due to the horizontal effects of human rights law. This 
makes public entities and private actors that carry out public functions have the duty to act, 
interpret and apply norms taking into account the horizontal dimension of human rights, that 
demands protection of individuals from private or public non-state threats to human rights.833 
To avoid confusion, it is convenient to stress that I do not recommend that all violations 
committed by non-state entities that exercise formal/normative or de facto authority over an 
individual must be examined internationally, but rather that international supervision is pressing, 
among other cases, when those (and other) actors make it very unlikely that States are able to 
protect individuals from their abuses. In some cases, domestic action is in principle the one that 
should address alleged violations, unless other relevant factors make international supervision 
necessary or highly advisable. In sum, international supervision of actors with a certain extent of 
power or authority that cannot be checked or controlled by a State that is unable to protect 
individuals for formal/legal or factual reasons (criterion of weakness handled for other purposes in 
cases in which international protection against non-state actors is granted)834 is recommended.  
                                                     
830 Cf. Alejandro Valencia Villa and María José Díaz-Granados M. (eds.), Compilación de jurisprudencia y doctrina 
nacional e internacional, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 13-27. 
831 Cf. article 42 of Decree 2591 of Colombia, 19 November 1991, available at: 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/lacorte/DECRETO%202591.php (last checked: 02/02/2012). 
832 Cf. Department for Constitutional Affairs, A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998: Third Edition, op. cit., pp. 9, 37. 
833 Cf. Ibid., pp. 9, 37. 
834 Cf. article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Darryl Robinson, op. cit. 
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Moreover, even if international supervision of non-state conduct does not exist, non-state 
actors as NGOs or international organizations, among others, can demand the pertinent 
authorities to respect and protect human rights, and international supervision may examine non-
state conduct to indirectly protect human beings from it by ordering State action in that regard. 
These considerations must be examined bearing in mind that responsibilities of States and other 
actors, whether they have considerable power or not, are cumulative and not exclusive. 
Apart from the criteria of serious violations and power and authority, direct international 
control of non-state conduct is also called for in relation to non-state violations contrary to human 
rights that are committed frequently or in an intense or otherwise especially worrisome manner 
(e.g. utterly denying the enjoyment of rights; intensely affecting vulnerable rights and individuals, 
etc.).835  
 
Figure 5: Intense legal response to non-state violations of human rights and guarantees 
 
To my mind, except for the considerations about serious violations and substantive 
obligations of non-state actors, which I deem necessary, the previous considerations about 
international action found in this Chapter are both recommendatory and non-exhaustive. They 
illustrate how in spite of strained international resources non-state violations can and sometimes 
                                                     
835 Cf. Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 186-187; articles 43 and 44 of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 96.3 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), for examples of both direct 
substantive and procedural engagement of jus gentium with potential abusers of norms that can or always do protect 
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must be dealt with by jus gentium in substantive and even procedural terms. The only prevalent 
condition concerning the treatment of non-state violations of human rights is that all individuals 
are effectively protected from them, among other reasons because they are legally relevant under 
international and other normative systems and affect their legal goods. 
This makes it convenient to analyze if it is worth stressing that all conduct that violates 
humanitarian legal goods, which as a result is legally relevant, is a substantive violation under 
international law, even if direct international supervision of that behavior is nonexistent. 
In that regard, I consider that in a multi-level and multi-actor framework of protection836 
labeling violations as such, no matter to whom they are attributable, fulfills several important 
functions. Plenty of those functions work thanks to the fact that the wrongfulness of violations is 
signaled to addressees of duties, authorities, victims, society and humanitarian actors. 
Signaling is a function related to the expressive or symbolic effects of law. It has been 
considered that norms and legal decisions can have expressive effects to the extent that they 
indicate what actions are encouraged or discouraged, attaching a legal value to them that may be 
taken into account by society due to communicative processes and thus end up impacting on the 
(de)legitimation and modification of practices.  
Precisely, among other things declaring that non-state actors can engage in legally-
relevant violations of human rights and guarantees attempts to tell society that such violations 
exist and are illegal, unfair and illegitimate, and must be tackled. As a result, activists or victims 
may feel emboldened given the legal support given to their claims and carry out lawful actions 
against non-state violators to make them refrain from engaging in violations or to repair victims, 
while authorities may be authorized by that indication to prevent or respond to violations. On the 
other hand, that indication and the stigma attached to it may raise awareness and dissuade non-
state entities from the commission of violations, the existence of which is highlighted as a 
problem that must be addressed in human rights terms, with the impact this has.  
Note how the positive impact of some non-state actions on the protection and promotion 
of human dignity is also related to this dimension, because actors can claim that they can 
condemn abuses of other entities and that they should be allowed to contribute to address them. 
Apart from the psychological dimensions of the symbolic and expressive functions of the 
identification of the existence and wrongfulness of non-state violations, because of it practitioners 
and authorities are made aware of the illegal character of certain non-state conduct and are 
prompted to react accordingly, being obliged to interpret norms in accordance with their purposes 
                                                     
836 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through 
Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 9-10, 15, 34-37. 
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and in a way that makes them have practical effects, as required by the principle of effet utile. 
Thus, for example, State and non-state entities that promote human rights under different legal 
systems can and must interpret their own functions and the remedies of victims in accordance 
with the existence of non-state violations, taking into account the rights of victims and their own 
obligations to protect individuals against them in both a preventive and an ex post facto fashion.  
Therefore, for instance, unless it is expressly impeded in an unavoidable form, States 
and other normative or de facto authorities must try to protect victims from non-state violations 
through mechanisms of supervision837 or non-adjudicatory actions, including the need that victims 
receive reparations and justice.838  
The previous ideas are reflected in instruments as the Human Rights Act 1998 of the 
United Kingdom. By virtue of article 3 and other provisions, it orders judges and authorities to 
interpret norms and their functions taking into account European international human rights law 
even in disputes between private parties, having the Act thus indirect horizontal human rights 
implications (not general direct ones insofar as no direct cause of action based on the Act is 
given).839 Additionally, it envisages direct horizontal effects against non-state actors that carry out 
public functions, either by allowing the institution of proceedings against them based on the Act, 
or by commanding that in their conduct and the proceedings they conduct or are subject to those 
entities abide by the substantive provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and sof ome of its Protocols (see articles 1.1 and 6 
through 8).840  
Concerning these possibilities, it must be recalled that the behavior of actors exercising 
functions of another entity (e.g. of a State or an international organization) can engage the 
responsibility of that other entity. This can happen in relation to functions that are privatized, 
delegated, authorized or effectively controlled by the actor originally entrusted with the relevant 
                                                     
837 Cf. e.g. article 44 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, according to which they may be 
bound by its provisions “within the limits of their competence” “with respect to matters governed by” the Convention. 
In procedural terms, analogous considerations and limits are found in article 12 of the Optional Protocol to the 
aforementioned Convention. 
838 Cf. e.g. article 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, where the power of the Court to order a 
convicted person to repair victims; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, para. 3.c., where the right of victims to have access to justice in order to claim their rights is recognized 
“irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation” (emphasis added). 
839 Cf, Department for Constitutional Affairs, A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998: Third Edition, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 
37; “The Human Rights Act and Private Parties”, where it is said that “The only difference in purely private disputes 
as opposed to claims framed solely in terms of Convention rights against public authorities is the fact that the litigant 
in the former will have to establish an existing statutory or common law cause of action on which to pin the human 
rights argument”, available at: http://www.yourrights.org.uk/vas/the-human-rights-act/private-parties-and-the-hra.doc, 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/26073083/Horizontal-effect (last checked: 03/02/2012). 
840 Cf. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/crossheading/public-authorities (last checked: 03/02/2012). 
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function, as expressed by the ILC and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, this 
does not turn the non-state entities exercising public functions into public actors. This is 
confirmed by the express attribution of the acts of an actor to a State or international 
organization841 for the purposes of determining the subjective element of responsibility.  
In these cases, the responsibility of the entity exercising the respective public functions 
can also be engaged, as demanded by the principle of individual responsibility, the 
complementarity of responsibilities, the importance of sanctioning offenders, and the need to 
deter breaches and protect victims from all participants in violations (some of these issues are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). Moreover, the delegation or privatization of functions does 
not entail the elimination of the duty of States or international organizations to protect human 
rights with due diligence regarding the supervision and transfer of those competences.842 
Altogether, violations of human rights and guarantees committed by non-state entities 
may engage the responsibility of a functional (normatively entitled or empowered de facto)843 
State or non-state authority with pertinent obligations under the humanitarian corpus juris, due to: 
i) failure of the authority to prevent or properly respond to non-state violations with due diligence; 
ii) attribution of non-state conduct to the authority due to its being related to a function of the 
                                                     
841 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, Judgment, 4 July 2006, paras. 86-
87, 94-100; articles 5, 6 and 8 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4) and 7 of the version of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international 
organizations adopted in 2011 (A/66/10). Concerning international organizations, the current version of the draft 
articles on their responsibility does not contain a provision analogous to article 5 of the articles on State 
responsibility, although a proper interpretation of the intention of the International Law Commission evinces how even 
non-state entities entrusted by an IO to perform its functions can generate its responsibility. In this sense, in 
accordance to article 2 of the current version of the draft articles on the Responsibility of international organizations, 
agents of IOs are all entities different from organs that are “charged by the organization with carrying out, or helping 
to carry out, one of its functions, and thus through whom the organization acts.” Taking into account the fact that the 
previous definition is applicable to the totality of the draft articles, and that therefore that definition is applicable 
concerning article 6, which expressly alludes to the conduct of agents as attributable to IOs, it is possible for agents 
to be private entities entrusted with functions of international organizations, according to article 2 of the 2011 version 
of the ILC articles on the responsibility of international organizations. 
842 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, Judgment, 4 July 2006, paras. 96-
97, 102-103; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 76, 80-82. 
843 In practice and case law, considerations of the protection against de facto or normative authorities can also be 
found, and in this sense the Human Rights Committee, for instance, has considered that once human rights are 
recognized in favor of the individuals in a given territory, changes in its administration do not alter that recognition, 
and those individuals are thereby still protected by the relevant norms and instruments against whosoever has 
control or administration, regardless of its identity and, accordingly, irrespective of its being a State or not. For these 
reasons, the Committee held that the UNMIK had human rights obligations in Kosovo. In the same sense, it has been 
considered that when territory is controlled de facto by a non-state entity that operates as an authority, or when they 
have power over the fate of individuals and can elude State control, among other possibilities, protection against 
individuals from that entity can take the form of international action in the form of recommendations and engagement 
directly addressed to them, as mentioned in the Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human 
Rights Council of 2008, or in the form of indirect protection against non-state threats by means of, inter alia, 
protecting refugees that escape non-state agents of persecution or by prohibiting a State sending a potential victim to 
a place controlled or under the power of the respective non-state entity or where it can operate largely uncontrolled 
and the territorial State’s protection is largely ineffective or illusory. 
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authority (function that is public in nature due to the role of the authority and to expectations of 
protection and respect); iii) attribution of non-state conduct to an authority or other type of entity 
that controls, directs or gives instructions (specific ones) concerning that conduct; iv) 
acknowledgment and adoption of non-state conduct by a public (or another) actor as its own; or 
v) the exercise of authority by others under some circumstances. Those are general possibilities, 
and regarding States there is another possibility: the behavior of insurrectional movements that 
establish a State or acquire the power and control of a State.844 
Additionally, both in legal and extra-legal terms, it is neither correct nor convenient to 
consider every entity that exercises publicly relevant functions as State entities, notwithstanding 
the wisdom of the international legal possibility that their conduct engages State responsibility. I 
hold this because otherwise some may try to subsume private entities in the State structure and 
deny them freedoms and liberties of their own, indirectly affecting conscience and privacy human 
rights of individuals related to those entities. It must not be forgotten that the State is a construct 
that must serve human beings and that it is part of society, not the other way around. 
On the other hand, supervisory bodies and authorities that have mandates to protect and 
promote human rights which are broad enough or can be interpreted as allowing those actions in 
relation to non-state actors will likely realize that they can and must examine non-state abuses 
due to the indication that there are non-state violations. This does not mean that they can only do 
this if contentious procedures admit this possibility. For instance, they can contact and engage in 
dialogue with potential abusers of all kinds; or shame, denounce or declare non-state violations 
and call for the protection of victims.  
If the behavior of non-state entities is assessed, scrutinized and criticized in human rights 
terms, victims will have more guarantees of protection. A result, the legitimacy of a system that 
claims to protect the non-conditional human dignity from all threats will be strengthened. That 
protection cannot be inconsistent or incomplete, or attach more importance to some (criticized 
and contested) abstract theories than to human beings.  
Additionally, the recognition that non-state actors can violate human rights and their 
victims must be protected makes law better respond to reality, as has been acknowledged by 
Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen.845 Certainly, non-state abuses take place daily, victims 
suffer, and law must respond to social and human needs (sic societas, sicut jus). That recognition 
is especially critical nowadays, because even though non-state entities have always been 
                                                     
844 Cf. article 10 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; Chapter II of the 
ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, and of the 2011 version of the ILC 
draft articles on the Responsibility of international organizations (A/66/10). 
845 Cf. Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 
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relevant in the “international” society, in the current social landscape they have more possibilities 
to impact positively or negatively upon the enjoyment of human rights and guarantees, given their 
empowerment and the normative and social dynamics they participate in, all of which makes it 
difficult for regulation and control to be completely effective unless global legal strategies are 
adopted.  
These issues must be examined considering that law is a tool that can accomplish 
several functions. According to many, including myself, its legitimacy rests on its serving human 
beings concerning their most essential and important needs and on its answering to what their 
inherent worth demands.  
It must be mentioned that those non-state violations that are not serious or are not 
strongly suggested to be addressed in international procedural terms can still be the object of 
international action. Even if this does not happen, the substantive qualification of those violations 
as wrongful serves many purposes, some of which have been explained in this section. 
Moreover, the possibility that there are rights without remedies and responsibilities without action 
confirms that a mere substantive international response to some violations can be admissible, 
provided that rights are effectively protected otherwise in accordance with international standards. 
Furthermore, domestic extraterritorial actions that respond to violations of international law, as 
explained before, can often be used based on the existence of an international substantive 
identification of non-state violations. 
This makes a universal universal protection of human dignity possible. It is complete both 
form the point of view of offenders from whom individuals are protected and from the point of view 
of actors that can exert protection in a global legal framework.  
As John Ruggie discusses, another relevant question is whether extraterritorial 
jurisdiction against non-state actors is not only possible but also mandatory. In most cases, it is 
deemed to be facultative under lex lata but encouraged de lege ferenda,846 especially because, in 
my opinion, it can shape legal lowest common denominators that condemn non-state abuses 
everywhere, with relevance in domestic and other jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion sometimes States are obliged to have extraterritorial 
jurisdiction against some non-state violations. This happens, for instance, when a State creates 
                                                     
846 Cf. Menno T. Kamminga, “The Next Frontier: Prosecution of Extraterritorial Corporate Misconduct before Non-US 
Courts”, op. cit., at 173; Bruno Demeyere, “States’ Innovative Mechanisms to Prevent Corporate Human Rights 
Crimes Abroad: Using ‘Due Diligence’ to Complement International Criminal Law’s Regulatory Leverage”, in Willem 
J.M. Van Genugten et al. (eds), Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years after the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, T.M.C. 
Asser Press, 2009, pp. 178-179; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 19, 27; 178-179. 
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or contributes to the generation of the risk of a non-state violation of human rights abroad or at 
home. In those and other events, according to principles identified in international human rights 
case law, States have positive duties that are more intense than the usual ones, having for 
instance duties to prevent or respond to violations the risk of which they created even 
extraterritorially, in my opinion.  
There may be other cases in which extraterritorial jurisdiction may be obligatory. For 
instance, Bruno Demeyere considers that a State perhaps should at least be obliged to deter 
violations that could be committed abroad when it is aware of their possible commission, and that 
it can respond by denying benefits to potential offenders, among other possibilities.847 
Needless to say, extraterritorial jurisdiction can be exercised in relation to all violations, 
either if they are serious or for other reasons can be examined in international procedures or not. 
In fact, to wisely spend international resources; and to be consistent with democratic criteria, a 
multi-level framework and the right of States to have a first chance to deal with problems in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it is convenient that international responses to 
violations are not used if extraterritorial domestic action effectively responds to violations and 
protects victims.848  
International action is, after all, complementary, as seen in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, according to which satisfactory domestic prosecution of the crimes 
over which the ICC has jurisdiction makes it unnecessary for the Court to operate. Still, 
international bodies examine cases where States with mandatory jurisdiction have no resources, 
decide to not use them or are prevented from doing so,849 reason why it is not necessary to wait 
for domestic extraterritorial jurisdiction to operate before international action is used. 
In regard to the complementarity between domestic and international action, apart from 
congestion issues, it can be said that overburdening the international level, or not allowing other 
legal systems to address non-state violations, risks over-empowering international authorities and 
tempting them to ignore legitimate domestic decisions. This echoes the risks of a world State or 
                                                     
847 Cf. Bruno Demeyere, “States’ Innovative Mechanisms to Prevent Corporate Human Rights Crimes Abroad: Using 
‘Due Diligence’ to Complement International Criminal Law’s Regulatory Leverage”, op. cit., at 179. 
848 Cf. the notion of the responsibility to protect, as examined in: Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of 
Sovereignty”, op. cit., pp. 514, 517, 522-524, 527, 535-540; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short 
Introduction, op. cit., pp. 59-60; United Nations, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, op. cit., paras. 199-203. 
849 Cf. Kevin Jon Heller, “A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 53, 
2012, pp. 208, 230, 234, 240, 242, 248, 249 available at: http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/HLI102.pdf (last checked: 03/02/2012); and the three paragraphs of article 17 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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an imperial legal context, pondered upon by Immanuel Kant or authors as Nico Krisch.850 On the 
other hand, denying the possibility of complementary international action and non-state 
contributions to the promotion and protection of human rights and guarantees deprives individuals 
of the possibility of challenging unfair local decisions or omissions that ignore universal 
concerns.851  
In turn, a multi-level and multi-actor framework offers possibilities of complementary 
initiatives and checks and balances. In such a framework, non-state activism can complement 
and demand public action, and the latter can examine if non-state claims are legally correct and if 
other members of civil society contradict those claims.  
One case study that exemplifies this possibility of multi-actor checks and balances is 
exemplified in the research conducted by Eyal Benvenisti regarding the possibility that national 
judicial authorities counter possible abuses of non-state actors in a transnational and international 
process of interaction.852 Likewise, it has been said that domestic judges can challenge what they 
perceive as wrong assertions of international authorities (including judicial ones) in order to 
stimulate normative and judicial changes or point out mistakes;853 while the latter can supervise 
or condemn the breaches of the former and can also declare non-state activities as lawful or 
unlawful, permitted or tolerated. This can happen, for example, when international bodies 
examine reports provided by States and non-state entities. Reports provided by these entities can 
be implicitly treated as acceptable even if they are not expressly regulated, thanks to implicit 
powers of the international bodies interpreted in light of the principle of effectiveness of human 
rights.854 
It is important to stress that recognition of the substantive protection against non-state 
threats permits individuals to request domestic (and sometimes international) protection based on 
international substantive law, even if domestic legislation does not reflect it, case in which it must 
                                                     
850 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Essay (translated by M. Campbell Smith), op. cit., pp. 155-
157; Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International 
Legal Order”, op. cit., pp. 370-371. 
851 This implies that subsidiarity rests on the condition that global concerns and fundamental rights are respected, 
given the idea that local authorities should be entitled to address concerns regarding them in the first place. Thus, 
subsidiarity is not a shield with an absolute character and is not unlimited either. 
852 Cf. Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, “National Courts Review of Transnational Private Regulation”, 
Working paper, 2011, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1742452 (last checked: 
06/02/2012), pp. 1-5, 17-18. 
853 Cf. J.C. von Krempach, “Austria: Crucifixes in Public Nursery School not Unconstitutional, says Constitutional 
Court”, 16 March 2011, available at: http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/council-of-europe/austria-crucifixes-in-
public-nursery-school-not-unconstitutional-says-constitutional-court/ (last checked: 06/02/2012); Nicolás Carrillo 
Santarelli and Carlos Espósito, op. cit., at 77. 
854 Cf. Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 189-190; Luis 
Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 37-38; Rule 69 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1, 1 September 1993; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Report on the forty-fourth and forty-fifth sessions, E/2011/22—E/C.12/2010/3, 2011, paras. 26, 44, 46, 48, 52-54. 
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change. This confirms that substantive regulation of non-state misdeeds is not to be 
underestimated and in practice operates doing away with boundaries between legal systems, 
which is necessary to tackle phenomena immersed in an interdependent and globalized world. 
From the point of view of non-state entities addressed by substantive or procedural 
norms on the protection of human dignity, it can be said that some of those actors may be 
sensible or react to regulations dealing with their conduct. Regulation may impact on non-state 
behavior at least by forcing non-state entities to either justify their behavior in its light or to declare 
a disavowal of its norms, decision that exposes them to sanctions, opposition or delegitimization.  
As to how regulations affect non-state decisions, some studies that examine incentives 
for compliance with regulations have concluded that different factors can make non-state actors 
consider complying with regulations that regulate their conduct. They include arguments of 
political, ideological, normative, strategic, legal, ethical or other natures.855 Usually, it will be a 
pondered or unconscious combination of some of these factors that will exert an influence on 
compliance or non-compliance, but frequently one of those arguments will be predominant or 
even exclusive.  
All in all, given the impact of regulations on non-state conduct, it is undeniable that calls 
for regulating non-state behavior in a globalized landscape856 are important, especially because 
of their potential to strengthen the protection of human dignity. 
Concerning those non-state violations which are not implicitly, necessarily or intensely 
urged to be tackled by international procedures and action but are only addressed in a 
substantive way, it is important to consider that some scholars have argued that, despite 
theoretical assertions to the contrary, States have not been exclusive actors and participants in 
the international arena, and many of their acts can be traced back to the strong influence of non-
state agents, or the influence of the latter has been quite influential (and vice versa).857  
Furthermore, the trends and processes of globalization, privatization, growing 
interdependence, empowerment of several actors, and delegation, among others, have 
strengthened the position of many non-state actors, which have at their disposal more resources, 
opportunities and capacities to operate with a previously unheard-of relevance. This allows them 
                                                     
855 Cf. Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 194-196; Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?", op. cit., at 2600-2601. The factors explored in: Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli and Carlos Espósito, 
op. cit., pp. 61-67 can also be relevant regarding non-state entities and not only concerning State judicial authorities, 
and are thus worth examining. 
856 Cf. Hans-Otto Sano, op. cit., pp. 137-141; Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: 
Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 2-3, 5-6, 8-9, 13-16, 40. 
857 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., pp. 24-34. 
 
 
279
to affect norms protecting human dignity (positively or negatively)858 or to exert influence over 
States, in comparison with some of which some non-state entities have more power or resources.  
Simultaneously, several actors increasingly operate in a transnational or international 
way:859 some of them seek profit or non-profit goals, and some even engage in criminal conduct –
many of those belong to the so-called “uncivil society”.860 One definition of transnational acts (that 
is not all-encompassing or universal given its use for the purposes of that treaty, which still 
provides inspiration) is found in article 3.2 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, according to which: 
“For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this article, an offence is transnational in nature if: 
(a) It is committed in more than one State; 
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control 
takes place in another State; 
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal 
activities in more than one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.” 
In a context with dynamics of globalization and interdependence, stakeholders, 
observers, lawmakers and law-enforcers have realized how important it is to tackle the 
challenges posed by many actors that operate transnationally, lest they take advantage of gaps in 
some domestic legal systems and of the lack of coordination among them and with international 
law and elude justice and controls or impose their will taking advantage of race to the bottom 
dynamics or forum shopping strategies, among other factors facilitated by the excessive 
importance attached to non-human interests by some State and non-state agents. Naturally, all of 
those dynamics must be properly addressed in global and international normative terms. 
On top of the challenges posed by actors due to the previous dynamics, some non-state 
entities cooperate among themselves to violate legal goods that protect human dignity and other 
values, as has been identified by the media, lawmakers, scholars861 and organs as the Security 
Council (hereinafter, SC), which for instance in Resolution 1373 (2001) expressed its concerned 
about: 
                                                     
858 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 95-97, 99, 101, 104-105. 
859 Cf. Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
860 Cf. Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., at 320; Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, op. cit., at iii.  
861 Cf. article 6 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., 
at 319; Celestino del Arenal, op. cit., at 39; Eric Suy, op. cit., at 382; http://www.elespectador.com/articulo-segun-
desmovilizado-existen-vinculos-entre-farc-eta (last checked: 06/02/2012); 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/prospera/coalicion/pirata/elpepuint/20090426elpepiint_3/Tes (last 
checked: 06/02/2012); “Los piratas blanquean el dinero a través de Dubai” 
(http://www.publico.es/estaticos/pdf/ficheros/pdf/22042009.pdf). 
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“[T]he close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit 
drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, 
biological and other potentially deadly materials”. 
Non-state interaction leading to violations of legal goods makes it very unlikely for 
isolated actions to successfully protect victims and affected legal goods. Legal responses must 
therefore not only lawfully make the most of global opportunities, but also permit and foster 
cooperation with both private and public non-state entities.  
Some initiatives have taken the previous ideas into account, and among the actions that 
have been proposed to combat non-state threats, several cooperation schemes with international 
legal dimensions have been adopted. This has happened in the fields of counter-terrorism and 
actions against transnational organized crime, for example,862 in which wrongs attributable to 
some non-state actors that operate transnationally or commit reproachful acts have usually been: 
a) labeled as contrary to international law from a substantive point of view (third level of horizontal 
international involvement according to Knox), being States expected to tackle those misdeeds 
and cooperate to do so; and b) required to be prohibited, prevented and dealt with domestically 
by States with the cooperation of non-state entities (first or second level of international 
involvement in the opinion of John Knox). The pertinent principles and regulation suggest that 
there may be implicit duties of non-state actors due to tacit international understandings or the 
emergence of principles in foro domestico and with an international origin. 
The two strategies mentioned in the previous paragraph are consistent with the doctrinal 
positions that argue that the behavior of actors that are significant or relevant because of their 
role or impact in reality and their capacity to affect legal interests (heightened by interdependency 
and globalization) must be regulated.863 Evidently, the suffering of individuals and the disregard of 
their dignity by non-state entities acting in a transnational way that enables them to elude the 
control of weak or complicit States or to take advantage of gaps and lack of coordination between 
actors and normative systems are relevant from ethical, social and legal points of view (given the 
violation of humanitarian legal goods). It is not only recommended but, from a legal point of view, 
also obligatory to regulate the conduct of those actors, out of consistency with demands of human 
rights normative foundations and principles. 
                                                     
862 Cf. Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., pp. 334-343; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., at 24; articles 
7 and 18 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
863 Cf. Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 15, 40. 
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If it is acknowledged that non-state activities committed in a transnational manner can be 
contrary to human dignity,864 then regardless of what level of international intensity operates to 
address it, States with jurisdiction in all the territories where transnational activities occur must be 
able to tackle those threats, and all other public entities must cooperate to address them and help 
States with jurisdiction. Concerning transnational violations with special relevance or frequency, 
States can be under more stringent and intense obligations to outlaw and regulate responses to 
those acts in great detail and to act accordingly. Direct international procedural action (not 
necessarily adjudicatory, see Chapter 8) is also recommended in regard to those violations, and 
non-state action that engages the respective actors must, as always, be permitted. 
In general terms, States and some international organizations have horizontal duties to 
protect individuals from non-state violations. They flow from the general obligation to guarantee or 
ensure the enjoyment of human rights; and some treaties envisage more detailed specific 
manifestations of the duty to protect individuals from non-state abuses in order to take account of 
the special needs of vulnerable rights or persons or the necessity of effectively dealing with some 
offenders, as happens with the treaties on the human rights of women, persons with disabilities, 
or migrants, among others.865  
The aforementioned specialized or detailed obligations are important because of the 
need to protect vulnerable individuals. This is important even if their effects are limited to the 
territory of a State or do not surpass local contexts in geographical terms, due to the global legal 
goods involved.  
Indeed, violations of vulnerable individuals and/or rights are important and must be 
specially addressed because those abuses can be committed in a way or in the midst of social 
and other dynamics that makes it necessary for individuals to receive special and intensive 
protection and for future violations to be deterred and prevented, especially (but not only) when 
they are common or widespread. In those cases, detailed international regulation is important to 
ensure that some minimum standards required by all affected vulnerable rights and individuals 
guide State and non-state initiatives of promotion and protection of rights.  
The absence of common international legal minimum standards to protect vulnerable 
rights and persons that could be taken into account by domestic legal systems could contribute to 
                                                     
864 Cf. Tom Obokata, “Smuggling of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective: Obligations of Non-State and 
State Actors under International Human Rights Law”, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 17, 2005, pp. 394-
395, 400-407. 
865 Cf. Articles 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 2 and 5 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 4 of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, 14 and 25 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families, or 1 through 9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará; John H. Knox, 
“Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 22, 24-26. 
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flaws in domestic legislation (perhaps innocently due to ignorance of best practices) and to the 
absence of the identification of situations of concern that must be especially addressed, 
preventing the symbolic effects that such special identification can have from operating. 
In my opinion, the aforementioned specialized international regulation should at least 
envisage detailed international substantive duties (not necessarily accompanied by procedural 
international actions) of non-state actors that are potential offenders. That detail does not have to 
be in depth all the time, and sometimes indication of specific prohibited conduct suffices. I defend 
this need of specialized non-state duties when non-state actors are frequently offenders of 
vulnerable rights because of the risk that States do not enact domestic substantive prohibitions 
that properly deal with the type of violations being examined. After all, inappropriate legislation 
concerning duties of protection and respect of human rights exists from time to time, and it 
constitutes a breach of the duty to internalize human rights law and adapt local norms to it.866 To 
my mind, this train of thought is not only important concerning vulnerable rights and is also 
applicable to transnational offenses contrary to human rights, due to the need to ensure both their 
being tackled and the protection of victims. 
Moreover, it is also risked that the absence of specialized international duties of frequent 
non-state perpetrators of transnational violations or attacks against vulnerable individuals 
encourages and fosters impunity when they seek refuge in legal systems in which they cannot 
face domestic prosecution or take advantage of social endorsement of their misdeeds (e.g. 
concerning domestic abuses against women in some societies). Thus, at a minimum (this means 
that international protection can be more intense), it is convenient to create international 
obligations of non-state actors that expressly and in detail deal regulate the conduct of entities 
that either recurrently or with a great likelihood can threaten certain rights (e.g. those of 
vulnerable individuals) or engage in certain violations (e.g. transnational abuses). Those 
obligations defend correlative entitlements of individuals in substantive terms regardless of where 
a violation takes place, and permit different actors and authorities to contribute to protecting them.  
Other violations can also be tackled in such an intense manner or even in a more intense 
way by international norms when their features make an exclusively domestic strategy potentially 
ineffective or have the chance of not fully and properly tackling abuses. 
                                                     
866 Cf. article 4 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; Nicolás Carrillo 
Santarelli and Carlos Espósito, op. cit., at 54. 
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Figure 6: Events in which express and detailed specialized human rights international obligations of non-state actors or 
alternative equally effective international actions are recommended 
 
It must be said that sometimes other strategies different from non-state duties regulated 
in great detail can guarantee that all the problematic aspects of violations will be tackled. Since 
the previous ideas are recommendatory, sometimes those alternative mechanisms may be 
acceptable instead. Whether those strategies should be adopted through binding norms or non-
binding regulation is a controversial question that has been discussed by other authors. Ensuring 
full and proper responses is the crux of the matter. 
To my mind, a combination of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms (see Chapter 8, infra) 
and standards is convenient, given the shortcomings and advantages of each of those types, as 
will be explained shortly. Mechanisms and instruments that are only recommendatory may be 
ignored in practice, or even twisted and taken advantage of to improve the reputation of entities 
that have no actual intention to comply with human rights standards, as can be inferred from the 
opinion of Alexandra Gatto.867 In fact, the somewhat disappointing outcomes of non-binding 
strategies, as the Global Compact, is attributed (at least partly) by some precisely to their non-
obligatory character, which permit to ignore those strategies with changes of policies without this 
constituting a breach of duties (although some consequences with expressive effects and indirect 
legal implications can exist even then).868  
                                                     
867 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 431. 
868 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., at 52; Koen de Feyter, “Globalisation and human rights”, op. cit., at 83; John H. 
Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit., where the author says 
that “Although thousands of businesses around the world have agreed to participate in the Global Compact, its 
Strong suggestion to create 
express and detailed 
specialized international 
duties of non-state actors 
de lege ferenda
Transnational violations or 
abuses committed by 
transnational actors (risk of 
elusion of control)
Violations of vulnerable 
rights and individuals 
(require extra-efforts to 
deter them given their 
frequency, social 
acceptance, etc.)
Other violations that have 
features worth addressing 
by means of international 
standards (risk of impunity, 
especial vulnerability, etc.)
 
 
284
Concerning these issues, it is at least suspicious that initiatives that seek to create or 
recognize binding human rights obligations of actors as corporations and are supported by 
human rights activists have been opposed by the would-be addressees of the norms in 
question,869 in spite of the supposed public pronouncements of those actors about being 
committed to the respect of human rights. The fact that States have given in to the position of 
corporations870 may be due to factors as their agreeing with them, the belief that it is complex or 
problematic to adopt those obligations, double standards, weakness against economic power, 
priority being given to certain interests over humanitarian ones, or a combination of these and 
other factors. 
Even if an entity desires in good faith to heed non-binding humanitarian standards, the 
frequent lack of access to impartial and/or direct remedies concerning compliance with them and 
the missed opportunity of permitting others to point out breaches,871 along with the absence of a 
process where compliance is discussed and there is a prospect of sanctions or reparations that 
can serve to deter breaches or repair victims, are some of the problems of exclusively voluntary 
standards. While they can trigger dynamics that can change the attitudes and practice of 
addressees and others, sometimes those standards can be adopted as propaganda or to try to 
evade protests, adverse effects or being branded as violating or having no commitment to human 
rights.872 
Therefore, for the protection of human dignity from potential non-state violations to be 
effective and not merely rhetorical, binding standards and procedures that can examine non-state 
conduct must exist, in accordance to the principles and criteria of operation found in this Chapter. 
These ideas are backed by the opinion of actors like Earth Rights International, that 
criticize frameworks on corporations and human rights that do not mention the imposition of 
                                                                                                                                                            
effectiveness is limited by its voluntary nature and the generality of its principles.” Additionally, see “859 Companies 
Delisted for Failure to Communicate on Progress”, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.htmlhttp://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/8-
02-01-2010 (last checked on: 12/03/2012). 
869 Cf. John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. 
870 Ibid 
871 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 431; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 52-53; Corporate Responsibility, the corporate 
responsibility coalition, “Protecting rights, repairing harm: How state-based non-judicial mechanisms can help fill 
gaps in existing frameworks for the protection of human rights of people affected by corporate activities”, op. cit., at 4; 
Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 94-95, 102-103; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Report of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, Principle 31 with its commentary (accessibility and other requirements 
have the utmost importance). 
872 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 431; August Reinisch, op. cit., at 53. 
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binding obligations on those entities,873 or due to the consideration that some initiatives are not 
completely effective because of their non-binding character.  
On the other hand, the adoption of an exclusively hard law strategy that ignores 
complementary mechanisms will fail to take advantage of the culture fostering, persuasion, 
flexibility, indication of responsibilities (legal or not) to the public and stakeholders, and the self-
initiative concerning regulation that are promoted by soft law and voluntary initiatives.874 Non-
binding standards and initiatives can help to promote a non-state culture of human rights, which 
in the long term is of the utmost relevance. It is certainly necessary to both impose obligations 
and generate conviction and awareness about the respect of the principles underlying those 
duties. After all, as Harold Koh argued in a persuasive way, conviction about the reasonableness 
and properness of law leads to its most effective implementation.875 This may explain why John 
Ruggie and others stress the importance of creating a human rights culture of corporations876 and 
other actors. 
Soft law initiatives can create symbols of what behavior is expected from a non-state 
entity (in human rights terms, in this case), which is relevant insofar as it can impact on and help 
to modify or reinforce a given non-state pattern of conduct and to offer incentives, claims and 
standards that can be invoked by affected persons, stakeholders and third parties. Additionally, 
soft law can pave the way for future legislation, point out some possibilities of changes de lege 
ferenda, serve as a bridge between soft and hard law, or signal actions that are needed or 
problems that need to be addressed, among others. Regarding all these functions, it is pertinent 
to examine the comments of various participants in the discussion of an initiative on Draft 
Principles on “The Children’s Rights and Business”, that mentioned the following functions and 
considerations as related to the “Utility of Principles”: 
 “Clarify definitions & standards; 
 Increase awareness and commitment by business; 
 Help businesses recognize a need to commit to the UN Global Compact; 
 Enable businesses to validate their communications to clients and suppliers; 
 Support humanitarian work; 
 Help to identify areas of improvement and foster our understanding that we are on track; 
                                                     
873 Cf. Earth Rights International, Jonathan Kaufman, “Ruggie’s Guiding Principles Address Some—but not all—ERI 
Concerns”, 2011, available at: http://www.earthrights.org/blog/ruggies-guiding-principles-address-some-not-all-eri-
concerns?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+EarthRightsInternational+%28Ea
rthRights+International%29 (last checked: 06/02/2012). 
874 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 99-101; August Reinisch, op. cit., at 53. 
875 Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., at 2601. 
876 Cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 27, 29-32. 
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 Help expand the approach to child focused issues; 
 Provide input to future advocacy campaigns around ethical business practices; 
 Enable NGOs to easily identify the responsibility that business have in relation to children 
rights and therefore making it easier to engage”.877 
There are soft law instruments that indicate how non-state entities should behave, as 
illustrated, for instance, with article XXX of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man, which deals with duties of individuals towards children and parents. Moreover, sometimes it 
is hard to distinguish between soft law and hard law are hard, due to possible changes 
concerning the current status concerning the obligatoriness or lack thereof of a standard, given 
the possibilities of incorporation of its content by any of the sources of law or of its indirect 
normative reception or effects in different ways. 
All in all, because of the need to effectively protect human dignity, the existence of 
binding obligations is often indispensable to prevent the lack of access of victims to protection 
measures, the absence of investigations of alleged violations, or mere rhetorical uses of 
standards. Likewise, both adjudication and complementary mechanisms and strategies that are 
non-legal in their dynamic (that yet may have a legal basis and/or be legally regulated or ordered, 
optionally or mandatorily) and non-judicial strategies (formal or informal), such as mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, or others, can contribute to the protection of human dignity. Additionally, 
mechanisms of protection can be State-based or not; and to be properly designed and employed, 
they must meet requirements of accessibility, legitimacy, and due process, in order to maximize 
and increase the likelihood of human dignity being effectively respected and promoted878 by State 
and non-state entities.  
                                                     
877 Cf. UNICEF, The Global Compact and Save the Children, “Draft Principles: Consultation Feedback Analysis & 
Report”, The Children’s Rights and Business Principles Initiative, 2011, at 15. 
878 Cf. Corporate Responsibility, the corporate responsibility coalition, “Protecting rights, repairing harm: How state-
based non-judicial mechanisms can help fill gaps in existing frameworks for the protection of human rights of people 
affected by corporate activities”, op. cit., pp. 1, 6-7, 11, 13-14, 17-27; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
No. 31, op. cit., para. 7; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 9, 26, 29-32, 84-85, 92; Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, principle 31 and its commentary, pp. 
26-27; Jernej Letnar Cernic, “Global Witness v. Afrimex Ltd.: Decision Applying OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
Responsibility for Human Rights”, ASIL Insights, vol. 13, issue 1, 2009; Jernej Letnar Cernic, “The 2011 Update of 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, ASIL Insights, vol. 16, issue 4, 2012; Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, commentary to principles 25-31 (on 
judicial and non-judicial, State-based and non-State-based “grievance mechanisms”); Protect, Respect and Remedy: 
a Framework for Business and Human Rights, op. cit., A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 82-103; Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, para. 7. 
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Concerning the importance of that effectiveness, let me briefly quote an idea mentioned 
in the British newspaper The Guardian regarding ethics and the tourism industry: 
“A code of ethics and human rights policy is no longer enough: companies need to show practical 
examples of where they have made a difference through the supply chain, local communities, their 
workplace, and to their customers' behaviour.”879 
Taking into account all the previous ideas, it is important to bear in mind that strategies of 
persuasion, socialization, threats, acculturation, internalization, conviction or social pressure, 
among others, may make soft law (and hard law) norms relevant and have an impact on non-
state behavior.880 Their use, coupled with the greater guarantees, prospect of effectiveness, 
access, and prevention of elusion of control present in binding strategies, must be taken into 
account to generate dynamics of non-state respect of human dignity and help to overcome the 
deficits of limited and isolated strategies.  
In this fashion, for instance, it is possible to order State parties to certain treaties to 
outlaw conduct deemed as unlawful, as that related to terrorism, transnational crime, etc. The 
mandate to adopt domestic standards with a content that is to a great extent detailed 
internationally is relevant because of those acts can affect legal goods that are relevant for the 
community dimension of the international legal society. That strategy can be complemented by 
contacts, agreements, persuasion, recommendations or supervision by international and national 
authorities and by non-state entities. Those actions can remind of the existence of responsibilities 
and rights in a multi-level framework with a global legal space, and their complementarity can 
maximize the prospects of effectiveness of the protection and promotion of human dignity. Some 
of these ideas are hinted in the Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human 
Rights Council of 2008.881 
To summarize the ideas presented so far, one can say that to complement rights of 
individuals and properly address legally relevant acts such as potential abuses, it is convenient to 
create some negative capacities (substantive capacities, e.g. duties, sanctions; and procedural 
burdens, e.g. subjection to mechanisms of punishment, deterrence or discouragement) of non-
state actors through international norms, which operate as lowest common denominators. This is 
illustrated as follows: 
                                                     
879 Cf. The Guardian, “Integrating ethics into tourism: beyond codes of conduct”, The sustainable business blog, 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/blog/integrating-ethics-into-tourism and 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1008336 (both last checked on: 07/02/2012). 
880 On these dynamics, cf. analogously the analysis presented in: Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli and Carlos Espósito, op. 
cit., pp. 61-66. Concerning processes of socialization, persuasion and threats and their influence on non-state 
compliance with regulations, cf. David Capie, op. cit. 
881 Cf. Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, paras. 81-83. 
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Figure 7: Synthesis of the basic and minimum international legal responses to non-state violations proposed de lege 
ferenda 
 
Note how the substantive or procedural strategies that have been discussed in this 
section are complementary to and not replacements of the general duties of protection, that are 
implied or –employing the terminology handled by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon- inherent, and 
bind actors with an inherent capacity to negatively affect the enjoyment of human rights, being it 
necessary to regulate that capacity just as every conduct that affects legal goods must be 
regulated, paraphrasing Nijman.882  
This regulation, as was just mentioned, can be implicit, given the existence of general 
principles of law that hold every actor that injures someone responsible. This reflects an implicit 
duty to not injure. Additionally, those obligations are supported by the ideas that: 1) the content of 
the legal goods that protect human dignity is affected by non-state violations and thus the 
interests of the world community are often threatened unless implicit negative duties exist; and 
that 2) these duties seek to deal with capacities (of violating human rights) that must be legally 
addressed, as can be inferred from the opinion of the ICJ regarding capacities of non-state 
addressees or subjects of international law, taking into account that such capacities can be 
positive (such as rights) or negative (e.g. duties or other legal burdens), as revealed by the close 
                                                     
882 Cf. Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 2-5, 7, 15, 40. 
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link between powers and duties, being some of the former required for complying with the 
latter.883 The possibility of international law creating such legal capacities of non-state entities is 
permitted by its sources and the absence of an impediment to do so, as authors have put forward 
and is discussed in Chapter 5.884 
It is necessary to stress that the absence of direct detailed and specialized international 
duties or subjection to procedures of supervision of non-state actors does not always imply the 
lack of effective protection of those affected by them. After all, duties are but one of the possible 
legal capacities of non-state actors and of the mechanisms to protect individuals.885 What matters 
is that protection is effective. Therefore, it is possible to use different preventive, ex post facto, 
judicial and non-judicial, legal- and non-legal, duty-based or non-duty based, cooperation or other 
actions and strategies, as long as they are appropriate. Often, a combination of those strategies 
is the only way to ensure an effective respect of dignity by non-state actors in practice.  
This also explains why non-legal mechanisms are sometimes crucial, as held by Amartya 
Sen.886 Legal strategies that do not follow a breach and sanction logic are also relevant, as are 
for instance those that address some material and/or ideological roots, causes and (unjustifiable) 
“justifications” that lead some violators to violate human rights,887 being it necessary to address 
those causes to bring about a lasting respect of those rights. Nevertheless, in turn those 
strategies cannot sufficiently ensure the protection of human beings, and so initiatives as the 
creation of duties of respect and the imposition of sanctions to offenders (in different normative 
systems, according to complementarity criteria) are necessary because there is always the 
possibility of non-state violations, all of which must be prevented and responded to. 
Concerning the impact of different strategies on the protection of human dignity from non-
state abuses, it is convenient to first examine the link between the expressive and educative 
functions of norms and reactions by non-state actors, and secondly analyze what factors can 
                                                     
883 Cf. International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, op. cit., pp. 178-180, 182; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 71; 
Koen de Feyter, “Globalisation and human rights”, op. cit., pp. 69-71, where it is argued that the extent of both “rights 
and duties” of international organizations, addressees of norms of jus gentium, depends on “the purposes and 
functions as specified or implied in the constituent documents of the organisations and developed in practice.” 
884 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 70-73; Robert Dufresne, op. cit., 
pp. 226-227; Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law, op. cit., pp. 39-41. 
885 In my opinion, both negative and positive legal capacities of addressees of norms belonging to jus gentium can be 
substantive or procedural or share both traits. Concerning this, one can think for instance of the freezing of assets, 
bans or embargoes as some negative capacities encompassed in jus gentium. Cf. Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-
Maslen, op. cit., at 195. 
886 Cf. Amartya Sen, op. cit., pp. 327, 345 (although it must be noted that I disagree with the author on the point he 
tries to make regarding the alternative or exclusive character of non-legal mechanisms of promotion of some rights, 
because I consider they must be complementary in order to ensure the enjoyment of all rights with judicial and legal 
backup so that no victim is unprotected). 
887 Cf. Preamble to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. 
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interplay with norms in order to increase or decrease the likelihood of an obligation being more 
effective. 
Concerning the first issue, it must be recalled that different authors have posited that 
legal actions, which include but are not limited to lawmaking, can send signals to society and to 
diverse actors that may contribute to modifying or endorsing behaviors and attitudes, thus 
impacting on the beliefs of addressees of multiple social actors and having a cultural and 
expressive impact (limited or strong, dismissed or accepted, depending on many circumstances).  
As a result, the creation of duties, judicial actions or the adoption of other measures that 
aim to protect human dignity from non-state threats, even in the absence of express non-state 
international obligations, may modify the attitude of non-state entities, making them pay more 
attention to the consequences of their behavior out of conviction or the desire to avoid sanctions 
and opposition, for instance through boycotts or losses in reputation and concerning their 
interests.888 
Even if for the sake of discussion one were to consider that non-state entities with 
international legal capacities will hardly adjust their behavior to what is legally expected of them, 
the expressive function of legal actions against non-state violations may persuade other actors to 
attach importance to the foundation and values of those actions and promote and protect them 
from offenders, through shaming techniques, boycotts, legal action,889 or otherwise.  
Taking into account that non-state entities can pursue interests shared with others 
through networks and informal alliances,890 and that as has been pointed out by David Caron 
third-parties may be interested in the outcome of legal actions and try to act in consequence to 
have their opinion heard and protected,891 tendency that is found in the framework of international 
law generally,892 the identification of non-state violations may persuade actors that promote 
human rights to operate in ways that help protect individuals from non-state abuses. 
Because of its potential to impact on non-state behavior directly and indirectly (i.e. 
influencing other stakeholders or actors that can exert influential pressure on it), it is pertinent to 
study what factors can increase the effectiveness of both the expressive, symbolic and educative 
                                                     
888 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 431; August Reinisch, op. cit., at 53. 
889 Cf. Thomas Buergenthal, op. cit., pp. 803-804; Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 55-56; Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., 
pp. 34-38; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., 98; Daniel Thürer, op. cit., at 47; ASIL, Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting: 
The Challenge of Non-State Actors, The American Society of International Law, 1998, pp. 22-23. 
890 Cf. Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 184-185, 192-200, 
203; Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework”, op. cit., pp. 3-4, 8. 
891 Cf. David D. Caron, “Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals”, Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 24, 2007, pp. 413, 417. 
892 Cf. Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 53-55. 
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functions of norms and their effectiveness, particularly concerning the dimension of their 
protection from non-state abuses. 
Regarding this, different studies and scholars have devoted attention to processes and 
factors that may weigh on the respect of (international or other) legal norms by a given entity.  
To begin with, it is convenient to handle a distinction drawn by Harold Koh, according to 
which coincidence with what a norm decrees can be due to: a) mere coincidence between what 
law states and how an actor behaves; b) strategic or rational considerations that lead an entity to 
think that it is convenient to act in accordance with what law prescribes; c) the desire to obtain a 
“reward” (in whatever form, be it a benefit, etc.) expected for compliance with the law, or to avoid 
sanctions for failure to abide by legal prescriptions; or d) a belief and conviction according to 
which a norm ought to be followed.893 
Complementing this interesting insight, other studies indicate that there are many factors 
that may exert an influence on the choice of which of the previous four courses of action to follow, 
including the following: ethical/moral considerations; pressure and/or tendency to follow the 
example set by others as paradigmatic in a system/group of common belonging (acculturation, 
etc.); economic or rational considerations; support of a given ideal or actor; knowledge or 
absence thereof; or extra-professional and academic background and considerations.894 Other 
factors suggested by authors include strategic, political or normative considerations about the 
possible consequences or principle implications of compliance with or disregard of law.  
It is necessary to take into account that frequently it is not a single factor but the 
combination of many of them that exerts an influence on the perception of an addressee (aware 
of it or not), that in the end makes its own decisions are is thus responsible.895 
Given their impact, the influence of those relevant factors has to be taken into account 
when designing norms that address non-state behavior for them to increase the likelihood that 
they are heeded in practice. Therefore, the specific mindset, context and reality of each actor has 
to be taken into account when designing legal actions and strategies, to ensure that they appeal 
to them and third parties and have more possibilities of being successfully obeyed or promoted. 
This implies, for instance, that it is necessary to take into account the reality of an actor when 
                                                     
893 Cf. Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., at 2600-2601. 
894 Cf. analogously, Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli and Carlos Espósito, op. cit., pp. 52, 57, 62, 64-65, 67-71. 
895 Cf. Ibid., at 66; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights 
Law: A Rejoinder to Roda Mushkat”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 20, 2009, pp. 444-445; Ryan 
Goodman and Derek Jinks, “Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 726-
727, 731, 743, 745-746; Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 177, 194-196. 
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adopting secondary norms on responsibility or substantive standards that address it, as has been 
expressed by some authors.896  
Nevertheless, strategic considerations are not to be regarded as the only criterion to 
inspire the design of non-state positive and negative capacities, because there is something that 
cannot be negotiated: the respect of human dignity by every potential violator. There can be no 
compromise concerning this, least we make individuals means of other entities when they desire 
to achieve their interests and the non-conditional inherent worth of individuals is ignored. 
Therefore, strategic considerations serve to make regulations that are necessary for protecting 
individuals fully effective in practice, not to decide whether to create them or not: human beings 
take precedence. 
That non-state entities can adjust their behavior to what is decreed in norms is 
demonstrated by some examples, such the fact that IHL or other international norms can impact 
on and modify non-state attitudes, compelling them to justify their behavior and seek to avoid 
being declared as violators (out of the desire to avoid sanctions and opposition, or out of 
conviction and the belief that they are bound by those norms), as has been explained by Fred 
Halliday, Annyssa Bellal or Stuart Casey-Maslen,897 among others.  
It cannot be denied that some non-state actors will disagree with the norms that compel 
them due to their not agreeing with their content or the way in which they were adopted 
(considering, for instance, that their opinion was relevant and was not considered). In those 
cases, the norms can still be effective. For example, they may be enforced or prompt actors to 
express and justify their disagreement.  
Alternatively, for a variety of reasons (e.g. brazenness in spite of the correctness of a 
norm due to attaching more importance to selfish interests), addressees, especially powerful 
ones, sometimes simply ignore the need to explain their behavior and opt to face the 
consequences of their conduct. When public interests such as the protection of human dignity are 
at stake, members of the world community should not make those actors think that they can get 
away with their violations, lest they foster them and with their negligence and omission have their 
responsibility engaged as well due to acquiescence or negligence. 
A very interesting possibility concerning stimuli of non-state compliance with international 
law is that of internalization. It illustrates the multi-actor framework of the current world society 
and the multiplicity of normative manifestations. First of all, authors as Günther Teubner and 
                                                     
896 Cf. Robert Dufresne, op. cit., pp. 227, 229; José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 2011, pp. 30-34; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 53. 
897 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 35; Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 194-195. 
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Rafael Domingo, among others, consider that non-state actors may adopt normative 
manifestations that, for those entities, are akin to law even if it is not incorporated in public legal 
systems (domestic or international ones). Sometimes those manifestations are called global law 
or lex privata, being in my opinion the latter a more accurate term when it is created by private 
actors, due to its emphasizing the private nature of its creators; while the former must be 
considered in my opinion a broader term, since participation in global legal spaces is not 
restricted to private entities.898 
These normative manifestations have an undeniable importance, regardless of 
agreement with their legal character or not, since they can guide and inspire non-state entities 
and serve as a measure with which to assess their behavior. This has been acknowledged by the 
theory of Global Administrative Law, and those standards can be transformed into or recognized 
by public legal systems, as happens for instance with the possible ascription of effects to 
standards of the ISO in the WTO, which derives from the recognition of the relevance of those 
normative manifestations -legal or not-.899 
Interestingly, the process can be the reverse one, with private non-state entities 
incorporating recommendations or norms of public legal systems or other non-state actors. This 
can happen due to dynamics of persuasion or introduction of the considerations of those 
prescriptions in their own norms, among other processes. This confirms that apart from unilateral 
or multilateral self-regulation (e.g. by means of some codes of conduct, agreements, contracts as 
those related to the safety of workers, etc.), non-state entities can also engage in hetero-
regulation,900 adopting norms that are meant to regulate the conduct of other actors (public or 
private, State or non-state), in the same way that public actors (State entities and international 
organizations)901 can. 
It is important to be aware of the fact that just as norms enacted by States can be 
contrary to international law and engage their responsibility, what non-state actors perceive as 
                                                     
898 Some theories posit that non-state actors can develop legal norms outside the frameworks of domestic and 
international law, due to reiterative processes where behaviors are labeled as legal or illegal, during the course of 
processes of hierarchization, temporalization and externalization. The terminology of global law as equating with law 
emanating from private entities without reference to State-sponsored legal systems may be misleading, since 
alluding to globality is more reminiscent of an all-encompassing category, that surpasses just private entities and 
includes public actors as well. Therefore, I agree with Domingo’s proposed terminology. Aside from terminological 
matters, however, both theories offer interesting and many accurate insights. These issues are examined without 
endorsing the theory of non-state “binding” law in: Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 31-34. 
899 Cf. Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law”, op. cit., pp. 36-37, 52-55. 
900 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., at 33, on non-state self- and hetero-regulation. An interesting and important 
contract that seeks to improve the safety of workers in the garment industry in Bangladesh is described in 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/press-releases/2013/07/08/accord-announces-implementation-plan (last checked: 
09/07/2013). 
901 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 99-101; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 43-49. 
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“their law” or norms can violate international human rights and guarantees. This is the case, for 
example, of the so-called ‘law’ 002 of the guerrilla FARC of Colombia, in furtherance of which that 
group considered itself legitimized to blackmail asking for a “revolutionary tax”, and threatened 
with consequences as kidnapping those who failed to pay it.902 
This case highlights how determining whether lex privata amounts to non-state law or not 
is tricky and involves many considerations, as for instance the possible risk of legitimization effect 
concerning non-state normative manifestations that are contrary to essential interests of the world 
community and all levels of governance. Public elements and the respect of rights thus must be 
used to evaluate non-state regulation.  
In any case, just as labeling a non-state actor as a violator of human rights does not 
legitimize it but quite the contrary, considering that a “non-public” regulation is condemned and 
considered contrary to human rights emphasizes the need to prevent its being applied and to 
declare that it constitutes an abstract violation. Moreover, its authors must face condemnation of 
civil society and public actors based on the legal and non-legal, ethical and moral dimensions of 
human rights, which have been important throughout the history of human rights activism and 
legal evolution. 
This multiplicity of possible interactions and influences of actors and normative dynamics 
reflects a changing social landscape, the opportunities of which must be taken advantage of to 
effectively protect human dignity in a multi-actor and multi-level framework. Furthermore, civil 
society and non-state actors can exert pressure in different ways to push for a more protective 
system of human dignity. Apart from exploiting current opportunities, the existence of non-state 
violations of human rights can no longer be ignored by some, lest the suffering of some victims 
that are unprotected delegitimizes the system903 and makes it crumble due to internal normative 
inconsistencies and failure to have solidarity with all who suffer, being that solidarity an imperative 
goal of the human rights movement.  
To achieve this, all regulations -private and public- can contribute to recognizing the 
existence of the aforementioned violations and therefore to highlight the need to protect human 
rights goals and interests -legal goods-, which are not only found in domestic and international 
law because, due to synergies, their core is shared in a global legal space of interdependence 
                                                     
902 Cf. http://www.elmundo.es/2000/05/03/internacional/03N0065.html; “El ‘negocio’ de los secuestros: Las FARC 
obtuvieron más de 20.000 millones de pesetas con la extorsión en el año 2000”, 25 March 2001, available at: 
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2001/03/25/internacional/985538651.html (last checked: 07/02/2012); “Farc 
‘proscriben’ el secuestro y dicen que es hora de dialogar”, El Tiempo, available at: 
http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/farc-dejaran-en-libertad-a-soldados-y-policias-secuestrados_11226728-4 (last 
checked: 27/02/2012). 
903 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
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and interaction, in which the failure of one actor or level can lead to an ineffective and insufficient 
protection of the shared interests of legal systems and actors. For this reason, the protection of 
human rights from non-state actors must both have an international legal dimension and not 
ignore global governance and global dynamics that are necessary for its effectiveness.904 
For these reasons, I disagree with assertions as those of Jean D’Aspremont in the sense 
that the study of non-state transnational or other regulations is outside the scope of the scientific 
study of international law.905 To my mind, that study is relevant for analyzing international law, 
because soft law can contribute to strengthening the protection of global legal goods in practice, 
and also because its content can be later included in hard law or produce effects indirectly. 
Furthermore, the study of international law should be critical and made in light of human and 
social needs, their relation to international norms, and their effective promotion, taking into 
account power and legal practices.906  
This alludes to the idea that, unlike what some notions of a “purity” of law suggest, law is 
not hermetic and neither can nor should wholly exclude meta-legal and extra-legal 
considerations. After all, theoretical conceptions have an impact on legal practice, and an 
extreme positivism may ignore important realities are related to law, which can lead to ignoring 
ethical imperatives and attacking human nature in practice.907 Law is not a goal in itself: it is a tool 
that must be used to protect and favor human beings or, at least, that should not harm them. 
Moreover, de lege ferenda considerations, as those presented in some soft law 
instruments and theories, must be as examined as well as de lege lata studies. After all, 
international legal scholars, international participants and practitioners engage in analyses related 
to both codification and the progressive development of law,908 and given its constant change it is 
imperative to carefully examine what the content of law should be and cannot have in the future. 
                                                     
904 Cf. Jan Klabbers, op. cit., locations 426 and 435 of 11783 (Kindle version). 
905 Cf. Jean d’Aspremont, “Non-State Actors in International Law: A Scholarly Invention?”, Paper presented in: FWO 
Seminar—Non-State Actors in International Law, Leuven, 2009, 10-13, available at: 
http://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/projects/non_state_actors/publications/aspremont.pdf (last checked: 07/02/2012). 
906 Cf. Anthony Carty, “Sociological Theories of International Law”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Oxford University Press, on some roles that the sociology of international law can have in legal studies; ¿Qué 
es el derecho global?, op. cit., pp. 141-226. 
907 Cf. footnote 169, supra; Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Law”, op. cit., at 62; Janneke Nijman, 
“Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., pp. 124-131; Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. 
Lasswell, “The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order”, op. cit., pp. 8-29; Myres S. 
McDougal, “Some basic theoretical concepts about international law: a policy-oriented framework of inquiry”, op. cit.; 
David Kerr, “Pope says Nazis showed danger of power divorced from natural law”, op. cit., where it is mentioned that 
“Pope Benedict pictured life in a culture dominated by positivism as akin to living in “a concrete bunker with no 
windows,” one in which “we ourselves provide lighting and atmospheric conditions, being no longer willing to obtain 
either from God’s wide world.”. 
908 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 215-217; José A. Pastor 
Ridruejo, Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones Internacionales (12th edn.), Tecnos, 2008, pp. 
74-75; article 15 of the Statute of the International Law Commission. 
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Concerning the question of why both positive and negative impacts of non-state actors on 
human rights are worth being addressed in an international law embedded in a multi-level 
framework, it can be said that law must ensure that the contribution of non-state actors is not 
hindered and that their abuses are properly condemned and tackled, given the relevance of both 
types of impact.  
Those considerations are indicated to all actors in domestic and international societies by 
norms addressing both types of roles of non-state entities concerning the protection of human 
rights, educating them in relation to the fact that legitimacy depends in part on the respect of 
human dignity.909 This rebuts the argument according to which granting subjectivity or legal 
capacities to non-state actors automatically legitimizes them, because the creation of negative 
legal capacities (subjectivity or duties) of actors that violate human rights, such as terrorists,910 
precisely indicates that they can engage in acts that deserve being reproached. 
The possession by an actor of one kind of capacity, such as rights or duties (or other 
positive or negative legal capacities) reveals that it can also possess other (positive or negative) 
legal capacities in the same legal system that envisages them. Sometimes, both positive and 
negative legal capacities are linked. This happens with human rights that are correlative to 
express or implicit non-state duties. Another example is the fact that NGOs are entitled to 
participate in international scenarios (positive capacities) if they comply with some pertinent and 
appropriate duties and meet certain requirements (burdens) envisaged in the same normative 
regime in which entitlements are found.911 
Likewise, potential human rights offenders, such as powerful and not-so powerful 
corporations, that are granted rights or capacities under international law, can also be bound by 
duties imposed on them, with this not being this contradictory in the least. Thus, their having 
rights or being addressees of international norms in branches concerned with economic or 
investment interests implies that they can also be subjects of other international norms, including 
human rights norms. Therefore, they can be obliged to not undermine or weaken guarantees of 
human dignity. In my opinion, this challenges the fears of some authors who consider that 
regarding an actor as a subject of international norms (i.e. being its addressee) can undermine 
                                                     
909 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 36. 
910 On this concern, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, op. cit., pp. 456-458. Versus: Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 46-53. 
911 Cf. Menno T. Kamminga, “The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State 
System?”, in Gerard Kreijen et al. (eds.), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford University Press, 
2002, pp. 402-403; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 785; Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations, Resolution 1996/31, 25 July 1996, Part VIII, paras. 55-59. 
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human rights law:912 not necessarily. To cite a previously invoked example, non-state entities are 
not empowered or legitimized a result of their being addressees of international humanitarian law, 
as common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 clearly indicates. 
To conclude this section, it can be stressed that in a socio-legal context in which private 
entities can cooperate among themselves or with public actors to promote human rights or to 
carry out violations and secure their product and effects, and can elude State or international 
control and even challenge it thanks to their power, the protection and full reparation of victims 
(see Chapter 7, infra) makes it necessary for multiple legal systems, levels of governance and 
actors to cooperate, complementing each other given their respective advantages and 
drawbacks, and to operate in a transnational and integrated fashion to protect humanitarian legal 
goods found in a global legal space of interaction.  
In such a context, different actors and authorities, including international and national 
ones, can contribute to protect victims that were not be effectively protected by a State due to its 
fault or incapacity. They may do this thanks to legal possibilities offered by extradition, the 
principle aut dedere aut judicare/punire, universal (civil or criminal) jurisdiction, contacts and 
agreements with non-state entities or even direct supervision –criminal or not- of non-state 
conduct, among others. In turn, non-state contribution must be permitted. A framework that takes 
advantages of all those lawful possibilities will make the protection of human dignity more likely. 
Additionally, the existence of a general international obligation of all non-state entities to 
respect human rights is necessary, given their potential capacity to violate them and the 
corresponding need to prohibit their perpetration of violations or cooperation with them. Moreover, 
a general implied duty that commands this might exist already, as argued in Chapter 6. Such 
general obligations can and must be complemented by more detailed specific non-state duties 
that deal with vulnerable rights or worrisome offenders, taking into account special needs of 
protection. 
 
                                                     
912 In this regard, José Alvarez has posited that conceiving corporations as international legal persons may have 
detrimental effects for human rights law due to the influence of, for instance, investment law on it and the defenses 
that may be invoked by corporations which can undermine public interests, although the same author mentions that 
some do not share his fears and that focusing on rights and duties of those and other entities rather than branding 
them as persons may impede the risks he perceives from materializing, although some disagree. Cf. José E. Alvarez, 
“Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, op. cit., pp. 27-35. 
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4.2. The necessity of a comprehensive framework of the protection of human dignity that 
encompasses all possible threats and contributions 
A narrow interpretation of the legal protection of human dignity that excludes protection 
from non-state threats is not only contrary to reality but also to its logic and legal foundations,913 
as explained in this Part.  
Interestingly, as mentioned by Elena Pariotti, there is a trend that seeks to focus more on 
what the content of rights is instead of focusing on the formal identity of offenders. A 
consequence of this is the attention paid by different initiatives to the fact that non-state actors 
can violate human rights just as a State can, and to the need to address their conduct through 
binding and non-binding legal strategies.914 For example, the recruitment of children by both State 
and non-state entities915 needs to be normatively addressed in international human rights terms 
(and has been so addressed),916 lest the protection of children is made conditional and based on 
the identity of those who intend to recruit them in armed groups.  
The preceding considerations are illustrated and dealt with in reports that mention how 
non-state entities can threaten the enjoyment of human rights, such as one that discussed how 
the non-state group al-Shabaab of Somalia controlled portions of territory and jeopardized the 
enjoyment of human rights. For example, it has been mentioned that: 
“[S]ources indicated that in al-Shabaab areas, human rights were practically non-existent because of 
the organisation’s interpretation of Sharia law, which was not in accordance with the beliefs of 
ordinary Somalis. Consequently, people lived in fear as there were serious punishments if al-
Shabaab orders were not obeyed [...]  
The human rights situation has deteriorated particularly in areas controlled by  
al-Shabaab and allied extremist groups. Al-Shabaab and other armed groups have continued to 
violate women’s rights in southern and central Somalia. Women face arbitrary detention, restriction of 
movement and other forms of abuse for failure to obey orders, including non-observance of dress 
codes. There is a rising pattern of inhuman and degrading treatment, including stoning, amputations, 
floggings and corporal punishment. Men too are subjected to inhuman and cruel treatment for their 
illicit relationship with women and other offences such as ‘spying’. Journalists have been repeatedly 
subjected to threats and short-term arbitrary detentions, particularly in Baidoa and Kismayo. Al-
Shabaab has increasingly targeted civil society groups, peace activists, media and human rights 
organisations. Humanitarian assistance has been severely hampered by the prevailing insecurity and 
threats specifically targeting humanitarian agencies. In southern and central Somalia there is 
                                                     
913 Cf., for instance, Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 186-187 (A narrow conception of human 
rights law does not correspond to the basic philosophy of human rights or to the reality of many situations in which 
ANSAs operate. As suggested by one author […] the foundational basis of human rights is best explained as rights 
which belong to the individual in recognition of each person’s dignity. The implication is that these natural rights 
should be respected by everyone and every entity”).  
914 Cf. Ibid., at 187; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 96. 
915 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, 28 June 2011, 
para. 131. 
916 Cf. Tilman Rodehäuser, op. cit. 
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evidence that children are being exposed to recruitment into armed forces by all parties to the 
conflict.”917 
Additionally, the fact that human rights experts consider that “citizen security is a human 
rights issue”918 confirms that some wrongful acts, as for instance crimes, can affect the enjoyment 
of human rights. This reality justifies and explains the existence of obligations of States and some 
other authorities to prevent and respond to those and other violations when they are committed 
by private or public actors. Additionally, this reflects the idea that the framework of the protection 
of human dignity is multi-dimensional, and that an interface approach that integrates different 
normative and operational components that are necessary for this protection and integrates 
different actors, branches and normative strategies, is crucial to effectively protect human dignity.  
One manifestation of this underlying spirit and its relevance concerning non-state threats 
is found in the protection of refugees persecuted by non-state entities. While rejected by some 
authors, other scholars and the UNHCR itself rightfully consider that this protection falls within the 
scope of the legal protection of refugees, which also protects human rights.919 The link between 
human rights and other regimes, as the one on the protection of refugees, also demonstrates that 
the humanitarian corpus juris can overcome formal normative boundaries and distinctions,920 and 
that it is possible and necessary to protect individuals from non-state violations. 
In sum, the foundation of human rights and guarantees, which is the protection of human 
dignity, is non-conditional, inherent and must be effective. Therefore, it cannot be narrowly 
interpreted.921 Accordingly, the relevance of public and private threats and contributions to that 
protection must be taken into account when interpreting, designing, evaluating or modifying the 
framework of its protection.922  
                                                     
917 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, 28 June 2011, 
paras. 94, 104. 
918 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release 53/11, 7 June 2011. 
919 Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, Reedited, Geneva, 1992, para. 65; Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126; Claire de 
Than and Edwin Shorts, op. cit., pp. 31-32 (note how articles 1.A.2) of the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and 1.2 of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees do not mention anywhere that States must be 
agents of persecution or involved for persons to be protected by the law of refugees). 
920 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through 
Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 19-20, 36-37. 
921 Cf. Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 
922 It has been mentioned that the public and private dimensions of society and contexts of violation (and of actors, I 
might add) are relevant for protecting human rights. Cf. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
United Nations, Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidance for Human Rights 
Monitors, Professional training series No. 17, 2010, at 22 (regarding the protection of persons with disabilities); 
articles 3 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women and article V of the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Persons with Disabilities. 
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This is supported by the fact that violations may occur with or without State 
involvement,923 and that even if a human rights stricto sensu language is not used, considerations 
of human rights and guarantees must be present in the legal responses to those violations.924  
Just as the creation of human rights obligations of States respond to needs of protection 
and overcame the fallacy that those rights were sufficiently protected by respecting the 
sovereignty of States that were assumed to protect them,925 it is necessary to dispel the false 
myth of the irrelevance of non-state entities in the human rights universe (both in positive and 
negative terms). This is especially necessary for the claim that law must take into account human 
necessities and protect human dignity to be truly and effectively upheld;926 for law and legal 
practice to be consistent with legal values, principles, obligations and rights; and for the call to 
protect individuals whenever they are vulnerable and have “specific needs of protection” to be 
heeded.927 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
923 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release 34/11, IACHR Condemns Murder of 145 People 
whose Bodies were Found in Clandestine Graves in Mexico, 18 April 2011, where a State was urged to deal with 
crimes regardless of whether it was purely attributable to non-state organized criminals or State agents are involved. 
Similarly, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, op. 
cit., para. 247; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 
Merits, op. cit., paras. 172, 176. 
924 Cf. Koen de Feyter, “Globalisation and human rights”, op. cit., at 74. 
925 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., at 254. Just as liberty must be protected from States due to their possible abuses, it 
must be protected against all abuses, regardless of to whom they are attributable. Furthermore, cf. Annyssa Bellal 
and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 
926 Cf. The community is concerned with the welfare of individuals, and theferore if there is a relevant violation, such 
as a violation of human dignity, it must be regulated and implicit rules and principles can already address it. This 
does not create subjects, but addressees, because reality does not create legal personality, but implicit duties and 
other legal capacities can exist in a legal system. Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 253-254, 268 269; Santiago 
Villalpando, op. cit., pp. 392, 394, 396-398, 401, 407; Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of 
law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal personality”, op. cit., at 40. 
927 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, Judgment, 4 July 2006, para. 88. 
(“[T]he Court has further established that from the general duties to respect and guarantee the rights, special duties 
are derived which are to be determined according to the specific needs of protection of the legal person, either due to 
his personal condition or the specific situation he is in”). 
 
 
301
 
 
 
 
 
PART II. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY FROM NON-STATE 
ABUSES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
302
INTRODUCTION 
 
Unlike what is suggested by some reductionist and State-centered accounts of 
international law, jus gentium counts with a rich background, theories, practices and traditions 
that permit it to integrate both an intra-gentes and an inter-gentes component and incorporate 
cosmopolitan aspirations gradually.928 Therefore, not only international relations, but also the 
protection of human beings are rightfully part of international law. 
In this context, the fact that non-state actors may possibly harm individuals and prevent 
them from enjoying their inherent rights must be the object of international legal action, as 
explained in Part I. As will be explained in Chapter 5, positive international law can perfectly 
address those violations.  
Having Part I explored why non-state violations of human rights are legally relevant 
conduct, it must be asked if the perpetrators and assistants of those violations are legally 
responsible, case in which they will have a duty to repair victims: it depends on whether they 
have breached international obligations of their own. 
This is because, as is well-known and is indicated in the famous Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts –Article 2- and in the draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of international organizations –Article 4- of the International Law Commission 
(hereinafter, ILC) adopted on second reading in 2011, two conditions must be met for an entity to 
be considered responsible: 1) a breach of an obligation of that entity 2) must be attributable to it. 
Apart from questions of responsibility, and as examined in Part I, there are different 
strategies and mechanisms that seek to protect human dignity from non-state abuses that are not 
based on the existence of international legal obligations. While Part I explored why and when all 
those strategies must exist, this Part will be more technical in scope and examine how those 
mechanisms and obligations can be created, why there may be implicit obligations in light of 
positive international law, and what the content and requirements of all those instruments can be. 
Concerning the distinction between strategies based on the obligation-reparations 
scheme and other mechanisms of promotion and protection of dignity, it can be said that systems 
with aspects and elements that are not based on that scheme are considered to belong to models 
of non-legal responsibility.  
                                                     
928 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 10-22; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 4-12. For purposes of clarity, throughout this 
book the terms jus gentium and international law (given its current prevalence) will be used almost interchangeably, 
unless otherwise stated. However, I manifest my preference for the former. 
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In this sense, for example, Bin Cheng comments that the ordinary sense of responsibility 
may be construed as the necessity of an entity that is “the author of an act”, especially a 
“reprehensible” one, to “bear the injurious consequences” of that act.929 By contrast, in a moral 
sense responsibility alludes to the moral duty that an author of an act has to bear its 
consequences or to behave in some manner. According to Cheng, the difference between these 
various models of responsibility lies in the fact that they consider that someone can be 
responsible by employing standards of a different nature. In his own words: 
“[A] person may be considered, by moral standards, as the author of an act and its consequences, 
and, for that reason, as incurring a moral obligation to repair those prejudicial consequences that 
have affected others. ‘Moral responsibility’ differs from ‘responsibility’ in ordinary usage and 
‘responsibility’ in its legal sense, in that in the former only common standards, whilst in the latter legal 
standards are applied.”930 
Therefore, while in an ordinary and moral sense entities that cause injuries are expected 
to bear the consequences of their acts and to repair those who are affected by their conduct 
(burden that is also present in legal responsibility),931 legal responsibility requires the breach of 
preexistent obligations, as demanded by the respect  ofthe principle of legality and its 
components of accessibility and foreseeability. This is discussed in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights and flows from secondary norms of international law.932 The legal 
responsibility of non-state actors must therefore satisfy those requirements. 
The logic of the previous ideas determines the structure of this Part: before ascertaining 
what the regime of the responsibility of non-state actors for the violation of human dignity dictates, 
it is necessary as a prior logical step to determine whether those actors can have legal 
obligations that seek to protect human dignity. If so, afterwards alternative legal capacities and 
strategies that can pursue that protection will be examined. 
The study of the obligations and other legal capacities of non-state actors and different 
legal strategies is important for many reasons: first of all, their existence and use send messages 
to actors and individuals, indicating the wrong character of non-state violations and preventing the 
consideration that international law is unjust for not being opposed to non-state abuses. 
Conversely, denying international substantive and procedural protection from non-state violations 
or, even worse, not recognizing the latter, would be reproachful in moral (and legal, as seen in 
                                                     
929 Cf. Bin Cheng, op. cit., at 163. 
930 Ibid., at 164. 
931 Ibid., pp.163-166, 169, 170. 
932 Cf. articles 2 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (A/56/49(Vol. 
I)/Corr.4) and 4 of the 2011 version of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations 
(A/66/10); European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 
185-187, 236. 
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Part I) terms,933 and that would be detrimental to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the legal 
system, among other negative repercussions.  
Simultaneously, the substantive message and signal sent by non-state duties and norms 
and strategies protecting human dignity may lead either to an internalization of human rights 
norms by different actors or to the generation of positive and negative incentives that push for 
compliance with substantive obligations, especially if the legitimate opinion of non-state 
addressees has been taken into account, which is a factor that can stimulate compliance. After 
all, the clear identification of non-state duties or legal capacities based on the protection of human 
dignity may encourage or discourage certain conduct and lead to positive changes in the attitude 
of the actors on which obligations are placed and other members of the local and world societies. 
 
  
                                                     
933 Cf. Cedric Ryngaert, “Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International Law”, 
in Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds.), Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law, Ashgate, 2010, pp. 
76-77. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONDITIONS AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS AND OTHER LEGAL CAPACITIES OF NON-STATE ENTITIES  
 
This Chapter will explore the legal justifications, requirements and possibilities related to 
the imposition or acceptance of legal capacities of non-state entities that have the purpose or 
consequence of protecting human dignity. 
In a few words, it can be said that obligations or other legal burdens of non-state actors 
can have the purpose of protecting human dignity and be created with the sources of the legal 
system in which they are incorporated. In the case of international law, given the multiplicity of 
sources of international law and the decentralization of legislative and adjudicatory functions in 
this legal system, it is especially important to analyze all of its sources in order to assess whether 
a given actor is bound by a certain obligation that protects human dignity either directly or 
indirectly. The identification of non-state obligations related to this subject-matter is, thus, a 
complex issue, and it is important not to dismiss the possibility of an actor having human rights 
obligations and burdens just because no obligations created with one specific source of 
international law have been found in a given moment.  
When analyzing positive international legal responses, it must be borne in mind that, 
when considering sources, there is no hierarchy of norms determined by the source that 
produces them, i.e. there is a horizontality of sources.934 Rather, hierarchy depends on the 
content of the norms, because when it excludes opposition from all manifestations it belongs to 
peremptory law.935 
Additionally, given the evolutionary nature of international law, that can accommodate 
new norms that fill gaps in the future –and there are many gaps when it comes to the subject 
being examined- and can incorporate mechanisms or interpretations that adjust preexisting 
norms to new needs and realities, the content or operation of law may change and a source that 
does not protect human dignity from non-state violations can do so later. This may permit law to 
better respond to human needs and explains the emergence of a socio-legal trend that seeks to 
hold every violator of important international norms accountable. 
Altogether, from the perspective of lawmaking, the obligations imposed on non-state 
actors that are created via the sources of international law may be ascribed to one of several 
categories related to the creation of duties: self-regulations, i.e. those in which a non-state actor 
                                                     
934 Cf. José A. Pastor Ridruejo, Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones Internacionales (12th 
edn.), Tecnos, 2008, pp. 162-163; Manuel Díez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público (16th 
edn.), Tecnos, 2007, pp. 118-119. 
935 Cf. Ibid. 
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binds itself to comply with an obligation via a commitment, declaration, or another unilateral act; 
hetero-regulations, which are those addressing an actor that did not participate in their creation 
and are adopted by third parties; and finally participative-regulations, related to lawmaking 
processes in which the actor that has an obligation or a burden had the opportunity to effectively 
participate (not necessarily with a defining vote) in the whole process that led to its adoption or in 
one or more of its stages. The two first categories echo the notions of self-regulating norms and 
hetero-regulating norms that have been identified by scholars who study the relationship of non-
state actors with international law.936  
Admittedly, the former categories are based on formal distinctions, because law can be 
understood as a process that surpasses legislative functions and includes other activities, such 
as the judicial one; and because non-state actors can exert influence on the creation and 
implementation of international and other norms formally or informally, within the system or from 
without.937 For description and classification purposes, however, those categories may be useful. 
From the perspective of normative nature and effects, the fact that a “norm” has not 
emanated from the sources of international law makes it either soft law, a political or a non-legal 
norm, or part of the international comitas.938 Prima facie, all those types have as common 
denominator their “non-binding” character from an international legal perspective.939 This 
assertion, however, may be misleading and must be qualified, because as explained in Part I, 
even though they do not produce legal effects directly, they may do so indirectly: i) by having their 
content included by a norm created through the sources of international law; or ii) due to 
application of a norm or principle that, while not incorporating or replicating its content, gives 
some legal effects to the existence of those non-legal norms. In my opinion, it is preferable to call 
them non-legal norms instead of “non-normative” rules, because they can regulate conduct and 
have the features of a norm despite not being directly legally binding and not having direct 
international legal effects.940 
Concerning hard law, the analysis of the interaction of non-state actors with the legal 
sources of obligations and legal burdens of non-state actors that seek to protect human dignity is 
of the utmost interest. Such relationships can assume many forms, as explained below.  
                                                     
936 On such processes, from a general point of view, cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 22-34; Andrea Bianchi, 
“Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 183-187. 
937 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., 22-26; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First 
Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors: Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and Scope of 
Project and Legal Issues, The Hague Conference, op. cit., pp. 8-11. 
938 Cf. Manuel Díez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público (16th edn.), Tecnos, 2007, at 134. 
939 Cf. Ibid.; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 192, 194. 
940 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., at 192; Hans Kelsen, Pure 
Theory of Law, University of California Press, 1978, at 65. 
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Basically, the three dimensions or relations of non-state actors in relation to sources of 
legal capacities that impose burdens refer to the following possibilities: non-state actors can be 
passive entities, that is to say, have a passive role in the sense that they are simply addressees 
of norms; non-state actors can be participants or proactive entities, role they assume whenever 
they directly or indirectly exert an influence on the creation of norms addressing non-state 
conduct –even their own-; thirdly, non-state actors can be active contributors in the adoption and 
effectiveness of norms and, conversely, can hinder them. These threefold set of relationships 
indicated that non-state actors can officially and unofficially have a direct or indirect impact on the 
dimensions of lawmaking, law-enforcement and implementation of norms,941 among others. 
In sum, there can be passive and active relationships between non-state actors and 
norms, referring to the possibility that besides being the addressees of norms regulating their 
legal capacities they can participate in or contribute to the creation and effectiveness of non-state 
international legal capacities. Chapter 6 will explore general and specialized international legal 
obligations, and the remainder of the present Chapter will examine the bases and conditions for 
the creation of those obligations and other legal capacities that non-state actors can have. 
 
5.1. The legal personality or subjectivity of non-state actors: preconditions for them to 
have international legal capacities in the human rights corpus juris? 
Legal capacities of non-state actors can have negative connotations due to the burdens 
and prohibitions they impose. They can have the purpose of protecting human dignity and 
regulate obligations or not. Moreover, they can have an international legal character and be 
imposed on actors, although sometimes they are binding if the respective actors consent to them. 
That being said, this section intends to explore if international law can accommodate 
those capacities and, if so, what the conditions for their creation are. Two pertinent kinds of legal 
questions can come to mind: first, if human rights must and can have a role in relations that do 
not fit the mold of the State-individual(s) archetype; and whether it is possible to impose duties on 
or permit the acceptance of duties by entities whose international legal personality or subjectivity 
is dubious or contested by some.  
The first question was examined in Part I, but in positive legal terms the second one 
seeks to determine if it is possible for an entity lacking “international legal personality” to have 
legal capacities under jus gentium. This has to do hesitation or reluctance by some authors 
                                                     
941 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit.; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state 
Actors”, op. cit., pp. 182-197. 
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regarding the possibility of the existence of non-state legal capacities, due to an alleged non-
settled character of the personality of some entities that are candidates to have those 
capacities.942  
This reveals that the questions of subjectivity or personality allude to a supposed 
prerequisite of some manifestations of the legal protection of human dignity from non-state 
violations because, according to some authors, their absence would preclude all discussion of 
non-state international human rights obligations and make it necessary (if possible) to assign 
legal personality to entities before they can enjoy those or other legal capacities, even in this field. 
To examine this question, it is convenient to begin by clarifying what non-state entities 
are.  
In international law generally, and concretely in the field of the protection of human 
dignity, some authors focus on some entities, such as corporations, armed groups, international 
organizations or NGOs,943 and some international standards have attempted to regulate or have 
successfully regulated some of the aspects of the links between that protection and some or all 
non-state actors. This has happened, for instance, in regard to the protection of individuals from 
corporations, field in which draft articles, principles, standards and a special framework have 
been developed; concerning duties and responsibilities of non-state armed groups and their 
members; and also in efforts to recognize the participatory status of entities that can contribute to 
the promotion of human rights –including corporations and others, which can be positive or 
negative actors-.944 This acknowledges that non-state entities can play a positive or negative role 
in the protection and promotion of human dignity, something confirmed by doctrine. 
The fact that some initiatives and norms focus on protection from and promotion by some 
entities, such as corporations or armed groups, does not mean that other non-state entities 
cannot violate human rights and should not be addressed in normative terms. For example, 
individuals may commit international crimes that are contrary to human rights, and pirates, 
terrorists or transnational organized criminal groups can also adversely impact on the enjoyment 
of human rights and guarantees, even cooperating with other non-state entities to successfully 
                                                     
942 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 
943 Cf. Philip Alston, “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?”, op. cit., pp. 8-14, 27-35; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 96-102; Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, 
op. cit., paras. 34-41, 46. 
944 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 105; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 63-64; Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations, Resolution 1996/31, 25 July 1996, para. 25; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 50; articles 4.3 
and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, or 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women.  
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carry out violations.945 Just as protection is insufficient if it is limited to protection from State 
abuses, victims would be unprotected if only the abuses of some non-state entities are 
addressed. However, initiatives that focus on some entities are important because they can better 
respond to the problems posed by them and take into account their features. 
It is also important to mention that there are many different non-state entities, often quite 
different from each other. For this reason, it is important to ascertain what entities have a non-
state character, and whether some or all of them can have legal personality or need to possess it 
in order to have international legal capacities that seek to protect human dignity. 
Concerning the notion of non-state actors, different authors, as Philip Alston or Andrew 
Clapham, consider that the notion encompasses all actors that are not States,946 as the term itself 
suggests. Such a non-reductionist approach, if it is considered that individuals must be protected 
from all such actors, is the one that can offer the most complete protection of human dignity, 
which does not exclude State duties but rather insists on them, for instance concerning their 
positive duties. 
Regarding the notion being examined, I consider that while the most widely used term is 
that of non-state actors, I prefer to talk of non-state entities, because it can be more 
encompassing insofar as some authors allude to participants in the international legal system, 
and the idea of acting may lead to a similar understanding by some, which could make some 
consider that if an entity is not a participant or actor in international society it cannot have 
international human rights responsibilities. This would not offer the full protection required by the 
central position of individuals in the humanitarian corpus juris and by the demands of human 
dignity, which must be universal and non-discriminatory, as seen in Part I. This is illustrated by 
the fact that there are non-state “entities” that “have emerged as actors in international legal 
processes and with specific reference to human rights law”, as Elena Pariotti  argues.947 
I grant that it is possible to understand the term actor as actor of violation or actor of 
promotion/protection. However, others may use a different notion, and for this reason I consider 
that the expression non-state entities stresses the subjective dimension of the universality of 
protection. As can be seen, I use both terms throughout this work, given the prevalent use of the 
notion of actors in legal literature. However, I understand the expression as indicated above. 
                                                     
945 Cf. Tom Obokata, “Smuggling of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective: Obligations of Non-State and 
State Actors under International Human Rights Law”, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 17, 2005, pp. 394-
395, 400-407. 
946 Cf. Bob Reinalda, Bas Arts and Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Relations: Do They Matter?”, 
in Bas Arts et al. (eds.), Non-State Actors in International Relations, Ashgate Publ., 2001, pp. 1-3; Bob Reinalda, 
“Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 12-15; Andrew Clapham, 
“Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 1-5. 
947 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 95. Similarly, cf. Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, op. cit., para. 15. 
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As to the encompassing character of the definition of non-state actors/entities, some 
ideas support the consideration that they are all entities, collective or individuals, 
artificial/constructs or natural, that are different from States. 
Firstly, while in social sciences and other disciplines (even in some legal studies) some 
alternative theories have put forward different definitions, according to which elements such as 
independence and autonomy from States or the level in which an entity operates –e.g. 
international, domestic or transnational- determine if an entity can be considered as a non-state 
actor,948 in my humble opinion those conceptions are not to be employed directly in legal studies, 
because they may lead to conclusions that differ from what jus gentium regulates (e.g. implied 
duties of all potential offenders) and are designed for specific purposes and to examine certain 
dynamics.  
Let me provide one example: in social sciences and international relations studies, some 
authors consider that international organizations are not non-state actors (although other authors 
disagree), given the influence of States over international organizations and/or due to the fact that 
States are members of those organizations and have the capacity to determine their 
competences and functions in their constitutions. Conversely, for international law international 
organizations are clearly not States: firstly, they have a legal personality that is different from that 
of its members; and secondly, those members can be State or sometimes non-state actors as 
well, as mentioned by José M. Cortés and the International Law Commission in its articles on the 
Responsibility of international organizations.949  
As a consequence, the rights and duties of international organizations may differ from 
those of their members, and accordingly their responsibility is engaged when they breach their 
own duties, and the responsibility that State and other members can have is not automatically 
transferred to the Organizations they are members of or vice versa.950  
Therefore, one cannot say that those organizations are States, and in light of the principle 
of individual responsibility it would be certainly improper to automatically engage the responsibility 
of an organization in connection with the acts of its members or vice versa, although in some 
occasions the responsibility of organizations can arise in connection with that of their members, 
but always in connection with their own conduct.  
                                                     
948 Cf. Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, op. cit., paras. 16-17, 19, 23; Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, 
“Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework”, op. cit., pp. 2-4. 
949 Cf. article 2.a of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations, A/66/10, 2011; José Manuel 
Cortés, op. cit., pp. 111-114; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 233. 
950 Cf. articles 2, 17, 18, and 58 through 62 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international 
organizations, A/66/10, 2011; José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 295-366; Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of 
Sovereignty”, op. cit., pp. 538-540. 
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As a result, if in legal terms non-state entities are all entities different from States, 
certainly international organizations are non-state actors. Truth be told, some authors accept this 
idea951 and others challenge it.  
Another point that is widely discussed in regard to differences about the definition of non-
state actors/entities in contrast to that of States between the legal discipline and other academic 
disciplines is related to the nature of entities that form part of State structures, such as organs, 
bodies or agents of States. Non-legal academic disciplines often examine their relevance when 
those members (e.g. judges) act independently from the dictates of high-ranking or central State 
authorities and even challenge them in different scenarios, including the international one. For 
this reason, some of their studies and critical legal works regard them as different from 
governments or other State organs.952 That consideration is useful for their purposes, but in legal 
terms the different entities mentioned in this paragraph are clearly State entities and can engage 
the international legal responsibility of their States in legal terms.953 For this reason, I consider 
that a convenient way to describe them is that of “sub-state” actors,954 which does not regard 
them as non-state but allows their separate analysis. 
The previous considerations do not suggest that the studies conducted in other 
disciplines are irrelevant for legal scholars and practitioners: law is not –and cannot be- detached 
from reality, and must answer to practical social and individual problems (not to fashions). 
Therefore, the study of the conduct and social or other impacts of some actors must certainly be 
taken into account in the legal realm, to better design or interpret norms in a way that makes it 
possible to respond to the challenges those actors pose in an effective manner and to accordingly 
protect international legal goods they affect in one way or another.  
That is why I disagree with Jean d’Aspremont’s consideration about the supposed 
impertinence of some studies about non-state entities from an international legal perspective due 
to the lack of formal lawmaking powers of those actors.955 Certainly, if law ignores reality and its 
implications, it will fail to evolve in a way that keeps up with new challenges or will not address 
problems, and what is more: non-state abuses and contributions are legally relevant, impacting 
                                                     
951 Cf. Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, op. cit., paras. 19, 26, 31, 35-39; Andrew Clapham, “Non-state 
Actors”, op. cit., pp. 1-4; Koen de Feyter, “Globalisation and human rights”, op. cit., at 52. 
952 Cf. Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework”, op. cit., pp. 2-3; 
Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 194-197, 199; Eric A. 
Posner, op. cit., pp. 40-53. 
953 Cf. article 4 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Judgment, op. cit., 
para. 72; Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade to the previous judgment, para. 1. 
954 Cf. Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 9, 11 (where the notion of “sub-state” actors is handled). 
955 Cf. Jean d’Aspremont, “Non-State Actors in International Law: A Scholarly Invention?”, op. cit., pp-. 5-13. 
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on legal goods and values, and their study is thus not only pertinent but also necessary. 
Furthermore, regulations or actions of non-state actors that do not directly and immediately 
generate legal effects may produce indirect international legal effects.956 
Relevant aspects of non-state actors examined in non-legal disciplines that are important 
for the purposes of legal analyses include the types of interests sponsored by an entity; the 
dimensions and levels in which entities are created and participate; their independence or lack 
thereof; their abilities and expertise; the possible manipulation of regulations by them; their being 
prone to be affected somehow by legal and non-legal standards; their influence and power and 
kind of power; their interest in having a good image; or the possible mechanisms of pressure 
(boycotts, shaming) to which they can be vulnerable or that they use to achieve their goals, 
including the protection of human beings,957 taking into account that those strategies are not 
always effective,958 among others.  
Those aspects are certainly relevant in relation to what law can and should do to better 
protect human beings, and also in relation to how protection purposes can be achieved, taking 
into account that law is an instrument that can be used by multiple actors to serve some ends, 
intentionally or not, and that accordingly those human beings who ultimately shape it (as a 
disaggregated analysis shows) have the moral imperative of making it serve human beings, not 
being it justifiable for law to refrain from protecting human dignity alleging difficulties due to non-
state power or their not being the object of legal studies. 
The law on the protection of refugees, for example, acknowledges that in practice non-
state entities can be agents of persecution and, accordingly, given its goal of protecting 
persecuted individuals, grants protection to individuals addressing that problem in a way that, 
without resorting to some mechanisms employed by other humanitarian norms (adjudicatory 
procedures, direct duties, etc.), can offer that protection by means of different strategies. Still, its 
norms could also follow the example set by other human rights norms, and it actually stresses the 
principle of non-refoulement, which is also present in human rights law stricto sensu. 
Additionally, both legal and non-legal studies that examine the relevance and roles of 
non-state entities consider that it is necessary to regulate the conduct of actors that can impact 
on interests endorsed by law, society or ethics in order to prevent and respond to abuses or 
permit and foster non-state cooperation. This is especially important because non-state entities 
                                                     
956 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, Report: Preliminary issues for the ILA Conference 
in Rio de Janeiro, op. cit., at 3. 
957 Cf. Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 188-190; Daniel 
Thürer, op. cit., pp. 44-47; Thomas Buergenthal, op. cit., pp. 803-804; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 
958 Cf. Menno T. Kamminga, “The Next Frontier: Prosecution of Extraterritorial Corporate Misconduct before non-US 
Courts”, op. cit., at 186. 
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may be receptive to (legal or non-legal) regulations that protect human dignity and modify their 
attitude in accordance to them, more likely if norms are perceived as just or are regarded as 
legitimate due to their taking into account non-state opinion,959 not necessarily supporting it but at 
least explaining why it is rejected. In a context in which non-state actors with both public and 
private origins and goals960 can violate human rights and elude controls due to different factors, 
the regulation of non-state conduct must not only indicate to multiple actors and normative 
systems that they can and must protect from non-state abuses, but also be designed in a way 
that overcomes shortcomings and problems posed by those factors.  
Among the factors and dynamics that can weaken the public control of non-state conduct, 
the following are found: decrease or loss of power of authorities; privatization; delegation of 
functions; interdependence; greater relevance of non-national identities and interests; legal gaps; 
lack of coordination among actors and normative systems; selfish interests of authorities and 
actors; alliances among non-state entities that violate rights –e.g. between terrorists and pirates 
or criminal groups-; increase of hard, soft or systemic power of non-state entities; expertise, 
flexibility and reputation (not necessarily justified) of some actors. Those and other elements are 
either intensified or permitted by globalization and demand a global and coordinated response.961 
That being said, it is necessary to analyze if international law restricts the notion of non-
state actors somehow. Concerning this, absent a general international legal definition of those 
entities, scholars and authorities use that expression and similar ones to refer to actors different 
from States that are relevant for the issues they examine. Logically, unless otherwise noted in an 
event, that category is a very broad one that includes many actors quite different from each other. 
Concerning this, Philip Alston has explained that the expression non-state actors 
encompasses a multiplicity of entities that differ among themselves in many respects and have as 
their only common characteristic their not being States. For this reason, he considers that 
expression as one that is not specialized, concrete or sophisticated962  
That non-state actors are quite varied is evident at a glance. The category includes 
religious groups, NGOs, international organizations, corporations, non-state armed groups, 
                                                     
959 Cf. On the possible reluctancy of non-state entities to abide by norms in whose creation they did not have a say, 
cf. Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, op. cit., pp. 177, 191. On the importance of permitting stakeholders give 
opinions on public decisions that affect them, cf. Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceiçao, Katell Le Goulven, and Ronald U. 
Mendoza, “Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today?”,  op. cit., at 5; Inge Kaul et al., “How to Improve the 
Provision of Global Public Goods”, op. cit., pp. 27, 30, 32-33, 35, 47.  Regarding procedural legitimacy, cf. Thomas 
M. Franck, op. cit., 7-8, 22-23; Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., pp. 2628, 2642-2643. 
960 Cf. Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 12-15. 
961 Cf. Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, op. cit., pp. iii-iv; Durban Declaration of the World Conference against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 2001, paras. 11, 105. 
962 Cf. Philip Alston, “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?”, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
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transnational criminal organizations, pirate groups, terrorist organizations, individuals that can act 
as international criminals, or terrorists, among others. 
To my mind, while the term is certainly vague and sometimes imprecise to some degree, 
it is not unadvisable or erroneous. In fact, it is quite useful when all non-state entities have 
relevance in one context and all of them must be examined, as is the case for the subject matter 
being studied. Moreover, it would be impractical or burdensome to come up with endless 
specialized terms. After all, specialized expressions are compatible with that of non-state actors, 
being subcategories of them, which can be used when conducting specialized studies of some 
actors. Therefore, apart from the fact that all non-state actors are different from States, there is 
another feature that is common to non-state entities: their being able to impact on the 
effectiveness of norms that protect human dignity, reason why all of them are relevant for 
international law.  
Moreover, terms that refer to subcategories of non-state actors are not replacements of 
the general notion of non-state entities, because even within those subgroups the actors that are 
included may differ from others also classified in them. This happens, for example, with 
international organizations, that are different from States and comprise multiple kinds of 
organizations, some of which have some peculiarities that make them, in the opinion of some, 
different in relevant regards from others, making it necessary for some to regulate them in a 
specialized manner that differs somehow from regulations devoted to international organizations 
generally, which in turn are subject to secondary rules of responsibility that differ from those of 
States,963 in order to better deal with their unique and different features. 
Because of this, just as sometimes all non-state entities can be addressed in like manner, 
for instance prohibiting all of them from violating human rights, sometimes it is necessary to come 
up with specialized studies and norms that take into account the particular aspects of some non-
state actors, for instance concerning their responsibility or the need to design different legal 
strategies to promote compliance in a way that addresses particular challenges of an actor or 
promotes their special contributions. 
Nevertheless, as some authors argue, while the category of non-state actors does 
encompass many entities that are different from each other, it also highlights how the current 
socio-legal context is characterized by “diversity and complexity”.964 
                                                     
963 Cf. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 211-223, 225-293; Nicolás Carrillo, “The Links between the 
Responsibility of international organizations and the Quest towards a More Reasonable and Humane International 
Legal System”, op. cit., pp. 445-446, 451. 
964 Cf. Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, op. cit., para. 17; Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International 
Legal System, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 4-5. 
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Additionally, Andrew Clapham mentions that while generally non-state actors are 
understood as all entities different from States, some authorities, regimes and norms (for 
instance, regarding specialized regimes of protection from torture or some peace-building or 
peacekeeping regimes) may adopt narrower definitions of the expression non-state actors for the 
purposes of the application or interpretation of some specialized norms or initiatives, given the 
narrower scope or personal field of application of the respective norms and strategies or the more 
limited competence of an authority regarding the entities it can examine or enter into contact 
with.965  
Specialized and limited uses of the notion may be abused and lead to reductionist 
strategies, for instance to offer protection only from some actors despite this not being necessary. 
Yet, specialized approaches can also be convenient due to needs to particularly deal with some 
entities that particularly affect some norms or to take into account their unique features so as to 
better engage them, although specialized approaches are not always necessary or convenient, 
because as was just indicated they may lead to deficits in the protection of legal goods if used all 
the time or in an expansive manner. 
In any case, specialized uses of the expression ‘non-state actors’ do not detract from its 
general understanding and do not modify it either, given their narrower scope. In consequence, 
unless expressly determined –case in which a normative conflict with implicit duties and other 
norms would arise-, when a limited definition of non-state actors/entities is used, it cannot be 
understood as being applicable generally. This is analogous to the fact that narrow definitions of 
human rights violations for the specialized purposes of an instrument are not applicable in 
general human rights provisions. Therefore, for instance, specialized attention paid to 
corporations in draft human rights law articles or principles that seek to protect human rights, or 
the (consultative) status given to some NGOs along with the entitlements this provides,966 do not 
mean that other non-state entities cannot have similar or different negative or positive legal 
capacities. 
In consequence, as confirmed by Clapham, definitions of non-state actors that do not 
encompass all non-state entities must be understood as applicable only in relation to the 
instrument(s) or regime(s) in which they are provided.967 One example that illustrates this is 
offered in Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), where the following definition, “for the 
purpose” of that instrument is provided: 
                                                     
965 Cf. Andrew Clapham, “Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 1, 4-6. 
966 Cf. ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, paras. 27-54; Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
967 Cf. Andrew Clapham, “Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
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“Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting 
activities which come within the scope of this resolution” (emphasis added). 
Since that Resolution, issued pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, addresses the “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” and the imposition of 
obligations on States to not assist non-state actors in the acquisition or use of certain weapons 
and to enforce prohibitions on this issue, the understanding of non-state actors therein does not 
constitute a general international legal interpretation or definition of non-state actors, given the 
specific purpose of the use of the term in that instrument and its limited scope.  
Furthermore, as indicated above, the coexistence of general and specialized notions of 
non-state actors serve to accommodate both specialized regulations that address specific 
challenges concerning some actors and also common obligations (e.g. peremptory duties), 
principles and guiding tenets applicable to all actors. The latter must perforce take into account 
that lex specialis provisions may exist, but these must respect the basic core of the effective and 
comprehensive protection of human dignity (see Part I, supra). 
Certainly, there may be general considerations and standards that are applicable to all or 
many non-state entities despite the (important) existence of specialized regimes. This is made 
possible, among others, by the analogous applicability of legal doctrines, principles and notions 
applicable to entities as States, international organizations or individuals. For example, the 
rationale and part of the content of rules addressing complicity and assistance found in 
international criminal law and secondary rules of responsibility applicable by analogy to other 
entities may be applicable to actors as corporations.968 
Authors as Jordan Paust and Fred Halliday have challenged as fallacious in legal and 
extra-legal terms an international legal State-centrism even in the Westphalian system and 
different historical stages, due to the participation and relevance of other actors. If that is so, it the 
international legal relevance of non-state actors is even greater currently, since globalization 
offers more opportunities to non-state participation and interaction with international legal goods, 
and may make the effects of their conduct have a greater impact. Handling the notion of non-
state actors can help jus gentium take that into account, catch up with reality, and protect victims. 
Likewise, the second common feature of non-state actors, i.e. their capacity to impact on 
international legal goods, coupled with the legal relevance of their violations or promotion of 
human dignity, explains how norms and mechanisms that were traditionally understood by some 
as having nothing to do with those actors can be and are being interpreted as demanding 
                                                     
968 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 341-345; articles 16 and 41 of the ILC articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001, or 14, 42, and 58 of the ILC draft articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations in its 2011 version (A/66/10). 
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protection from non-state entities and authorization of their contribution,969 lest human dignity is 
not protected fully and effectively and legal practice contradicts legal values and principles.  
Therefore, for me it is surprising that some authors and entities highlight the positive 
contribution that some non-state actors can provide to the protection of human rights but ignore 
the fact that they can violate the protected content of human rights. Sometimes this is ignored to 
further theoretical or political interests:970 to the detriment of victims, it must be said, and contrary 
to human dignity. 
Some criticisms of the expression non-state actors allude to its giving central relevance to 
States, while others prefer narrower categories, such as that of transnational actors.971  
Concerning the first criticism, one can say that the category serves to distinguish some 
entities from States, not to underestimate them. The first idea that the expression tends to inspire 
is one of difference from States, not a supercilious attitude towards other actors.  
Granted, the distinction is implicitly based on the fact that for (too) long States were 
considered the centrals participant of the “international” legal system, as that expression reveals: 
for this reason, I prefer the expression jus gentium to that of international law, because it is a 
more encompassing notion that indicates the presence of different entities and legal goods, 
especially human ones. Still, other actors were relevant even in previous stages of international 
law.972  
In regard to the second objection, international relations scholars have pointed out how 
non-state entities may participate not only in the transnational but also in the national or 
international arenas. Therefore, given the possible non-state impact on human rights and 
guarantees in any of those socio-legal levels, it would be improper to limit the regulation and 
study of the protection of human dignity from non-state violations to actors that operate in a 
transnational fashion or to any other entities, because that approach would suffer from a problem 
similar to that of State-centered conceptions of human rights: it would impede the protection of 
many victims, be contrary to equality and non-discrimination, and prevent a full and effective 
protection of human dignity. 
That being said, it will now be explored if non-state entities have or need to have 
international legal personality to be able to possess international legal capacities that seek to 
                                                     
969 Cf. Part I, supra. 
970 Cf. Chris Jochnick, op. cit., at 58; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 
25-58, where persuasive counter-arguments to some theories that deny the direct relevance of humanitarian norms 
vis-à-vis non-state entities, described therein, are offered. 
971 Cf. Philip Alston, “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?”, op. cit., pp. 3-4; Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, op. cit., para. 49. 
972 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., pp. 
985-1004. 
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protect human dignity, imposed on them or consented to by them. To examine this, the current 
state of the discussion on international legal personality and subjectivity must be explored.  
Concerning this, Janne Nijman persuasively argued that the notion of international legal 
personality can be traced back to a theoretical construct of Leibniz, who wanted to strike a 
balance between the freedom and power of political entities and their belonging to and being 
embedded in an imperial structure, in which their power was not absolute (unlike what some 
positivists that defend a false alleged preponderance or exclusiveness of States hold).973  
It is important to take this into account, because by force of repetition of the notion of 
personality, not found in a general international legal norm but rather employed by doctrine and 
jurisprudence974 –and if such a norm existed, it could still be modified-, practitioners and scholars 
may attach a meaning or importance to it which it originally lacked. This may be contrary to the 
possibilities offered in international law or may prevent that law from fulfilling its potential in 
several areas, especially that of the full protection of human dignity against all violations. This 
makes it necessary to ponder what the purpose of notions of personality is and how they stand in 
light of current legal goods, developments and goals of the international legal system.  
To my mind, the starting point of these analyses is the necessity of making non-state 
actors subject to international law. This is because, as expressed previously, due to the power 
that many non-state entities have had and have nowadays975 it is important to acknowledge their 
influence and interaction with legal goods and the need to subject them to regulations, so as to 
ensure that events in which they are able to disrespect human dignity are deterred through 
prohibitions or preventive measures and are addressed. This implies recognizing their violations 
and placing legal capacities on them, and also to grant entitlements of participation to entities that 
can or should contribute to promoting the respect of human dignity. 
Just as the emergence of powerful political entities made Leibniz realize the importance 
of subjecting entities to law, both to give them positive capacities (as rights) or negative ones, the 
power of non-state entities -which has increased with globalization but is not only a recent 
                                                     
973 Cf. Janneke Nijman, “Leibniz’s Theory of Relative Sovereignty and International Legal Personality: Justice and 
Stability or the Last Great Defence of the Holy Roman Empire”, IILJ Working Paper 2004/2, International Law and 
Justice Working Papers, Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law, 2005, at 2-6, 
33-57; Janne Elisabeth Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004, pp. 448-
449. On the problems of State-centeredness, cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 5-12, 20; Concurring Opinion of Judge 
A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 10-
20. 
974 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 59-63, 70-73; Roland Portmann, 
op. cit., at 9; José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 109-111; Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 46-52. 
975 Cf. Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, op. cit., at 3. 
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phenomenon-976, and their capacities to violate or promote rights (that are powers to do 
something),977 demand that their legally relevant conduct is properly regulated by jus gentium, 
which is concerned with a society not composed only of States. 
Another idea related to the possibility of actors having legal international legal capacities 
indicates that since both entitlements and burdens can belong to the same legal system and be 
created by the same sources, the possession of international rights by a non-state reveals the 
capacity to possess international legal burdens, and vice versa. This has been recognized by 
NGOs, practitioners and scholars, even concerning corporations and other private actors,978 and 
explains the reluctance of some to create or recognize either rights or duties of an entity, because 
they may fear that this will reveal the possibility of that entity having other international legal 
capacities. Nonetheless, denying that some actor must be obliged to not violate human rights is 
unacceptable, no matter which entity that actor is. 
Some authors consider that instead of talking about personality, given the confusions of 
the term and how misleading theories about it can be, it is preferable to talk of legal capacities 
because, as they accurately point out, the sources of international law can regulate legal 
capacities of any entity, even if they are not formally recognized as actors but their conduct is still 
factually and legally relevant. In other words, an actor can be addressed by international law even 
if some authors do not consider it a subject of law or as one that has international legal 
personalities, as long as the sources of jus gentium determine so979 and, I might add, there are 
no logical or legal impossibilities, such as express or implied exclusions of the possession of one 
capacity based on normative considerations about peremptory or systematic legal 
impediments.980  
For instance, because of the functional and secondary character of international 
organizations and the relevance of their functions and goals, these entities cannot have 
                                                     
976 Cf., for instance, Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., at 319; Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, op. cit., pp. iii-iv. 
977 According to the Oxford Dictionaries available online, one of the meanings of power is “the ability or capacity to do 
something or act in a particular way”. Available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/power?q=power (last 
checked: 10/02/2012). 
978 Cf. ASIL, Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting: The Challenge of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 34; Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 82; EarthRights International, “One Year Later, 
Citizens United Decision Prompts Calls for a Constitutional Amendment on Corporations”, 16 February 2011, 
available at: http://www.earthrights.org/blog/one-year-later-citizens-united-decision-prompts-calls-constitutional-
amendment-
corporations?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+EarthRightsInternational+(EarthRi
ghts+International), where it is held that denying the capacity of an entity to possess rights may end up denying the 
capacity for it to have legal responsibilities, thus showing how possessing certain legal capacities reveals the ability 
to possess others. 
979 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 59-75; José Manuel Cortés, op. 
cit., pp. 109-111; Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., at 34; Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 271-283. 
980 Cf. Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 34-35, 61-62; Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., at 391; Roland Portmann, op. cit., 
pp. 273-274, 280-281. 
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capacities that are not compatible with their nature and purposes. This is evinced by the analysis 
of ultra vires acts of international organizations, for instance, because the regulation of those acts 
is not and cannot be identical to that of the ultra vires acts of States.981  
Concerning this discussion about the capacity to have capacities, it is interesting that 
Gaetano Pentassuglia, reviewing the work of Anna Meijknecht, alludes to similar considerations 
when he explains how he considers that entities can have: 
“[L]egal capacity as the ‘internal’ capacity of an entity to bear rights and duties. Such a capacity would 
indeed reflect the complex of factual qualities of the entity, most notably its degree of autonomy and 
its will to exist as a separate entity, which manifests itself, in the case of composite entities, with a 
degree of organization and representation instrumental in establishing relations with other entities. 
International legal subjectivity, to be enjoyed only by entities possessing legal capacity, would instead 
indicate the ‘external’ perspective of the international legal order, namely the act of attributing rights 
and duties to an entity”982 (emphasis added). 
The prerequisite of an actor having the capacity to have some legal capacities983 refers to 
all legal capacities, not only to rights and duties.  
Moreover, apart from i) factual qualities, I consider that the internal dimension of the 
capacity to bear capacities also alludes to the ii) normative possibility of an entity to have a given 
capacity. This can be illustrated with the example of the ultra vires acts of international 
organizations, which is related to a normative feature of those entities. For this reason, there are 
“ontological” and normative capacities to have legal capacities. They allude to the complex set of 
factual and normative features of an entity that makes it able or not to possess a given legal 
capacity. This explains why there can be some exceptions to the general capacity to have 
capacities, although this should never exclude the protection of human dignity from that actor.  
Additionally, there is an external dimension of the capacities to have capacities. It refers 
to the respect of jus cogens and fundamental features of the international legal system. Thus, the 
regulation of a capacity by that legal system, rather than being only an external dimension, 
constitutes the transition to the realm of subjectivity (i.e. becoming an addressee of law). 
Additionally, the theory of legal capacities stresses that it is irrelevant whether an entity 
possesses the same legal capacities that another entity possesses or has them to the same 
extent or not. In my opinion, unlike what some authors say, the fact that an entity does not have, 
for example, the same lawmaking capacities that a State does, or other capacities of States or 
other actors, says nothing about its having or being able to have those or other legal capacities 
                                                     
981 Cf. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 110, 211-223; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, 
Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 93. Versus (regarding the secondary status of international organizations): Roland 
Portmann, op. cit., pp. 274-275, 278-279, 283. 
982 Cf. Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., at 391. 
983 Cf. Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., at 34. 
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under international law. In fact, it is possible that a State does not have all the international legal 
capacities that other entities have.984  
I find an account that focuses on legal capacities more persuasive than those that 
consider that personality is only enjoyed by entities with certain powers, which are often said to 
be lawmaking powers, jus standi or locus standi. To my mind, an entity having those powers or 
not says nothing about its being able to be an addressee of jus gentium. For these reasons, I do 
think that theories of legal personality are limited and may be confusing.985  
For instance, the fact that there can be rights or duties without related remedies means 
that an entity with substantive capacities lacking the procedural capacity of answering to them in 
international fora, explains that by virtue of its being regulated by jus gentium it is an addressee of 
that legal system. Moreover, theories that require a certain group of capacities in order to 
consider an entity as a subject or person, notwithstanding the mutability of some legal capacities, 
are forced to end up using notions of “limited” personality986 when a relevant entity only has some 
capacities. That is why I consider that the theory of capacities is more descriptive and better 
reflects legal practice. 
This is illustrated in the so-called matrix of capacities, which indicates how the legal 
capacities of each actor must be analyzed separately. It is thus compatible with the notion of the 
“addressees of law.”987 It emphasizes the relevance of each capacity and implies that an entity 
that is regulated somehow by jus gentium, even if it does not have the same capacities that, for 
example, States have, still possesses its own international legal capacities. Comparisons 
between capacities are relevant for descriptive purposes or, in my opinion, for studies about the 
need to regulate or assign more capacities to an actor de lege ferenda, in light of teleological 
considerations and the need to better protect human dignity and other global legal goods (found 
in international law and other normative systems). 
                                                     
984 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 71-74, 83; Roland Portmann, 
op. cit., pp. 272, 274-276, 278, 283. 
985 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 102, 104 (on the comparison of theories that require certain capacities or the mere 
fact of being addressees of law in order to regard an entity as a subject of law); Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 58-62. 
Versus: Manuel Díez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público, Tecnos, 2005, pp. 258, 292; José 
Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones Internacionales, Tecnos, 2003, 
pp. 185-194. The ILC has acknowledged that “The acquisition by an international organization of legal personality 
under international law is appraised in different ways. According to one view, the mere existence for an organization 
of an obligation under international law implies that the organization possesses legal personality. According to 
another view, further elements are required. While the International Court of Justice has not identified particular 
prerequisites, its dicta on the legal personality of international organizations do not appear to set stringent 
requirements for this purpose.” Cf. ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with 
commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, pp. 8-9, para. 8 of the commentary to article 2. 
986 Cf. Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 55-56. 
987 Ibid.; Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 271-283; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 
op. cit., pp. 59-83. 
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Some studies of international legal personality examine the most regulated actors and 
other relevant entities that are also or according to them should be addressed by jus gentium.988 
Nevertheless, different authors persuasively argue that the doctrine of international legal 
personality purports to have a pedagogic function that is often exceedingly descriptive and not 
prescriptive. Still, that function is not always fulfilled and must give way to legal reality, and the 
notion of personality is truly sometimes rather confusing and can operate as a “mental prison”, as 
pointed out by Rosalyn Higgins, Andrew Clapham, José M. Cortés, José E. Alvarez and others.989 
This is why the idea of legal personality could turn into a barrier to logical and necessary 
developments in the protection of international legal goods. This is because if it is employed to 
say that an entity is not a legal person under international law and therefore capacities such as 
human rights duties cannot be imposed on it, the protection of human dignity will be weakened. 
Additionally, authors may be led to think that an entity “cannot” have capacities under 
international law, which is false because, as said before, absent legal impossibilities or 
exclusions, the sources of jus gentium can create legal capacities of that entity. Moreover, if an 
actor does not have capacities at present, it can have them in the future or possess legal 
capacities to a different extent. 
Descriptions used in accounts of legal persons can thus become outdated due to the 
evolution of law. Additionally, not all notions of personality have exclusively educative functions. 
In this sense, Jordan Paust has mentioned how some conceptions of personality, such as that of 
Oppenheim and others, which are completely or almost State-exclusivist, pretend that many 
entities cannot be directly regulated by international law, which allegedly has nothing to do with 
them. Paust rejects this based on practice that is contrary to that narrow conception, and other 
authors rebut such theories from a theoretical standpoint (mentioning how the notion of “objects” 
of law ends up undermining itself and showing multiple possible addressees). Certainly, in 
practice international law has recognized the capacities of different entities, such as indigenous 
groups, among others, and non-state actors have sometimes even contributed to shape jus 
gentium.990  
A serious problem of many theories of international legal personality is that unconsciously 
theoretical analyses can turn into supposed “truths” of positive law, and make others believe that 
                                                     
988 Cf. e.g. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 269-289, 784-786; 
Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 
989 Cf. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 109-111; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors, op. cit., pp. 62-63; Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 50-51; José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of 
International Law?”, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 2011, at 8.  
990 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., pp. 
985-986, 992, 997, 999, inter alia; Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 46-52. 
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some non-state entities, as indigenous groups or non-state political groups, due to their not being 
considered to have international legal personality, cannot have legal capacities or be addressees 
of international law. The danger is that descriptions about personality may be perceived as 
prescription and become self-fulfilling prophecies,991 especially if their authors are influential, and 
therefore may also make law stagnant in practice and not regulate relevant non-state conduct.  
Apart from hindering the protection of global legal goods and human dignity, some 
theories of personality are contrary to the history of jus gentium, which throughout its history has 
included entities different from States, as happened in Greece, the middle ages or modern times, 
as can be gleaned from studies on the history of international law.992  
Additionally, several authors, as Kate Parlett, Felipe Gómez Isa, John H. Knox, Koen de 
Feyter, Antonio Cançado, Theodor Meron, Andrew Clapham, Hersch Lauterpacht and others, 
argue that unlike what was long believed by some adherents to narrow theories, individuals and 
other entities can possess international legal capacities, including as rights and duties.993 This is 
one example of how State-centered theories are limited and equivocal.994  
Unfortunately, some authors replace narrow conceptions with others that include a few 
more entities but are still limited. They often recognize the “limited” personality of a few entities 
but not that of others entities that have or can and must have international legal capacities, that 
thus are or must be subjects/addressees of international law. This explains why it is preferable to 
use the theory of subjectivity based on capacities, because it is better at describing and 
permitting lex ferenda analyses. 
Apart from agreeing with historical criticisms, I disagree with narrow conceptions of 
personality, especially those that have “normative” pretensions or effects in practice (disguised as 
descriptions of lex lata), because apart from often failing to describe, they ignore that law evolves 
                                                     
991 In other areas of legal analysis, it has been pointed out how the theories posited by scholars, even if not 
necessarily supported by positive law or legal practice, may make practitioners end up acting in accordance with 
what they believe has been accurately “described”. In this sense, Joel Trachtman has mentioned for instance that if 
citizens are convinced by doctrinal works that “international law is ineffective, their support for making and complying 
with international law could decline significantly, making [those] work[s] a self-fulfilling, and welfare-reducing, 
prophecy.” Cf. Joel P. Trachtman, short review of Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism, The University of 
Chicago Press, 2009, Global Law Books,  available at: http://www.globallawbooks.org/reviews/detail.asp?id=627 (last 
checked: 10/02/2012). 
992 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., pp. 
994-1004; Antonio Truyol y Serra, Historia del Derecho Internacional Público, Tecnos, 1995, pp. 15-17, 146-158. 
993 Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, op. cit., pp. 27-47; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 70-73, 82-83; Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal 
System, op. cit., at 370-372; Koen de Feyter, “Globalisation and human rights”, op. cit., pp. 52-53, 67-81, 90; John H. 
Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 27-31; Felipe Gómez Isa and Koen de Feyter, “Preface”, in: Felipe 
Gómez Isa and Koen de Feyter (eds.), International Human Rights Law in a Global Context, 2009, at 16. 
994 On an alternative account that does not consider that State-centric models in jus gentium have been necessarily 
overcome and that they may sometimes be beneficial or not necessarily improper, cf. Kate Parlett, The Individual in 
the International Legal System, op. cit., pp. 3, 6-7, 365, 369-372. 
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and has an instrumental character, both factually –as demonstrated by the invocation of law by 
different actors and authorities to further interests- and from the point of view of the ‘ought’. 
Concerning this, in my opinion law should be used to protect human dignity and to take into 
account human needs from a meta-legal perspective, being a tool that is not a goal in itself and 
must serve human beings.  
Even from an intra-normative perspective, norms protect interests, values and goals, i.e. 
legal goods, as recognized by entities as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
in doctrine.995 Those legal goods are relevant and their protection must guide the attribution of 
legal capacities. This is confirmed by the requirement that international norms are interpreted 
taking into account teleological considerations, as mentioned for instance in article 31 of the 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (of 1969 and 1986) and in the studies on the 
fragmentation of international law conducted by scholars or International Law Commission.996  
It is also important to identify values and interests that do not form part of positive law but 
must be included in it, as happened with the emergence of international human rights law. 
Despite considering that the theory of legal capacities better explains the possibility of 
legally addressing non-state actors, it is not possible to altogether dismiss the relevance of some 
aspects related to legal personality or subjectivity when analyzing the position of non-state 
entities in international law. It is convenient to look at these issues taking into account the 
distinction between those two notions because, as considered by Anna Meijknecht and Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, personality and subjectivity constitute different concepts.997 
In that regard, the notions of subjectivity, direct regulation and the existence of 
“addressees” refer to the possession and assignation of international rights, duties and other legal 
                                                     
995 Cf. Markus Dirk Dubber, “The Promise of German Criminal Law: A Science of Crime and Punishment”, German 
Law Journal, Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 1069-1070; Santiago Mir Puig, “Legal Goods Protected by the Law and Legal Goods 
Protected by the Criminal Law as Limits to the State’s Power to Criminalize Conduct”, New Criminal Law Review, vol. 
11, 2008; Christoph J. M. Safferling, “Can Criminal Prosecution be the Answer to massive Human Rights 
Violations?”, German Law Journal, vol. 5, 2004, at 1472; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 
95/08, Admissibility, Nadege Dorzema et al., or “Guayabin Massacre” v. Dominican Republic, 22 December 2008, 
footnote 7, and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 64/01, Leonel de Jesús Isaza Echeverry 
and Others v. Colombia, 6 April 2001, para. 22, in connection with Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment (Merits), 16 August 2000, par 117; Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49, 11 April 1980, in: Chapter II, The 
Right to Life, para. 1 of section A. General Considerations. 
996 Cf. International Law Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law, op. cit., paras. 13, 16, 21, 23, 27, 29, 30; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: 
Curso General, op. cit., pp. 375-377. 
997 Cf. Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 32, 34, 45, 49-51; Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., at 391; International Law 
Commission, First Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Yearkbook of the 
International Law Commission, vol. II, A/CN.4/144 and Add.1, 1962, at 32, paras. 3 and 4 of the commentary to 
article 1. 
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capacities –e.g. burdens, permission to do something neither prohibited nor protected in a right, 
etc.-.998  
In this regard, it is important to recall that law can do more than protect rights and 
regulate duties and conduct in a prescriptive manner,999 and can also envisage facultative 
treatments –ranging from toleration to permission-.1000 Since non-state entities can be 
addressees of norms of jus gentium, they cannot be rightly considered as mere “objects” of law, 
i.e. as entities that cannot be directly addressed by international legal norms, as explained by 
Anna Meijknecht and Elena Pariotti.1001 
Therefore, actors that have legal international legal capacities are truly subjects of 
international law. This notion is thus compatible with the theory of capacities.  
Indeed, Anna Meijknecht, Jans Klabbers and Elena Pariotti consider that an entity is a 
subject (and Portmann argues that it is a person) of international law whenever it is addressed by 
its norms, regardless of the extension or type of that regulation.1002 This idea concurs with the 
implications of the theory of capacities, because it avoids complicated theories of subjectivity or 
personality and focuses on existing legal capacities, whether they are lawmaking powers and jus 
standi or any other. Some authors consider that these two or other capacities constitute 
“evidence and requirement” of legal personality.1003 However, those capacities say nothing about 
the regulation of other capacities of an actor by jus gentium and its being able to acquire legal 
capacities it originally lacked, as has happened in international human rights law, criminal law, 
and regarding participation in lawmaking and adjudicatory processes and in relation to sources of 
law. Moreover, lawmakers are addressees of legal capacities too, in the sense that their 
lawmaking powers are recognized by and regulated in jus gentium. 
Indeed, international law has undergone a process of openness and inclusion of more 
entities that can participate and interact with its norms, either as addressees, operators, shapers 
or agents of promotion and implementation.1004 
Concerning legal personality, according to Anna Meijknecht it is a somewhat “empty” 
notion that is filled with: the capacity to bear legal capacities, the recognition of accepted 
                                                     
998 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., at 283. 
999 Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn.), Oxford University Press, 1997, at 81. 
1000 Cf. Declaration of Judge Simma to: International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, op. cit., paras. 8-10. 
1001 Cf, Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 46-52; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 102. 
1002 Cf. Jans Klabbers, op. cit., locations 2533-2540; Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 271-283; Anna Meijknecht, op. 
cit., pp. 32-62; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 102. 
1003 Cf. Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 64-66; Manuel Díez de Velasco, op. 
cit., at 258; José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, op. cit., at 186. 
1004 Cf. Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit.; Luis Pérez-Prat 
Durbán, op. cit. 
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capacities (in my opinion entitlements and burdens), the imposition or assignation of legal 
capacities, and sometimes with jus or, I might add, locus standi.1005  
Conversely, according to the theoretical construct of Roland Portmann, it is useful to take 
into account legal personality, but without it being relevant in which legal system that personality 
arises, is granted or recognized. This is because he claims that an entity can have international 
legal capacities that are analogous to those possessed by other entities, and in my opinion also 
capacities that only it has, even if it is a legal person under the domestic law of a given State. 
Other authors and standards certainly confirm that such an entity can have international legal 
capacities, and international relations studies confirm the international relevance of actors with a 
local or internal origin.1006 
The same can be said of entities whose legal personality has an international legal origin. 
The most conspicuous actors in this case are international organizations, that according to some 
authors always have legal personality; while others argue that some of them may not have legal 
personality,1007 although it could be considered that those organizations without that personality 
are actually different non-state entities. Regardless of the correct answer to this, the discussion 
raises the thorny question of whether entities without legal personality recognized in either 
international or domestic law can be the addressees of jus gentium.  
To begin this analysis, it is convenient to clarify that the term personality is not used here 
in the same sense in which it is used in discussions of international legal personality described 
above. This is because the latter refer to a) the possibility of an entity being an addressee of 
international legal norms, which according to a strict version is only possible for international legal 
persons, which would be those that have capacities, being this an argument used in doctrine and 
case law that has been criticized because of its circularity.1008  
Conversely, the notion of (formal) personality used now refers to b) entities that are 
considered to have a separate existence under a legal system. Hence, even if they are collective 
entities (i.e. composite actors or non-individuals),1009 they are deemed to be different from their 
                                                     
1005 Cf. Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 32-62; Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., at 391. 
1006 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 273-274, 276-277, 280-281; ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, paras. 5, 8, 20; 
Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 275; Bob Reinalda, “Private in 
Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 12-13; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., 
Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 271-272, 275. 
1007 Cf. article 2.a of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations adopted in 2011 
(A/66/10); José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 79-111. 
1008 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 63-64; Bob Reinalda, “Non-
State Actors in International Relations: Do They Matter?”, op. cit., at 65; José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations 
“Subjects” of International Law?”, op. cit., pp. 7, 12. 
1009 Cf. e.g. Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., pp. 393-395; Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 273-283. 
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members and actors with which they are related. This makes it possible for them to be 
independent addressees of rights, duties and legal capacities. 
Because of this, one can say that all legal persons, due to their separate formal or legal 
existence, can have international legal capacities, even if that legal existence has a national 
origin. This explanation confirms the ideas proposed in this text, because non-state entities with a 
local origin can certainly act and affect international, transnational and domestic legal goods;1010 
and the necessity to effectively protect humanitarian legal goods from all threats, State or not, 
demands that they can have pertinent legal capacities.  
That violations of human rights always affect international legal goods is confirmed by the 
legal consideration that even violations of human rights committed by States without 
transboundary elements against their own nationals are addressed by international law.1011  
On the other hand, capacities can be assigned to collective or legal persons and to their 
members, that can be simultaneously responsible in connection with one same violation but 
always as a consequence of the breach of the duties of each of them, as required by the principle 
of individual responsibility. 
Since all individuals have a right to legal personality, the next question is whether apart 
from entities with a formal or legal independent existence, collective entities with a factual 
existence that is not formally recognized by a public legal system (i.e. excluding lex lata) can 
have international legal capacities. 
From the point of view of the effective protection of individuals from all violations to their 
human dignity, which are always legally relevant, as discussed in Part I, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that in practice some collective actors, civil or “uncivil”, engage in abuses of human 
rights, criminal or not, interact with individuals, and operate in global, transnational and/or local 
planes, often in a way that would not be feasible for individuals acting alone without the 
network(s), resources and tools at the disposal of collective entities. They can even have de facto 
hierarchies, procedures and identities regardless of their legal recognition or lack thereof, which 
they may conceive as irrelevant, unjust or even inconvenient from their point of view. 
                                                     
1010 Cf. Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 12-
13; Draft Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 2003, para. 21, where business enterprises are considered to include 
“any business entity, regardless of the international or domestic nature of its activities”. Additionally, ECOSOC 
resolution 1996/31, paragraph 4, mentions that “the term "organization" shall refer to non-governmental organizations 
at the national, subregional, regional or international levels.” 
1011 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 254-257. 
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For these reasons, to protect human dignity, international law must regulate positive or 
negative legal capacities of non-state entities that do not have legal capacities recognized under 
domestic law.  
Not all actors have a factual origin: sometimes, an entity comes into existence only when 
it is created and given formal independence, as happens with international organizations.  
Altogether, all non-state entities with international legal capacities are subjects of 
international law, whether they are collective or individual and have formal recognition or not.  
One example of the existence of international legal capacities of entities that can lack 
formal legal personality and an independent legal patrimony under either domestic law or 
international law (that has no general norms for granting personality and is an “open system”)1012 
is that of non-state armed groups. Their conduct is still regulated by customary and treaty 
International Humanitarian Law, and some of those groups can sometimes consent to be bound 
by treaty law, as permitted by article 96.3 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.  
In my opinion, another example that supports the possible existence of capacities of 
entities without expressly-recognized personality in a public legal system, that highlights the 
distinction between formal existence or personality (with origin in any level) and subjectivity, is 
that of article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights, according to which petitions of a 
contentious nature can be filed in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by:  
“Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
member states of the [OAS]” (emphasis added).  
Similarly, article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities specifies that a Party to that Protocol: 
“[R]ecognizes the competence of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("the 
Committee") to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of 
individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of the 
provisions of the Convention” (emphasis added). 
These provisions highlight that it is possible for many persons acting as a group, that i) 
factually operate as a single entity and is conceived as such for certain legal purposes, or for 
entities with ii) a formal existence originating in domestic or international law, to have international 
legal capacities, including those that seek to protect individuals from non-state violations.  
In my opinion, the idea that entities with factual but not legally-recognized existence can 
have international legal capacities (both positive and negative ones) is endorsed in the decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in the Case of Boimah Flomo, et al. 
                                                     
1012 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 62-63, 70-71; Roland 
Portmann, op. cit., pp. 271-283. 
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versus Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC. The defendants objected that only entities with a 
“heartbeat” have been found to violate customary law (alongside States, it is presumed that the 
respondents meant).1013 To this, the Court answered saying, among other things, that: 
“[I]f precedent for imposing liability for a violation of customary international law by an entity that does 
not breathe is wanted, we point to in rem judgments against pirate ships. E.g., The Malek Adhel, 43 
U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233-34 (1844); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40- 41 (1825). Of 
course the burden of confiscation of a pirate ship falls ultimately on the ship’s owners, but similarly 
the burden of a fine imposed on a corporation falls ultimately on the shareholders”1014 (emphasis 
added). 
Altogether, it is not true that legal capacities of entities without formal existence are 
pointless. While it is true that ultimately individuals or entities with formal recognition that 
compose or support factual actors will be affected by legal capacities of collective entities they 
have relations with, factual entities deserve individualized attention as well, to better address their 
challenges and features.  
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals implies that an entity can have the burden of 
being subjected to a legal response directly (I only disagree with the aspect of its decision 
considering a vessel an independent actor). On the other hand, the Court says that while 
ultimately the affectation of the members or associates of an entity that is directly addressed by 
international law may exist as an indirect side effect, this effect differs from the direct purpose of 
the legal response, which seeks to directly deal with a given entity that is different from those 
indirectly affected by that response. As will be explained shortly, it must be determined if 
fundamental rights are affected directly or indirectly as a result of an action against an entity 
different from an individual, given the existence of a condition that legal capacities respect 
fundamental and human rights, studied in Section 5.2.  
Additionally, it must be taken into account that the members of collective entities can 
have responsibilities and capacities of their own, as is required by an effective full protection of 
human dignity. Certainly, members or allies of an actor can bear direct legal burdens and be the 
object of legal responses as well and have their legal own responsibility engaged due to their 
breaching obligations of their own when they participate (as perpetrators or assistants) in a 
violation of human rights, as follows from principle of individual responsibility. 
For legal purposes, the fact that some persons are affected by what happens to others, 
as social and theoretical approaches suggest, does not mean that only some of those parties or 
sides must and can be addressed by law. For instance, when a human rights violation takes 
                                                     
1013 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, pp. 5-6. 
1014 Cf. Ibid., at 15. Also see pages 7-14. 
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place, those directly affected by the act or omission that violates rights are considered as victims, 
while those who suffer and have their rights affected as a result of the affectation of direct victims 
can also be considered as victims, namely indirect ones. Likewise, it has been suggested that 
human beings can suffer as a result of conduct that directly affects some non-state entities with 
which they are related.  
This has been recognized in international human rights law, because it is accepted that 
some entities may be directly affected and lack the right to file claims but when conduct against 
those entities can indirectly affect and violate human rights, individual victims of the these  
violations can claim protection (and indirectly end up protecting the entities directly affected as 
well).1015  
Moreover, entities that do not suffer a breach of international erga omnes or erga omnes 
partes obligations directly, including human rights ones, can sometimes invoke the responsibility 
of offenders or, according to some, employ countermeasures, due to the violation of interests of 
the international community they are members of.1016 This highlights that legally relevant conduct, 
as violations of human dignity, can affect multiple actors, not only direct victims, and that State 
and non-state members of international society are entitled to promote and seek the respect and 
protection of human dignity from all violations. 
Some examples help to illustrate the previous points. Pirates and terrorists, for instance, 
can be the subjects of international norms and decisions, as happens with Security Council 
Resolutions that attempt to combat the phenomena of piracy and terrorism. While some 
provisions of those resolutions are directly related to individuals who engage in the unlawful 
activities in question, some others are designed to combat the capacity of groups. In this sense, 
rather than being restricted to addressing individuals, norms may command members of the 
international community to refrain from cooperating with actions of terrorism or piracy and to 
cooperate and adopt measures to counter them, including actions as freezing assets or outlawing 
some conduct in domestic legal systems.  
Regulations of that sort recognize the capacity of groups to engage in certain activities 
that can and must be neutralized through lawful actions in order to protect important legal goods.  
Certainly, this integral and multidimensional strategy is the most effective one, because 
while it is necessary to sanction and prohibit the conduct of individuals that threatens the 
effectiveness of humanitarian legal goods, it cannot be denied that their capacity to act and their 
                                                     
1015 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 9; Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., pp. 
393-395. 
1016 Cf. articles 48 and 54 of the ILC articles on State responsibility or 49 and 57 of the International Law 
Commission’s draft articles on the Responsibility of international organizations adopted on second reading. 
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modus operandi sometimes answer in part to group structures and networks that need to be 
equally tackled and regulated, lest human dignity cannot be effectively protected from all 
violations. This logic is relevant to address violations committed by groups and individuals that 
engage in transnational and local organized crime. 
There are different examples of the aforementioned logic that can be found in the 
following provisions. For instance, Resolution 1373 (2001) of the Security Council decided that: 
“[States shall] Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of 
persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission 
of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons 
and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds 
derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and 
associated persons and entities […] 
Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, 
financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or 
indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the 
commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and 
of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such person […] 
Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in 
terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the 
supply of weapons to terrorists […] 
Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on 
issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing 
counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents […] 
[And also called upon States to] Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of 
operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; 
forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of 
communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons 
of mass destruction by terrorist groups […] 
[And noted] with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational 
organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of 
nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes  
the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels 
in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security” 
(emphasis added). 
That excerpt illustrates how non-state groups or entities without formal personality, 
mentioned therein as “entities”, “groups” or “networks”, can also be addressed directly or 
indirectly by international law, because they are relevant and can affect legal goods of the world 
community. This is remindful of the idea that international law and global governance should 
regulate the activities of entities with the capacity to affect their interests.  
The cited resolution evinces that obligations or recommendations directed to States or 
other authorities or actors concerning non-state entities. They can indirectly affect and address 
these entities and their capacities and position in international legal terms and relations of the 
international society. This presupposes a recognition that those entities can engage in legally 
relevant conduct contrary (and sometimes beneficial) to international (and global) legal goods. 
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More intense and direct regulations can be used as well, but the choice to employ them must be 
made taking into account various factors, as those explored in Chapter 4. 
Another example is provided in several provisions of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, which have a human rights dimension 
insofar as they seek to tackle some behavior that affects human rights and guarantees.1017  
For instance, article 10 of the Convention, read in light of paragraphs (a) and (c) of article 
2, distinguishes between groups, individuals, and legal persons, being the last two entities subject 
to liability in connection with misdeeds in which organized criminal groups participate. Treaty 
norms recognize that to address certain acts criminal organizations, their allies and members 
must be the object of legal responses, and also acknowledge that legal responses must take into 
account the challenges created by the operations of those groups, how they affect individuals, 
and the need of international cooperation, as indicated in doctrine1018 and the Preamble to the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.  
Other norms belonging to that framework against transnational organized crime mention 
how public entities must cooperate judicially or otherwise, exchanging information and 
intelligence, or employing other measures, to counter the unlawful activities of criminal groups 
and their members. The following articles, for instance, deal with this: 10, 26, 27, 28 or 31 of the 
Convention; 10 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children; 10, 14, 15 or 16 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and 12 of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. 
Other examples include some of the Security Council resolutions addressing Somali 
piracy, insofar as they encourage and permit actions against it in different sea and air spaces 
(even in Somali land territory for a period of time, to some States). Among them, the following 
resolutions are included: 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008) or 1851 (2008). Additionally, 
paragraph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008) prohibits military, technical, financial or other assistance 
to pirates and calls for the adoption of economic measures against “individuals or entities” 
(emphasis added) -designated by a Committee established “pursuant to” Resolution 751 (1992)- 
that: a) commit or support acts that threaten the peace, security or Stability of Somalia; b) violate 
an arms embargo against Somalia; or c) obstruct the delivery or distribution of humanitarian 
assistance intended to be given in Somalia. 
                                                     
1017 Cf. Tom Obokata, op. cit., pp. 394-395, 399-402; Preamble to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. 
1018 Cf. Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, op. cit., pp. iii-iv. 
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Additionally, it is necessary to take into account that, for some authors and authorities, 
according to international customary or treaty law, and pursuant to Security Council resolutions, 
non-state entities can engage in major uses of force and, accordingly, can be the subject of 
measures of self-defense, case in which they bear the burden of being the object of those 
measures, which is a legal capacity.1019 
Interestingly, the International Court of Justice declared that the Security Council can 
“make demands on actors other than United Nations Member States and intergovernmental 
organizations”,1020 that is to say on non-state actors. This secondary source of regulation is but 
one of the multiple possible origins of the international legal regulation of non-state conduct. This 
means that other sources of jus gentium can regulate legal capacities of non-state entities as 
well, even if those entities do not have an independent formal independence, because their 
factual operations as distinct entities, which can be identified by others and themselves, as 
happens with non-state armed groups, and their impact on human and other legal goods, makes 
this possible and necessary. 
Another question is whether factually-operating entities without formal independence can 
have all or just some international legal capacities. The possibility of examining those entities as 
units, and the need to address the specific challenges their conduct poses, make it necessary to 
stick to the principle of individual responsibility and establish their legal capacities. Those of their 
members must also be regulated, to fully protect human dignity, as permitted by the possible 
coexistence of responsibilities. The fact that they are aggregated entities does not detract from 
this, because all collective actors, including States, operate through others and can have their 
own responsibilities. 
Therefore, entities without formal personality, e.g. the G8 or some organizations, can 
have international legal capacities and be the object of legal responses just as their members 
can, lest there are normative or factual impossibilities.  
This leads to the question of whether the effectiveness of the protection of human dignity 
can be intimately related to or even dependent on the existence of non-state legal capacities of 
both group units and members or allies. Quite often that link exists.  
                                                     
1019 Cf. Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans to: International Court of Justice, Case concerning Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, paras. 26-
31; Separate Opinion of Judge Simma to: International Court of Justice, Case concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, paras. 7-13; 
Constantine Antonopoulos, op. cit., where opinions for and against self-defense against non-state actors are shown. 
1020 Cf. International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, para. 116. 
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In order to prevent or promote contacts and the management of resources by collective 
actors, and to counter their unlawful activities or to support their promotion of human dignity, 
capacities of those actors and their members, including individuals, may and often must be 
created for the sake of the effectiveness of legal goods in practice, because without pertinent 
regulation patterns of behavior may be not discouraged or encouraged, depending on the type of 
non-state impact. Moreover, since acts of collective actors are ultimately committed by individuals 
and omissions are due to their failures, those individuals can and ought to have responsibilities of 
their own, as held by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Military 
Tribunal.1021  
On the other hand, international law must recognize that collective units can also be 
members of others1022 and provide them with means to commit abuses. Those and other factors 
must be evaluated when determining if it is necessary or important to assign duties or other 
capacities to collective entities and their members. 
Sometimes, policy and legal considerations make it advisable to distinguish the 
capacities of each actor despite its relations with others. This is because the capacities of formal 
entities, e.g. duties, can be complemented by different legal capacities of informal entities, all of 
which can be required by the protection of human dignity. Similar considerations apply when 
different entities potentially involved in violations have formal personality, as happens with 
individuals and legal persons with which they are linked, such as corporations, being it possible to 
assign criminal duties to the former, while the latter can have them but often do not have that sort 
of obligations but others.1023 This is because the assignation of legal capacities depends on many 
considerations, not necessarily being the formal personality of an entity or the lack thereof 
definitive. 
Concerning the question of what legal capacities entities without formal personality can 
have, a look at international practice shows, for instance, that because of their roles and impact, 
both formal and informally existent non-state entities have international legal capacities, such as 
                                                     
1021 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, pp. 7-15; Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, op. cit., paras. 7, 21 (“informal 
actors […] do not need a procedure or constitution, but their actions must –for practical reasons- be in conformity 
with certain rules […] even informal actors have to take into account to a certain extent international norms and 
customs, and the practice of other actors” –emphasis added-). 
1022 Cf. article 2.a of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations adopted by the ILC in 2011, 
A/66/10; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 111-114; ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, para. 44.f. 
1023 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, at 9; Menno T. Kamminga, “The Next Frontier: Prosecution of Extraterritorial 
Corporate Misconduct before Non-US Courts”, op. cit., pp. 174-175; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 31, 74, 
83. 
 
 
335
legal burdens; being subject to certain measures or sanctions; being entitled or tolerated1024 to 
present demands, information and claims –e.g. as follows from article 44 from the American 
Convention on Human Rights-; being able to participate or act in a given manner (formally or 
informally interacting with actors and international norms); or having some obligations –as 
happens with non-state entities under IHL-, among others.  
Therefore, while one could think that, at first glance, only formally recognized entities can 
have rights and duties, given their legal patrimony and their being expressly regarded as having 
the possibility of being addressees of rights and duties, practice demonstrates that other actors 
can also have the same or other international legal capacities. This is consistent with the need to 
regulate all legally relevant behavior that affects legal goods positively or negatively.  
Additionally, practice shows that assertions that rights and obligations are the only legal 
capacities that non-state entities can have1025 are flawed, because subjection to or access to 
procedures in which their respect can be supervised also exist, and other legal capacities 
different from and unrelated to rights and obligations that seek to protect human dignity can exist. 
Additionally, there can be legal burdens that strictly speaking are not obligations, because they 
are meant to be implemented by third parties, obliged or authorized to do so, and produce effects 
that may affect an actor in a permissible way, without the respective international norm directly 
obliging that actor to behave in a certain manner.  
Naturally, some legal capacities have both elements of burdens and aspects of 
obligations, because they may oblige an actor to not deprive the effects of a burden of prospects 
of effectiveness. Additionally, actions of an actor may be tolerated without it having an entitlement 
to carry them out; or an actor can be given recommendations, which are not binding and are thus 
not duties.  
About the multiplicity of positive and negative legal capacities, it is convenient to mention 
that Bruno Simma considers that: 
“[An] approach [according to which] everything which is not expressly prohibited carries with it the 
same colour of legality […] ignores the possible degrees of non-prohibition, ranging from “tolerated” 
to “permissible” to “desirable”.”1026 
In sum, absent legal or logical impossibilities, entities with or without legal or formal 
personality may have different international legal capacities. When they are necessary for human 
                                                     
1024 Cf. Practice Direction XII of the Practice Directions adopted by the International Court of Justice in relation to 
Declaration of Judge Simma to: International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, op. cit., paras. 8-10. 
1025 Cf. Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., at 391. 
1026 Cf. Declaration of Judge Simma to: International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, op. cit., para. 8. 
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dignity to be effectively and fully protected, and do not exist yet, they must be created de lege 
ferenda. Their existence can also be implicit. Coinciding with this idea, Roland Portmann argues 
that automatic or presumed duties can exist in the humanitarian framework.1027 
Certainly, Antonio Cançado, Anne Peters, or Roland Portmann, among many other 
authors, explain that international law is not exclusively concerned with “State” interests or inter-
State dimensions and relations.1028 In fact, there are even jus cogens norms that protect human 
dignity, and given their nature they automatically display their effects in regard to all potential 
factual violators (as the ICTY and Portmann have mentioned)1029 and prevail over some State-
centered regulations. If duties to respect those peremptory norms are not expressly recognized, 
actors that can act against them are still implicitly bound by obligations to respect them.  
Therefore, if non-state conduct affects the protection of human dignity1030 positively 
or/and negatively, it must be addressed normatively. 
Based on what has been said, personality and subjectivity can be considered to be 
different notions. This is reflected, for instance, in the First Report on the Law of Treaties by 
Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock of 1962, that included draft articles with the following 
content: 
“‘International agreement’ means an agreement intended to be governed by international law and 
concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law possessing international 
personality and having capacity to enter into treaties under the rules set out in article 3 below […] 
International capacity to become a party to treaties is also possessed by international organizations 
and agencies which have a separate legal personality under international law if, and to the extent 
that, such treaty-making capacity is expressly created, or necessarily implied, in the instrument or 
instruments prescribing the constitution and functions of the organization or agency in question”1031 
(emphasis added). 
In the same document, the commentary to the draft articles mentions how reference to 
subjectivity, personality and capacity to celebrate treaties was understood in the sense that some 
entities different from States could enter into treaties, but that not every subject had that 
capacity.1032 It also highlights that not all legal persons have the same legal capacities when it 
mentions how draft articles 1 and 3 implied that not all international legal persons had treaty-
making powers. In this sense, the commentary said that: 
                                                     
1027 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 273-274, 276-277. 
1028 Ibid., pp. 257, 268. 
1029 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 162-167, 273-274, 280-281; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 
10 December 1998, paras. 155-157. 
1030 Logically, individuals are not the only entities protected by norms and legal goods in jus gentium, and thus are 
not the only, almost exclusive or absolute primary subjects of it, contrary to what some theories may suggest. Cf. 
Philip C. Jessup, op. cit., at 3. 
1031 Cf. International Law Commission, First Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special 
Rapporteur, Yearkbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, A/CN.4/144 and Add.1, 1962, pp. 31, 36. 
1032 Ibid., at 32, paras. 3 and 4 of the commentary to article 1. 
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“[W]hereas treaty-making capacity involves international personality in the sense that all entities 
having treaty-making capacity necessarily have international personality, it does not follow that all 
international persons have treaty-making capacity”1033 (emphasis added). 
That being said, it is convenient to take into account that some authors have posited the 
idea that, rather than employing a normative notion of subjectivity or personality, considerations 
of a realist, factual, empirical or other non-normative nature must be examined to determine 
whether a given entity possesses international legal personality or subjectivity. This conception 
can be found in theories of “participants” or in some “realist” theories of personality.1034  
Theories as those have been criticized, among others, by Roland Portmann and Math 
Noortmann. Noortmann mentions how participation of an actor says nothing about the existence 
of norms addressing it; and Portmann, faithful to the idea of subjects as addressees of law, 
mentions how entities that operate and are actors in sociological terms are not necessarily 
“recognized” or “regulated” by international law.1035 It is hard to dismiss this criticism, because 
certainly if one conceives subjects of international law as addressees of its norms, the order of 
the syllogism cannot be altered to make factual actors subjects of law even if they are not 
addressed by legal norms, which would drastically alter the conception of subjectivity and fail to 
explain what being an addressee of law means. Logically, socially relevant activity may make an 
actor deserve being regulated, and the interplay of its power with some legal goods and principles 
may make it possess implied legal capacities. Therefore, If law fails to take into account realities 
that must be regulated, it logically has to be modified de lege ferenda or, if that failure is 
superficial, implied or express legal capacities may be found with a correct interpretation of law. 
Moreover, unlike factual conceptions of personality, the normative conception defended 
herein is preferable because it distinguishes between “is” and “ought”, which is something 
important in legal studies, as argued by Hans Kelsen.1036 
Possible objections to the previous ideas could include: a) some could mention that legal 
norms may recognize or assign legal capacities to entities that engage in relevant acts in practice 
if some factual requirements are met, as happens with the Montevideo Convention of 1933, that 
in article 1 purports to address the existence of States, or with article 1 of Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, that determines that that instrument is applicable, among other 
                                                     
1033 Ibid., at 36, para. 2 of the commentary to article 3. 
1034 Cf. Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., pp. 117, 129-131, 133-134, 
138, 140-141; Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law, op. cit., at 317; Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 
3, 208, 248-254; Janne Elisabeth Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality, op. cit., pp. 453-455; 
Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international 
legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 29-40. 
1035 Cf. Bob Reinalda, “Non-State Actors in International Relations: Do They Matter?”, op. cit., at 65; Roland 
Portmann, op. cit., pp. 248-254. 
1036 Cf. Hans Kelsen, op. cit., 76-81. 
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conditions, when a non-state entity has “responsible command, exercise[s] such control over a 
part of […] territory as to enable [it] to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and 
to implement” that treaty. Those norms certainly consider factual elements, but they do so to 
determine which entities meet certain criteria and thus become addressees of international law. 
Therefore, they actually confirm the conception of subjectivity and capacities presented here. 
In addition to this, Roland Portmann challenges that possible objection by questioning if 
the provision of the Montevideo Convention is still valid in light of possible legal changes, which 
subject factual elements to compliance with essential international norms.1037  
A possible second objection could point out how b) the meta-legal necessity and demand 
to protect human beings and adjust law to realities and needs that law is meant to address 
require making all entities that have the factual capacity to violate human dignity subjects of law, 
and also making them subject to obligations to respect and, sometimes, to protect human dignity.  
About this, taking into account that in principle there are multiple international legal 
capacities that non-state actors can have in the human rights field, and that international law can 
deal with non-state conduct with varying degrees of intensity and involvement, it is possible that 
lawmakers or practitioners decide that non-state conduct is subject to only indirect control, carried 
out through the obligations of States and. While this may happen, implicit human rights duties of 
non-state actors may exist already, as seen in Chapter 6. 
Additionally, sometimes regulations of non-state legal capacities to protect individuals are 
deficient and must be modified de lege ferenda. This criticism, in any case, supports a normative 
conception instead of challenging it, because it recognizes the possible flaws of a normative 
system for not regulating relevant non-state conduct or for doing it improperly. 
It cannot be said that the implicit human rights duties of non-state actors handle only a 
factual and not a normative conception of subjectivity. Far from doing so, these duties are nothing 
but legal capacities of non-state actors created by law. In other words, implicit obligations 
constitute one category of legal capacities, and their belonging to international law and binding 
their addressees confirm the theory defended herein.  
Altogether, a normative conception of subjectivity based on the analysis of legal 
capacities prevents the stagnation and inflexibility of strict conceptions of quasi-exhaustive lists of 
legal persons, ironically created in doctrine but pretending to be descriptions of law. Moreover, 
lack of certain powers that according to some theories must be held by an actor to have 
international legal personality does not prevent an entity from having other legal capacities, 
including those that must exist for human dignity to be protected. Apart from not explaining law as 
                                                     
1037 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 250-253. 
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well as other theories do, narrow conceptions of personality are dangerous because they may 
lead some to refrain from tackling non-state abuses in international legal practice. 
The ideas I defend do not dismiss as irrelevant factual or realist conceptions of “actors or 
participants” or other entities that and can affect legal goods and are important in practice. What I 
hold is that a normative conception better explains what entities are addressees of law. Still, 
regulations may be limited and it can be necessary or convenient to legally address non-state 
entities –granting them rights, entitlements, permission, tolerance, regulating their duties or the 
burdens to bear adverse legal effects or actions, inter alia-. Thus, the conduct and roles of entities 
that are factually relevant and can impact on the protection of human dignity in a positive or 
negative sense can be examined from a factual point of view, which can inform advisable norms 
and serve to criticize positive law, which is a very important task. 
In light of the foregoing considerations, I conclude that there is no prior impediment to the 
possibility of non-state entities having legal capacities under jus gentium –accepted or imposed-. 
They may exist if they are created by the sources of international law, and there must be no 
logical or legal impediment to their possession by an actor. Therefore, it must be examined if the 
creation of legal capacities meant to address an actor respect substantive legal criteria, what 
sources of international law can create them, and how non-state entities may interact with them. 
These issues will be explored in the remainder of this Chapter.  
What is more, according to an eclectic, non-formalist and non-fictitious theory of 
capacities and addressees of law,1038 the legal capacities that an actor has may change, but 
there is one that should never change in meta-legal terms and according to the value of the 
protection of human dignity: the implicit duty to respect human dignity, which is overarching and 
binds all entities, States or not, and is thus a common legal capacity.  
Similarly, Roland Portmann mentions that one common automatic presumed capacity is 
the prohibition of committing international crimes that affect human beings, which binds many 
entities.1039 Still, the aforementioned implicit duty the existence of which I defend has a universal 
ratione personae scope, and thus binds entities than the one suggested by Portmann, given the 
common legal relevance of all non-state violations and the common potential capacity to violate 
human dignity that all entities have. It is a trait that must be regulated, as Janne Nijman 
                                                     
1038 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 70-75, 82-83; Elena Pariotti, 
op. cit., at 102; Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 34, 61-62; Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 271-283. 
1039 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 273-274, 276-277, 280. 
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suggests,1040 and is implicitly so in my opinion, due to the implications of the global legal good of 
the protection of human dignity, as explained in Chapter 6. 
Before concluding this subsection, it is convenient to quote the following opinion of 
Antonio Cançado:  
“It results quite clear today that there is nothing intrinsic to International Law that impedes or renders 
it impossible to non-State actors to enjoy international legal personality. No one in sane conscience 
would today dare to deny that the individuals effectively possess rights and obligations which 
emanate directly from International Law, with which they find themselves, therefore, in direct contact. 
And it is perfectly possible to conceptualize - even with greater precision - as subject of International 
Law any person or entity, titulaire of rights and obligations, which emanate directly from norms of 
International Law. It is the case of the individuals, who thus have strengthened this direct contact - 
without intermediaries - with the international legal order”1041 (emphasis added). 
In the preceding text I would simply replace the term personality with that of subjectivity, 
and would also say that it is not necessary for an entity to possess both rights and obligations to 
be a subject of international law, being it sufficient that it has any international legal capacity.  
Additionally, there are also indirect addressees of international law. They are those 
entities that are indirectly affected by international norms. This must be stressed because 
sometimes non-state entities engage in legally relevant conduct, and international law does 
address their conduct, although not directly but by means of regulating the duties and 
entitlements of other actors, such as States or other authorities, that for instance must protect 
individuals from them.1042 It cannot be denied that international law does affect those entities in 
different indirect ways, as for example ordering competent authorities to freeze their assets. 
 
5.2. Substantive conditions of the creation of duties and legal burdens of non-state actors 
with the purpose of protecting human dignity 
At the outset, it must be mentioned that substantive guarantees require that obligations 
and legal burdens of non-state actors created in international law: a) are foreseeable and 
accessible (condition of legality), and b) are not contrary to human dignity or fundamental rights 
(respect of the non-conditionality of essential rights). 
a) According to the condition of legality, legal capacities that impose burdens must be 
created by law, which means that actors cannot be held responsible for breaches of obligations or 
                                                     
1040 Cf. Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 15-18, 40. 
1041 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., para. 28. 
1042 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 18-27; Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 2006, para. 4; article 4 of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in conjunction with articles 43 and 44. 
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be forced to endure adverse effects of other legal capacities if a legal norm that determines so 
has not been adopted previously.  
This principle is interesting for many reasons. Firstly, ignoring this guarantee can lead to 
situations in which some authorities and actors blurr the difference between lex lata and 
ideological or other beliefs, denying legal guarantees of actors. Secondly, for actors to have 
responsibility and a legal duty to repair, they must have breached obligations1043 that bind them 
and comply with the conditions of legality, examined in detail below.  
Additionally, a careful analysis of the condition of legality can dispel some 
misconceptions about international obligations. 
There can be confusion about whether international law can impose duties on non-state 
actors directly, or if instead the creation of their obligations can be ordered by international norms 
but they must always be adopted under domestic law, which is closer to its “subjects”. On the 
other hand, it is necessary to examine if international law follows the nullum crimen [delicto, more 
broadly], nulla poena sine lege criterion, and if it admits the more relaxed version of nullum 
crimen [delicto], nulla poena sine jure, as some argue.1044 
As to the first question, different norms that protect human dignity in different branches 
and fields of international law deal with non-state duties and legal capacities, proving that nothing 
prevents international norms from directly regulating them, unless they violate jus cogens. 
This implies that, in principle, there are no structural, inherent or general impediments 
that prevent other international norms that also seek to protect human dignity from following 
strategies that are similar to those used by other norms that have the same purpose, being all of 
them created through the same sources of international law. Still, there may be express or 
implied specific logical or normative prohibitions or impediments to the creation of some non-state 
legal capacities. 
                                                     
1043 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., at 69; articles 31 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4) and 31 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international 
organizations as adopted in 2011 (A/66/10); Bin Cheng, op. cit., pp. 166, 169-170. 
1044 Cf. Audiencia Nacional de España, Sala Penal, Sección Tercera, Sentencia Núm. 16/2005, 19 April 2005, 
apartado III.4, “El problema de la tipicidad, ‘lex certa’, e irretroactividad de la norma penal aplicable”, where the 
judicial body mentions that “la formulación clásica del principio de legalidad penal (criminal y penal) nullum crimen 
nulla poena sine lege […] se articula como de nullum crime sine iure, lo que permite una interpretación mucho más 
amplia de las exigencias derivadas de este principio”. On the principle “of the legality of criminal offences and 
penalties”, cf. Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice, Case of Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden 
van de Ministerraad, 3 May 2007, paras. 49-50; articles 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (that 
expressly accepts punishments and responsibility based on both domestic and international law, even concerning 
general principles of law “recognized by civilised nations”), 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (that also envisages in an express manner responsibility based on both legal orders and likewise mentions 
general principles of law, although using the expression “recognized by the community of nations” instead), 7.2 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights (whose 
wording, by alluding to the “applicable law”, implicitly accepts this, in my opinion). 
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For instance, different norms admit the possibility that non-state entities can consent or 
be compelled to be bound by international law directly, without requiring that domestic norms are 
the ones that create their legal capacities.  
The fact that sometimes an entity may have to consent to an international obligation for it 
to produce effects does not detract from the capacity of sources of international law to directly 
bind an actor with no intermediaries. Indeed, in analogous terms, it is accepted that treaties can 
regulate obligations of States and international organizations that are not parties to them, as long 
as they consent to be bound by them in written form, as reflected in articles 34 and 35 of the 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and of 1986, that contemplate an exception 
to the maxims of res inter alios acta and pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.1045 On the other 
hand, consent of an actor bound by treaty obligations adopted by others is not always necessary, 
as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reveals. 
Conversely, an example of international norms that can bind non-state actors when they 
consent to them is found in article 96.3 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I). It deals with the way in which some non-state entities may, through a certain 
representative, issue a unilateral declaration that makes them be bound by that Protocol. No 
domestic action is required to transform or incorporate the decision of the actor for the effects of 
the Protocol to be displayed towards it and bind it. 
Examples of norms that impose obligations on non-state actors directly and without 
requiring their consent include the prohibition of committing international crimes –implicitly 
contained in their formulation-; and duties of armed groups and belligerents participating in non-
international armed conflicts, regulated under international humanitarian law, as seen in articles 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on International Humanitarian Law, 96.3 of Protocol 
1 to the aforementioned Geneva Conventions, or implicitly throughout Protocol II thereto, among 
others.  
Having said this, it must be said that the principle and guarantee of legality has two 
components: foreseeability and accessibility, both of which must be respected when creating 
obligations of non-state actors. Those elements were mentioned, among others, in the Case of 
                                                     
1045 On these maxims, see Erik Franckx, “Pacta tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation & 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks & Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, FAO Legal Papers Online, No. 8, 2000, at 5, 
available on: http://www.fao.org/legal/prs-ol/lpo8.pdf; articles 34 through 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969 and the same articles in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
international organizations or between international organizations of 1986; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho 
Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 175, 187, 211-212. 
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Kononov v. Latvia, wherein the European Court of Human Rights considered that the guarantee 
of legality, being “an essential element of the rule of law”, has “qualitative requirements, notably 
those of accessibility and foreseeability.”1046 
The principle of legality serves to dispel some doubts regarding non-state obligations. 
Firstly, it helps to answer the question of whether international law can impose obligations on 
non-state actors directly, even if domestic law is silent on the matter or contradicts it.  
Interestingly, in the Kononov case, the Court considered that international law can 
directly regulate obligations of non-state actors –in that case, individuals-.1047 This possibility has 
also been accepted by the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals,1048 by authors as Hersch Lauterpacht, Clapham or Meron,1049 and in instruments such 
as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in articles 7 and 15, respectively). The 
pertinent provisions of those treaties have an almost identical content, expressing clearly that 
international law can impose prohibitions on non-state actors directly and, by extension, other 
legal capacities. They say: 
“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed […] 
This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, 
at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized 
by civilised nations” (emphasis added) –European version-. 
“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed 
[…] Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles 
of law recognized by the community of nations” (emphasis added) –version of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The American Convention on Human Rights, in a briefer version, talks in article 9 of the 
necessity of punishing offenses previously envisaged by an “applicable law”. This expression can 
perfectly include international law, which may lawfully place obligations on non-state actors, and 
has done so even in the severe criminal sphere, to which the article refers expressly. 
                                                     
1046 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, 17 May 2010, 
para. 185. 
1047 Ibid., paras. 185-187, 205-213, 236-239. 
1048 Cf. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals; Principle I of the 
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal; Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals and the 
commentary thereto, according to which generally “international law may impose duties on individuals [as individuals 
or as members of organizations] directly without any interposition of internal law.” Cf. Principles of International Law 
recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, with commentaries, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, 1950, paras. 98-99. 
1049 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 70-73, 82-83; Theodor Meron, 
The Humanization of International Law, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 27-29, 35-47. 
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Another important question is whether the conditions of foreseeability and accessibility of 
obligations, encompassed in the guarantee of legality, are respected by implicit or inherent duties. 
In that regard, it is useful to bear in mind that non-state actors can be responsible for 
violating international human rights and guarantees, among other reasons because those 
guarantees may be strengthened by implicit duties to not violate them that consider their 
violations as unlawful, due to their being legally relevant and forbidden. This can be inferred from 
one passage of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, that considered that: 
“[I]ndividual criminal responsibility […] [can be] defined with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability 
by, inter alia, a requirement to comply with international fundamental human rights instruments, which 
instruments [do] not, of themselves, give rise to individual criminal responsibility and one of which 
[was] not been ratified by the relevant State at the material time [of a violation] (K.-H.W. v. 
Germany, §§ 92-105, cited above). The Court considered that even a private soldier could not show 
total, blind obedience to orders which flagrantly infringed not only domestic law, but internationally 
recognised human rights, in particular the right to life, a supreme value in the international hierarchy 
of human rights […] [a person can be condemned for violating] international laws and customs […] 
[that are] sufficient, of themselves, to found individual criminal responsibility”1050 (emphasis added). 
As required by the elements of foreseeability and accessibility, international prohibitions 
or commands that seek to bind non-state actors must be sufficiently accessible and foreseeable 
to their addressees. Otherwise, they cannot be sanctioned and bear responsibility under 
international law. 
Concerning this, the fact that domestic prohibitions consistent with international ones 
respect the principle of legality must not lead to the belief that if domestic legislation says nothing 
and an actor has international legal burdens the principle of legality is violated against it. This is 
because international law is in itself a sufficient and autonomous normative basis of obligations of 
non-state entities designed to protect human dignity.  
In this sense, international decisions and various international norms recognize that it is 
possible to sanction violations of international law committed by non-state entities even if there 
are no domestic norms that incorporate and internalize their prohibition.1051 In this sense, in the 
Kononov case the European Court of Human Rights found that international law alone can be a 
sufficient legal basis to sanction individuals (or other actors, I might add) when it respects the 
                                                     
1050 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, 17 May 2010, 
paras. 236 and 237. 
1051 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 
213, 236; Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
the Tribunal, Principles I through IV; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 
155-157 (concerning jus cogens). 
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guarantee of legality and its elements, independently of what the domestic legal position is. 
Human rights provisions certainly accept that individuals can be directly bound by jus gentium.1052 
This rationale is confirmed in articles 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, according to which the principle of legality is respected when persons are tried 
and punished “for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognized by” the international society. 
That being said, it cannot be denied that domestic prohibitions are important, first of all 
because non-state violations of human rights are not always directly prohibited in an express and 
comprehensive way under international law, and secondly because domestic law can increase 
the likelihood of effectiveness of the protection of human dignity.  
Moreover, when international and domestic norms condemn and address violations of 
internationally recognized human rights, which can be done in different ways (in tort or criminal 
regulations, etc.), those rights are simultaneously protected in different legal systems and their 
guarantees are thus strengthened. According to what has been said, all those norms must still 
comply with the guarantees of legality and respect of fundamental rights and jus cogens. 
Actors that participate in serious violations of human rights ought to know that their acts 
and omissions are contrary to legal principles and human rights protected internationally (and, 
hopefully, also domestically). Therefore, the prohibition to engage in those violations is accessible 
and foreseeable, so much so that not even obedience of instructions or internal law can be raised 
as defenses.1053 
It is also important to ascertain if the guarantee of legality is restricted to criminal matters, 
as the wording of some treaties suggests, or if it also covers non-criminal obligations.  
In my opinion, the underlying rationale of the protection of the principle of legality is the 
necessity that burdens, duties and sanctions be based on preexistent, foreseeable and 
accessible norms. This guarantee is therefore not only relevant for criminal law, as required by 
the full protection of human dignity in regard to individuals that have those legal burdens, and by 
                                                     
1052 Cf. articles 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights; European Court of Human Rights, Grand 
Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 185, 213, 236-239. 
1053 Cf. Principles II and IV of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal 
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal; articles 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 7.4 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or 6.4 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, para. 155; 
Margalida Capellà i Roig, “Los crímenes contra la humanidad en el caso Scilingo”, REEI—Revista Electrónica de 
Estudios Internacionales, No. 10, 2005, pp. 9-11; European Court of Human Rights, Case of K.-H. W. v. Germany, 
Judgment, 22 March 2001, paras. 68-76; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. 
Germany, Judgment, 22 March 2001, para. 100. 
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a necessary evolutionary interpretation of the principle of legality in general terms. Analogously, it 
has been considered that due process guarantees are applicable outside judicial procedures. 
Indeed, according to judicial and doctrinal opinions, punitive norms cannot be applied in a 
retroactive way even if they are not criminal; soft law condemns violations of the principle of 
legality when deprivation of liberty is at stake, even when non-criminal norms would be applied; 
and criminal punishments that violate the principle of legality are prohibited.1054 
In this sense, international human rights decisions have considered that due process 
guarantees and the principle of legality are applicable not only in judicial but also in other 
proceedings, such as administrative ones. This was mentioned in the Case of Baena-Ricardo v. 
Panama, decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which said that “punitive 
administrative [or] judicial” procedures must respect guarantees of due process and the principles 
of legality and non-retroactivity.1055 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has 
considered that guarantees are applicable in “disciplinary proceedings”.1056  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights based its decision, among other 
considerations, on the idea that it is necessary to not permit the use of punitive powers in a way 
that is inimical to the exercise of human rights and to limit State discretion in all fields, even 
administrative ones, because the conduction of all proceedings ought to respect guarantees of 
human and fundamental rights.1057 That logic is applicable to the powers of all functional and 
factual authorities and powers, which must respect human dignity even when exercising illicit or 
non-legally endorsed powers (which may be prohibited under domestic legal systems).1058 
Likewise, this logic can be handled when interpreting the principle of legality, because 
obligations, and sanctions of their breaches, must respect the guarantees of foreseeability and 
accessibility to be legitimate, even when they do not have a criminal character. Thus, references 
to criminal law in norms on the principle of legality must not make one think that it is only 
applicable to criminal issues. 
                                                     
1054 Cf. Daniel O’Donnell, op. cit., pp. 448-451; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. 
v. Panama, Judgment, 2 February 2001, paras. 106-107. Likewise, contrast article XXV of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man with articles 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 15 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7.2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 9 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights. 
1055 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Judgment, 2 February 
2001, paras. 107, 124-131. 
1056 Ibid., para. 128. 
1057 Ibid., paras. 106-107, 126-129. 
1058 This is my proposed solution to the question on the dilemma/tension presented in: Robert Dufresne, op. cit., at 
227. 
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Having said this, it can be asked how human rights guarantees as those of legality and 
due process can benefit non-state entities that are not individuals. This has to do with 
fundamental rights, as will be explained now. 
First, not all legal capacities are applicable prior to the commission of a legally relevant 
(attempted or accomplished) conduct, because sometimes legal capacities seek to tackle or 
address legally relevant facts after their emergence in order to stop their effects or prevent the 
continuation of human suffering. Yet, many of them are relevant before violations are committed. 
This happens with the concrete duty to abide by precautionary measures, for instance, even 
when the actor bound by them did not create a risk of violation. Other examples include 
measures of arms embargoes or assets freezing that affect armed and other non-state actors, 
which are usually adopted after verifying imminent dangers of attacks against civilian populations 
in which they could participate. Still, subjection to the duty to comply with precautionary 
measures, and all other duties, must respect the principle of legality. 
This is because the principle of legality is still applicable and relevant in those cases: not 
in the form of the prohibition of the retroactive application of law, because this dimension is 
applicable in punitive spheres that sanction breaches of obligations;1059 but rather requiring that 
the respective negative legal capacities are adopted in accordance with the sources of law, are 
necessary and proportionate if they restrict fundamental or human rights, and the affected entities 
and stakeholders have timely access to information about them, among other conditions.  
As can be seen, the principle of legality is intimately related to the protection of 
fundamental rights, rule of law considerations, elements of public guarantees,1060 and 
fundamental rights. Law requires that restrictions of human rights are necessary and 
proportionate: given their relevance, these conditions must be analogously satisfied when 
fundamental rights are at stake, even if this is not expressly indicated. 
For formal and pedagogic purposes, one can think of legality strictly speaking as 
encompassing the necessity of enacting negative legal capacities in accordance with the sources 
of law and their being publicized. In a broad sense, however, since law requires compliance with 
them, the requirements of proportionality and necessity are part of the principle of legality. At the 
same time, the principle of legality is a fundamental right. 
                                                     
1059 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Judgment, 2 February 
2001, paras. 106-107. 
1060 Cf. Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 7-19; Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative 
Law”, European Journal of International Law, op. cit., at 33. 
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Concerning its intensity, it has been considered that the principle of legality under 
international criminal law may not be as stringent as the one found in domestic criminal law. 
Given the fact that international criminal norms can be enacted and implemented to protect 
human dignity, this merits a careful analysis. 
A distinction is often drawn when considering that while domestic criminal law 
emphasizes the criterion nullum crimen/nulla poena sine lege, international law enshrines a more 
lenient principle: nullum crimen/nulla poena sine jus/jure. However, some authors consider that 
the principle is stricter nowadays than when the International Military Tribunal applied it in the 
Trial of German Major War Criminals.1061  
The idea that the principle of legality under international law may not be as strict as under 
domestic legal systems was taken into account by the Spanish Audiencia Nacional, which said: 
“The classical configuration of the principle of criminal legality […] nullum crimen nulla poena sine 
lege is articulated in international law as nullum crime sine iure, which permits a much broader 
interpretation of the conditions required by this principle, insofar as it is enough to consider legality in 
international law even if a crime is not typified under domestic law. Unlike what happens with 
domestic law, respect of the principle of typification of crimes against peace and security of 
humankind is not determined in international law by its incorporation in written texts. In this regard, 
the lex is expressed by customary methods (and general principles of law) that make it ambiguous 
and uncertain until its codification takes place”1062 (my translation). 
According to the Audiencia Nacional, and as has been considered by Margalida Capellà i 
Roig, this consideration is based on the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Trial of German Major War Criminals, that attached importance to justice and the sanction of 
violations of jus gentium.1063 In that Judgment, the International Military Tribunal considered that 
since the principle of legality is a principle of justice, punishing those that violate publicly-known 
international norms is not unjust because the offenders ought to be aware that they were 
                                                     
1061 Cf. Marko Milanovic, “Gallant on Legality and the Rome Statute”, EJIL: Talk!, 5 October 2011, where it is 
mentioned that “Schabas argues that the application of new, non-customary crimes in the ICC Statute to such 
persons is acceptable by pointing out that aggressive war was effectively a new crime at Nuremberg. The problem 
with this argument is that international human rights law has changed since that time. The claim by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal that nullum crimen sine lege was, in international law, merely a principle of justice was true then but is not so 
now. Now it is a rule of customary international law and perhaps a jus cogens rule at that.”, available at: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/gallant-on-legality-and-the-rome-statute/ (last checked: 14/02/2012). 
1062 The original text says: “[L]a formulación clásica del principio de legalidad penal (criminal y penal) nullum crimen 
nulla poena sine lege, en el Derecho internacional se articula como de nullum crime sine iure, lo que permite una 
interpretación mucho más amplia de las exigencias derivadas de este principio, en cuanto que sería suficiente la 
consideración como tal en Derecho internacional, aunque no estuviera tipificado en derecho interno. A diferencia de 
lo que ocurre en los ordenamientos internos, la tipicidad de los crímenes contra la paz y seguridad de la humanidad 
no está determinada en el orden internacional por su incorporación en textos escritos. En este ámbito la lex se 
expresa mediante métodos consuetudinarios (y principios generales del Derecho) que la hacen ambigua e insegura 
hasta que se produce su codificación”. Cf. Audiencia Nacional de España, Sala Penal, Sección Tercera, Sentencia 
Núm. 16/2005, 19 April 2005 (the “Scilingo Case”), available at: 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/juicioral/doc/sentencia.html (last checked: 14/02/2012). 
1063 Cf. Margalida Capellà i Roig, op. cit., pp. 9-11. 
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perpetrating a wrongful act. For that reason, it can be considered that the guarantees of 
foreseeability and accessibility would not be violated. In the words of the Military Tribunal: 
“[I]t is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is 
in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties 
and assurances have attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such 
circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to 
punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished. Occupying the positions 
they did in the government of Germany, the defendants, or at least some of them must have known of 
the treaties signed by Germany, outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of international 
disputes; they must have known that they were acting in defiance of all international law when in 
complete deliberation they carried out the designs of invasion and aggression. On ,this view of the 
case alone, it would appear that the maxim has no application to ,the present facts” (emphasis 
added).1064 
The implications of the different demands of the guarantee of legality under international 
law are manifold: firstly, it confirms that individuals (and analogously other non-state entities, as 
domestic1065 and transnational or international actors) can be responsible for violating 
fundamental and peremptory international norms, and that accordingly negative capacities, such 
as subjection to punishments, can be designed to respond to threats and protect affected legal 
goods. 
Secondly, the principle supports the idea that non-state entities can have negative legal 
capacities created by the different sources of international law, and that it is thus not necessary 
for a legal burden, prohibition or sanction to be regulated in a written or formal international 
instrument. For example, the Spanish Audiencia Nacional mentions international customary law 
and general principles of law alongside treaties. Other sources of law are also relevant because, 
as the International Military Tribunal expressly mentioned, violations of “international law” can be 
sanctioned. 
Logically, apart from sanctions, a preventive dimension also exists, and negative 
capacities and mechanisms that seek to prevent violations can address non-state entities. 
Likewise, when an entity does not have an express or specific duty to refrain from affecting 
human rights and guarantees, the international community may create and use mechanisms to 
deal with or prevent its factual abuses, given their legal relevance. In all these cases, the principle 
of legality and fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees must be respected. 
b) The principle of legality is comprised in the respect of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, since there is a fundamental right according to which the imposition of obligations must 
comply with the requirement of legality. Consequently, legal capacities must respect the principle 
of legality and other fundamental rights, being all of them in the same normative framework and 
                                                     
1064 Cf. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, section “The Law 
of the Charter”, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp (last checked: 15/02/2012). 
1065 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 273-274, 280-281. 
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based on common principles. Conditioning the effectiveness of fundamental rights by permitting 
legal capacities to disrespect them would be contrary to their fundamental character. 
Taking into account that not all non-state entities are individuals, is it proper to hold that 
non-state actors different from human beings have fundamental rights? Some terminological and 
conceptual overlaps and confusion may muddle the question. 
First, non-state entities can enjoy rights that have a fundamental nature given their 
relevance and intimate relation with the rule of law, among other criteria. Even if those rights have 
a content that is similar or equal to that of human rights, they are not ontologically human rights 
because their beneficiaries do not have that identity and those rights would not protect human 
dignity (see Part I). In this sense, the Human Rights Committee has considered that: 
“The beneficiaries of the rights recognized by the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political 
Rights] are individuals [...] with the exception of article 1, the Covenant does not mention the rights of 
legal persons or similar entities or collectivities, [but] many of the rights recognized by the Covenant 
[…] may be enjoyed in community with others.”1066. 
Therefore, while some jurisdictions and norms consider that some rights, e.g. civil or 
fundamental rights, can be enjoyed by individuals and other actors, such as legal persons, in 
theoretical, ontological and general legal terms human rights are those enjoyed by individuals that 
protect their dignity, who deserve special and central protection.1067 Other entities can sometimes 
enjoy other types of rights that have a similar or equal content. This assertion may be considered 
as contradicted in formal terms by norms that protect rights of non-individual entities under 
human rights treaties. For instance, article 34 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms establishes that: 
“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights 
set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High  Contracting Parties undertake not to 
hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right” (emphasis added). 
That provision, reinforced by article 1 of the first Protocol to the Convention, which 
regulates the right to the protection of property and considers individuals and legal persons as 
holders of that right, differs from norms found in other human rights instruments, such as articles 
1 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 44 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights: the former only recognizes the right to petition of 
individuals, and the latter grants a wide jus standi of non-state entities in quasi-judicial processes, 
but it can only be used to denounce violations of human rights recognized in the treaty.  
                                                     
1066 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 9. 
1067 Cf. José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, op. cit., pp. 9-11, 17-19; John Finnis, 
“The Priority of Persons”, op. cit., pp. 6-9. 
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The nominal choice made in the European Convention can be considered to either 
confuse terms and inaccurately regard some rights of non-individuals as human rights for the 
purposes of that treaty or, alternatively, it can be argued that the very name of the European 
Convention, that mentions the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, can be 
understood as indicating that non-individuals may enjoy the latter, the content of which may 
coincide with that of human rights, which can only be enjoyed by human beings. Similarly, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights implicitly considers that different entities may 
have different categories of rights, as revealed by the mention of rights of human beings and 
rights of peoples.1068 
Based on the previous considerations, it is possible to consider that non-state entities, 
except individuals, do not have human rights but may have rights with a fundamental relevance.  
Chimene Keitner has made a theoretical distinction between constitutional rights found in 
domestic legal systems and internationally recognized human rights,1069 but this distinction is not 
relevant for the purposes of the analysis I am conducting. I consider that international law can 
have fundamental or other rights that differ from human rights not concerning their content but 
their beneficiaries: as said before, human rights are all those rights directly recognized in favor of 
human beings that protect their dignity in a direct manner.1070 Their enjoyment and exercise is an 
entitlement and not a condition of their being human rights. 
This is so because human rights are supposed to be recognized due to their being based 
on human dignity,1071 the legal protection of which must evolve in response to new or different 
challenges. That consideration implies that it is possible to critically examine if rights labeled as 
human rights can be considered as such1072 and others must be recognized. 
                                                     
1068 Articles 19 through 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, while articles 2 through 18 refer to 
rights of individuals (i.e. human rights, given their being based on human dignity -mentioned in article 5-, as 
explained in Part I, supra). 
1069 Cf. Chimène I. Keitner, “Rights Beyond Borders”, The Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 36, 2011, pp. 58-59, 
108, 112-114; Chimene Keitner, “A Response to Milanovic and Verdier on Rights Beyond Borders”, EJIL: Talk!, 8 
March 2011, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2011/03/08/a-response-to-milanovic-and-verdier-on-rights-beyond-
borders/ (last checked: 15/02/2012). 
1070 Cf. Part I, supra. 
1071 Concerning this, most human rights instruments mention in their Preambles that the rights enshrined therein are 
“recognized”, term that is also found in article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and article 1 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
1072 The need to examine whether a right formally labelled as human is truly one and the need of drafting human 
rights provisions in accordance with the tenets of the protection of human dignity are mentioned in: General 
Assembly Resolution 41/120, A/RES/41/120, 4 December 1986, para. 4 (human rights instruments “should, inter 
alia”, “Be of fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity and 
worth of the human person”); Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, 1975 (“all” 
human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full 
development”); James Griffin, “Human Rights and the Autonomy of International Law”,  op. cit.; Joseph Raz, “Human 
Rights without Foundations”, op. cit. (note that I disagree with some of the authors’ criteria for identifying human 
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Being human rights based on human identity, someone does not cease to have human 
rights despite engaging in violations, given the non-conditional character of his dignity, which 
means that sanctions and protection from him must respect those rights. Likewise, if other 
offenders have fundamental rights, they have to be taken into account when designing responses 
to their abuses, which naturally must be tackled. Yet, their elements are not as strong as those of 
human rights, which prevail over them. 
Moreover, restrictions of and suspension of obligations in relation to both human and 
fundamental rights are sometimes permitted, as long as conditions as necessity, proportionality 
and admissibility, among others, are met, as seen in Chapter 1. In those cases, rights would not 
be violated.  
Concerning the condition that legal capacities of non-state actors respect fundamental 
and human rights, it is convenient to mention that John H. Knox proposes that non-state human 
rights should preferably be correlative instead of converse duties. His theory suggests that the 
latter could be used by States to subject rights to interests of collectivities in an abusive manner. 
According to Knox, correlative duties of non-state actors have the direct purpose of 
protecting human rights of others, for instance prohibiting violations of those rights, reason why 
they are correlative to them. On the other hand, converse duties seek to protect collective 
interests, rather than concrete rights of individuals. In the author’s own words, converse duties 
are: 
“[O]wed by [an entity] to the society or state […] Although these duties may appear to be horizontal, 
in the sense that they are owed to others in the duty holder’s society, in practice they are vertical, 
enforced by the government acting on behalf of the society. They run conversely to the vertical duties 
of the government to promote and protect the individual’s human rights.”1073 
While Knox warns of the risks that can arise from a misuse of converse duties, and rightly 
puts forward the idea that correlative obligations are better suited to deal with the protection of 
human dignity, converse duties exist in international law.1074 To prevent abuses of the latter, 
which sometimes permit restricting rights, pro homine interpretation is to be made. It demands 
that converse duties are interpreted in a way that makes the goals that permit restrictions, 
suspensions and duties be consistent with (not necessarily identical to) human rights and the 
elements of its foundation, since those measures are part of the same system of those rights.  
For instance, public order or peace, which are envisaged in some instruments as 
objectives that permit to adopt restrictive measures, can be interpreted as goals that serve to 
                                                                                                                                                            
rights, but agree on the necessity of examining whether what is called a human right is truly one, my proposal being 
that found in Part I of this book). 
1073 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. at 1-2. 
1074 Ibid., pp. 5, 15, 32, and 34. 
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protect individuals, to the extent that war or public disorder can affect them and make them 
suffer.1075 Being found in human rights instruments, those objectives must be understood as 
protecting human dignity. Moreover, principles and requirements of proportionality, necessity and 
legitimacy, among others, must guide the use of converse measures. 
Altogether, the idea that not only rights but also obligations regulated or permitted in 
human rights frameworks are based on the protection of human dignity requires that those 
obligations are interpreted in its light, which implies that those obligations must respect and serve 
rights based on human dignity and, by analogy, other fundamental rights that have a similar 
content. The guarantee of legality must therefore be respected by non-state human rights 
obligations, since it is embedded in the framework of human and fundamental rights.  
If those conditions and guarantees are respected, then Knox’s fear that converse duties 
may be invoked to further abuses may be allayed, given the wrongfulness of those abuses, which 
would not be acceptable under the framework of those duties. Unfortunately, throughout history 
appeals to collectivities and “nations” have been invoked to disregard fundamental rights, and 
abstract, contingent and fictitious entities as States have been treated as more important that real 
and precious human beings.1076 This is why those conditions must be respected. 
The fact that fundamental and human rights of individuals and other actors must be 
respected does not mean that they are “permitted” to carry out violations of the rights of others, 
as some mistakenly argue colloquially: law commands their abuses to be prevented and 
sanctioned, and that victims to be repaired. However, those responses must respect the essential 
rights of abusers,1077 lest they are treated as means and without inherent worth.  
 
5.3. The consistency of non-state obligations and legal capacities with the protection of 
human dignity 
As mentioned before, the fact that some norms impose obligations on non-state entities 
to protect human dignity clearly reveals that other norms that seek the same purpose may follow 
their example, even if they ‘formally’ belong to other legal branches, as long as normative and 
logical conditions are met. 
This is illustrated with the prohibitions of the recruitment of children and of violations 
committed against children affected by armed conflict, that bind States and non-state armed 
                                                     
1075 Cf. Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, op. cit., pp. 11, 14, 204. 
1076 Cf. Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global, op. cit., pp. 23, 131-136, 158-163. 
1077 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, 30 May 1999, para. 
89. 
 
 
354
actors. The violation of those commands thus exposes offenders to sanctions and engages the 
responsibility of the perpetrators, both under human rights law stricto sensu and international 
humanitarian law.1078  
In this regard, apart from Security Council Resolutions and examinations by the 
Secretary-General of the UN, that also deal with non-state actors,1079 it is worth examining 
articles 8.2(b)(xxvi) and 8.2(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 4 and 1 
of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict, and 77.2 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
1), in connection with article 96.3 thereto. These norms, with differences regarding age in one 
case, protect the same general legal good and concrete legal interest in different but related legal 
branches against all threats, both State and non-state, as can be inferred from their text. 
The respective articles of the Rome Statute provide that: 
It is an international war crime to “[c]onscrip[t] or enlist[t] children under the age of fifteen years into 
the [national armed forces, armed forces or groups], or [to] us[e] them to participate actively in 
hostilities”. 
In turn, the cited Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, that 
belongs to both human rights stricto sensu and international humanitarian law, to the extent that it 
recognizes rights based on dignity in the universal human rights framework and regulates the 
conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts, regulates duties of respect (abstention)1080 of States; and 
in article 4 expressly regulates a (positive) duty of protection1081 of States and imposes a direct 
duty on non-state entities in an express and evident way as well. It states that: 
Article 4 
1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use 
in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years. 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal 
measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices. 
3. The application of the present article shall not affect the legal status of any party to an armed conflict. 
                                                     
1078 Cf. Optional Protocol to the Convention Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict, article 1 through 7; article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Andrew Clapham, Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
1079 Cf. Security Council Resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1539 (2004); and “Children and Armed Conflict”, Report of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, A/64/742—S/2010/181, 13 April 2010, paras. 167-175, 179; and 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/monitoringreporting.html, on the monitoring and reporting mechanism on 
children affected by armed conflict.  
1080 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. 
cit., paras. 165, 169-172; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 6. 
1081 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., paras. 6-7; Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. cit., paras. 166-168, 172-177; Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 03, Implementation at the National Level (Art. 2), 29 July 1981, para. 1. 
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As commented by Tilman Rodenhäuser, the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic considered that the treaty in which that provision is examined 
“applies to non-State actors”, confirming the opinion of authors as Andrew Clapham that they are 
bound by it. It also said that those who recruit children under the age of 15 “may be liable under 
international criminal law.”1082 
Lastly, article 77.2 of Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions mentions that: 
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained 
the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from 
recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age 
of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest. 
Norms of the human rights corpus juris reveal that it is possible to regulate duties, 
responsibilities and other legal capacities of non-state actors with the purpose of protecting 
human dignity. Soft law instruments confirm that possibility and stress the importance of the 
respective capacities of non-state actors, for instance in provisions related to both human rights 
and IHL, as commented by Andrew Clapham and Theo van Boven.1083 What is more: the fact that 
all those norms protect the same legal goods highlights how unreasonable and unfair it is to deny 
a similar protection of the same legal goods in different formal (that should not be treated in a 
formalistic way) branches that belong to the same legal system and sometimes also to the same 
corpus juris. 
The way in which those norms protect dignity from non-state abuses can vary on the 
condition that victims are appropriately, effectively and fully protected, as argued in Chapter 3. 
Certainly, the regulation of direct international non-state duties is not the only way to protect 
individuals. For example, refugees are protected not only from State agents of persecution but 
also from non-state persecutors who may have no refugee law obligations. 
Soft law attempts to raise awareness of the duties of non-state entities as corporations, 
and campaigns for the adoption of norms that bind non-state actors, confirm and are based on 
the assumption that international law can directly regulate legal capacities of non-state actors. In 
turn, such efforts are part of a general trend in international legal practice and theory that seeks to 
hold every entity that violates relevant norms and legal interests accountable, revealed by 
                                                     
1082 Cf. Tilman Rodehäuser, op. cit.; Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of 
inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, para. 44; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 74-75. 
1083 Cf. Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, op. cit., at 3; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 73. 
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developments in international criminal law or the codification, progressive development and 
clarification of the responsibility of actors as international organizations and corporations. 
Apart from the fact that nothing prevents the sources of international law from being used 
to adopt norms that protect individuals from non-state abuses directly or indirectly,1084 the logical, 
legal and ethical possibility of non-state actors having duties for that purpose, either accepted by 
them (consented or created ex novo by them) or imposed on them, is confirmed by these facts: 
first, that i) rights and participation entitlements enjoyed by actors indicate that they can also have 
responsibilities and obligations in the same normative system;1085 and secondly, that ii) 
universalistic arguments about the respect of human rights imply that human dignity must be fully 
protected, which is not compatible with excluding some authors of violations from duties to not 
violate human rights. 
Concerning the first consideration, it can be repeated that norms that address non-state 
actors, no matter what they stipulate (conferring or recognizing rights; regulating participation in 
regime or body; or imposing duties or responsibilities, etc.), indicate that those actors can be 
addressed by other norms that regulate different capacities, as duties or burdens, some of which 
may be implicit and necessarily accompany other legal capacities. I will now further develop these 
arguments. 
Antonio Remiro has commented, for example, that the fact that some NGOs have some 
rights or entitlements to participation in the United Nations system when they meet some 
requirements, for instance, implies that if they cease to meet the aforementioned conditions they 
may lose their participation entitlements.1086 If we take this a step further, it can be considered 
that the goal and foundation of the protection of human dignity implicitly imposes on them an 
obligation to respect it, because it is a central part of the legal system that regulates their 
entitlements. 
A systematic analysis of international law, examined both in terms of the hermeneutic 
and theory of law, confirms that it is contradictory to hold that entities with international legal 
entitlements, as NGOs, cannot have international duties and responsibilities.1087 Similarly, Hersch 
Lauterpacht analyzed how the possibility of individuals having obligations that protect human 
                                                     
1084 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 20-31. 
1085 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 785; Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations, Resolution 1996/31, 25 July 1996, Part VIII, paras. 55-59. 
1086 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 785. 
1087 Cf. article 31 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986; International Law Commission, 
Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 2006, paras. 6, 17-23; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho 
Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 375-377. 
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dignity reveals, out of consistency, that they can also have international rights1088 -and vice versa, 
I might add-.  
Moreover, the fact that in international law there can be rights without remedies or duties 
without procedures of supervision confirms that it is implausible to argue that an entity can have 
rights but not duties, unless they violate fundamental guarantees or are illogical, but these are 
substantial rather issues instead of absolute impossibilities. In sum, if an actor can have some 
positive or negative international legal capacities, it is equally capable of possessing others.  
Concerning the universality of the protection of human rights, a universal protection is 
necessarily one against all threats; and entities that invoke universalistic claims must be coherent 
and respect universalistic standards, like any other actors.1089 The “educative” effects of human 
rights norms may impact on previously reluctant actors, reason why their universality is double. 
In relation to the previous arguments, it is worth noting that the idea that the protection of 
human rights must be universal is indicated by the very name of instruments as the universal 
declaration of human rights; by the consideration that apart from regional frameworks (that 
contribute to protect the universal human dignity in a specialized way in certain geographical 
areas) there is a universal system of protection of human rights, not limited to one region; by the 
inherent worth of all human beings, and the fact that their full protection must respond to every 
threat to the exercise of human rights, that can be prevented by multiple actors; and by the 
existence of peremptory human rights norms, that bind all potential offenders. Moreover, the 
protection of human dignity is strengthened with the evolution and expansion of human rights 
norms and procedures, which must respect legitimate and lawful domestic decisions.1090  
The universal protection of human rights is an underlying aspiration reflected in 
instruments as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on 
Human Rights of 1993, according to which: 
“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated […] While the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic 
and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms […] 
Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human rights. They 
should reinforce universal human rights standards”1091 (emphasis added). 
In light of this, it is important to examine in depth if the universal protection of human 
rights demands protection from non-state violations.  
                                                     
1088 Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
1089 Cf. Chapter 1, supra; Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 36. 
1090 Cf. Carlos Villán Durán, op. cit., pp. 111-112. 
1091 Cf. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, A/CONF.157/23, op. cit., 
Part I, paras. 5, 37. 
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As indicated in Part I, I consider that the universality of human rights does not refer 
exclusively to the aspiration that human rights norms and guarantees display effects everywhere 
(geographical dimension), but also implies that they must have universal effects ratione 
personae, because unless individuals are protected against all possible violations and offenders, 
they will not be protected completely or universally. This is because the foundation of human 
rights is human dignity, that refers to the non-conditional inherent worth of every human being, 
not dependent on features different from human identity or contingent aspects such as the nature 
of a potential offender. Moreover: in an ordinary sense, universality points to comprehensiveness 
and to the idea that no exceptions are permissible,1092 and teleological considerations about the 
protection of dignity can confirm this. 
When discussing universality, some tend to point to territorial aspects, which include the 
need that peremptory human rights are protected in every State at all times.1093 If this is so, and it 
is admitted that some territories are administered or controlled by non-state entities, the territorial 
dimension leads to accepting that individuals must be protected from non-state authorities. And if 
so, why should they not be protected from other non-state actors? That exclusion would be 
discriminatory and contrary to the effectiveness of human rights. 
Some discussions debate tensions between universal claims and particular cultural or 
ideological manifestations that may be at odds with them. In legal terms, State agents are called 
to protect international human rights norms that bind them (jus cogens ones always do) from 
those manifestations, which are often non-state in origin and practice. 
The universalistic aspiration of a basic and equal protection everywhere is in turn part of 
a deeper aspiration to protect human rights from all contrary manifestations, regardless of their 
source. Else, an exclusively territorially-universal protection would fail to truly protect individuals 
in universal terms, and its framework could be rightly deemed as incoherent.  
That universality demands protection from non-state entities flows from the fact that State 
practices held as contrary to human rights violate them as much as similar practices carried out 
by non-state entities, as for instance minorities in some States. Likewise, the existence of 
obligations of authorities to tackle abuses attributable to non-state actors, as considered by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and international experts, and in international 
                                                     
1092 Cf. article 31 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., 
Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 375-376. According to the Oxford Dictionaries available online, 
the word “universal” is related to something done or applicable “to all cases” or to “all people or things in the world or 
in a particular group”, and to things “having universal effect […] or application”, as shown in: 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/universal#m_en_gb0906520 (last checked: 16/02/2012). 
1093 Cf. Carlos Villán Durán, op. cit., at 111. 
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instruments,1094 implies that those actors can violate human rights. The question is thus not if 
they can commit violations but when they must be responded to internationally, which was 
examined in Chapter 4. 
Apart from those procedural responses, in substantive terms factual non-state violations 
of human dignity are always legally relevant and contrary to human rights. This is why States and 
authorities of the national and local level are required to respond to them. Concerning that duty to 
respond, international norms can regulate: i) general obligations of protection that bind authorities 
–as the duties to fulfill, ensure, protect or guarantee human rights-1095; ii) and can also regulate 
detailed and specialized obligations that indicate what authorities should specifically do to protect 
some rights and individuals or to respond to some abuses, as for instance enacting certain 
prohibitions under domestic law. Examples of these more concrete duties are found in norms 
protecting women and persons with disabilities, or dealing with the prohibition of racial 
discrimination, transnational organized crime or terrorism.1096 Positive duties of authorities oblige 
them to protect human rights in the territories they control or administer, wherever someone is 
under the jurisdiction, and abroad when non-state entities may violate rights that authorities 
should guarantee extraterritorially (e.g. if they have assumed control of a foreign land and 
exclude all other authorities, being it necessary for its inhabitants to be entitled to claim protection 
by their agents) or when those authorities created the risk of those potential violations.1097 
As indicated before, apart from duties of authorities, international norms can also iii) 
regulate direct obligations of non-state entities, such as those found in criminal law, the law of the 
seas, international humanitarian law, or implied duties to not engage in serious violations and 
                                                     
1094 Cf. articles 2 and 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 4 of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, or 7 and 8 of the Convention of Belém do Pará; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 78, 81, 88, 104, 149, 153, 164, 167; Durban Declaration of the World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 2001, paras. 29, 38, 102, 
109; Durban Programme of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination paras. 69, 92, 
144; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 27-32; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, Case 12.626, Merits Report No. 80/11, op. cit., para. 
126. 
1095 Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The right to adequate food (art. 
11), op. cit., para. 15; articles 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, or 2 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
1096 See the footnote before the last; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 20-27; Henry J 
Steiner, op. cit., pp. 803-804. 
1097 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, 31 
January 2006, paras. 125-126 in light of: European Court of Human Rights, Case of Issa and others v. Turkey, 
Judgment, 16 November 2004, paras. 69-71, 76, 81; International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, op. cit., paras. 109-113. 
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breaches of jus cogens, among others. Moreover, international bodies and authorities can 
sometimes iv) directly supervise non-state conduct; or promote and recommend non-state 
compliance with human rights standards.1098 
As can be seen in articles 4 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
or 2 of the CEDAW, the first two levels of international responses to non-state violations require 
addressing not only norms that violate human rights but also practices that are contrary to them, 
such as those that encourage or permit non-state violations.  
As considered by John Ruggie, States (and other authorities) can comply with their duties 
with different strategies, including contributing to change non-state conduct that is contrary to 
human rights.1099 The only condition, as argued in Part I, is that those strategies provide effective, 
appropriate and sufficient protection, which must include access of individuals and prospects of 
effectiveness of their demands of protection. As Henry J. Steiner rightly points out, deciding which 
measures must be adopted to deal with and prevent non-state abuses will sometimes depend on 
factors as the context where they are committed, because it can make some strategies be more 
effective or convenient than others.1100  
The yardstick with which to assess compliance of authorities with their obligations will 
often be that of due diligence, being there some cases in which their efforts must be greater (e.g. 
if they created risks, if there are especially vulnerable individuals, or if they have a guarantor 
position, among others).  
The margin of choice of authorities to elect strategies to respond to non-state abuses with 
some limitations and conditions reminds about the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
developed in the European human rights regional system: despite its ambiguities, it is considered 
that States have some margin of conduct given their position to evaluate and deal with violations, 
although that conduct is subject to international supervision and some core human rights 
elements are not subject to discretion.1101 
In regard to the different ways in which international law can deal with non-state threats 
to human rights, it must be noted that the creation of international non-state obligations and direct 
supervision of non-state conduct are not limited to criminal matters and may even be found in 
human rights law stricto sensu. For instance, the possibility that human rights treaty law binds the 
European Union and certain other international organizations is contemplated in some 
                                                     
1098 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 18-31. 
1099 Cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 18, 21, 27-32 
1100 Cf. Henry J Steiner, op. cit., at 804. 
1101 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, op. cit., at 49. 
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international instruments.1102 Additionally, the Human Rights Committee has for instance admitted 
international supervision of non-state conduct in light of human rights standards.1103 Other 
possibilities may exist or develop across international legal fields. 
Concerning consistency of legal systems with human rights law, it must be mentioned 
that if internal laws fail to be compatible with the obligations of authorities, including those against 
non-state violations, those authorities incur in a breach of international human rights law and their 
responsibility is engaged for having breached a duty to prevent or respond to non-state violations 
of human rights.1104 Likewise, international law must give effective protection to all victims in a 
non -discriminatory way, as argued in Chapter 3. 
As argued in Chapter 4, non-state promotion of human rights in relation to State or non-
state actors must be permitted, and it strengthens the different levels of international horizontal 
protection of human rights.  
Non-state cooperation need not be independent, and actors can participate in joint-
actions and international fora, contributing with the expertise, flexibility and legitimacy that some 
actors have. The importance of permitting and even encouraging non-state initiatives also has to 
do with the possibilities of checking possible State and non-state abuses and omissions and of 
their contributing to counter selfish interests and providing information or resources.  
In turn, the behavior of those actors can be checked in terms of their representativeness 
and consistency with human rights standards by entities affected by them, public entities, their 
members and social actors, with the aims of rebutting false legal interpretations or wrong 
portrayals of lex lata1105 and asking them to meet fair participation requirements and respect legal 
goods. 
In turn, with the purpose of promoting human rights, international bodies and agents can 
issue press releases, statements and recommendations concerning non-state conduct, and even 
contact non-state actors,1106 among other measures that acknowledge the legal relevance of non-
state violations of human dignity.  
These ideas indicate that the protection of individuals from all abuses can be carried out 
by multiple actors, legal branches and mechanisms, which can complement each other. 
                                                     
1102 See articles 17 of Protocol 14 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, article 59 of this Convention, article 1.8).2 of the Treaty of Lisbon, or articles 11 and 12 of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities along with articles 43 and 44 of this Convention. 
1103 Cf. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 
2006. 
1104 See footnote 646, supra. 
1105 Cf. Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 191, 201-202. 
1106 Cf. Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. 
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According to these ideas, international law is but one component of the full protection of 
human dignity, which would often be ineffective without complementary actions and legal 
systems.  
This implies that without the cooperation of national authorities and non-state entities, 
international action may be unable to effectively protect individuals, and vice versa, given the 
shortcomings and advantages of each. As previously indicated, the President of the European 
Court of Human Rights recognized this when requesting the cooperation of national authorities, 
legal practitioners and representatives of victims, without which the system may collapse. For this 
reason, regional human rights systems rely on a principle of shared responsibility,1107 which 
reveals that legal practice ignores formalistic divisions between systems and is based on an 
integrated dynamic centered on common legal goods. 
All those complementary mechanisms must work together to offer a protection of human 
rights and guarantees that is universal and takes account of the indivisibility and interdependence 
of those rights, which call for overcoming State-centric approaches to human rights.1108 
On the other hand, it may be considered that some non-state actors may feel 
disinterested or choose to ignore recommendations to respect human rights. For this reason, 
legal obligations must bind them, authorizing domestic authorities to enforce them, and their 
conduct must be supervised internationally in some cases due to the possibility of State failure 
and the special features of some cases, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
The creation of non-state regulation by human rights standards is based on the premise 
that they can violate human rights or promote them. This includes all non-state entities (private or 
public, such as international organizations and, from a non-legal perspective, sub-State 
entities).1109  
If non-state entities must have international legal capacities based on human rights 
standards, and the sources of international law can create them except when normative or logical 
impediments exist, it is necessary to explore if the norms regulating those capacities can be 
effective; how they can be created and bind actors; if non-state actors themselves can participate 
in the processes that lead to the creation of the norms that regulate non-state legal capacities; 
and if there are risks or problems created by non-state legal capacities that seek to protect 
human dignity. These and related issues will be explored in the next sections of this Chapter. 
                                                     
1107 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2011, Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, 
2012, pp. 34, 36-37. 
1108 Cf. Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, “Looking beyond the State But Not Ignoring It”, op. cit., at 6. 
1109 Cf. Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., pp. 12-
15; Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international 
legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 9, 11. 
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5.4. The normative sources of the legal capacities of non-state actors in the human rights 
corpus juris 
As has been mentioned before in this Chapter, the sources of international law can 
create legal capacities of non-state actors that seek to enhance the protection of human dignity 
from non-state abuses. That being said, the creation of some non-state by the sources of jus 
gentium is necessary for the protection of human dignity to be effective.  
This is compatible with the possibility that implicit non-state duties that flow from legal 
principles and values exist, just as there are inherent and implied powers of subjects of 
international law.  
Since required legal capacities may not exist in lex lata and it is possible that positive 
international law only offers a limited and deficient protection to victims of non-state abuses at a 
given stage, law must change de lege ferenda in those events. Interestingly, such a critical 
conclusion need not be based only natural law or sociological considerations that take into 
account the power of actors and/or human needs and nature, but can also be derived from the 
positive law requirements of the full and effective protection of human dignity and consistency 
with human rights principles and norms. 
That the sources of jus gentium can be used to directly regulate non-state behavior is 
accepted in international decisions and opinions, as the one adopted by the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights in the Kononov v. Latvia case, the ICJ advisory opinion 
concerning Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
respect of Kosovo, or the Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, that in 
spite of its cautious and somewhat ambiguous language supports the idea that international 
treaties can deal with rights or duties of non-state entities, as commented by Kate Parlett, 
Theodor Meron or Hersch Lauterpacht.1110  
According to the conclusions of the Danzig opinion, the fact that certain entities 
participate in the adoption of an international norm does not mean that its scope ratione personae 
is necessarily limited to them, being it possible for it to address other entities.  
Furthermore, authors and associations posit that different sources and normative 
categories of international law can regulate the conduct of non-state entities. In this manner, for 
                                                     
1110 Cf. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006, p. 40; Kate Parlett, “The 
PCIJ’s Opinion in Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. Individual Rights under Treaties”, op. cit., pp. 120, 143-145; 
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 71-73, Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., 
pp. 27-29. 
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instance, it has been considered that customary and peremptory law can bind international 
organizations or other entities, such as individuals.1111  
Concerning this, the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals, and the Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, acknowledged that individuals can commit 
violations of international law and be accordingly punished.1112 Denying that this logic is relevant 
regarding other non-state entities that can equally affect legal goods and breach duties that bind 
them is baffling and unsustainable from a practical and an axiological point of view and also from 
a normative standpoint.  
Additionally, the possibility that non-state actors have international duties and legal 
capacities is confirmed by some international norms that reveal that international organizations, 
humanitarian agencies or armed groups, among other entities, can have both international and 
domestic obligations, such as articles 6 and 7 of the African Union Convention for the Protection 
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)1113 or article 7 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, entitled “No punishment without law”, that states:  
“1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. 
Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal 
offence was committed.  
                                                     
1111 Cf. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 116-133; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 
December 1998, paras. 155-157; European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, 
Judgment, op. cit., paras. 205-213, 235-239. 
1112 Cf. Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal, with commentaries, op. cit., Principle I and paras. 98-99. 
1113 Article 6 reads: “1. International organizations and humanitarian agencies shall discharge their obligations under 
this Convention in conformity with international law and the laws of the country in which they operate. 2. In providing 
protection and assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, international organizations and humanitarian agencies 
shall respect the rights of such persons in accordance with international law. 3. International organizations and 
humanitarian agencies shall be bound by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence of 
humanitarian actors, and ensure respect for relevant international standards and codes of conduct.” Article 7 states, 
in turn, that: 4. Members of Armed groups shall be held criminally responsible for their acts which violate the rights of 
internally displaced persons under international law and national law. 5. Members of armed groups shall be 
prohibited from: a. Carrying out arbitrary displacement; b. Hampering the provision of protection and assistance to 
internally displaced persons under any circumstances; c. Denying internally displaced persons the right to live in 
satisfactory conditions of dignity, security, sanitation, food, water, health and shelter; and separating members of the 
same family; d. Restricting the freedom of movement of internally displaced persons within and outside their areas of 
residence; e. Recruiting children or requiring or permitting them to take part in hostilities under any circumstances; f. 
Forcibly recruiting persons, kidnapping, abduction or hostage taking, engaging in sexual slavery and trafficking in 
persons especially women and children; g. Impeding humanitarian assistance and passage of all relief 
consignments, equipment and personnel to internally displaced persons h. Attacking or otherwise harming 
humanitarian personnel and resources or other materials deployed for the assistance or benefit of internally 
displaced persons and shall not destroy, confiscate or divert such materials; and  i. Violating the civilian and 
humanitarian character of the places where internally displaced persons are sheltered and shall not infiltrate such 
places.” 
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2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission 
which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations” (emphasis added). 
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that non-state conduct and legal capacities can also 
be regulated via ‘secondary law’, to employ a term of European Union law.1114 In this sense, for 
instance, the International Court of Justice accepted the possibility that demands, burdens, duties 
or other negative legal capacities of non-state actors can be imposed by the Security Council, 
when mentioning in its Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo that: 
“The only point at which resolution 1244 (1999) expressly mentions other actors relates to the 
Security Council’s demand, on the one hand, “that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups 
end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization” (para. 15) 
and, on the other hand, for the “full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security 
presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (para. 14).  There is no 
indication, in the text of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), that the Security Council intended to 
impose, beyond that, a specific obligation to act or a prohibition from acting, addressed to such other 
actors. 
The Court recalls in this regard that it has not been uncommon for the Security Council to make 
demands on actors other than United Nations Member States and intergovernmental organizations. 
More specifically, a number of Security Council resolutions adopted on the subject of Kosovo prior to 
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) contained demands addressed eo nomine to the Kosovo 
Albanian leadership. For example […]  Resolution 1199 (1998) included four separate demands on 
the Kosovo Albanian leadership, i.e., improving the humanitarian situation, entering into a dialogue 
with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, pursuing their goals by peaceful means only, and co-
operating fully with the Prosecutor  of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(resolution 1199 (1998), paras. 2, 3, 6 and 13).  Resolution 1203 (1998) “[d]emand[ed] . . . that the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership and all other elements of the Kosovo Albanian community comply fully 
and swiftly with resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) and cooperate fully with the OSCE 
Verification Mission in Kosovo” (resolution 1203 (1998), para. 4).  The same resolution also called 
upon the “Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without 
preconditions and with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the 
crisis and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo”; demanded that “the Kosovo 
Albanian leadership and all others concerned respect the freedom of movement of the OSCE 
Verification Mission and other international personnel”; “[i]nsist[ed] that the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership condemn all terrorist  actions”;  and demanded that the Kosovo Albanian leadership 
“cooperate with international efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert  the impending 
humanitarian catastrophe” (resolution 1203 (1998), paras. 5, 6, 10 and 11)” (emphasis added)1115 
Another example of secondary legislation addressing non-state conduct is provided in 
Security Council Resolution 1269 (1999), which “condemns all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable […] by whomever committed”. This direct international 
consideration of terrorist acts as illegal and unjustifiable is made regardless of domestic legal 
                                                     
1114 Cf. “Sources of European Union law”, available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l14534_en.htm (last checked: 
16/02/2012), where it is mentioned that “There are three sources of European Union law: primary law, secondary law 
and supplementary law […] Secondary sources are legal instruments based on the Treaties and include unilateral 
secondary law [“regulations, directives, decisions, opinions and recommendations”, or “"atypical" acts such as 
communications and recommendations”] and conventions and agreements.” 
1115 Cf. International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, op. cit., paras. 115-116. 
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considerations. Interestingly, in SC Resolution 1373 (2001), “acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism are [declared] contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”, and 
human rights are among them.1116  
This Resolution thus declares those acts as unlawful under international law directly and 
regardless of State decisions on the matter. This, coupled with the duty of authorities to 
cooperate to combat terrorism, mentioned therein, seeks to ensure a minimum global and 
coordinated response to terrorism, the only one that can aspire to protect individuals effectively in 
a global context in which gaps, coordination between offenders and other features facilitate the 
commission of violations and their impunity.1117 
Additionally, indirect international responses to non-state violations are also found in 
secondary legislation, as for instance in the obligation placed by the Security Council upon States 
to punish terrorist and related acts in accordance to their seriousness, as mentioned in point 2(e) 
of Resolution 1373 (2001). This provision requires States to respond to certain non-state legally 
relevant conduct in a given manner. Similarly, SC Resolution 1343 (2001) imposed obligations on 
Liberia in order to prevent and stop threats to international peace and security posed by the 
operations of a non-state entity (the Revolutionary United Front, or RUF). 
As examined in section 5.1, international law can regulate legal capacities of non-state 
actors. A related interesting and complex issue is the possible influence of non-state actors on 
the modification or emergence of international law, including norms that regulate their behavior or 
that of other actors. Additionally, it is worth examining how normative manifestations of non-state 
actors can have legal relevance in a multi-level framework of global normative interaction. 
To examine this, it is convenient to distinguish direct and indirect legal effects of non-
state influence.  
a) Sometimes, non-state actors can directly participate in the shaping of international law 
by interacting with its sources. For instance, international organizations can negotiate and be 
parties to international treaties (as indicated by the existence of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and international organizations or between international 
organizations), including human rights treaties, as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (articles 43 and 44) and its Optional Protocol or the European Convention for the 
                                                     
1116 Cf. articles 1.3, 55, 56, and 68 of the Charter of the United Nations; Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and 
Human Rights, op. cit., pp. 33-35; Felipe Gómez Isa, “International Protection of Human Rights”, op. cit., pp. 28-32. 
1117 Cf. Security Council Resolution Resolution 1373 (2001), para. 4, where it is mentioned that there is a “close 
connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal 
arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials,” and 
that there is thus a “need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels 
in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security”; Kofi A. Annan, 
“Foreword”, op. cit., pp. iii-iv. 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (see article 17 of Protocol 14 to the 
Convention); and other non-state actors can also have capacities to be bound by treaty law, for 
instance in the fields of arbitration or international humanitarian law.1118 On the other hand, it is 
considered that non-state actors can also interact with other sources of jus gentium directly or 
indirectly, for instance by means of prompting practice or opinio juris due to factual or normative 
positions that permit them to do so.1119  
The fact that a non-state entity lacks lawmaking capacities does not detract from its 
capacity to have its conduct regulated by international law. In this sense, Roland Portmann 
mentions that entities addressed by international law are its subjects, and that except 
responsibilities of individuals and other actors in relation to the respect of dignity, there are no 
automatic or unavoidable consequences of being a subject or addressee of international law. 
Moreover, Jean D’Aspremont, the ILC and Portmann consider that lawmaking power is a capacity 
that is not enjoyed by all subjects, and therefore it cannot be said that an addressee that does not 
have that power is not a subject of international law.1120  
These ideas are consistent with the consideration that the sources of international law 
can assign positive or negative capacities to different entities, which do not necessarily enjoy the 
same capacities or enjoy them to the same extent.1121 Therefore, there may be subjects of 
international law that can not interact with the sources of international law directly and shape it 
(although they could acquire that capacity) and others that can. Likewise, not all non-state actors 
with lawmaking capacities enjoy those capacities to the same degree, being there possible 
differences concerning sources and influence.  
Additionally, there are some discussions about the impact of some entities on some 
sources of law. For instance, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has declared that as an 
                                                     
1118 See footnote 738, supra. 
1119 Cf. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 116-168; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, 
First Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors: Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and 
Scope of Project and Legal Issues, The Hague Conference, op. cit., pp. 8-13; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, “Customary 
International Humanitarian Law: a response to US comments”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 89, no. 
866, 2007, pp. 476-479 (in my opinion, besides the ICRC given its formal position in the normative context related to 
IHL, besides the ICRC currently non-state armed groups are also (although differently) relevant when it comes to IHL 
custom and principles, subject to the reaction of other entities, such as States). 
1120 Cf. Jean d’Aspremont, “Non-State Actors in International Law: A Scholarly Invention?”, op. cit., pp. 5-7; Roland 
Portmann, op. cit., pp. 277, 283; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 70-
71, 82-83; International Law Commission, First Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special 
Rapporteur, Yearkbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, A/CN.4/144 and Add.1, 1962, pp. 31, 36. 
1121 Cf. Andrew Clapham, op. cit., pp. 68-71. 
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international judicial body it has the capacity to generate or stimulate customary law, idea that is 
contested by some authors.1122 
Lastly, it must be noted that sometimes non-state actors can consent to be bound by the 
product of sources of international law, while other times that product binds them even when they 
do not have an intention to be bound, as happens with some unilateral acts. 
b) On the other hand, some non-state actors without the power to directly interact with 
the sources of jus gentium may overtly or subtly have an indirect influence on the determination 
of the content of jus gentium. This may be due to either: (i) their formal participation in debates or 
other processes in which lawmakers can take into account their opinion (due to pressure or 
persuasion, for instance) despite their lacking decision power or due to their participation in 
delegations or (rarely) drafting bodies;1123 or (ii) to their informal activism from the “periphery”, 
that may lead lawmakers to take into account their opinions about what the content of law should 
be like.1124 
Logically, the impact of non-state initiatives varies according to several factors and is not 
always successful. Factors as power, effectiveness of campaigns, willingness of States, special 
features of some negotiations not replicated in others,1125 social trends, actions of networks, or 
the identity of the individuals involved in negotiations or other lawmaking processes, among 
others, may tip the balance in one side or the other. 
Additionally, as explained in doctrine, it is sometimes difficult to trace the origin of the 
content of some norms, and thus it is not easy to ascertain if non-state actors have contributed to 
its adoption or to what extent their contribution has been considered and modified.1126 
The study of the direct and indirect interactions and possible impact on the content of 
international law by non-state entities has been downplayed by some authors, according to whom 
non-state entities (who are truly actors concerning this issue) are not a proper object of scientific 
study about international law, because their influence and participation are often informal or 
without decision power, and formal international lawmaking would be mostly handled by States. 
                                                     
1122 Cf. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Chamber, Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial 
Judge’s Order regarding Jurisdiction and Standing, 10 November 2010, para. 47, versus: a skeptical analysis 
presented in: Marko Milanovic, “Formation of Custom and the Inherent Powers of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, 
EJIL: Talk!, 11 November 2010, available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/formation-of-custom-and-the-inherent-powers-of-
the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon/ 
1123 Cf. Jean d’Aspremont, “Non-State Actors in International Law: A Scholarly Invention?”, op. cit., pp. 3-7; Luis 
Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 24-31; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state 
Actors”, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 
1124 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 22-23, 26-31; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role 
of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 
1125 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 29-31. 
1126 Ibid., at 26. 
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This has been defended by Jean D’Aspremont, who nonetheless accepts that non-state entities 
increasingly participate in conferences and processes that deal with the adoption of international 
norms.1127 
In my opinion, criticism of this sort adds nothing, and does not deny the point that non-
state actors may have an influence in the determination of the content of jus gentium and can 
thus be participants in the process of its generation, sometimes informally and other times having 
the entitlement to have their opinion heard in lawmaking processes. These facts alone –their 
impact on the content of law, whose goals and features can be somewhat shaped by them, and 
the possible relevance of their opinions for interpretive purposes- make those actors worth being 
studied by international law scholars, who should not limit their works to mere descriptions but 
also critically assess law, what it represents, whether it is capable of achieving its goals 
effectively, and how open and participatory legal processes are, among other questions.  
In fact, the pre-legal account of the drafting history and account of the emergence of 
norms would be incomplete without the study of important non-state opinions that may have 
exerted an influence on the content of law, being received completely or with modifications or 
rejected after being studied. Non-state opinions are also useful to contrast them with positive law 
and alternative proposals to conduct a critical analysis of law. 
For the aforementioned reasons, the study of non-state interaction with the sources of 
international law is quite important, especially because a very formalistic approach may ignore 
important realities and dynamics that shape the content and effects of law. Narrow approaches 
may also suffer from the shortsightedness and ignore how law can be used as a tool of inclusion 
or exclusion1128 and used to protect or abuse, as the old story of Antigone warns. 
Additionally, as Jordan J. Paust expresses, the entities that can formally participate in the 
shaping of international law are not as few as State-centered conceptions suggest, as revealed 
by the existence of treaties entered into by non-state political groups even during the peak of 
classic international law or by the impact on customary and treaty international humanitarian law 
and other legal branches by tribes and other actors, such as armed entities.1129 Additionally, the 
informal participation of non-state actors (individuals and others as legal or juridical persons)1130 
can be quite relevant as well, and can have a tremendous impact despite its informal character.  
                                                     
1127 Cf. Jean d’Aspremont, “Non-State Actors in International Law: A Scholarly Invention?”, op. cit. 
1128 Cf. Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Law”, op. cit., 62-63; Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and 
Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., pp. 140-144. 
1129 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., pp. 
978-986, 994-998. 
1130 Cf. John Finnis, “The Priority of Persons”, op. cit., pp. 6-10; José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of 
International Law?”, op. cit., pp. 4-5, 8-9, 17-18, 26-28, 30-31, 34-35. 
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For instance, a disaggregated analysis of States indicates that their opinions or actions 
may be sometimes shaped by other actors (and vice versa),1131 whose opinion is also relevant in 
world and transnational relations. Those actors can influence decisions of other authorities as 
well, and therefore they can contribute to shaping non-state legal capacities, including their power 
to shape law formally or informally, directly or indirectly. The examination of non-state entities is 
thus also relevant concerning the influence of States and other authorities in legal processes. 
According to Jordan J. Paust: 
“More adequate awareness of the formal and informal roles of prior and present non-state actors and 
present competencies, rights, and duties is necessary for realistic inquiry into what many term the 
nature, sources, and evidences of international law and the dynamic nature of both treaty-based and 
customary international law. Ignorance of our past should no longer be used to deny our common 
dignity.”1132 
Altogether, in formal terms there are restrictions as to the heterogeneity of entities with 
lawmaking powers concerning some sources of international law, although sometimes non-state 
entities can shape them. This does not detract from the recognition of non-state input and 
interaction with the content and implementation of international law. Understanding what a norm 
attempts to achieve, what social dynamics lead to its creation, and what its relation with non-state 
positions may be, often requires examining non-state entities.  
Certainly, non-state actors can have material and substantive influence in international 
legal processes even when they lack formal participation or decision-making powers. Moreover, 
when they have formal participation entitlements, their potential of influence is undeniable 
because their opinion must be heard. Regarding these entitlements, one must not forget that law 
is neither one-dimensional nor reductionist in its scope and dynamics. Thus, absence of certain 
lawmaking capacities does not deny the possible existence of other relevant positive legal 
capacities, even concerning the sources of jus gentium. According to the International Law 
Association: 
“[E]ven if NSA may not have formal treaty-making capacity, some international NGOs, such as the 
ICRC, have had special roles in the development of international treaties, and have thus been able to 
influence the content of international treaty law. NGOs have also long enjoyed formal participatory 
rights through accreditation as consultants or observers within the UN under Article 71 of the UN 
Charter, and its bodies, and within UN-related and unrelated IGOs responsible for negotiating, 
drafting and organising conferences for the adoption of multilateral treaties, and within COP/MOPs of 
MEAs. They often participate formally (and informally) in developing norms within these 
arrangements. NGO participatory rights are accompanied by obligations to comply with rules and 
regulations of the relevant international legal arrangement. Accreditation rules provide a legal basis 
for NGOs to participate within particular arrangements, and recent scholarship suggests NGOs now 
                                                     
1131 Cf. Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 40-45, 53-58; Fred Halliday, op. cit., pp. 26-34; Daphné Josselin and William 
Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework”, op. cit., pp. 4-10; Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor 
Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., at 999. 
1132 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., at 
1004. 
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have “at least a legitimate expectation” to a “general right to participate in international legal 
discourse”1133 (emphasis added). 
Concerning formal participation, it must be said that non-state actors have sometimes 
participated in what has been called a “new diplomacy”, in which that participation was highly 
influential. This happened in the drafting and negotiation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Law and the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention.1134 On the other hand, participation 
entitlements are envisaged for instance in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, that in Part VII 
regulates the “Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Conferences 
Convened by the United Nations and their Preparatory Processes”. 
The Non-State Actors Committee of the International Law Association considered that the 
possible impact of non-state entities on the sources of international law has the potential to 
transform international law and turn it into a transnational system or, in my opinion, to make it 
have transnational and global dimensions. According to the Committee: 
“In order for the binding force of international law to be palatable to non-State actors as (possible) 
subjects of international law, international law norms need to be made through an inclusive process, 
with the participation of all relevant stakeholders. This requires a fundamental rethinking of 
international law formation, which is traditionally centered on States. It may require giving non-State 
actors the right to participate in treaty negotiation and adoption, and giving the practice of non-State 
actors some weight in the determination of norms of customary international law. Law may then 
become transnational rather than international”1135 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, measures and initiatives of lawmakers and authorities can be inspired on non-
state actions and requests, as can be seen in the influence of movements whose claims were 
later incorporated into law, including claims about the protection of human dignity (e.g. the anti-
slavery, anti-apartheid and other movements).1136  
Furthermore, a scientific approach to law cannot be exclusively intra-systematic and 
ignore extra-legal or supra-legal criteria and elements such as the social and human impact of 
law, dynamics leading to its creation, or its relations with other normative systems. Likewise, it 
cannot be ignored that law is not limited to formal lawmaking but comprises other dynamics as 
well, including processes previous to formal lawmaking, which is but one operation –certainly 
important- among others. Non-state actors sometimes participate in them, even formally.  
                                                     
1133Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State 
Actors: Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and Scope of Project and Legal Issues, The Hague 
Conference, op. cit., at 10. 
1134 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 29-31. 
1135 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, Report: Preliminary issues for the ILA 
Conference in Rio de Janeiro, op. cit., at 3. 
1136 Cf. George J. Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, and Peter Juviler, “Rethinking the Human Rights 
Universe”, op. cit., pp. 335-337; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. 
cit., pp. 186-187; Felipe Gómez Isa, “International Protection of Human Rights”, op. cit., pp. 19-21. 
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Concerning this, it is essential to distinguish between “formal and material ‘sources’ of 
international law”, being the latter those “[indirect] sources of ideas for the lawmaker” concerning 
the “content of the law”.1137 Non-state actors can interact with both kinds of sources. 
Additionally, the regulation of non-state participation can change, and even become 
formal and/or direct sometimes. It is possible that entitlements to formal participation in a direct 
way are granted in the future if an actor does not enjoy them. For instance, the United Nations 
mentioned that the drafting and adoption process of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
disabilities was “the first time that NGOs had actively participated in the formulation of a human 
rights instrument”.1138 In this sense, apart from receiving statements, comments and proposals by 
non-state entities (as NGOs, international authorities or international organizations),1139 the Ad 
Hoc Committee that was entrusted with the task of drafting the instrument and reached an 
agreement on it had delegates that “represented NGOs, Governments, national human rights 
institutes and international organizations”.1140 In its second session, the Committee established a 
Working Group that had the task of drafting the Convention, which was composed of “government 
and NGO representatives” and elaborated a draft version in 2004.1141 
According to what has been said, the possibility of interactions between non-state and 
the sources of jus gentium cannot be dismissed, and accordingly it is convenient to propose 
criteria about when their participation cannot be refused or is recommended.1142 In sum, just as 
                                                     
1137 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State 
Actors: Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and Scope of Project and Legal Issues, The Hague 
Conference, op. cit., pp. 8-11. Also see: Jean d’Aspremont, “Non-State Actors in International Law: A Scholarly 
Invention?”, op. cit., pp. 2-6. 
1138 Cf. “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Why a Convention?: How was the Convention 
negotiated?”, available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/questions.shtml#ten (last checked: 20/02/2012). 
1139 Cf. United Nations Enable, NGO Comments on the Draft Text (Comments made at the Seventh Session and 
submitted to the UN Secretariat, available at: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7contngos.htm (last 
checked: 20/02/2012); United Nations Enable, “Frequently Asked Questions regarding the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities”, available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=24&pid=151#neg1 (last 
checked: 20/02/2012), where it is mentioned that “The Convention was drafted by the Ad Hoc Committee on a 
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of 
Persons with Disabilities (Ad Hoc Committee), which was a committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Its 
membership was open to all United Nations Member States and observers. During its first session, the Ad Hoc 
Committee decided that representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accredited to the Ad Hoc 
Committee could also participate in meetings and make statements in accordance with United Nations practice […] 
During its first session, the Ad Hoc Committee decided that representatives from non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) accredited to the Ad Hoc Committee could also participate in meetings and make statements in accordance 
with United Nations practice. Thereafter, the General Assembly repeatedly urged that efforts be made to actively 
involve disability organizations in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Throughout the process, organizations of 
persons with disabilities and other NGOs were very active in providing comments and information from a disability 
perspective […] National human rights institutions (NHRI) were also active in the negotiations.” 
1140 Cf. http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/questions.shtml#ten (last checked: 20/02/2012). 
1141 Cf. http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=24&pid=151#neg1 (last checked: 20/02/2012). 
1142 Cf. e.g. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, paras. 41-42, 47-50. 
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soft law or hard law can have an impact on non-state attitudes,1143 non-state entities can also 
have an impact on the content of international law. 
c) Apart from the possibilities of indirect and direct interaction between non-state actors 
and the sources of international law, non-state conduct can sometimes produce international 
legal effects, binding the entities that engage in it or having other legal implications. These effects 
are neither necessarily desired by those actors nor always directly produced by that conduct, and 
can be produced by principles, norms and sources of jus cogens in relation to them.  
This can happen, among other possibilities, because of: 1) the reception of the content 
non-state regulations (whether one considers them legal or not) by international soft or hard law; 
or 2) the application of good faith and related principles to the protection of third parties, that may 
oblige non-state entities to comply with their promises or to not disappoint those who trust in their 
assertions and commitments, for instance. In this regard, in 2008 in the Committee on Non-State 
Actors of the International Law Association it was considered that: 
“Many non-State actors, e.g. corporations and armed opposition groups, commit themselves to 
upholding international law. However, they tend to do so as a matter of policy/soft law than as a 
matter of hard law. In so doing, they may avoid legal accountability. There may nevertheless be 
doctrines and principles that could be used to harden these soft commitments into hard law (duty of 
care/negligence/corporate organization/legitimate expectations/good faith/unilateral act...)"1144 
(emphasis added). 
Concerning the question of whether non-binding regulations of non-state behavior 
sufficiently protect international legal goods, I consider that given their voluntary character and 
frequent lack of access of victims to remedies and petitions of supervision of compliance, binding 
norms and mechanisms must complement them for the protection of human dignity to have solid 
prospects of effectiveness in case non-binding initiatives are not heeded. 
A twist that has to be considered is how jus gentium can be relevant for non-state 
regulations that are increasingly employed in a globalized world and vice versa.  
Authors as Günther Teubner argue that non-state regulation can be considered as law, 
which he calls global law. Other authors agree with this general conclusion and consider that 
there are increased possibilities of non-state regulation due to globalization and transnational 
relations, but prefer expressions as lex privata when regulation is created by private entities, 
especially because they are private regulations not based on the recognition of public law1145 and 
                                                     
1143 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., at 35 
1144 Cf. International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, Report: Preliminary issues for the ILA 
Conference in Rio de Janeiro, op. cit., at 3. 
1145 I consider public law to be that in which public public entities control to a relevant extent the sources of law, 
instead of controversial and somewhat artificial distinctions between private and public law. Cf. Antonio Remiro 
Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, McGraw-Hill, 1997, at XLV; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho 
Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 40; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 
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public legal rules of recognition.1146 They can have domestic and local scopes and not 
necessarily global or transnational implications.  
Regulations adopted by non-state actors that do not directly create international or 
internal norms can seek to regulate the conduct of the actors that adopt them or that of others, 
and can also incorporate the content of international or domestic norms,1147 just as it is possible 
for the latter to include non-state standards.  
Sometimes, that incorporation can reinforce the protection of shared legal goods, and is 
thus recommended. One provision that recognizes and requests this is paragraph 15 of the 
Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with 
regard to human rights, adopted by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, according to which: 
“As an initial step towards implementing these Norms, each transnational corporation or other 
business enterprise shall adopt, disseminate and implement internal rules of operation in compliance 
with the Norms. Further, they shall periodically report on and take other measures fully to implement 
the Norms and to provide at least for the prompt implementation of the protections set forth in the 
Norms. Each transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and incorporate these 
Norms in their contracts or other arrangements and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, 
suppliers, licensees, distributors, or natural or other legal persons that enter into any agreement with 
the transnational corporation or business enterprise in order to ensure respect for and implementation 
of the Norms” (emphasis added). 
Moreover, sometimes effects of lex privata and jus gentium are intermingled, as happens 
when non-state norms are given legal effects because of the application of the principle of good 
faith or other principles, as explained above, or when non-state normative manifestations are 
regarded as unilateral acts that produce international legal effects. 
The three general forms of interplay between non-state entities and the content of jus 
gentium being explained, and the possibility of those entities being bound or constrained by jus 
gentium clarified, it is possible to say that non-state actors and international law can be related in 
two ways: a) having a causal nexus, when non-state actors exert an influence on the 
determination of the content of law (proactive or positive nexus) and vice versa; and b) a 
normative link, when norms regulate non-state behavior, sanctioning or supporting it (passive link, 
which is negative when negative legal capacities are involved). These two types of relations have 
been recognized in doctrine when it has been said that non-state actors can be lawmakers and/or 
law-takers.1148  
                                                     
1146 Cf. H.L.A. Hart, op. cit., pp. 92, 94-95. 
1147 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
1148 Cf. Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., at 9; Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, “Introduction: Non-State Actors: 
International Law’s Problematic Case”, op. cit., pp. 1, 3. 
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The division between relations can be blurred in practice, because they can be 
combined: an entity can be bound by a norm and also have contributed to its emergence. 
On the other hand, it is important to make it clear that the content of the principle of 
legality in international law permits non-state duties and other negative legal capacities to be 
created and regulated by any source of international law if some conditions are respected, as was 
discussed previously when examining that principle and its international formulation in the form 
nulla poena/nullum crimen sine jure/jus (see section 5.2, supra). 
Even if international law can regulate negative legal capacities of non-state entities, 
sometimes State duties and actions may sufficiently protect individuals from those entities and 
make the creation or implementation of norms on those legal capacities unnecessary. However, 
as explained throughout this book, the existence of State duties does not always ensure the full 
reparation and protection of victims, as happens for example when States behaveswith the 
required diligence but victims are not repaired, or when reparation provided by a State is 
insufficient since some components of reparation, as truth or guarantees of non-repetition, can 
only be fully satisfied if non-state participants in violations repair victims. The same can be said of 
preventative measures, and not only of ex post facto strategies. 
These reasons explain why there is a trend in international law that seeks to hold all the 
actors that violate international legal goods accountable. José Manuel Cortés, for instance, 
argues that progresses in international criminal law and the law on the responsibility of 
international organizations are efforts of the international community that belong to that trend,1149 
implicitly arguing thus that this community considers that substantive duties ought to exist or 
sometimes exist already, since responsibility is a consequence of their breach.1150 Therefore, if 
actors that can affect legal goods (values, goals and interests that a norm seeks to protect) do not 
have obligations, their conduct must be regulated through substantive (primary) rules and 
therefore automatically also by secondary norms, i.e. norms about legal responsibility.1151  
That not only States must have international human rights responsibilities is confirmed by 
the idea expressed before that just as it was considered that States should have human rights 
obligations for individuals to be better protected,1152 non-state actors must have duties and other 
                                                     
1149 Cf. José Manuel Cortés, op. cit., pp. 56-58. 
1150 Cf. articles 2 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (A/56/49(Vol. 
I)/Corr.4) and 4 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations adopted in 2011 
(A/66/10); Bin Cheng, op. cit., pp. 166, 169, 174-176, 180. 
1151 On primary and secondary rules, cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, pp. 31, 34-35, 54, 60-61, 63, 75, 85, 92, 94-95, 141. 
1152 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 254-257. Just as human beings must be protected from State abuses and 
States must not be unchecked concerning human dignity, they must for the same reasons be protected from non-
state entities that can also threaten them. 
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legal capacities that reinforce the protection of human dignity because they can, and often do, 
violate the content of human rights and guarantees, and an exclusively State-centric international 
protection cannot fully protect victims in all cases, as explained previously. 
Therefore, non-state actors can not only have international legal capacities created by 
the sources of jus gentium, but also must have them for human dignity to be effectively protected. 
Before studying different relations between non-state entities and sources of international 
law, it is important to mention that, unless peremptory law is involved, the existence and status of 
norms produced by one source does not affect that of other norms even if they have the same or 
similar content and object, given their independence, as declared by the International Court of 
Justice in the Case on the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. The Court 
argued that: 
“The fact that the […] principles, recognized as such, have been codified or embodied in multilateral 
conventions does not mean that they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even 
as regards countries that are parties to such conventions. Principles such as those of the non-use of 
force, non-intervention, respect for the independence and territorial integrity of States, and the 
freedom of navigation, continue to be binding as part of customary international law, despite the 
operation of provisions of conventional law in which they have been incorporated.”1153 
This international principle of normative independence is logically applicable in the field of 
the legal protection of human dignity from all violations, as revealed for example in article 10 of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which states that: 
“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing 
rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.” 
Therefore, for example, the fact that there is a specific treaty regulation in that Statute 
concerning elements of responsibility arising out of complicity in international crimes, for instance 
regarding actus reus and mens rea (being it uncertain if the intentional component of complicity in 
the Statute is narrower and stricter than the general one regulated under customary criminal 
law),1154 does not mean that it is applicable to international criminal law generally (that condemns 
some violations of human dignity), and therefore customary norms may be broader than it and 
are not affected or overridden by it, as commented by Chimène I. Keitner.1155 The same logic 
applies to other norms protecting human rights and guarantees. 
 
                                                     
1153 Cf. International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), 26 
November 1984, para. 73. 
1154 Cf. Albin Eser, “Individual Criminal Responsibility: Mental Elements—Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law”, 
Reprints from: Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 791-792, 801; Chimène I. Keitner, “Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort 
Cases”, Hastings Law Journal, vol. 60, 2008, pp. 88-89, 91, 93-96. 
1155 Cf. Chimène I. Keitner, “Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases”, pp. 82-83, 87-97. 
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5.5. Rebuttals to objections to non-state human rights duties and legal burdens 
An analysis of the possibility of regulating international negative legal capacities of non-
state actors with the goal of better and effectively protecting human dignity requires ascertaining 
whether this regulation is feasible in international law and other legal systems, which requires 
examining their sources of law.  
It has been argued that the sources of jus gentium and the notion of legal subjectivity 
confirm that legal capacities of non-state entities can be created if they respect fundamental 
guarantees and peremptory law. Moreover, non-state regulations can contribute to enhance the 
protection of human dignity and help shape international law in that regard, but must be controlled 
to make sure that they are not abusive or contrary to human rights. 
Even though international law can accommodate the acceptance by or imposition on non-
state entities of negative legal capacities, some argue that this assignation or imposition is 
unadvisable or even absurd from the perspective of what human rights are meant to be and do. 
First of all, it must be said that those criticisms are not actually positive law discussions, 
given the possibility and examples of the creation of non-state human rights responsibilities. For 
instance, Hersch Lauterpacht comments that some legal capacities with negative connotations, 
such as those related to criminal responsibility, can protect human rights and are known bind 
non-state entities.1156  
The facts that criminal law and other branches that can protect human dignity, such as 
international humanitarian law or refugee law, regulate duties, rights and other guarantees to 
protect individuals from non-state abuses, and that they are sometimes found simultaneously in 
norms from different formal branches that yet belong to the same corpus juris in substantive 
terms, demonstrate that human dignity can be protected legally from non-state violations, even in 
jus gentium and human rights stricto sensu, and equally under domestic law and lex privata 
manifestations, as exemplified by the ATS of the U.S., the Human Rights Act 1998 of the UK or 
the tutela action of Colombia. 
As a result, it is possible to infer that criticisms to having a human rights logic in the 
relations of individuals with non-state entities, not being sound from a positive law perspective, 
should at least appeal to meta- or extra-legal considerations to be persuasive. However, I 
consider that a deep analysis proves precisely the contrary: that it is necessary for individuals to 
be legally protected from non-state abuses in international law and other normative systems. 
                                                     
1156 Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, op. cit., pp. 35-46. 
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Let us say that, as has been commented in doctrine, the internationalization of human 
rights1157 was a response to historical grievances and serious abuses, and constituted a 
dismantling of the myth that individuals were sufficiently protected under State jurisdiction.  
The fact that there are initiatives and trends to persuade non-state entities as 
corporations to behave in accordance with human rights standards, and even to hold some non-
state entities, as individuals, accountable for violations of human dignity, proves that there is 
awareness of the potential abuses that non-state entities can commit.  
Developments concerning legal capacities created to respond to non-state abuses must 
thus be understood both as reactions to increased non-state abuses and power due to processes 
of globalization, weakening of States, changes of identities and other dynamics, which are 
changes that certainly require a proper and updated regulatory response; and as 
acknowledgments of the need to be coherent with the legal implications of the full and effective 
protection of human dignity, which would be limited if it denies the vulnerability of individuals 
against entities different from States and the consequent need of legal protecting them because 
the logic of State responsibility can be insufficient to protect them.  
Both of those logics are intertwined. Since non-state entities can1158 and have always 
been able to act in a manner that is contrary to human dignity, just as they have always been 
relevant actors in world social relationships throughout history, human rights law must implicitly or 
expressly acknowledge the need to protect individuals from non-state violations and ignore 
contrary theories that would deprive its norms of their purposes.  
                                                     
1157 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., at 254-257; 33, 54-56. 
1158 See, among others, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Preliminary Observations of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights after the visit of the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Afro-Descendants and 
against Racial Discrimination to the Republic of Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134, Doc. 66, 27 March 1999, para. 46; 
Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, op. cit., at 14; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez 
v. Honduras, Judgment, 29 July 1988, paras. 166, 172; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 140; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, 
Judgment, 30 May 1999, para. 89; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 43-
44, 47-53, 56-58, 70-73; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 2006, 
para. 4; Committee Against Torture, Communication No 120/1998: Australia, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, 25 May 1999, 
para. 6.5; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 03/08, Human Rights of Migrants, International 
Standards and the Return Directive of the EU; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release No 
06/09, IACHR Condemns Killings of Awá Indigenous People by the FARC; Chris Jochnick, supra; Jordan J. Paust, 
“The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law”, op. cit.; August Reinisch, supra; Robert 
Dufresne, op. cit., at 227. As the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has considered, just as there are express and implied 
powers, when there are none of these and one such capacity is required for an organ as an international tribunal to 
fulfill its functions, protect human rights and/or achieve goals inherent to it, it can have such functions. If non-state 
actors have the factual –yet legally relevant- potential to offend dignity, they must have the inherent duty to refrain 
from these legal relevant factual violations, or else relevant goals of the legal system will be left unprotected, contrary 
to the absolute nature of the core peremptory norms involved. Domestic, international and transnational action that 
responds to those violations “evinces” those inherent duties. Cf. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Chamber, 
Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, of 10 November 2010, paras. 44-49.  
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Current social trends have not only made individuals more vulnerable against non-state 
entities. Thanks to the greater ease of mobilization and exchange of opinions made possible by 
technological and social progresses, for instance, demands for protection from all abuses are 
facilitated. Ignorance of those demands will make human rights law incomplete, contradictory, 
illegitimate and unfair.  
The facts that international bodies operating in contexts with highly State-centered 
competence rules have granted protection against non-state entities directly or indirectly, and that 
non-jurisdictional mechanisms (such as agreements; creation of non-state legal capacities; 
contacting and persuading entities, shaming them, or issuing recommendations to them) have 
been employed, confirm that the horizontality of human rights is not just related to State duties of 
protection of individuals from other private entities, because it comprises a whole framework that 
is transversal insofar as it answers to the full protection of human dignity, which is non-conditional 
and thus cannot be relegated to just one accidental set of relations. Responding to non-state 
threats directly is not only pertinent but also necessary for human rights law. 
That being said, it is important to examine in greater detail some of the most frequent 
objections to strategies and paradigms that go beyond the narrow State-centered paradigm and 
truly answer to the call for fully and effectively protecting human dignity. The first thing is to bear 
in mind that the center of the human dignity paradigm is the protection of individuals, not being it 
proper to place different entities as States at its center, which would turn things upside down and 
subvert the principles and values of the framework of protection. 
Objections are usually of two kinds: first, objections that consider that assigning negative 
legal capacities to non-state entities can have the adverse effect of legally or socially legitimizing 
them; and secondly, the idea that the logic of human rights cannot accommodate protection from 
non-state violations or that it would be weakened as a result of that direct protection.1159 
These two criticisms have different concerns and emphasis: while the first type shows 
fears of a symbolic or legal empowerment of non-state entities, the second one considers that 
‘expanding’ the protection of human rights would be detrimental to the purposes and strengths of 
human rights law.  
                                                     
1159 On these arguments and counter-arguments, cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors, op. cit., pp. 25, 32, 41-44; Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., at 339; Draft Norms on the 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 2003, para. 1; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 17-26; August Reinisch, op. 
cit., at 82. 
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I consider that human rights (lato sensu) have always been able to be protected from 
non-state violations, being the particular the way in which that protection takes place subject to a 
restricted discretion. Traditionally, this has been done to a large extent in an indirect manner, by 
means of State duties and responsibility for failing to tackle non-state violations, explicitly or 
implicitly considered as such. Therefore, for a long time human rights have been protected from 
non-state violations (sometimes in an incomplete or ineffective way, reason why their regulation 
must evolve), and somewhat recently that protection has been reinforced. That reinforcement has 
been sometimes related to the ratione personae ‘expansion’ of specialized human rights norms, 
and other times to an international procedural scope. Such extensions are necessary out of 
consistency with the foundations, values and goals of the humanitarian corpus juris, which require 
a non-discriminatory and effective protection of all victims.  
Apart from this, I disagree with both sets of objections for the following reasons: 
a) Concerning the consideration that negative legal capacities of non-state entities 
designed to protect human dignity may end up legitimizing or empowering those entities 
somehow, it is convenient to begin by recalling how some international norms expressly make it 
clear that the fact that an entity is bound by some duties does not entail a change of its status. 
This is contemplated in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and international 
humanitarian law generally, that protects some human rights and guarantees.  
That article mentions that parties to non-international armed conflicts must abide by some 
norms, and that this does “not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.” The underlying 
logic of this provision is applicable in other fields, because if one entity is assigned a legal 
capacity that is not expressly or implicitly accompanied by other capacities that are necessary for 
that capacity to have effectiveness, it has no additional legal entitlements or burdens as a result. 
From another perspective, the objection under examination has been properly rebutted 
by Andrew Clapham, who considers that declaring that an entity is capable of perpetrating or 
cooperating with violations of human rights does not legitimize it at all and actually restricts its 
behavior.1160 Moreover, the finding that such violations have been committed can lead to 
delegitimation or condemnation, which is far from symbolically empowering or legitimizing it.  
Expanding on this idea, it is interesting that considering that an entity has the capacity to 
carry out conduct regarded as reprehensible and deserving regulation by the international 
community is not ‘flattering’ at all and opens up the door to, at least, the following implications: 
labeling an actor as an offender of norms that protect human dignity attaches a negative status, 
that engages the legal responsibility of that entity if an obligation is breached, its social 
                                                     
1160 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
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accountability when the ethical dimensions of human rights are violated; exposes the entity to 
possible repercussions, reactions or legal measures adopted to protect victims, sanction 
violations and enforce the affected norms; encourages examining the behavior of that actor; 
fosters social and individual examination and mobilization to protect victims and condemn 
abuses; and prompts subjecting the entity to standards that, if ignored, expose it to further legal 
and extra-legal repercussions. 
Objections to alleged ‘legitimizations’ of non-state entities have been expressed, for 
instance, by authors that consider that imposing (negative) legal capacities on perpetrators of 
acts of terrorism or on armed groups would risk giving them international legitimacy, or that 
holding corporations subject to human rights standards will empower them and permit them to 
make their private interests prevail over humanitarian considerations.1161 To my mind, however, 
those possibilities are prevented by the fact that violations of human rights and other standards 
protecting human dignity will in fact de-legitimize offenders, negatively affect their reputation, and 
possibly expose them to adverse reactions (social, legal or otherwise). 
b) As to the objections according to which human rights could be weakened for holding 
that non-state entities can violate human rights and guarantees and be accountable or 
responsible for such violations, or that international law can directly protect victims from non-state 
abuses, the following can be said. Some argue that, historically, human rights were designed to 
protect individuals from State abuses, and others consider that the human rights system is fine if 
it is limited to protecting individuals from States. These theories agree on the idea that it is not 
convenient to alter the individual-State logic and scheme of human rights because doing so may 
weaken or undermine the human rights system.  
To answer to those objections, the first idea that must be considered is that State 
obligations are in no way altered by non-state human rights negative legal capacities. This has 
been explained by several authors, as August Reinisch, Scott Jerbi or Andrew Clapham,1162 and 
is demonstrated in international case law, which supports the argument that States and other 
authorities remain bound by their negative (duty of abstention from violations) and positive 
obligations even if they have delegated or transferred competences to a non-state entity, and that 
in all other cases they still have a duty to prevent or address non-state violations.  
However, as has been explored before, this strategy is not sufficient and can fail to fully 
and effectively protect individuals, because violations may remain in impunity (which further 
                                                     
1161 Cf. Mary Ellen O’Connell, op. cit., pp. 456-458; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 
op. cit., pp. 46-53; José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
1162 See footnote 59, supra. 
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violates rights and guarantees) and victims be left unprotected even when States with jurisdiction 
acts with the due diligence with which they have to act, according to their obligations of means. 
Therefore, not only human rights would not only not be weakened by the existence of non-state 
responsibilities, but their values and logic would actually be undermined if those responsibilities 
do not exist, because human dignity demands protection from all threats in an effective way, that 
requires substantive and sometimes procedural non-state capacities. Paradoxically, what critics 
of non-state capacities fear can come true if their position is upheld! 
Some authors argue that human rights law was created with the purpose of protecting 
individuals from States, and that it should remain as its exclusive function to not lose its identity, 
be weakened by offering more than can be handled, or be manipulated by States that may invoke 
non-state duties to elude supervision of compliance with their own obligations. 
In regard to the possibility of States diverting attention away from their human rights 
duties by taking advantage of the existence of non-state human rights duties and other legal 
capacities, it must be repeated that in legal terms States remain bound by their obligations. 
Therefore, any attempts by them to elude scrutiny should and can be condemned and denied by 
national authorities, international bodies and independent examiners of the local, transnational 
and domestic levels (NGOs and judicial authorities, among others). 
On the other hand, it is doubtful that since their inception or recognition –being the 
election of the term dependent on one’s theoretical conception of human rights-, the idea of 
essential, fundamental or inherent rights was limited to the protection of individuals against 
States.  
To examine this, it is convenient to stress that while some consider that the notion of 
natural rights differs from the contemporary conception of human rights due to differences of the 
foundations of each category, both seek to protect the inherent rights and worth of individuals, 
and therefore are connected historically and theoretically. Moreover, the former inspired some 
features of positive human rights law and may have contributed to its emergence;1163 and some 
meta-juridical teleological (rational, ethical, theological or otherwise) conceptions identify many 
rights from both categories. What is interesting for the issue being discussed is that some natural 
rights theories defended the idea that individuals had to be protected from other individuals –non-
state entities-, and this was a reason why some State functions were legitimized: not being ends 
in themselves, I consider it important to hold that States are empowered precisely to protect 
                                                     
1163 Cf. section 1.1, supra. 
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inherent rights of individuals against non-state entities, among other functions, and their powers 
are always subject to serving human beings.1164  
The evolution of the humanitarian legal corpus, not limited to the contemporary 
conception of positive human rights (broadly speaking, which include stricto sensu rights too), 
later incorporated the necessary protection of individuals against States, because it was 
recognized that individuals were not sufficiently protected by the assignation of protection powers 
to States, which are potential violators that can abuse their power or otherwise act against human 
dignity, for instance due to inertia and omissions of protection despite their duties.  
These considerations reveal two things: first, as the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has stated, the human rights system is not static but dynamic. This is consistent with the 
general evolutionary character of jus gentium, acknowledged by the International Court of Justice 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.1165 Ergo, the humanitarian corpus juris can 
continue to evolve and accordingly improve the protection of human dignity it offers, including 
better and more direct protection from non-state abuses, as is direly needed in practice by 
victims. After all, just as concerns about State threats led to protection against them, the 
undeniable presence of frequent and heightened non-state threats must likewise be legally 
prevented and dealt with.  
Such protection would be necessary even if non-state actors were not empowered and 
able to elude control more often due to globalization and other trends and dynamics, because the 
foundation and source of human rights and guarantees demands a universal protection from all 
threats.  
                                                     
1164 Cf. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, where it is said that “But because no political society can be, 
nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of 
all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this 
natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for 
protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the 
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having 
authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between 
any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath 
committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, 
and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common established 
law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in 
civil society one with another”; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651 (“The only way to erect such a Common Power, as 
may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure 
them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and 
live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may 
reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or 
Assembly of men, to beare their Person”); Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (Thomas Nugent, translator), 
The Spirit of Laws, 1752 (“In the state of nature, indeed, all men are born equal, but they cannot continue in this 
equality. Society makes them lose it, and they recover it only by the protection of the laws”); Concurring Opinion of 
Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, Juridical 
Condition and Human Rights of the Child, 28 August 2002, para. 19. 
1165 See footnote 575, supra. 
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Concerning the room for improving the legal protection of human dignity from non-state 
threats there are examples of developments, as the gradual acceptance by some supervisory 
bodies of their power to examine non-state conduct, issue recommendations concerning 
responses to their violations, or the regulation of legally relevant non-state behavior in criminal 
law and other fields. 
Secondly, it can be inferred that just as the legal evolution of the humanitarian corpus 
juris incorporated both internationalized and internal protection against State violations, protection 
against non-state entities can also be internationalized, as has happened in some cases.  
To expand upon this, it can be said that protection from non-state violations usually exists 
under domestic law, in an imperfect manner or not, because many domestic norms and 
mechanisms protect human dignity from non-state threats expressly or implicitly. For instance, it 
is undeniable that criminal law protects some humanitarian legal goods, and civil or tort law also 
permit individuals to be protected from harm to their inherent rights or to request protection of 
entitlements closely related to their inalienable dignity. Actually, the facts that human rights 
violations are frequently committed by non-state entities, and that State responsibility can coexist 
with that of non-state entities, have led to legislation and demands to legally protect individuals 
from those entities in ways that, despite not being formally part of ‘human rights’ stricto sensu, 
belong to the humanitarian corpus juris in substantive terms. 
Moreover, scholars have posited the idea that there have been different stages in the 
evolution of the legal protection of human rights, namely: their constitutionalization, 
internationalization –incorporation and recognition in jus gentium-, and specialization, which 
consists in the design of specialized norms that either better protect or develop some rights that 
require special attention given their vulnerability, or respond to the specific challenges posed by 
some actors. Simultaneously, there is a related process of humanization of international law that, 
alongside the process of inclusion (increasing international regulation of relevant non-state 
conduct), seeks to make law better reflect and answer to reality and human and social needs and 
better protect human dignity, which demands full protection of individuals not limited to protection 
from just some potential violators.  
Concerning these processes, the fact that some norms and principles (even those that 
belong to soft law or have a voluntary nature) regulate humanitarian standards with which some 
non-state entities as corporations must comply, can be understood as a necessary part of the 
specialization and humanization processes of law, in the sense that additional regulation is 
necessary not only to answer to special needs of some rights and individuals, but also to regulate 
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the behavior of entities that have been identified as potential or frequent violators in depth, to 
discourage and sanction their abuses and to educate them to respect human rights.  
The processes of internationalization and specialization of human rights are not limited to 
protection from non-state actors but certainly permit and require improving that protection, given 
the necessity of protecting victims against their violations, as required by the legal foundation of 
those rights and human rights principles. This dimension of protection is accepted by NGOs, 
international bodies and authors. 
The need and possibility of protecting human dignity from non-state abuses is confirmed 
by the existence of standards and codes of conduct issued by public and private organizations, 
such as the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy, the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises, the Global Compact, a 
framework and principles of corporations and human rights, and instruments drafted by NGOs, 
private and public entities,1166 among others. Those instruments and initiatives acknowledge that 
non-state conduct must be regulated in order to better protect human dignity. 
The facts that all entities have a “capacity to have capacities” that are not prohibited, 
illogic or impossible;1167 and that rights can be unaccompanied by remedies, and that likewise not 
all addressees of duties and legal burdens have related procedural capacities,1168 rebut the 
arguments that deny the possibility and necessity of non-state actors having legal capacities that 
seek to make them respect (and sometimes protect) human rights. Moreover, this is confirmed by 
the fact that there can be international supervision of non-state conduct, which is consistent with 
the mandate to protect all victims without discrimination even against private entities and with the 
goal to not let any abuse against human dignity, State or not, remain in impunity.1169 
Lastly, regarding the idea that the human rights discourse or framework could be 
weakened because of its ‘subjective expansion’, apart from recalling that this protection already 
exists in some cases in an indirect and sometimes direct manner and human rights law still 
protects individuals from State abuses, it can be said that human dignity must always be 
                                                     
1166 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., pp. 425-426, 428-429, 431-432; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 42-50; Elena Pariotti, 
op. cit., pp. 99-100; John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. 
cit.; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 23; International Standard ISO 26000, Guidance on 
Social Responsibility (cf. http://www.iso.org/iso/discovering_iso_26000.pdf; 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_26000_project_overview.pdf, both last checked on 21/02/2012); OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (2011 Edition). 
1167 Cf. Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., at 391; Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 34-42, 44, 61. 
1168 Anna Meijknecht, op. cit., pp. 56-62; Gaetano Pentassuglia, op. cit., at 391. 
1169 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of 
Undocumented Migrants, 17 September 2003, paras. 72-85, 141-147. 
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protected effectively and fully in an integrated global legal space: therefore, it is not necessary to 
always resort to international authorities with a contentious jurisdiction (judicial or not), being 
there multiple actors, including domestic ones, that can contribute to implementing international 
norms on the protection of human rights and guarantees from non-state violations.  
Nonetheless, the wrongfulness of non-state violations must always be recognized and 
condemned, to make every actor and authority aware of the need of protecting individuals against 
non-state entities and enable or demand protection mechanisms –non-judicial or national, for 
instance-. This requires international substantive norms that, in turn, demand domestic authorities 
and legal systems to recognize and appropriately respond to non-state violations of human rights. 
Furthermore, in my opinion the identity of human rights law and other humanitarian 
norms is not altered but fully realized if protection against non-state entities is granted: otherwise, 
the praxis of that corpus juris would betray its foundation of the non-conditional protection of 
human dignity, and so be inconsistent and defective. In practice, this may mean that communities 
and victims may feel abandoned1170 by a legal system that claims to protect the rights of humans 
but yet attaches more importance to rigid, outdated or false theories than to real human needs 
and fails to protect all individuals from threats to the exercise of their inherent rights, since in 
practice those violations are committed by both States and non-state actors in conjunction or 
alone.  
Furthermore, just as the evolution of the legal protection of human dignity granted 
protection from States, the vulnerability of individuals before other actors must be regulated, as 
confirmed by theories of the rule of law, that consider that it demands regulating both authorities 
and non-authorities, and that the power to affect legal interests must be regulated.1171 The power 
of violating human rights and guarantees is a problematic one, and individuals must be protected 
from it. This means that they must be protected from all actors, since all of them have the 
capacity to violate those rights and guarantees.  
Logically, the maintenance of State duties, the overarching requirements of the rule of 
law, and compliance with the conditions of legality and respect of fundamental rights, that are 
                                                     
1170 Cf. Chris Jochnick, op. cit., pp. 57-58; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., 
at 44. 
1171 Cf. Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, op. cit., pp. 13-18, 40. Analogously to the exploration of historical objections 
mentioned and properly rebutted by Clapham, Nijman says that protecting all individuals by law in the international 
level, against power abuse and abuse by those not in positions of power, is “more helpful than conceptualization 
which proceeds from the power against which the rule of law was first developed to make a stand – arguably this is 
historically contingent” (emphasis added). What matters is the essence of protecting individuals no matter what or in 
what circumstances (reminiscent of non-relationness or non-conditionality”), as that train of thought confirms. On 
Clapham’s analysis of historical objections, cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. 
cit., pp. 33-35, 55-58; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
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never lost, not even for violators, ensure that State abuses will be deemed unlawful. Likewise, the 
fact that international legal personality as a concept was designed by Leibniz in order to address 
some social realities and problems makes it necessary to consider how individuals are to be 
protected against entities that can violate their innermost and most essential rights and 
guarantees in today’s world… actually they have always had this capacity, heightened in some 
respects nowadays. 
As follows from the previous arguments, the humanitarian corpus juris risks losing its 
legitimacy and consistency if victims are not legally protected from all violations, State or not, in 
an effective manner. Rather than weakening human rights, the protection from non-state 
violations reinforces them and contributes to their continued relevance and to achieving the 
purposes of that corpus juris. 
Certainly, the inherent worth of every single human being is not only existent and relevant 
in relations with States. Therefore, a legal framework founded upon the full protection of that 
value must not ignore human suffering and violations of human dignity at the hands of non-state 
entities.  
As explained in this Chapter, as long as it respects several conditions –of fundamental 
rights, legality, logic and peremptory law-, jus gentium can regulate substantive and procedural 
legal capacities of non-state entities through its sources. This can be done either to strive to make 
them refrain from engaging in violations and be sanctioned if they commit them, or to entitle and 
legitimize promotion and cooperation activities carried out by them concerning the protection of 
human dignity. Those legal capacities can be rights or other entitlements, in the positive 
dimension, and obligations or other legal burdens that attempt to regulate and control non-state 
behavior in order to protect individuals from it. 
The impact of those legal capacities is very important. Among others, they have an 
educative function, that can make their direct addressees, stakeholders and third parties change 
their position and behavior concerning the respect and promotion of human rights and 
guarantees. Additionally, norms that regulate those capacities make it possible for activists and 
individuals to invoke them when making claims; and procedurally, they either permit or command 
actors and authorities across different levels of governance to operate in order to fully protect 
human beings and make law respond to reality and the need of attaching the greatest importance 
to the respect of human dignity. 
The mechanisms with which actors and authorities can strive to protect human dignity 
from non-state violations, as commanded or permitted by law, are plenty and varied. For 
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instance, acculturation, persuasion and coercion are complementary strategies1172 that can 
strengthen the protection of human dignity. The features of these and other strategies and 
mechanisms, when combined, make the accomplishment of the task of protecting human rights 
and guarantees from non-state abuses more likely.  
Many of those mechanisms can be used by different entities and in different legal 
systems. Through implementation, promotion, coercion or persuasion they can make the 
substantive and procedural legal capacities of non-state actors operative and effective. This, in 
turn, answers to the legal and ethical foundations of the humanitarian corpus juris explained in 
Part I and, accordingly, to human needs. Some of those mechanisms are explored in Chapter 8.  
Altogether, mechanisms that can currently be used to protect human dignity can be found 
in multiple normative systems, which share legal interests and values (legal goods), some of 
which have a humanitarian nature. This, coupled with the impossibility of effectively protecting 
human dignity unless mechanisms and actors from different normative systems and levels of 
governance cooperate to protect shared legal goods, makes it important to take into account the 
global dimension of the practical protection of human dignity, that ignores formal boundaries and 
answers to how legal values are and must be effectively protected in practice, as required by 
axiological and effectiveness considerations. 
 
  
                                                     
1172 Cf. Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., pp. 2600-2601, 2634, 2649. 
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CHAPTER 6. OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ENTITIES THAT SERVE TO PROTECT HUMAN 
DIGNITY 
 
According to the principle of legality, the analysis of the possible responsibility of non-
state entities and their duties to repair victims must inexorably start from the identification of 
international obligations of those entities, because that responsibility presupposes that an 
obligation has been breached and that such breach can be imputable to those entities.1173 
In legal terms, differences about the origin or source of an international obligation do not 
change the fact that responsibility emerges when any legal obligation, regardless of its origin, is 
breached. Hence, an actor is equally responsible under international law even if it fails to abide by 
duties created by general principles, custom, treaties, unilateral acts, or other sources of law.1174  
Because of this, the International Law Commission has commented that responsibility is 
a unitary concept in international law, since there is no difference between “contractual” 
responsibility and “tort” responsibility, for instance. In the words of the Commission: 
“[T]here is a breach of an international obligation when the act in question is not in conformity with 
what is required by that obligation “regardless of its origin” […] International obligations may be 
established by a customary rule of international law, by a treaty or by a general principle […] 
Thus, there is no room in international law for a distinction, such as is drawn by some legal systems, 
between the regime of responsibility for breach of a treaty and for breach of some other rule, i.e. for 
responsibility arising ex contractu or ex delicto. In the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration, the tribunal 
affirmed that “in the field of international law there is no distinction between contractual and tortious 
responsibility”. As far as the origin of the obligation breached is concerned, there is a single general 
regime of State responsibility. Nor does any distinction exist between the “civil” and “criminal” 
responsibility as is the case in internal legal systems”1175 (emphasis added). 
As the Commission acknowledges, the idea that in international law there is no difference 
between contractual and other responsibilities has been recognized in international arbitration.1176  
This makes it necessary to ask if international law can accommodate a framework 
analogous to domestic tort law to permit individuals who have suffered harm in connection with 
violations of human rights and guarantees to seek reparations and protection even if they had no 
previous relations with offenders, which should be responsible for breaching prohibitions of 
inflicting harm. Thus, it must be asked if victims of non-state entities can have the right to ask 
those entities to repair them when they disregard their human dignity and, therefore, if those 
entities have (correlative) duties to refrain from those violations. 
                                                     
1173 Cf. articles 1 through 15 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 
2001 (A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4), and 3 through 13 of the Draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations, in the version adopted by the ILC in 2011 (A/66/10). 
1174 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, pp. 31, 55, paras. 3 and 4 of the commentary to article 12. 
1175 Ibid., at 55, paras. 3 and 5 of the commentary to article 12. 
1176 Cf. Ibid., at 55, para. 5 of the commentary to article 12. 
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As argued before, all violations of human rights and guarantees are legally relevant. 
However, perhaps this would not necessarily mean that a legal obligation to not violate them 
always binds material offenders. Consequently, having examined in Chapters 4 and 5 how legal 
capacities of non-state entities can be created with the purpose of protecting human dignity, it is 
now necessary to ascertain what types of non-state international obligations can be created with 
the aim of protecting human dignity. As will be seen, there are different possibilities: general or 
specific obligations; and express or implicit duties, including a principle that regulates a general 
prohibition of violations of human dignity and implicit obligations that forbid some abuses.  
It can also be considered that apart from a principle that forbids violations in general 
terms, international law can regulate in greater detail specialized non-state obligations with 
varying degrees of prohibitions or mandates, for instance outlawing the violation of concrete 
rights, such as those found in a given branch of law or an intersectional group of rights. 
Specialized obligations complement the general prohibition of violations and implicit obligations, 
reinforcing the protection of individuals.  
Additionally, it is necessary to bear in mind that the necessary involvement of non-state 
offenders in the reparations of victims of violations of human dignity requires the existence of 
obligations to participate in reparations that bind them. This makes the creation of primary and 
secondary norms on non-state human rights obligations a pressing matter. 
 
6.1. General and implicit human rights obligations of non-state entities 
The fact that international law can respond to non-state violations of human rights with 
varying degrees of intensity and involvement, as examined in Chapter 4, could seem to suggest 
that core norms that protect individuals against harm and injuries and prohibit non-state actors 
from committing them do not exist. However, detailed examination may reveal elements of 
general prohibitions to harm to individuals in ways that are contrary to their inherent and non-
conditional worth and of implicit obligations that forbid certain violations.  
It is convenient to start considering that, as the ILC suggests, in international law there 
may be an omnipresent or pervasive correlation between rights and duties, including erga omnes 
duties1177 (as human rights obligations), being one always present when the other exists.  
If that correlation exists, it can be considered that just as the identification of a duty 
indicates the existence of a correlated right protected by that duty, the existence of a right or a 
guarantee may presuppose the existence of at least implicit duties of respect –negative duties of 
                                                     
1177 Cf. Ibid., para. 3 of the commentary to article 2, at 35. 
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abstention-, addressed towards entities that can violate that right (and certainly non-state entities 
can violate human rights), especially when that right has an erga omnes nature in the transversal 
sense, i.e. it displays effects across relations with all possible entities and manifestations. Let us 
examine these considerations in detail. 
Concerning the notion of the correlation between rights and duties in international law, 
the International Law Commission expressed that: 
“In international law the idea of breach of an obligation has often been equated with conduct contrary 
to the rights of others. PCIJ spoke of an act “contrary to the treaty right[s] of another State” in its 
judgment in the Phosphates in Morocco case. That case concerned a limited multilateral treaty which 
dealt with the mutual rights and duties of the parties, but some have considered the correlation of 
obligations and rights as a general feature of international law: there are no international obligations 
of a subject of international law which are not matched by an international right of another subject or 
subjects, or even of the totality of the other subjects (the international community as a whole). But 
different incidents may attach to a right which is held in common by all other subjects of international 
law, as compared with a specific right of a given State or States”1178 (emphasis added). 
As said above, if a correlation between rights and duties does exist, it must perforce 
operate in two ways. Therefore, when the international legal system recognizes or creates a right 
or guarantee, it indicates entities that may potentially favor or prevent its exercise that its content 
is protected and that, for this reason, they must refrain from violating it, especially when it 
embodies values and interests of the world or a regional community (erga omnes and erga 
omnes partes norms will thus be involved) and when jus cogens norms are at stake. Prohibitions 
of that sort can be general or specialized duties dealing with some rights and vulnerable victims 
or actors, and can be express or implicit, as befits the necessary correlation between rights and 
duties. Furthermore, the emphasis laid sometimes on the existence of rights and guarantees, 
whose violation is equated with a breach, which presupposes a duty, is nothing but a confirmation 
of the existence of implicit obligations, which in my opinion exist in the field of the protection of 
human dignity. 
This logic seems to be even more pressing when the rights in question are either 
peremptory rights –which generate erga omnes obligations all the time, albeit the latter do not 
always flow from those rights-1179 or otherwise have an erga omnes character. In those cases, the 
community dimension of international society values their respect.1180 Moreover, when the 
content and nature of those rights can be violated by different actors, it is logic that the prohibition 
                                                     
1178 Ibid. 
1179 Cf. Ibid., pp. 111-112, 126, para. 7 of the commentary to Chapter III and para. 6 of the commentary to article 48; 
Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 67-69; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, 
Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-: la transformación de los derechos internacional y colombiano gracias 
al Ius Cogens internacional, op. cit., pp. 147-160; Daniel O’Donnell, op. cit., at 73; Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. 
Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 80. 
1180 Cf. Santiago Villalpando, op. cit., pp. 394, 400-401, 410; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 
December 1998, para. 151. 
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of all violations of those rights extends to all those actors, whose conduct is thus legally relevant 
because they have the capacity to attack normative values held dear by a proto-community.  
Regarding erga omnes obligations, it can be said that they include human rights 
obligations1181 and indicate the existence of ‘community interests’1182 in the ‘international’ or world 
society. Given this connection, it is natural to consider that this society expects their communal 
interests to be upheld thoroughly, which implies protecting them from all offenders and 
considering all offenses to shared legal values and interests as unlawful. 
Moreover, erga omnes obligations are owed to all members of a group or collectivity, 
having thus all of those members an interest in their respect and an entitlement to demand it.  
In addition to this, obligations can have an erga omnes character in another sense, 
according to which they bind all potential offenders. This complementary dimension is necessary 
for common interests to be protected because, as Santiago Villalpando comments, when 
international legal community interests are involved “any attack on the public good necessarily 
affects the enjoyment of its benefits by all members of the community”1183 (emphasis added). 
The existence of several dimensions of erga omnes obligations has been de facto 
handled in international jurisprudence. From a theoretical perspective, Antonio Cançado has 
clearly expounded and described the existence of different manifestations of erga omnes 
obligations. According to him: 
“In my view, we can consider […] obligations erga omnes from two dimensions, one horizontal and 
the other vertical, which complement each other. Thus, the obligations erga omnes of protection, in a 
horizontal dimension, are obligations pertaining to the protection of the human beings due to the 
international community as a whole. In the framework of conventional international law, they bind all 
the States Parties to human rights treaties (obligations erga omnes partes), and, in the ambit of 
general international law, they bind all the States which compose the organized international 
community, whether or not they are Parties to those treaties (obligations erga omnes lato sensu). In a 
vertical dimension, the obligations erga omnes of protection bind both the organs and agents of 
(State) public power, and the individuals themselves (in the inter-individual relations) [...] 
For the conformation of this vertical dimension have decisively contributed the advent and the 
evolution of the International Law of Human Rights. But it is surprising that, until now, these horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of the obligations erga omnes of protection have passed entirely unnoticed 
from contemporary legal doctrine. Nevertheless, I see them clearly shaped in the legal regime itself of 
the American Convention on Human Rights. Thus, for example, as to the vertical dimension, the 
general obligation, set forth in Article 1(1) of the American Convention, to respect and to ensure 
respect for the free exercise of the rights protected by it, generates effects erga omnes, 
                                                     
1181 Santiago Villalpando, op. cit., pp. 388-389, 394, 401; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes 
–Ius Cogens-: la transformación de los derechos internacional y colombiano gracias al Ius Cogens internacional, op. 
cit., at 155; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 109-110; Concurring 
Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 
op. cit., paras. 69, 75-77, 79; International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company, Limited, Judgment, 5 February 1970, paras. 33-34. 
1182 Cf. Santiago Villalpando, op. cit., pp. 389, 394, 401. 
1183 Cf. Santiago Villalpando, op. cit., at 392. 
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encompassing the relations of the individual both with the public (State) power as well as with other 
individuals (particuliers)”1184 (emphasis added). 
The argument of Cançado is largely based on the effects of State obligations of 
protection, and emphasizes indirect effects of human rights towards non-state actors, which are 
limited, because according to some possible interpretations of that theory, without the duties of a 
State the effects of a norm would not reach non-state actors and bind them to respect human 
dignity. For this reason, rather than using the expression ‘vertical’ dimension of erga omnes 
obligations, I prefer to talk of the ‘transversal’ or comprehensive effects and subjective scope of 
human rights and guarantees. The idea that Cançado bases his theory on State duties can be 
clearly seen in another opinion of his, according to which: 
“It is precisely in this private ambit that abuses are often committed against children, in face of the 
omission of public power, - what thus requires a protection of the human rights of the child erga 
omnes, that is, including in the inter-individual relations (Drittwirkung) […] 
This is a context in which, definitively, the obligations of protection erga omnes assume special 
relevance. The foundation for the exercise of such protection is found in the American Convention on 
Human Rights itself. The general obligation which is set forth in its Article 1.1 to respect and to 
ensure respect for the protected rights - including the rights of the child, as stipulated in Article 19 - 
requires from the State the adoption of positive measures of protection (including for preserving the 
preponderant role of the family, foreseen in Article 17 of the Convention, in the protection of the child 
- para. 88), applicable erga omnes. In this way, Article 19 of the Convention comes to be endowed 
with a wider dimension, protecting the children also in the inter-individual relations”1185 (emphasis 
added). 
It must be admitted that due to the limited jurisdiction and competence of many 
international human rights supervisory bodies, that affects their jurisdiction ratione personae, the 
dimensions described by Cançado are the ones most handled those bodies. However, nothing 
prevents that competence from expanding or other international mechanisms of protection and 
broad substantive guarantees from being regulated and used to highlight protection from non-
state abuses. Among those bodies it is possible to find the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, according to which:  
“The effects of the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination encompass all States, 
precisely because this principle, which belongs to the realm of jus cogens and is of a peremptory 
character, entails obligations erga omnes of protection that bind all States and give rise to effects with 
regard to third parties, including individuals […] 
In an employment relationship regulated by private law, the obligation to respect human rights 
between individuals should be taken into consideration. That is, the positive obligation of the State to 
ensure the effectiveness of the protected human rights gives rise to effects in relation to third parties 
(erga omnes). This obligation has been developed in legal writings, and particularly by the 
Drittwirkung theory, according to which fundamental rights must be respected by both the public 
authorities and by individuals with regard to other individuals.”1186 
                                                     
1184 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 77-78. 
1185 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, paras. 63-64. 
1186 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 110, 140. 
 
 
394
Given the limitations of some mechanisms of international supervision, it must be 
acknowledged that the theory of Cançado is correct from their perspective. Certainly, the 
obligations of protection that bind States and other authorities, and treaty and customary duties to 
adapt internal norms and practices to international legal demands,1187 oblige them to protect 
individuals from all threats to human rights within their jurisdiction. In this way, human rights law 
reaches potential offenders indirectly, but that is not the only way in which they can be reached. 
Certainly, the indirect dimension can be complemented by another, because human 
rights and guarantees can also have effects that reach non-state actors directly, which is often 
required due to the need to interpret and implement norms that protect important legal values that 
demand protection from all violations in a way that makes them effective in practice.  
The different dimensions studied above indicate that, ultimately, erga omnes obligations 
must be understood as affecting everyone: both concerning those entitled to demand respect and 
those that owe respect.  
In other words, human rights erga omnes obligations are owed towards everyone and 
protected from everyone. This second dimension has both: a) an internal manifestation, binding in 
the domestic or internal normative systems, reaching potential offenders through the mediation of 
authorities; and sometimes b) a direct international manifestation, related to the possibility and 
importance of directly forbidding non-state violations under international law. It is justified by the 
importance of the values protected and the fact that they can only be effective if they are 
protected from every potential violation, because human dignity (the foundation of those rights) is 
non-conditional and must be protected from all possible offenders, who ought to have a duty not 
to infringe on rights. To my mind, the correlation between rights and duties and preceding 
considerations suggest that a principle of law already regulates an implicit duty prohibiting non-
state violations. 
Concerning this, it is pertinent to say that Hersch Lauterpacht considered that the 
effectiveness of international protection of individuals rested upon the “evolution of international 
morality”, which in turn rests on not sending a message that some actors are exempted from 
obligations to respect international law.1188 
The direct manifestation of erga omnes obligations that protect human dignity implies that 
there can be obligations of potential offenders not to breach those norms, as required by the 
importance attached to their respect by the global community, revealed precisely by the erga 
                                                     
1187 Cf. articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., paras. 78, 81, 88, 103-104, 149, 153, 155, 164, 167, 171; Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., paras. 13-14. 
1188 Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 46 and 47. 
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omnes character of obligations, that indicate agreements on shared legal goods, as those 
protected by human rights and guarantees1189. 
Concerning the ratione loci and ratione personae scopes of erga omnes obligations 
based on human dignity, it is important to distinguish between universal erga omnes obligations –
derived from peremptory norms or from dispositive universally applicable norms-, which have 
effects that reach all members and actors of the international society (that have an interest in their 
respect and a duty to respect them); and erga omnes partes obligations, which are applicable 
only in regard to certain regions or entities bound by a given treaty or norm.1190  
According to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, some norms that 
protect human dignity are universal erga omnes obligations, as seen in the Barcelona Traction 
Case,1191 and authors as Antonio Cançado have recognized that not all human rights norms 
generate obligations that belong to that category but are nevertheless erga omnes partes 
norms1192 (and can become universal if law changes). In the aforementioned case, the ICJ 
mentioned that: 
“In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes. 
34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of 
acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights 
of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the 
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law 
(Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of a 
universal or quasi-universal character”1193 (emphasis added). 
The International Law Commission, in turn, has distinguished between universal and non-
universal erga omnes obligations.1194  
                                                     
1189 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, pp. 126-127, paras. 6 through 9 of the commentary to article 48; Concurring Opinion of 
Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 
77. 
1190 Ibid. 
1191 Cf. International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, 
Judgment, 5 February 1970, paras. 33-34. 
1192 Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 77. 
1193 Cf. International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, 
Judgment, 5 February 1970, paras. 33-34. 
1194 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 126, para. 6 of the commentary to Article 48, where the ILC comments that “[u]nder 
paragraph 1 (a), States other than the injured State may invoke responsibility if two conditions are met: first, the 
obligation whose breach has given rise to responsibility must have been owed to a group to which the State invoking 
responsibility belongs; and secondly, the obligation must have been established for the protection of a collective 
interest. The provision does not distinguish between different sources of international law; obligations protecting a 
collective interest of the group may derive from multilateral treaties or customary international law. Such obligations 
have sometimes been referred to as “obligations erga omnes partes”.” 
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The fact that a given obligation belongs to one or the other category can have relevant 
implications. Concerning the ideas proposed herein, while all potential offenders are bound by 
universal erga omnes regulations, erga omnes partes obligations only have effects towards 
actors in a given region or legal space of applicability (not necessarily in geographical terms).  
This implies that the fact that a norm that protects human dignity does not have a 
universal scope of application does not detract from its possibility of binding non-state actors 
implicitly insofar as they fall within their restricted scope. In those events, prohibitions of violations 
of human dignity must be adjusted to the scope of these norms, binding those non-state entities 
that operate in the field or region in which erga omnes partes obligations are applicable. 
Therefore, the demand that non-state violations of human dignity are prohibited implies that some 
conduct must be forbidden universally and some conduct prohibited only in some regions or fields 
of applicability. This demand can be fleshed out and materialized by implicit and express duties 
that forbid abuses and harm, the breach of which generates legal responsibility.  
The importance of erga omnes partes duties and their horizontal effects were highlighted 
by Antonio Cançado, according to whom: 
“[T]he obligations erga omnes partes are not to be minimized, nor at the conceptual level, as, by 
means of the exercise of collective guarantee, such obligations can serve as guide, or pave the way, 
for the crystallization, in the future, of the obligations erga omnes lato sensu, due to the international 
community as a whole. And, at the operative level, the obligations erga omnes partes under a human 
rights treaty such as the American Convention also assume special importance, in face of the current 
diversification of the sources of violations of the rights enshrined into the Convention, which requires 
the clear recognition of the effects of the conventional obligations vis-à-vis third parties (the 
Drittwirkung), including individuals (e.g., in labour relations)”1195 (emphasis added). 
In light of the previous considerations, it can be considered that the violation of human 
rights by an non-state actor should amount to a breach of a correlated human rights erga omnes 
obligation that binds that actor, which cannot be not based on notions of reciprocity but on the 
existence of general and common legal interests of the international society. 
It may be asked whether national Courts that take into account international law when 
examining non-state conduct have endorsed developments regarding the responsibility of non-
state actors. Some of them have adopted an approach according to which actors responsible for 
violating jus cogens clearly have legal responsibility. The principle that regulates an implicit duty 
correlative to human rights indicated before is broader than this approach. Those two approaches 
are clearly complementary and domestic decisions may be explained by limitations in the scope 
of national laws or lack of development regarding the possibilities of interpretation of jus gentium. 
                                                     
1195 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 83. 
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Concerning internal approaches, some judges of the United States of America, when 
examining the ATCA or ATS (Alien Tort Statute), have considered that they can hold non-state 
actors as individuals or corporations responsible for violating human rights embodied in norms 
with a universal acceptance, which can coincide with jus cogens norms, as commented by 
Roland Portmann;1196 although others consider that this universality alludes to the general 
customary nature of the international human rights norms.  
In this regard, for example, some American judges and author Chimène I. Keitner differ 
from Portmann, and instead of equating universality with the superior hierarchy of some norms, 
consider that it is customary international law as a source which operates as the benchmark with 
which to identify norms of general application in the international society with a scope of 
application that is so broad that the obligations created by them bind (implicitly or not, I might 
add) non-state or State actors.1197 Some may consider that this idea is apparently confirmed by 
the fact that prohibitions imposed on non-state actors under classic international law, as the 
prohibition of piracy, were covered by the ATS1198 in an age in which peremptory law was not 
formally recognized in treaty law.  
This view seems to be confirmed by international case law and doctrine, which admit that 
customary law may create obligations of non-state entities.1199 However, in practice U.S. Courts 
have sometimes protected some rights and not others, and some rights are protected with 
limitations (e.g. protection from torture only from States) that are not present in customary law or 
jus cogens but only in some instruments and for their purposes. Perhaps there is uncertainty or 
lack of consistency.1200 This proves that despite the fact that State agents can implement 
international law, it is unreliable to always trust them and to interpret all jus gentium in light of 
their decisions, which may be erratic or constrained by purely domestic legal considerations. 
                                                     
1196 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 162-167. 
1197 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, pp. 3-5, 11, 15, 17, 23; United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, pp. 1-3, 6-7, 9-10, 
24, 26, 31, 35, 48; Chimène I. Keitner, “Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases”, op. cit., pp. 84-87, 101. 
1198 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, pp. 3-4; United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, pp. 16-18. 
1199 Cf. sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4, supra. 
1200 Compare ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 159-162, Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton 
Field”) v. Mexico, Judgment, 16 November 2009, paras. 5-7, 10-17, 20 with: United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, Ali Mahmud Ali Shafi, Lamia Ali Shafi, et al. v. Palestinian Authority, No. 1:09-cv-00006, 
14 June 2011, pp. 13-16; Concurring Opinion of Judge Leval to: United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, at 
78. 
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From an international legal perspective, the two aforementioned theories complement 
each other: peremptory law is so important that, for the sake of its effectiveness, absolute 
character and prevalence demanded by it,1201 the imposition of implied duties on entities that can 
violate jus cogens is a necessary way to protect its norms (the concept of necessity for 
restrictions of conduct under international human rights law is not identified with indispensability 
but with the presence of serious reasons that demand protection of legitimate essential aims).1202  
Customary law, in turn, is known to be capable of regulating obligations of non-state 
actors, for instance obligations to protect human dignity, as happens with some criminal or 
humanitarian customary norms, among others. Moreover, this possibility is not limited to 
customary law, because all sources of international law can directly regulate non-state conduct 
and legal capacities, as explained in Chapter 5.  
The existence of an implicit obligation that prohibits violations of jus cogens is necessary 
and flows from its features, as indicated above and in the Furundzija case (see below). In turn, 
the creation of general prohibitions of violations of customary human rights law is encouraged 
given its general applicability and the implications of human rights and human dignity, apart from 
the need that international substantive law outlaws all non-state violations (see Chapter 4). 
My theory about an obligation of all actors to refrain from violating essential interests of 
the international community enshrined in jus cogens is supported by arguments as those of José 
E. Alvarez, who has mentioned that it is possible to “find implicit duties on corporate entities (as 
well as other non-state actors) from the principle of universal jurisdiction as applied to jus cogens 
prohibitions”.1203  
Roland Portmann also accepts a presumed and automatic obligatory character of peremptory 
law in relation to non-state entities. Other authors agree with this idea or have similar theories, and 
some even consider that all subjects of international law are obliged to comply with erga omnes 
obligations.1204 Even John Ruggie, who was reluctant to recognize or draft an obligatory set of human 
rights obligations of corporations in the framework and principles he worked on as Special 
Rapporteur, recognized that fundamental humanitarian and criminal provisions (belonging in my 
                                                     
1201 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, Los retos del derecho de gentes –Ius Cogens-: la transformación de los derechos 
internacional y colombiano gracias al Ius Cogens internacional, op. cit., pp. 66-73, 161-167; article 53 of the Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986; articles 26, 40, 41, and 50 of the ILC articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, and 26, 41, 42, and 53 of the Draft articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations, it the version adopted by the ILC in 2011. 
1202 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, op. cit., para. 46. 
1203 Cf. José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, pp. 31-32. 
1204 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 162-167, 273-274, 276-277, 280-281; Stephan Hobe, op. cit., at 130; Mireia 
Martínez Barrabés, op. cit., pp. 238, 265; International Law Association, Law Association, Non-State Actors 
Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors: Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, 
Approach and Scope of Project and Legal Issues, The Hague Conference, 2010, at 17. 
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opinion at least to jus cogens) can be binding for corporations (and, in turn, for other actors, I might 
add).1205  
The argument that supports the existence of a general obligation of respect of jus cogens 
that binds every potential violator is reinforced by considerations of universality. It is important to 
distinguish universality of protection from universality of application and recognition: the former refers 
to how binding humanitarian norms are to be protected, and the latter concept alludes to whether 
norms are binding universally or in some locations.  
Those that are binding everywhere exert an influence on all legal systems and actors, cannot 
be derogated from, their effects and prevalence cannot be excluded in any way, and additionally de-
legitimize contrary provisions and conduct, even domestic ones, such as those that deny the liability 
of individuals (non-state entities) that violate them. Those norms are peremptory and bind all possible 
offenders. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: 
“155. The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has other effects at 
the inter-state and individual levels.  At the inter-state level, it serves to internationally de-legitimise 
any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorizing torture.  It would be senseless to argue, on 
the one hand, that on account of the jus cogens value of the prohibition against torture, treaties or 
customary rules providing for torture would be null and void ab initio, and then be unmindful of a State 
say, taking national measures authorising or condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators through 
an amnesty law.  If such a situation were to arise, the national measures, violating the general 
principle and any relevant treaty provision, would produce the legal effects discussed above and in 
addition would not be accorded international legal recognition. Proceedings could be initiated by 
potential victims if they had locus standi before a competent international or national judicial body 
with a view to asking it to hold the national measure to be internationally unlawful; or the victim could 
bring a civil suit for damage in a foreign court, which would therefore be asked inter alia to disregard 
the legal value of the national authorising act.  What is even more important is that perpetrators of 
torture acting upon or benefiting from those national measures may nevertheless be held criminally 
responsible for torture, whether in a foreign State, or in their own State under a subsequent regime.  
In short, in spite of possible national authorisation by legislative or judicial bodies to violate the 
principle banning torture, individuals remain bound to comply with that principle.  As the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg put it: “individuals have international duties which transcend the 
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State”.  
156. Furthermore, at the individual level, that is, that of criminal liability, it would seem that one of the 
consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the international community upon the 
prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite 
individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction.  Indeed, it would be 
inconsistent on the one hand to prohibit torture to such an extent as to restrict the normally unfettered 
treaty-making power of sovereign States, and on the other hand bar States from prosecuting and 
punishing those torturers who have engaged in this odious practice abroad.  This legal basis for 
                                                     
1205 Cf. International Commission of Jurists. “High Level Discussion on Advancing Human Rights and Business in the 
Human Rights Council.” In Parallel Event to the Human Rights Council 20th Regular Session, Palais de Nations, 21 
June 2012. Geneva, 2012, at 3; John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for 
Corporations”, op. cit., where it is discussed that Special Representative Ruggie: “took the position that, with the 
potential exceptions of “the most heinous human rights violations amounting to international crimes, including 
genocide, slavery, human trafficking, forced labor, torture, and some crimes against humanity,” human rights law 
does not currently impose direct obligations on corporations or any other non-state actors […] In his view, the 
responsibility stems from societal expectations rather than human rights law. Unlike the Norms, the Framework does 
not claim to impose human rights obligations directly on corporations. Nevertheless, the corporate responsibility to 
respect is not mediated through the primary state duty to protect; the responsibility does apply directly to 
corporations. Moreover, Ruggie stressed that the responsibility is not toothless. It can be enforced through domestic 
legal sanctions as well as in the court of public opinión.” 
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States’ universal jurisdiction over torture bears out and strengthens the legal foundation for such 
jurisdiction found by other courts in the inherently universal character of the crime.  It has been held 
that international crimes being universally condemned wherever they occur, every State has the right 
to prosecute and punish the authors of such crimes.  As stated in general terms by the Supreme 
Court of Israel in Eichmann, and echoed by a USA court in Demjanjuk, “it is the universal character of 
the crimes in question [i.e. international crimes] which vests in every State the authority to try and 
punish those who participated in their commission”. 
157. It would seem that other consequences include the fact that torture may not be covered by a 
statute of limitations, and must not be excluded from extradition under any political offence 
exemption”1206 (emphasis added). 
It must be noted that not all violations of humanitarian jus cogens or dispositive norms are 
criminal in nature, as shown in studies of authors as Eric Suy and revealed in Principle 18 of the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.1207  
Despite this, victims of violations of jus cogens can and must be protected in universal terms, 
due to the all-encompassing protection that peremptory law requires: this is applicable everywhere, 
since peremptory law also has universality of recognition. These implications are the consequence of 
the facts that jus cogens negates all contrary manifestations (including violations) and that the world 
community has a vested interest on its protection.  
Therefore, it follows that all potential violators of jus cogens, individuals or not, cannot claim 
that they are not bound by duties to respect that body of law. As can be gleaned from the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, even when norms that directly and expressly regulate an 
obligation of an actor to not violate human rights do not exist and domestic norms do not prohibit their 
violation, the fact that international norms are contrary to human rights violations implies that entities 
with the capacity to violate them are obliged to refrain from engaging in such violations and must face 
the legal consequences of their wrongful conduct.1208 Human rights peremptory norms undoubtedly 
form part of a core that is universal in its territorial and subjective scopes of protection, among others. 
The previous insights concerning an implicit obligation of all entities, State or not, to respect 
peremptory norms founded upon human dignity (or others) are confirmed in practice. As discussed by 
Tilman Rodenhäuser, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic established by the Human Rights Council considered in its third report that peremptory 
                                                     
1206 Cf. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, paras. 155-157. 
1207 Cf. Antonio Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, op. cit., pp. 167-170 (that 
considers that the criterion according to which those humanitarian norms whose violation amounts to an international 
crime belong to jus cogens is but one of the criteria to identify humanitarian peremptory norms, thus implicitly 
recognizing that not all of them are protected by criminal law). Generally and not exclusively concerning peremptory 
law, cf. the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, paras. 1 and 18, 
where victims of violations of their fundamental rights are recognized both when those violations are contrary to 
criminal norms and when this does not happen –whether the term fundamental rights corresponds to peremptory 
humanitarian rights is open to discussion-. 
1208 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, 17 May 2010, 
paras. 213, 227, 236-237; European Court of Human Rights, Case of K.-H. W. v. Germany, Judgment, 22 March 
2001, paras. 75, 92-106; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, 
Judgment, 22 March 2001, paras. 85-87, 92-106. 
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norms bind all non-state entities and not only States or groups with ‘quasi-State abilities.’ According to 
the Commission: 
“The commission carefully reviewed the information gathered on the operation and activities to date 
of FSA groups. In this regard, the commission notes that, at a minimum, human rights obligations 
constituting peremptory international law (ius cogens) bind States, individuals and non-State 
collective entities, including armed groups. Acts violating ius cogens – for instance, torture or 
enforced disappearances – can never be justified”1209 (emphasis added). 
Apart from jus cogens, general prohibitions of non-state violations can be regulated by 
general principles of law in foro domestico or with an international origin. For reasons that will be 
explained below, the principle of a general prohibition can be created by both types, which 
influence each other mutually due to their belonging to a field in which domestic practice can 
influence international law, which in turn determines the way in which some entities can and/or 
must protect internationally recognized rights and guarantees in the domestic level.1210 
State practice and norms must be carefully examined, as said before. For instance, it is 
important to not be misled by the considerations of U.S. Courts and rely too much on their 
conclusions to attempt to identify general principles applicable to the international legal system. In 
this sense, their assertions about their limitations concerning the possibility of ascertaining the 
legal responsibility of several actors only when certain violations may have been committed or, 
that for petitioners to have cause of action certain links with the State of those Courts must be 
present, indicate that those Courts have specific domestic jurisdictional limitations, such as 
competence only over violations of “specific, universal, and obligatory” norms, i.e. of norms 
accepted “by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th century paradigms […] recognized [by the U.S. Supreme Court, related to the “historical 
paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted].”1211  
Still, without domestic decisions necessarily discussing international law in an accurate 
way, it is interesting to examine discussions about non-state responsibility under international law 
in domestic cases. For example, U.S. Courts have differed about the possibility of that 
                                                     
1209 Cf. Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, para. 106; Tilman Rodehäuser, op. cit. 
1210 On the influence of domestic practice on jus gentium, cf. Chimène I. Keitner, “Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien 
Tort Cases”, op. cit., at 101; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli and Carlos Espósito, “Los Jueces Nacionales como Garantes 
de Bienes Jurídicos Humanitarios”, op. cit., pp. 72-77. 
1211 Cf. Chimène I. Keitner, “Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases”, op. cit., pp. 68-69; Supreme Court of 
the United States, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al., Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, 29 June 2004, pp. 30-31, 38-40; United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. 
v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, at 4. Concerning the idea that links with the United 
States must be present for U.S. Courts to have jurisdiction, see Supreme Court of the United States, Kiobel et al. v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum co. et al., Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, April 17, 
2013, pp. 13-14. 
 
 
402
responsibility, denying some of them corporate international human rights responsibility and 
others accepting it, being the latter position supported by NGOs and activists.1212 
Moreover, given the relevance of domestic legal practice for the emergence of customary 
law and general principles of law, it is noteworthy that there is State practice under domestic law 
according to which individuals can (and must) be protected from non-state threats, which is in 
turn consistent with international duties of protection: this practice is thus reinforced and required 
by international legal considerations.  
The possible existence of a non-state obligation of respect is reinforced by the fact that 
some domestic jurisdictions accept that when some conditions are met, individuals can request 
protection of their human or fundamental rights against non-state threats to the judiciary or other 
authorities. This implies that domestic conditions constitute procedural requirements for the 
judges to be able to examine a case, rather than international substantive considerations about 
the existence of non-state violations of human rights. Sometimes those requirements are 
substantive, but they often have a purely internal character as well. Accordingly, from an 
international substantive point of view, domestic limitations do not deny that it is implied that all 
violations of human rights attributable to non-state entities are unlawful acts and, hereby, 
prohibited. 
Furthermore, those procedural limits have a purely domestic nature, which means that 
they cannot be transposed to the international level. The fact that they have a procedural nature 
reminds of the distinctions between rights and remedies and between obligations and 
enforcement, and of the fact that international supervisory bodies have sometimes refused to 
examine alleged non-state violations simply due to their (real or supposed) lack of jurisdiction.  
When peremptory law is at stake, some consider that peremptory norms do not 
necessarily clash with procedural impediments to the examination of alleged violations.1213 This 
approach has been criticized by those who, as I, consider that peremptory and humanitarian 
norms have both substantive and procedural dimensions and effects, and that it is inconsistent to 
                                                     
1212 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, versus: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010; Marco Simons—EarthRights 
International, “Kiobel officially an outlier: Yet another US court rules for corporate accountability for human rights 
abuses”, available at: http://www.earthrights.org/blog/kiobel-officially-outlier-yet-another-us-court-rules-corporate-
accountability-human-rights-abus?page=7 (last checked: 22/02/2012). 
1213 Cf. International Court of Justice, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), 
Judgment, 3 February 2012, para. 93; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, 
Judgment, 21 November 2001, paras. 61-66; International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment 
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), 3 February 2006, paras. 64-70. 
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consider it possible for a clash of jus cogens with criminal norms to exist but not with civil or other 
ones.1214  
In any case, it is necessary to distinguish between substantive obligations, which regulate 
conduct, and procedural conditions that determine if a supervisory body has competence and 
jurisdiction over an alleged violation of substantive law. In the context of the ATS, for instance, 
that distinction has been made explicit by Chimène E. Keitner, who mentioned that: 
“This distinction between “conduct-regulating norms” and “other rules of decision” categorizes legal 
standards according to their functions. In this framework, standards that govern behavior are part of 
what Judge Reinhardt would call the “substantive component” of the ATS. International law provides 
these substantive standards, including the standards for accomplice liability. Federal common law 
supplies other rules, such as rules relating to personal jurisdiction and matters of practice and 
procedure, which Judge Reinhardt would characterize as “ancillary.””1215 (emphasis added). 
As a result of the difference between substantive norms, that can prohibit non-state 
violations, and procedural requirements, the fact that a given domestic Court only has the 
competence to study violations of universal (general customs) or jus cogens –not necessarily 
customary- norms or rights by non-state entities does not necessarily mean that those entities do 
not have material or substantive duties concerning other norms or rights under international law, 
which is not limited by procedural and substantive considerations of internal law, as the law of 
treaties and responsibility confirm.1216 
Additionally, it can be considered that internal law and practice can implement some 
international substantive norms and that they sometimes reinforce or shape the principle 
according to which violations of human rights and guarantees generate the responsibility of all 
offenders. In this sense, inasmuch as internal legal systems have rules of torts and extra-
contractual responsibility according to which the causation of harm or injury that is attributable to 
a –legal or natural- person generates its responsibility, it can be said that harming individuals in a 
way that is contrary to human rights, some of which have a universal scope of recognition and 
universal protection, generates the responsibility of violators according to a general principle of 
law.  
                                                     
1214 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “La inevitable supremacía del ius cogens frente a la inmunidad jurisdiccional de los 
Estados”, op. cit., pp. 72-76; Kerstin Bartsch and Björn Elberling, op. cit., pp. 483-488; Andrea Bianchi, “Human 
Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens”, op. cit., pp. 500-501; Alexander Orakhelashvili, “State Immunity and Hierarchy 
of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It Wrong”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 18, 2008, pp. 955-956, 
965-970; Lorna McGregor, “Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty”, European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 18, 2008, pp. 905-912; Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch 
Joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and VajiĆ to: European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-
Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para. 4. 
1215 Cf. Chimène I. Keitner, “Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases”, op. cit., at 81. 
1216 See for instance articles 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 3 of the ILC articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
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Certainly, there are internal differences concerning elements as the presence of 
negligence or its not being required for responsibility to arise, but common features include 
attribution of the causation of harm. Breaches of contract may also generate the legal 
responsibility of parties that breach it.  
The commonality of the previous rationales in most legal systems make it possible to 
consider that there is a general principle of law according to which violations of human dignity, 
which are contrary to essential common legal values of the world community and violate erga 
omnes duties, and which always harm individuals and are contrary to non-conditional and 
inherent rights and guarantees, generate the responsibility of perpetrators and accomplices.  
From a theoretical standpoint, it can be considered that domestic norms, which ultimately 
ought to be designed for the sake of human beings, may protect their dignity indirectly or directly 
without labeling their norms as human rights norms, for instance through civil or criminal law –
which can prohibit some violations of fundamental and human rights in absolute terms. This 
happens in the international plane as well, as explained in regard to the notions of human rights 
lato sensu and humanitarian guarantees, and certainly some crimes sanction violations of human 
rights –for instance, crimes against humanity-. 
In the internal realm, it must be recognized that violations of human rights committed by 
non-state entities affect their exercise, and domestic authorities are sometimes obliged and other 
times encouraged to protect individuals and affected legal goods, that are shared with other 
actors and normative systems, from those entities. This means that the purposes of international 
and other normative systems can be protected simultaneously and even jointly. Moreover, 
regarding the possibility of protecting those legal goods from non-state offenders, criminal norms 
and mechanisms that are adopted to protect human dignity precisely sanction non-state actors, 
usually individuals; and authors, activists and judicial organs suggest that similar violations 
committed by other non-state entities can be harshly and properly sanctioned as well.1217 
To my mind, the fact that different legal systems can coincide in the consideration that 
victims of damages are to be protected from harm caused by non-state actors that perpetrate 
violations of human rights and guarantees may generate or even have generated a general 
principle. Despite variances in some specific aspects, the general responsibility of an entity to 
which a conduct that injures inherent rights or guarantees can be attributed is established in 
                                                     
1217 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., 273-274, 276-277, 280-281; United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, pp. 5-15; Ka Hsaw Wa, 
“When big business and human rights collide”, Los Angeles Times, 26 February 2012, available at: 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-ka-nigerians-20120226,0,4288698.story (last checked: 
27/02/2012) (victims must have “hope that the perpetrators, including the corporations that enable and profit from 
such crimes, would be punished so that future abuses could be deterred”). 
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multiple legislations, and under international law that entity is regarded as a violator of human 
rights and reparations by it are demanded by legal principles and soft law (see Chapter 7 and 
Part I). 
Moreover, the topic under examination is one in which analogies with private law, 
discussed by Hersch Lauterpacht, are pertinent. They are made possible by the role of principles 
of law in jus gentium,1218 and are justified by the purpose of the full protection of individuals. 
Moreover, the protection of human rights from non-state violations is one universal human 
problem,1219 because the necessity of legally protecting human dignity from all violations is an 
imperative for law to fulfill its purpose of truly having individuals at its center, lest it is illegitimate 
and unfair. Therefore, normative systems must jointly protect individuals from all violators, as 
demanded by “social consciousness”, reason why the aforementioned analogies are justified.1220 
In my opinion, general principles are sources of international law not only when they are 
shared by or found in many internal laws in an identical or very similar manner, but also when 
those laws and other systems share at least a legal lowest common denominator, that constitutes 
the content of a general principle, which can also be independently and simultaneously an 
international legal principle. Legal principles with an international origin that can coexist with 
those with an internal origin may have a narrower or broader content than the principles in foro 
domestico or not. In both cases, the shared content can belongs to a global legal space. 
In international human rights law, no conditions of intentionality are required for an 
international breach to exist, unless lex specialis provisions demand them. This is revealed in 
case law –that recognizes objective responsibility-1221 and permits to consider by analogy that 
generally no such requirements exist for other actors to have international responsibility in 
relation to norms that seek to protect human dignity, unless otherwise stated, as happens in 
international criminal law because of its regulation of mens rea elements.1222  
This means that beyond the core of the principle of non-state respect of human rights and 
guarantees, specialized duties can adjust some features of that core principle to take into account 
                                                     
1218 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, “Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 224-225, 232-233, 
259-260; Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., at 43. 
1219 On universal human problems and jus gentium, see: Philip C. Jessup, op. cit., pp. 1-34. 
1220 Cf. Philip C. Jessup, op. cit., at 30. 
1221 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, 29 
July 1988, para. 173; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, 
Judgment, op. cit., para. 396; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment, 9 June 2009, 
para. 191; Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
“The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, op. cit., paras. 5, 13, 26. In international law 
generally, the International Law Commission considers that primary rules determine an objective or subjective 
regime. See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries, 2001, at 34, paragraph 3 of the commentary to article 2. 
1222 Cf. articles 7, 8.2.b.iv, 25.3.d.ii, 28, 30, 33, and 70 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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specific demands of substantive and procedural protection. Both the general core and specialized 
adjustments to it in some fields that respect minimum standards are consistent with and required 
by the need that principles that originate in internal law are compatible with the features of jus 
gentium.1223  
Furthermore, the importance of a general prohibition of violations of human rights and 
guarantees that binds all potential offenders, which contributes to the effective and integral 
protection of human dignity, justifies recourse to domestic law considerations. This is because 
analogies with internal laws and identification of principles originating in them favor the 
identification of a principle that makes the effective protection of global legal goods more robust, 
since those principles serve as legal bases of domestic and other actions that can implement 
substantive norms based on those legal goods. 
The fact that different normative systems, norms and actors can contribute to the 
protection of human dignity against non-state violations is an important one, because without 
them that protection can have no prospects of effectiveness nowadays. Those norms can thus 
have different features and be, for instance, civil norms protecting victims from harm; criminal 
norms punishing serious violations of human dignity; administrative law norms against lack of 
protection by authorities; norms on universal jurisdiction and transnational litigation, that permit 
many victims to have chances of seeking protection from non-state offenders; or human rights 
provisions that can be invoked directly or indirectly against non-state entities, among others.  
While not every domestic legal norm can protect individuals from non-state actors 
directly, many do so indirectly. Their existence and that of norms some from other normative 
systems with the same goals reinforces the idea that there is a general principle that requires 
legal protection of human dignity from all violations, which includes their prohibition (and ensuing 
responses to breaches). This indicates that such prohibition can have both a domestic origin and 
an international legal origin, due to both jus cogens and the implications of human dignity.  
José E. Alvarez puts forward a comparable idea when he comments that it is possible to: 
“[F]ind […] obligations [of non-state actors such as corporations] in general principles of law (as 
through a showing that national laws impose civil or criminal penalties on corporations in comparable 
circumstances).”1224 
A general principle according to which entities that violate human dignity are 
internationally responsible can be found by directly analyzing the implications of international 
norms. This seems to be acknowledged in soft law instruments, as the Basic Principles and 
                                                     
1223 Cf. Michel Virally, op. cit., pp. 113-116; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. 
cit., at 37. 
1224 Cf. José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, pp. 31-32. 
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Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, that in 
Principle number 15 indicate that: 
“Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by redressing gross 
violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. In 
accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation 
to victims for acts or omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of 
international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law. In cases where 
a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should 
provide reparation to the victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation 
to the victim” (emphasis added). 
The cited Principle recognizes that non-state actors can be legally responsible for 
violating norms that protect human dignity. Interestingly, the existence of an obligation to not 
violate those norms is a precondition of their responsibility. In turn, legal responsibility generates 
the duty to (fully) repair, one of whose many components is compensation, as considered by the 
International Law Commission and seen in the aforementioned Basic Principles (Principles 18 
and 20, for instance),1225 that examine reparations from the perspective of the victims, who have 
a right to them whenever their rights are violated by any actor, being all violations inexorable 
legally relevant conduct, as mentioned before. Interestingly, Principle 15 mentions domestic 
protection of internationally recognized rights. 
Furthermore, it is possible to consider that there are different normative elements that 
seem to support the idea that international law regards violations of human dignity attributable to 
different entities as unlawful or wrongful without this recognition requiring breaches of State 
duties of prevention and protection to exist. In this sense, for example, general clauses that either 
directly envisage the prohibition of abuses of rights and violations of human dignity attributable to 
State or non-state actors, or that indirectly delegitimize such abuses, may be considered as legal 
bases, confirmation and evidence of a general principle that prohibits non-state violations of 
human dignity even implicitly.  
Some authors consider that clauses such as these may well be the basis of non-state 
responsibility. Jordan J. Paust, for example, argued that:  
“[M]ost modern human rights instruments create private duties expressly or by implication. Several 
instruments recognize or create private duties in preambular provisions and in particular articles, and 
in many articles duties and prohibitions are not limited to particular types of actors. Many human 
rights expressly deny the right of any group or person to engage in conduct aimed at the destruction 
                                                     
1225 Cf. articles 1, 2, 28 through 33 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
of 2001 (A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4), and 3, 4, and 28 through 33 of the ILC Draft articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations, in the version adopted in 2011 (A/66/10). 
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of rights of others or at their limitation, thereby necessarily recognizing duties of all groups or 
persons”1226 (emphasis added). 
Probably one of the most conspicuous examples of the clauses that are being 
commented is Article 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that:  
“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein” (emphasis added). 
Because of the relevance of the Declaration, the fact that part of it has achieved 
customary law status, and the implicit general prohibition of non-state violations it contains, the 
cited article has an undeniable importance, which is however somehow lessened because of its 
function. This is because what it concretely does is forbid interpretations of the Declaration that 
would permit human rights abuses. However, as Jordan J. Paust considers, this sort of clause 
and those that foresee obligations to prevent or respond to non-state violations indicate the 
existence of implied duties.1227 Indeed, the fact that the toleration and acceptance of abuses are 
forbidden implies that their unlawfulness is not altered. 
In this sense, if one interprets clauses of the sort being examined in light of the value-
principle of human dignity, it can be concluded that abuses committed by non-state entities are 
not only legally relevant but also unlawful and prohibited. Concerning this, it is interesting to note 
that Chris Jochnick has commented that: 
“[T]he emphasis on the human person places human rights beyond the narrowness of particular 
treaties or, at a minimum, suggests a broad interpretation of these treaties and their corresponding 
duties. Thus human rights obligations linked to human dignity may be violated by a host of actors 
including non-parties to the treaties; the exclusive focus on the state must be viewed as pragmatic 
and contingent, rather than necessary”1228 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, human rights treaties have incorporated clauses according to which the norms 
of those treaties cannot be interpreted as endorsing human rights abuses, and mention that 
individuals have responsibilities and/or cannot rely on those instruments to engage in human 
rights abuses. These considerations are presented, for example, in the Preambles of the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and in article 32 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Interestingly, the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stands 
apart from the previous examples and follows the UDHR more closely, forbidding in article 17 
                                                     
1226 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal Process”, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 25, 2004, pp. 1242-1243. 
1227 Cf. Ibid.; Jordan J. Paust, “The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 54-56, 
59, 62; articles 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 17 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights, or 5 of the International Convenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
1228 Cf. Chris Jochnick, op. cit., at 61. 
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abusive interpretations that support abuses committed by States, groups or persons. The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopts an interesting alternative model, and in articles 27 
through 29 includes express duties of individuals. 
Underlying some international rules on the responsibility of perpetrators, accomplices, 
aiders and abettors of internationally wrongful acts, who can be non-state entities, is the 
assumption that those actors have duties to refrain from committing abuses of human dignity or 
cooperating with them: this can be found in criminal norms and human rights norms, such as 
those against genocide.1229  
As José E. Alvarez wrote, apart from obligations that are found in “general principles of 
law”, it is feasible to: 
“[F]ind implicit duties on corporate entities (as well as other non--‐state actors) from the principle of  
universal jurisdiction as applied to jus cogens prohibitions. Alternately [it is possible to] infer corporate 
liability from the application of rules for secondary liability (such as the application of international 
rules governing aiding and abetting in distinct international legal regimes, including under 
international criminal law)”.1230 
Moreover, just as some instruments have narrow definitions of violations of human rights, the 
limitations of which do not constrain general norms that are more protective and inclusive given the 
specialized character of the former; the existence of norms regulating duties of States and certain 
authorities or actors and the absence of an express mention of general non-state obligations in some 
instruments in no way denies the possible existence of general prohibitions of non-state violations. 
This is so because many instruments can be considered specialized from a subjective point of view, 
focusing on addressing abuses of States and authorities. Yet, those instruments tend to stress the 
importance of ensuring that human dignity is protected from all entities, and sometimes even mention 
non-state duties or legal burdens, apart from considering that no entity is entitled to weaken the 
protection of human dignity by invoking those instruments or in any other way.1231 In sum, specialized 
obligations of States do not deny that other actors must abide by human rights standards.  
This, coupled with the fact that jus gentium norms created by one source of law have an 
autonomous life independent of others even if their content and protection coincide fully or partly, 
makes it possible, for instance, for an entity not bound by some treaty norms to be bound by general 
principles of law or customary law, among other possibilities.  
In my opinion, this highlights the importance of the argument that international law implicitly 
accommodates the existence of a principle prohibiting non-state violations, or that at least it does not 
                                                     
1229 See article IV of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, among others. 
1230 See José E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 
1231 Cf. the Preamble and articles 2 and 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Preamble 
and article 5 of the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Preamble and articles 1, 
27, 28 and 29 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;  articles 1 and 17 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights; articles 1, 2 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
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deny the possibility of creating non-state duties with the purpose of better protecting human dignity, 
since the fact that State obligations do not bind non-state entities does not entail that they do not or 
cannot have human rights obligations. After all, the fact that an entity is able to affect essential legal 
interests means that such capacity must be regulated, for instance through principles addressing, at 
least, (all types of) harm against individuals caused in a way contrary to their inherent worth. 
Furthermore, in my opinion a general principle that prohibits non-state violations of 
human dignity, manifested in acts or omissions contrary to rights and correlated obligations 
founded upon it, is a logic consequence of the public character of the protection of human dignity.  
In this sense, for instance, many internal laws regulate administrative, constitutional or 
other public law standards, one of whose principles is the consideration that what is not permitted 
is prohibited. This differs from a private law perspective, according to which what is not prohibited 
is permitted.  
In international law, the International Court of Justice seems to favor a principle handled 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus Case that favors consent and 
sovereignty by considering that what is not prohibited is permitted. This conception, however, has 
recently been criticized by Bruno Simma, who considers that it represents bygone 19th century 
legal conceptions that ignore that silence does not necessarily amount to approval, and that there 
may be shades or degrees regarding apparently unregulated conduct (e.g. tolerance).1232  
In light of the evolution of international principles, values, theoretical developments and 
legal goals in the current context of the world society, it is possible to interpret apparent silences 
of law and identify prohibitions (or entitlements) in the context of goals and systems of norms. 
Concerning pertinent recent international legal developments, it is remarkable that the 
ICJ has considered that faculties and entitlements may be implicitly held by an actor by virtue of 
the legal goals of the community and its functions and goals, and that other international judges 
have considered that entities can have inherent powers.1233  
In my opinion, since legal capacities can generally assume the forms of legal entitlements 
or burdens, the fact that legal purposes related to the full and effective protection of individuals 
often require the existence of non-state duties (see Chapter 4), and the fact that non-state 
violations of human rights and guarantees is condemned and not at all “tolerated” or “desirable”, 
indicate that duties related to that subject matter can implicitly bind non-state actors. 
Implicit prohibitions concerning the issue under examination can be partly based on the 
public character of human dignity, although this is not required. This publicness rests not on the 
                                                     
1232 See footnote 1025, supra. 
1233 See footnotes 1244 and 1322, infra. 
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features of the entities involved and their conduct but on the public interest in the defense of that 
value and on the nature of the rights involved, whose protection is necessary –some even 
consider that human rights have a constitutional vocation-.1234  
Those implied duties can be accessible given the knowledge of human rights,1235 and the 
requirement that restrictions of rights of non-state actors seek an admissible purpose is also 
complied with, because their purpose in this case is the protection of human dignity (see 
Chapters 1 and 5). All potential participants in human rights violations (i.e. all entities, see 
Chapters 1 and 2), in consequence, have a prohibition that forbids participating in them. This 
applies to any entity, actor or group (see Article 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
The existence of implicit human rights prohibitions and general duties that bind non-state 
actors gives many advantages, summarized in the consideration that they contribute to prevent 
impunity, condemn abuses, and grant greater substantive protection to individuals, who are thus 
entitled to demand protection from non-state violations and full reparations when those abuses 
are committed. In other words, to protect human dignity in a complete, practical and real way, it 
must be recognized that the normative guarantees that protect it can be violated in practice by 
non-state entities and that, implicitly, any such violation is a trespass and a forbidden act. This is, 
to my mind, how the following passage of the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Trial of German Major War Criminals must be construed: 
“[I]ndividuals can be punished for violations of international law. Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”.1236 
Furthermore, currently there are many important actors, actions, relationships and 
interconnections with transnational, domestic, global and/or internationally features. In an 
interdependent and global world as ours, some conduct that must be unlawful due to its being 
contrary to essential values of the world society and humankind is carried out by actors that take 
advantage of possibilities available in legal and social landscapes,1237 and they must be dealt with 
in legal terms. 
Since it may be difficult for a single individual devoid of resources available to collective 
actors to accomplish certain deeds that amount to violations of dignity in transnational, 
international or even local levels, and since many violations are committed by collective entities, 
                                                     
1234 Cf. Stefan Kirchner, “Relative Normativity and the Constitutional Dimension of International Law: A Place for 
Values in the International Legal System?”, German Law Journal, vol. 05, 2004, pp. 58-61. 
1235 See footnote 1207, supra. 
1236 Cf., Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, “The Law of the 
Charter”, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp (last checked: 27/02/2012). 
1237 Cf. Kofi A. Annan, op. cit., pp. iii-iv. 
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their abuses and those of their members must be tackled as well, sometimes even in criminal 
terms if this is so required. 
On the other hand, only comprehensive and global strategies1238 can counter many non-
state violations due to factors as those discussed in previous paragraphs. This implies that it is 
necessary for public and private entities to cooperate to protect individuals.  
The possibility of holding all non-state entities accountable is further based on a rationale 
identified in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal: given the nature of States as legal 
fictions, it is necessary to look beyond them in practice because, to truly deter and punish 
violations, those that effectively carry violations out must be sanctioned. The same can be 
predicated of other collective entities, whether they have formal recognition or not. This view is 
supported by disaggregated analyses of collective entities, and is consistent with historical 
studies that argue that many actions formally or superficially attributable to States have non-state 
origins.  
In order to avoid confusions and misstatements, rather than stressing the idea that 
different entities can engage in conduct that is formally attributable to States, which may seem to 
suggest that violations necessarily involve State participation, emphasis must be laid on the fact 
that many violations are committed independently of any link, support or even remote connection 
with States. This has been expressly recognized by U.S. Courts and assumed by international 
criminal judicial bodies. For instance, in the Case of Kadic v. Karadzic the Second Circuit of the 
United States Court of Appeals argued that: 
“We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state 
action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken 
by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals. An early example of the 
application of the law of nations to the acts of private individuals is the prohibition against piracy […] 
pirates were “hostis humani generis” (an enemy of all mankind) in part because they acted “without 
… any pretense of public authority.” […] Later examples are prohibitions against the slave trade and 
certain war crimes”1239 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the International Criminal Court deals with individual responsibility and can 
contribute to the protection of victims from all actors that commit crimes under its jurisdiction, 
which are purposes and functions of its Statute. It is telling that the International Criminal Court 
can examine cases in which offenders are members of non-state groups, not only concerning war 
crimes but also regarding crimes against humanity, as mentioned in the 2012 Interim Report on 
                                                     
1238 Cf. Ibid.; Durban Declaration of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, 2001, paras. 3, 11, 105, 120. 
1239 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, S. Kadic et al. v. Radovan Karadzic, Decision of 13 
October 1995. 
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the Situation in Colombia.1240 This means that there is no need of State involvement in or 
cooperation with the conduct of a non-state entity for misdeeds of the latter to be considered 
criminal and unlawful under international law. 
In sum, it can be said that given the way in which violations of human rights and 
guarantees are committed in practice, all offenders can incur in conduct that is contrary to them 
and violate an implicit legal principle of respect of human dignity. The comprehensive protection 
that this principle demands is consistent with the requirements that victims are protected and 
guarantees of non-repetition of violations exist: they require the participation of all agents of 
violation.  
In this sense, for example, according to U.S. Judge Leval, considering that individuals are 
the only non-state entities capable of being responsible for human dignity violations would run 
counter to the goals of norms protecting human dignity, because other actors that commit 
violations would be unchecked and benefit from the impunity of violations.1241  
Certainly, the impossibility of holding some actors responsible would lessen the 
protection of victims, because this denial prevents claims and sometimes even preventive or ex 
post facto measures of protection, such as reparations, against some violations. In those cases, 
victims might not receive the full reparations they are entitled to,1242 and law would foster the 
impunity of some offenders, which is contrary to international legal goods and principles and 
encourages the commission of future violations. 
Conversely, if it is considered that materializations of non-state threats and obstacles to 
the exercise of human rights and guarantees are violations contrary to the effectiveness of legal 
principles and to the integrity of legal and human values, some of which are peremptory, it can be 
concluded that non-state obligations of respect of human rights are necessary and inherent legal 
burdens, not just implicit duties.  
                                                     
1240 Cf. Elements of Crimes (Elements of the Crimes of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 
corresponding to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court), para. 3 of the introduction to article 7 and 
footnote 6 therein, at 5, where both State and organizational policies to commit attacks against a civilian population 
are mentioned. Likewise, the Elements of  article 7 (1) (i) mention the crime against humanity of enforced 
disappearance of persons (paras. 4 and 5); Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito to: International 
Criminal Court, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 14 March 2012, paras. 9-14; International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation 
in Colombia, Interim Report, 2012, paras. 37 onwards. 
1241 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge Leval to: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, pp. 1-2, 10-11. 
1242 Cf. articles 31, 34 and 38 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 
2001 (A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4), and of the ILC Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, in the 
version adopted in 2011 (A/66/10); Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, paras. 18, 22. 
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The doctrine of inherent capacities has been handled by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,1243 and is worth 
considering. The fact that non-state entities can participate in violations of human rights and 
guarantees in different ways, as direct, beneficial or silent accomplices or perpetrators,1244 among 
others, means that they have the inherent capacity of violating norms protecting human dignity, 
and therefore have the inherent duty to refrain from doing so.1245 This is confirmed by a systemic 
analysis that takes into account the effectiveness, goals and interconnectedness of legal goods 
and norms protecting human rights. In this regard, finding functions and capacities required to 
achieve purposes of legal goods is essential for ascertaining if an inherent capacity exists.1246 
It must be mentioned that all the previous ideas have a substantive nature, and non-state 
duties of the types being described are not necessarily accompanied by procedural mechanisms 
of international supervision to which actors are subjected. However, this does not mean that 
those duties have no procedural implications: the substantive emergence of responsibility, 
regulated by secondary norms, must be supported by procedural norms and mechanisms of 
implementation and legal burdens created to fully protect human dignity.1247  
Chapter 4 examines in depth when international procedural action for the purpose of 
effectively protecting human dignity is required or advisable, which implies that sometimes non-
state actors must or should have international procedural capacities and their conduct can be 
supervised internationally. 
Some points are worth being stressed: first, that not only criminal cases can or must have 
international supervision, for instance because other cases must be like addressed due to the 
seriousness and the unacceptability of lack of protection if domestic actions cannot protect 
victims. Secondly, it is convenient to treat every violation of human dignity as unlawful in 
international substantive terms, to permit and demand action from different authorities and outlaw 
those abuses.  
                                                     
1243 This doctrine permits to hold that an entity that does not have an express or implied legal capacity may still have 
the inherent power to exercise it for the sake of its functions and legal goals (goods). These notions permit, thus, to 
fill gaps concerning procedural protection regulations. See, for instance, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, Judgment (competence), 24 September 1999, paras. 31-33. 
1244 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 341-348; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights, op. cit., A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 51-81; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
1245 The only coherent (legal answer) to the capacity to violate human dignity is the responsibility that ensues from 
engaging in one such violation, in light of inherent capacities and legal goods, whose protection is comprehensive 
and guided by the principle of effectiveness in the humanitarian field. 
1246 Cf. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Chamber, Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial 
Judge’s Order regarding Jurisdiction and Standing, 10 November 2010, paras. 45, 47-48. 
1247 The relevance of procedural measures in order to make substantive guarantees effective is undeniable. Cf. Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. cit., paras. 
166-167, 172-177; European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, 17 
May 2010, paras. 128-130, 150-153. 
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Permitting other States or international authorities to identify substantive violations of 
international law committed by non-state actors and to protect victims is necessary because 
States can fail to adopt legislation that implements jus gentium or have norms that are contrary to 
it or are ineffective1248 and lack duties to appear before supervisory bodies that can order 
protection against breaches of human rights duties, or States may simply fail despite their efforts. 
In those events, victims may have no reparations or only partial reparations if non-state actors 
have no responsibilities, which should be ordained by international law to ensure their recognition 
everywhere. 
In other words, since the accountability of States that fail to protect victims of non-state 
actors may be insufficient to fully repair victims, as explained in Chapter 7, considering that all 
entities that violate human dignity have breached obligations of their own authorizes legal 
responses of States and other entities with competence over those violations.  
Interestingly, in the Kononov v. Latvia Case the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights declared that measures adopted by a State in order to sanction violations of 
international norms dealing with non-state conduct (an individual, in that case) can be lawful even 
if there are no violations of internal law –if the conditions examined in Chapter 5 are satisfied, it 
must be added-. In this regard, the Court considered that: 
“[B]y May 1944 war crimes were defined as acts contrary to the laws and customs of war and […] 
international law had defined the basic principles underlying, and an extensive range of acts 
constituting, those crimes. States were at least permitted (if not required) to take steps to punish 
individuals for such crimes, including on the basis of command responsibility. Consequently, during 
and after the Second World War, international and national tribunals prosecuted soldiers for war 
crimes committed during the Second World War. 
[…] 
236. As to whether the qualification of the impugned acts as war crimes, based as it was on 
international law exclusively, could be considered to be sufficiently accessible and foreseeable to the 
applicant in 1944, the Court recalls that it has previously found that the individual criminal 
responsibility of a private soldier (a border guard) was defined with sufficient accessibility and 
foreseeability by, inter alia, a requirement to comply with international fundamental human rights 
instruments, which instruments did not, of themselves, give rise to individual criminal responsibility 
and one of which had not been ratified by the relevant State at the material time (K.-H.W. v. 
Germany, §§ 92-105, cited above). The Court considered that even a private soldier could not show 
total, blind obedience to orders which flagrantly infringed not only domestic law, but internationally 
recognised human rights, in particular the right to life, a supreme value in the international hierarchy 
of human rights (K.-H.W. v. Germany, at § 75). 
237.  It is true that the 1926 Criminal Code did not contain a reference to the international laws and 
customs of war (as in K.-H. W v. Germany) and that those international laws and customs were not 
formally published in the USSR or in the Latvian SSR (as in Korbely v. Hungary [GC], cited above, at 
§§ 74-75). However, this cannot be decisive. As is clear from the conclusions at paragraphs 213 and 
                                                     
1248 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. 
cit., paras. 167-170, 175; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, op. cit., paras. 32-38, 
50; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., paras. 7, 13-15; International Law Commission, 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, at 40, 
paragraph 5 of the commentary to article 4, and article 4.1 of the aforementioned articles. 
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227 above, international laws and customs of war were in 1944 sufficient, of themselves, to found 
individual criminal responsibility. 
238.  Moreover, the Court notes that in 1944 those laws constituted detailed lex specialis regulations 
fixing the parameters of criminal conduct in a time of war, primarily addressed to armed forces and, 
especially, commanders”1249 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, if a non-state entity breaches international norms that protect human 
dignity, States or other legitimate authorities can punish that violation in a proportionate way that 
furthers the goals of protection sought by the prohibition. Concerning this, in the same case the 
European Court held that: 
“[W]here international law did not provide for a sanction for war crimes with sufficient clarity, a 
domestic tribunal could, having found an accused guilty, fix the punishment on the basis of domestic 
criminal law”1250 (emphasis added). 
Apart from ensuring the legality of measures that prevent or deal with non-state violations 
of human rights, international prohibitions will ensure that those abuses are regarded as unlawful 
even if some States fail to recognize their illegality or to sanction abuses and protect victims. 
Those problems may exist because of: i) State weakness against some actors –economic or 
otherwise- and difficulties to control them, as happens with some States acting against certain 
criminal groups;1251 ii) connivance or the desire to not forbid certain violations, for instance to 
encourage investment even if labor or other rights are not effectively upheld; or iii) lack of 
jurisdiction or evasion by a violator of State control, which is a possibility that makes 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and strategies relevant,1252 among other reasons.  
For those reasons, it is important to consider all non-state violations of human dignity to 
be unlawful, or at the very least to consider that they must be branded as such de lege ferenda. 
The unlawful character of those violations will, as argued previously, enable different authorities 
and actors to undertake actions of protection and promotion of human rights if some conditions of 
competence are satisfied. This can happen with universal and international jurisdictions if no 
exceptions –such as forum non conveniens in the case of some domestic jurisdictions-1253 are 
present. Otherwise, without multiple possibilities of access to mechanisms and authorities to 
which protection can be requested, especially concerning serious violations, individuals will be 
vulnerable, unprotected, and likely devoid of prospects of legal protection. Additionally, lack of 
                                                     
1249 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, 17 May 2010, 
paras. 213, 236-238. 
1250 Ibid., para. 212. 
1251 Cf. Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126. 
1252 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 54-55, 77, 89; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, op. cit., A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 14-15, 19, 27; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho 
Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 786. 
1253 Cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, op. cit., A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., 
para. 89; August Reinisch, op. cit., at 56. 
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formal recognition of all the elements of a violation may make some authorities think that victims 
have no standing or that alleged offenders have no duty to participate in proceedings as 
defendants. 
Recognition of non-state human rights duties is also important because of the symbolic 
and educative functions of law, since the indication that law condemns breaches from a legal and 
social perspective can have an impact on beliefs and attitudes and make victims aware of their 
entitlements and possibility of claiming protection with legal support, besides making agents of 
promotion of human rights conscious of the possibility to demand non-state respect and 
accordingly mobilize and shame or exert pressure against violators.1254  
From the perspective of duty-bearers, consciousness of their duties may lead to gradual 
or fast changes of their attitude. Coupled with awareness of social and legal expectations upon 
them and possible reactions against violations, this may make non-state actors behave carefully 
and strive to show respect of human rights. Apart from the case of international humanitarian law 
regulations, authors have considered that corporate awareness of normative expectations upon 
them (not necessarily in positive law) can lead corporations to conform to human rights standards 
and others to condemn abuses.1255  
Mechanisms that can contribute to the protection of individuals from non-state abuses 
can involve dybamics of persuasion, shaming, threats of negative consequences, promises of 
benefits, or socialization, among others that can stimulate norm compliance.1256 These dynamics 
may accompany general or specialized, implicit or express non-state prohibitions. 
Concerning access to remedies and individual petitions, it must be repeated that 
procedural entitlements do not always accompany substantial rules. Additionally, the exhaustion 
of or inadequacy of internal remedies will either permit or obstruct access to international 
supervision, which sometimes can examine non-state conduct. Still, authorities retain their duties 
of protection (and what some call primary obligations) to tackle violations of human rights, and so 
can have vicarious or direct responsibility in connection with non-state abuses and even have 
their responsibility engaged simultaneously with that of non-state actors for some violations.1257  
In my humble opinion, it is preferable to not allude to States as the preponderant or 
primary duty holders in the humanitarian corpus juris, because they are contingent entities with 
rights and duties that may not exist in the future or be relevant in one case, despite which 
                                                     
1254 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 347-348; August Reinisch, op. cit., at 68. 
1255 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 347-348. 
1256 Cf. David Capie, “Influencing Armed Groups: Are there Lessons to Be Drawn from Socialization Literature?”, in: 
Geneva Call, Exploring Criteria & Conditions for Engaging Armed Non-State Actors to Respect Humanitarian Law & 
Human Rights Law, Conference Report, 2007. 
1257 See footnotes 568 and 569, supra. 
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individuals will still have entitlements to be protected and pertinent authorities must have duties of 
protection.  
Additionally, the effectiveness of the exercise of human rights and guarantees depends 
on many factors, including some related to the behavior of different entities. Therefore, if the 
features of the protection of human dignity demand protection from State abuses, they also 
require protection from other entities, with or without authority roles. Because of the role and 
position of States in contemporary international human rights law, however, it cannot be denied 
that they have an important but not exclusive role in the protection of human rights. 
That being said, if implicit or general prohibitions of non-state violations exist, they do not 
deny the importance of more specific and/or express human rights international obligations of 
non-state actors, which can be created and exist alongside obligations of authorities and public 
entities and domestic non-state obligations, which can be based on international legal demands. 
In fact, express and specialized non-state duties can contribute to fleshing out relevant general 
principles and implicit duties and address specific needs of protection in detail.  
The absolute inexistence of non-state duties of respect, besides making victims 
vulnerable and too dependent on contingent State and non-state initiatives and actions, would 
also be contrary to the correlation between rights and duties and the implications of human 
dignity. 
To conclude this section, in the first place it can be said that the behavior of entities with 
the factual capacity to affect legal interests with a special importance must be regulated, to 
prohibit and discourage violations attributable to them and guide their actions (and omissions) 
towards the promotion of legal goods, especially fundamental ones. Moreover, if an entity has an 
inherent capacity to potentially affect legal goods, it can be considered to also have inherent 
duties to not engage in violations for legal purposes to be achieved and expected functions to be 
fulfilled. 
Secondly, it must be stressed that since there can be many sources of general and 
implied prohibitions, they are cumulative but not mutually dependent. Therefore, if one specific 
possible source is challenged and denied lex lata status, the rest can still regulate non-state 
duties. Still, the importance of the protection of human dignity and the equality of all victims call 
for the creation of implicit and general obligations of respect that bind non-state entities de lege 
ferenda if they are ever considered to not have them in positive law. 
Thirdly, the existence of implicit and general duties and principles of non-state duties or 
lack thereof does not undermine the possible existence and importance of specialized non-state 
human rights obligations, which also serve to address in detail some abuses and prevent their 
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impunity and the legal abandonment of victims. Thereby, it is indispensable to examine what 
specific international human rights duties non-state actors can have, which is a study that will be 
conducted in the next section. 
 
6.2. Specialized international obligations of non-state entities designed to protect human 
dignity 
Possible specialized or concrete non-state human rights obligations are important for two 
reasons: they can complement general and implicit duties, and they permit to address some 
abuses in case the existence of general and implied duties are denied by someone.  
Indeed, some may argue that only some non-state entities, as individuals, have certain 
international obligations, and that those duties are few; or) that (some) non-state entities can only 
violate norms belonging to certain branches of international law. The arguments expressed in this 
text reveal that I disagree with those assertions. 
For instance, some scholars argue that the conduct of some actors apparently cannot be 
regulated due to their lack of international personality;1258 and others consider that certain 
branches, as international humanitarian law, expressly permit regulating some non-state conduct 
but that other branches (as human rights law) do not. Needless to say, those ideas are (to my 
mind correctly) challenged by some authors.1259 For instance, it can be said that developments on 
the protection of human dignity in some areas can be imitated or followed in others. 
Moreover, nothing impedes the creation of general prohibitions that bind non-state actors, 
and likewise obligations with a more focused scope can be created by the sources of jus gentium 
as well, as examined in Chapter 5. What is more, some who have denied the existence of some 
non-state duties examine the sources of international law, such as custom, to ascertain whether 
those duties have been created, and admit that it is possible for inexistent non-state international 
obligations to be created in the future.1260  
Additionally, as examined previously, the International Court of Justice accepts that non-
state duties may be created even by means of the adoption of norms by bodies and procedures 
that derive their normative powers from original or constitutive norms of international law. 
According to the Court: 
                                                     
1258 Cf. e.g. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, at 784. 
1259 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 36, 40, 48, 50, 73-75. 
1260 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-
4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decision of 17 September 2010, at 49. 
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“[I]t has not been uncommon for the Security Council to make demands on actors other than United 
Nations Member States and intergovernmental organizations”.1261 
Specialized human rights duties of non-state entities that complement general and 
implicit duties (or that make up for their supposed absence in an insufficient way) can focus on 
certain prohibitions, rights to be protected, vulnerable victims, some potential offenders, or other 
more concrete aspects, instead of regulating general prohibitions or implicit duties to respect jus 
cogens and other rights. Their specialized nature not only permits express focused duties to be 
used to complement general and implicit obligations but also to flesh out some aspects and 
details of general obligations and of the protection of legal goods. Both functions serve to better 
protect human dignity by addressing specific elements that require attention. 
Because of the multiple options available, specialized regulation of non-state conduct 
does not always have to indicate lists of rights to be protected. For example, it can regulate duties 
of a specific type of actor to respect all human rights. This is the method proposed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, concerning corporations (although 
that proposal does not consider all corporate responsibilities as binding).  
Focused strategies can also specify lists of some rights that some actors must respect, 
and regulate their duties in an express or detailed fashion (this does not mean that other rights 
should not be respected, as explained in Part I). Focused duties can also take the form of 
regulation of non-state conduct in some formal branches of international law, as international 
humanitarian law or international criminal law (likewise, this does not deny that other entities can 
also breach obligations under those or other branches and affect legal goods). Additionally, 
focused duties may impose positive duties and not just mandates of respect or abstention. 
All in all, express specialized non-state obligations differ from implicit prohibitions in an 
evident way, and all specialized duties differ from general prohibitions because they focus on 
some aspects that merit specialized attention. Still, they may be intersectional and ignore formal 
divisions between branches of international law, for instance prohibiting violations of human 
dignity that affect the legal goods of many of them,1262 which contributes to counter fragmentation 
of law by focusing on protected interests and values. 
In spite of the possibility of creating focused or specialized non-state duties, for some 
authors certain conceptions of international legal personality prevent some entities from having 
international duties, and for others human rights should not be concerned with non-state threats 
                                                     
1261 Cf. Cf. International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, op. cit., para. 116. 
1262 See footnote 1077, supra. 
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directly but only through the mediation of States (and that of other authorities, as they must admit 
given recent normative and jurisprudential developments).  
These issues were discussed in Chapter 5 already, but it can be added that the notion of 
legal personality is not static but dynamic, as recognized by the International Court of Justice, 
which considered that changing conditions and “needs” of the international society could lead to 
the emergence of new entities as, for instance, international organizations, that can have 
international rights and obligations.1263  
Objectors to the possibility of direct international non-state human rights duties must 
admit that even if for the sake of discussion their objections were regarded as correct, new norms 
could well regulate duties of previously unregulated non-state conduct, something that is often 
required by international social needs, which include the full and effective protection of human 
beings. On top of that, some notions of personality are “circular” or tautological and consider that 
“persons” are those entities capable of having rights, duties and maybe certain capacities, but 
also hold that it is only “persons” may have any such rights, duties and capacities.1264 
The need of regulating the conduct of relevant actors1265 not only justifies their being 
addressees of law, but also possession of human rights duties because of how they can affect 
those rights. The fact that special attention must be paid to some protection needs also explains 
why some focused duties must be created.  
It is also convenient to mention that Hersch Lauterpacht warned against prejudices or 
“preconceived notions as to the capacity of” an actor to be a subject of international law, being 
instead “the practice of States in both the international and the municipal spheres”1266 important. 
That practice indicates that protection from non-state abuses of human rights is and must be 
given. Additionally, Lauterpacht also rightly argued that legal considerations deemed to be 
important in doctrine, such as that of personality, ought to be tempered by due consideration to 
the effectiveness of law and its moral evolution.1267 Human and social needs may well change or 
have existed before but been ignored by norms or practitioners. Both things happen with the 
vulnerability of individuals in relation to non-state threats: they have always existed, but some 
patterns of violation have intensified or emerged due to recent phenomena. 
Implied and express human rights specialized or focused duties of non-state actors can 
be subclassified in accordance with what they command and what is expected of non-state 
                                                     
1263 Cf. International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion of 11 April 1949, pp. 8-10, 15. 
1264 See footnote 435, supra. 
1265 Cf. Fred Halliday, op. cit., pp. 34-37. 
1266 Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., at 38. 
1267 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
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entities. Among others, there can be non-state obligations of result, that are breached by failure 
to obtain certain results; or obligations of means, that require behaving in accordance with a 
certain degree of diligence,1268 which may vary according to different factors.  
Needless to say, since actors can participate in violations of all human rights, non-state 
obligations may have the purpose of protecting any human right or guarantee. This means that 
economic, social and cultural rights, civil and political rights, or any other right or guarantee that 
given its features (direct recognition and protection of human dignity) is a human right or 
guarantee, can be protected through non-state obligations, given the same condition of those 
rights and guarantees and the fact they have important common traits1269 despite having some 
differences, and because they are interdependent.1270 
Focused non-state duties can also be classified as duties of abstention (also known as 
negative duties or duties to respect) and obligations to do something or positive obligations, 
which are analogous to State duties to not violate human rights and to ensure or facilitate their 
exercise. 
Some authors hesitate about the convenience or possibility of regulating positive human 
rights obligations of non-state actors, because they fear that they may place excessive burdens 
on them. However, I believe that there are some situations in which those obligations are 
reasonable and even necessary.  
First of all, it is convenient to mention that the design of some positive obligations of non-
state entities is in certain events consistent with the protection of human dignity, and may even be 
required by it. As Andrew Clapham argues when analyzing the work of Immanuel Kant, the notion 
of dignity can be understood as suggesting that positive duties of individuals and, by extension, of 
other actors, are required in a framework of the protection of human dignity.1271  
                                                     
1268 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, pp. 56-57, para. 11 of the commentary to article 12; Carolin F. Hillemanns, “UN Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”, 
German Law Journal, vol. 04, 2003, pp. 1072-1073; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, op. cit., A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 56-58, 73; Norms on the responsibilities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights and the commentary on the Norms, para. b. 
of the commentary to para. A.1.; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, para. 6 of the Introduction, and 
para. 17 (“Human rights due diligence”); Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), 
CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 2006, paras. 8-22. 
1269 Cf. Christian Tomuschat, op. cit., pp. 43-45, 53-54 (on the existence of positive obligations in relation to both civil 
and political rights and economic, social and cultural ones, notwithstanding differences on the protection and 
implementation of their guarantees). 
1270 Cf. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. I.5; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 3, The nature of the States parties obligations (Art. 2, para. 1), 14 December 1990, paras. 8-12; 
articles 1 of the Protocol of San Salvador and 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, compared to articles 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights or 2 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
1271 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 536, 544, 546-547. 
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I agree with this conclusion because the recognition of the inherent and inalienable worth 
of an individual, coupled with the notion that the behavior of all actors must be consistent with 
universal normative criteria, may indicate that sometimes individuals must be protected by non-
state entities or else they will suffer in a serious and irremediable way. This may justify some 
mandates to protect when inaction would lead to harm that is contrary to rights and guarantees 
based on human dignity.  
While the notion of the necessity of adjusting behavior to universalist criteria is an ethical 
and philosophical one, it can be relevant in legal terms for regulating non-state conduct for the 
reasons just explained. 
While law must be designed for ordinary human beings and not demand perfection, it 
must and can prohibit and command certain acts in a way that is consistent with or even required 
by ethics,1272 as happens in my opinion in these cases. However, how can these ideas be 
translated into concrete legal notions? 
To my mind, there are at least two general situations in which positive non-state 
obligations may be necessary or especially important for human dignity to be effectively 
protected: first, 1) when an entity a) has a role that generates legitimate expectations of 
protection, for instance because it has a legal mandate or role or due to its de facto position; or 
when b) it is in such a position that the enjoyment of a human right or guarantee completely 
depends on positive actions of that entity or is exposed to threats due to the conduct of that actor, 
that may be obliged to act with certain due diligence standards. This may happen, for example, 
when an actor has the only means that permit to safeguard the enjoyment of a right, creates a 
risk of harm that must be neutralized, or when individuals and stakeholders can legitimately 
request protection from that actor. 2) Secondly, in some situations in which an individual faces an 
imminent danger of having her essential rights harmed unless a non-state actor helps her, 
positive obligations of that actor would be indispensable, legitimate and fair (emergency criterion). 
1) As to the first criterion, some have posited the idea that when an entity has a position 
that creates expectations that it will protect a legal good, it must strive to do so. Interestingly, 
even non-state groups have accepted that they may have positive duties for having a guarantor 
position, as has happened with a Colombian guerrilla (whose declarations may have legal 
                                                     
1272 Cf. the distinctions between fairness and lawfulness, equity as correcting “legal justice”, and legal and natural 
justice, that support the idea that law does not have to demand perfection from men, yet lawfulness and justice can 
coincide, as discussed in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Forgotten Books, 2007, pp. 101-103, 105, 116, 123-
124. Moreover, Seneca considered that “modesty (or shame) forbids what the law does not.” Cf. Jon R. Stone, The 
Routledge Dictionary of Latin Quotations, Routledge, 2005, at 102. It must be borne in mind that some natural legal 
theories and other conceptions call for positive law to not endorse inhuman or certain unethical positions and 
provisions and to serve human beings, i.e. urging certain mandates of legislation and gap filling. 
 
 
424
effects).1273 Considerations of this kind have been taken into account when examining or creating 
some criminal norms and norms on the protection of fundamental rights that can be invoked to 
demand the protection of human rights from non-state actors when the exercise of those rights 
depends to a large extent on the action of those actors. In the British and Colombian legal 
systems, for instance, the conduct of entities with public functions can be regarded as contrary to 
human rights if it does not conform to general standards set forth in international human rights 
law.1274  
A similar doctrine has been employed by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, that consider that intense duties of protection 
exist when an entity has a guarantor position, either because the enjoyment of human rights 
largely depends on actions of that entity (as happens with some rights of detainees) or because 
an individual is in a vulnerable position and requires protection by that entity1275 (which shows 
that, in practice, differences between events in which positive duties are convenient are blurred). 
Even though those international bodies talk about State duties, this is been because of limitations 
of their competence, and the rationale they examine can and should be used in regard to other 
entities. An analysis in light of the legal goods that must be legally protected permits to consider 
those situations as legally relevant and in need of regulation when non-state entities are involved. 
This criterion, based on legitimate expectations regarding the factual or formal role of 
social actors, may seem at first difficult to be extrapolated to international human rights law. 
                                                     
1273 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has mentioned, for instance, that ir “reiterates that the State is 
in a position of guarantor with respect to persons deprived of liberty, and as such it has the absolute obligation to 
guarantee the rights to life and humane treatment of those persons in its custody.” Cf. Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Press Release 114/10, “IACHR Deplores Acts of Violence in Prisons in Brazil”; Comunicado de las 
FARC sobre los 11 Diputados, where the group said that “Reiteramos nuestra responsabilidad como garantes que 
éramos de la integridad de los Diputados”; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. 
cit., pp. 176-179. 
1274 Cf. Department for Constitutional Affairs, A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 11, 37; paras. 
1-3 and 8 of article 42 of Decree 2591 of 1991 of Colombia, in light of the information found in: Compilación de 
jurisprudencia y doctrina nacional e internacional, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 13-27. 
1275 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release 60/11, “IACHR Expresses Concern over 
Situation in Juvenile Jail in Panama”, where it held that “The State holds a special position as guarantor when it 
comes to the rights of persons deprived of liberty, which means that the State has the obligation to guarantee their 
life and humane treatment. Its obligation as guarantor means that the State must take all necessary measures to 
diligently prevent situations of risk that, as in this case, may pose serious threats to the fundamental rights of those in 
custody. This obligation also carries special features with regard to minors, which means the State must work more 
intensely to prevent situations that could place incarcerated children and adolescents at risk. The State has the duty 
to investigate and punish alleged violations of the right to life and humane treatment, particularly when these occur in 
correctional facilities.” The Commission has invoked the same doctrine of guarantor position and the positive duties it 
imposes in other press releases, such as the following ones: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press 
Release 19/12, “IACHR Deplores Deaths in Fire in Honduras Prison”; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Press Release 21/12, “IACHR Deplores Violent Deaths in Mexican Prison”. On the protection that vulnerable 
individuals are entitled to, cf. European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, 
Judgment, 30 November 2010, paras. 41, 45-46, 50. In my opinion, when it is urgent and State action is not possible 
or effective, other entities may be obliged to protect them in some cases. 
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However, there are some indicia that suggest that, with some adjustments, it is possible and 
legitimate to consider that sometimes the role and/or position of actors in relation to inherent 
rights of individuals demand(s) that they do something and act in accordance with special 
standards. 
These indications are found in international decisions and recommendations that have 
been developed to tackle some acute problems faced by human rights. One such hint is that of 
the more intense responsibility of entities that create risks of non-state violations. 
This criterion was presented by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case 
Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. According to the Court, the fact that a risk that non-state 
actors could violate human rights was encouraged and created by the respondent State made the 
latter’s positive duties more strict, and the diligence with which it had to behave more intense, 
obliging it to strive even harder to prevent the risks it created from materializing, lest its 
responsibility was engaged.1276 
It is undeniable that apart from States, non-state entities may also create risks of 
violations or obstacles to the exercise of human rights. In those cases, it is reasonable and 
justified to consider that, apart from duties of respect, and partly as a result of their indirect 
breach if violations occur, non-state entities must be bound by a positive duty to strive hard to 
prevent those threats from materializing. After all, the generation of risks of violation by any entity 
can be regarded as contrary to the spirit and content of the duty to refrain from violating a right.  
These considerations are consistent with the purpose and content of human rights law 
and with an interpretation of non-state duties1277 and human rights in good faith, which is a 
criterion of interpretation of international law. 
Additionally, some actors have positions of power de facto or formally, as when they are 
entrusted with functions the discharge of which may have an considerable impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights, which can be negatively affected if those actors are negligent. In 
those cases, the respective actors ought to be under a positive duty to protect those rights within 
the scope of their competence and concerning the impact of their functions and conduct on 
human rights and guarantees, that is to say regarding the impact of their conduct, encompassing 
both acts and omissions,1278 on the protection of human dignity. 
                                                     
1276 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, 31 
January 2006, paras. 125-126. 
1277 On support of the idea that non-state entities that generate a risk of a violation may be obliged to neutralize it, cf. 
Albin Eser, op. cit., at 819. 
1278 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, pp. 31 (para. 1 of the General commentary and footnote 33), 32, 34 (paras. 1 and 8 of the 
commentary to article 1), or 35 (para. 4 of the commentary to article 2), and article 2 of the aforementioned articles.  
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Interestingly, the consideration of how non-state conduct can have an impact on the 
exercise of human rights as one of the criteria to determine the content of non-state human rights 
responsibilities has been taken into account by John Ruggie in regard to corporations.1279 
According to John Ruggie, instead of basing responsibilities on abstract notions of the 
sphere of influence of corporations, their conduct and duties to act with due diligence should be 
assessed considering the “potential and actual human rights impacts resulting from a company’s 
business activities and the relationships connected with those activities.”1280 Curiously, that 
conclusion can also be obtained with doctrines of the sphere of influence. As mentioned by 
Menno T. Kamminga, the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, which mention that sphere, are not to be 
dismissed lightly.1281 In my opinion, this is confirmed by an analysis of the notion of the corporate 
spheres of activity and influence as embodied in those norms, which according to the 
Commentary to the Norms entails that: 
“[E]nterprises shall have the responsibility to use due diligence in ensuring that their activities do not 
contribute directly or indirectly to human rights abuses, and that they do not directly or indirectly 
benefit from abuses of which they were aware or ought to have been aware. Transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises shall further refrain from activities that would undermine 
the rule of law as well as governmental and other efforts to promote and ensure respect for human 
rights, and shall use their influence in order to help promote and ensure respect for human rights. 
Transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises shall inform themselves of the human rights impact of 
their principal activities and major proposed activities so that they can further avoid complicity in 
human rights abuses”1282 (emphasis added). 
To illustrate this, it can be considered that because of their role, private entities entrusted 
with functions of providing public services can affect the enjoyment of human rights if they are 
negligent, as for example happens with functions to sanitation and water services. Therefore, it 
shall be required of them to act with due diligence in the performance of their functions, mandates 
and activities.1283 According to this, sometimes it will be necessary to regulate positive duties of 
those actors in order to effectively protect human rights and guarantees. This explains why the 
Human Rights Council of the United Nations considered in a Resolution that “non-State service 
providers” of “water and sanitation services” must: 
                                                     
1279 Cf. John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit.; Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 52, 56-58, 61, 63, 
67-68, 71-72; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, principles 11-24. 
1280 Cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 72. 
1281 Cf. Bruno Demeyere, “The Next Frontier: Prosecution of Extraterritorial Corporate Misconduct before Non-US 
Courts”, op. cit., at 172. 
1282 Cf. Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to 
human rights and the commentary on the Norms, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, paragraph b of the commentary to 
paragraph A.1. of the Norms. 
1283 Cf. Ibid.; Carolin F. Hillemanns, op. cit., at 1073. 
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“(a) Fulfil their human rights responsibilities throughout their work processes, including by engaging 
proactively with the State and stakeholders to detect potential human rights abuses and find solutions 
to address them; 
(b) Contribute to the provision of a regular supply of safe, acceptable, accessible and affordable 
drinking water and sanitation services of good quality and sufficient quantity; 
(c) Integrate human rights into impact assessments as appropriate, in order to identify and help 
address human rights challenges; 
(d) Develop effective organizational-level grievance mechanisms for users, and refrain from 
obstructing access to State-based accountability mechanisms.”1284  
Certainly, the responsibilities of private providers (must) include positive obligations. 
Likewise, when considering that some non-state entities that administer territories have a position 
that makes them have human rights obligations, the Human Rights Committee mentioned that 
those entities have obligations to ensure and promote human rights. On the other hand, the 
International Law Commission considers that entities as international organizations can have 
obligations of prevention.1285 
The preceding considerations corroborate that non-state actors can have positive human 
rights duties, which are often necessary to ensure the protection of individuals and the 
satisfaction of essential human needs, especially in a context in which privatization and 
delegation of State functions take place. According to authors as August Reinisch, Philip Alston 
or Janne E. Nijman, those dynamics call for examining the protection of human rights and the rule 
of law, both of which seek to protect important legal goods, from non-state abuses,1286 which in 
my opinion include both direct violations and harm caused by inaction of relevant entities.  
For the sake of clarity, it must be repeated that duties of State and other authorities are 
not eliminated by non-state duties, and so they still have obligations to oversee the performance 
of private entities that provide public services or of public non-state actors as international 
organizations to whom they have delegated functions, for example. This is consistent with the 
requirement that an effective and multi-level protection of human rights protection is ensured in 
relation to delegation and privatization. That can be achieved partly with the existence positive 
State duties and the vicarious responsibility of States and other entities with positive duties. The 
human rights framework does not eliminate necessary responsibilities of actors but makes them 
complementary to others when they are required by the practical and principled protection of 
human dignity.  
                                                     
1284 Cf. Human Rights Council, Resolution 15/9 adopted by the Council, Human rights and access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation, A/HRC/RES/15/9, 6 October 2010, para. 9. 
1285 Cf. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 August 
2006, paras. 4, 8-22; International Law Commission, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, 
with commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, at 29, para. 10 of the commentary to article 8. 
1286 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 75-76; Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: 
Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal personality”, op. cit., at 7; Philip Alston, op. cit., at 17. 
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International decisions1287 support the previous considerations, which are also confirmed 
in instruments as the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. For instance, the Commentary to the first of 
those Norms declares that “[t]he Norms may not be used by States as an excuse for failing to 
take action to protect human rights, for example, through the enforcement of existing laws.” 
Moreover, taking into account that lawmaking and other powers other powers traditionally 
held by States are sometimes delegated,1288 and that human rights law demands that legislation 
is respectful of and compatible with its standards, it is necessary that States make sure that 
organizations to which those functions are delegated ensure an equal or better level of protection 
of human rights in connection with its functions.1289 
The criterion that the role of non-state actors may require that they have positive 
obligations seems to be corroborated by domestic and international practice and decisions. For 
example, declarations –which may have international legal value-1290 that affirmed that non-state 
armed groups as the FARC have responsibilities concerning the respect and enjoyment of rights 
of individuals kidnapped by them1291 can be considered as being based on how duties change 
when an actor creates a risk of violation, because that guerrilla made individuals vulnerable and 
had duties to cease its abuses and ensure that the rights of its victims are guaranteed and 
protected. 
The underlying rationale of positive non-state duties can be illustrated with a previously 
mentioned example. Concerning the idea that positive duties of non-state actors are also 
pertinent when individuals have legitimate expectations or reasons to demand protection from 
them, due to factors as their role or actions, the opinion that non-state administration of territories 
with no State control generates positive non-state duties, according to the Human Rights 
                                                     
1287 On all these issues, cf. Ibid. 
1288 Cf. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 227-228. 
1289 See footnote 806, supra. 
1290 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., pp. 176-179. 
1291 Cf. Amnesty International, Press Release, Colombia: FARC and ELN must release all hostages, 28 June 2007, 
where it is said that “Whilst civilians and others remain hostage to guerrilla forces their physical security remains the 
responsibility of the group holding them”; Voice of America, Editorial: “U.S. Condemns FARC Terrorism”, 15 July 
2007, where it is said that “U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey condemned the FARC for the 
deaths of eleven Colombian politicians” and expressed that “[t]he responsibility for their death as well as the 
responsibility for the well-being of other hostages that the FARC maintains is with the FARC, and we call on them to 
release all of the hostages they have”; OAS, “Declaration on the Assassination of the Colombian Deputies 
Kidnapped by the FARC”, OEA/Ser.G CP/DEC. 37 (1601/07), 29 June 2007, where it is declared that “kidnapping is 
a heinous crime; and urges the illegal groups to release immediately, safe and sound, all the kidnapped persons”; 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release Nº 28/08 (“The IACHR urges the armed groups […] to 
respect [the] lives [of illegaly held hostages], their security and their health, and to proceed with their unconditional 
and immediate release”); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release Nº 2/08, “IACHR Expresses 
Satisfaction Over Release of FARC Hostages”; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release No. 
35/07. 
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Committee, can be considered as confirming that the central human rights consideration is the 
exercise of rights by individuals, regardless of who administers a territory of performs other 
functions, which are elements that are ancillary to that main point. Therefore, all individuals must 
be protected from all actors who perform relevant functions or roles, as activists demand1292 and 
the implications of human dignity confirm. 
In my opinion, in cases similar to the one mentioned before, non-state administration 
does not even have to be complete or absolute for an actor to have positive duties. In this sense, 
if an actor shares control with other entities –State or not- or has functions or roles that only partly 
affect the exercise and enjoyment of human rights, protection from their possible abuses and 
negligence is still needed. This is because the rationale in those cases is the same one: the 
difference is that outside the scope of influence, capacity or power of an actor, it would have no 
positive duties. Moreover, relevant roles that non-state actors can play that can be considered to 
require positive duties of those actors are not limited to administration functions, and are also 
predicated of other situations in which legitimate expectations of non-state protection exist. 
In sum, positive non-state human rights duties are not limited to actors that manage 
territories, and extend to all actors with roles or features that generate legitimate normative or 
factual expectations or (implied or explicit) mandates of protection –including non-state power 
and control-.1293  
Therefore, it is possible to consider, for example, that given their mandate and role, when 
peacekeepers or peacemakers are deployed in a territory expectations or mandates of protecting 
the civilian population are sometimes generated and perceived implicitly or expressly by 
authorities or that population. Those perceptions can be reinforced or generated by statements 
and other acts. Therefore those actors can have implicit or express specialized duties or they 
must be created. Examples of those obligations include reducing the chance of violations –e.g. 
through de-mining operations- or protecting civilians from State or non-state armed actors. 
Debates and developments concerning the inclusion of functions to protect civilians in the 
mandates of peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in connection with the expansion of their 
roles and functions1294 reveal struggles to make international law demand and ensure protection 
                                                     
1292 Cf. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, op. cit., para. 
4; Philip Alston, op. cit., at 8. 
1293 Cf. paragraphs 4, 5 or 9 of article 42 of Decree 2591 of 1991 of Colombia; Philip Alston, op. cit., pp. 9-13. 
1294 Cf. A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, United Nations, A/59/565, 2004, paras. 210-214; “Protection of Civilians”, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml (last checked: 29/02/2012); Security Council Resolution 
1289 (2000). 
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in a way that meets human and social needs and expectations from those and the legal 
dimensions (sadly, those expectations have been let down sometimes).1295  
Whether all or some social expectations should lead to the creation of positive non-state 
obligations or those obligations exist implicitly must be examined on a case-by-case basis. When 
expectations are grounded on strong needs of protection due to dependence on non-state 
performance of functions or roles to a large extent, or if they are created or reinforced by 
unilateral non-state manifestations, it is hard to deny the pertinence of non-state positive duties. 
It is also important to mention that expectations according to which an entity must ensure 
or protect human rights can have a social, legal or implicit nature. For instance, the Independent 
expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and 
sanitation has mentioned that there are social expectations about non-state entities, that the fact 
that soft law standards call for them to operate with due diligence reveals the need for them to act 
proactively, and that those actors should not fail to behave as expected by others and in 
normative terms, that is to say, that they should not omit to do or fail to do what is expected of 
them in accordance with the criterion of due diligence, since they not only have duties (binding or 
not) to refrain from doing something1296 but also positive obligations. 
Truth be told, there are dimensions of many rights that must be fulfilled and protected for 
them to be enjoyed or exercised, as happens with many aspects of economic, social and cultural 
rights and also of some civil and political rights (for instance the right to life must be protected 
from criminals and armed groups).1297 This consideration is relevant for non-state conduct too. 
For instance, the fact that actions must be conducted to guarantee the supply of safe 
drinking water, analyzed in light of the relationship between that supply and human rights, 
suggests that domestic or international duties must bind private or other non-state suppliers. 
While this does not eliminate State vicarious responsibility and obligations to supervise, regulate 
or sanction violations,1298 the possible coexistence of responsibilities of different actors (see 
                                                     
1295 Cf. ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, United Nations, 2000, at 49. 
1296 Cf. Human Rights Council, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to 
access to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, A/HRC/15/31, 29 June 2010, para. 26, where 
it is mentioned that the “responsibility [of non-state service providers, based on due diligence]  is not a mere passive 
one, but requires active steps  to put into place the necessary policies, mechanisms to identify actual and potential 
harm to human rights, and grievance mechanisms.” 
1297 Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The right to adequate food (art. 
11), op. cit., paras. 15, 20, 27; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, 
Judgment of Merits, 29 July 1988, paras. 172-177. 
1298 Cf. Human Rights Council, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to 
access to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque, A/HRC/15/31, 29 June 2010, paras. 18-21; 
August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 78-82. 
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Chapter 7) indicates that duties of multiple actors (that must exist for their responsibility to be 
possible) can coexist as well, being it possible for those duties to ordain them to do something. 
2) Apart from the previous events, it can be considered that a non-state actor can have 
duties to protect human rights in situations of urgency when those rights will be severely or 
considerably violated unless that actor promptly protects the affected individuals. Such situations 
can be due to impossibility of protection from States or other authorities or to lack of their 
presence or of their effective control, for instance. This is relevant, for example, when territories 
are temporarily or almost permanently not controlled by States or controlled to a higher degree by 
other entities, which are events that the regulation of internal armed conflicts and the rules on 
State responsibility take into account for different purposes.1299 Moreover, when the likelihood of 
effective State protection is seriously prevented by a non-state actor (e.g. an armed group), the 
creation of positive duties of that actor is fair and can be even necessary, due to the risk it 
created (once again, the differences between events in which positive non-state obligations can 
be created and between justifications of those obligations are blurred). 
This category of positive duties echoes so-called ‘good Samaritan laws’ or criminal norms 
that sanction the omission of help, according to which individuals are required to help persons 
who would otherwise suffer severely and almost inevitably, and is consistent with the foundations 
of an human rights, that require their effective and full protection. The potential seriousness of the 
impairment of human rights that triggers positive duties, the effectiveness that human rights must 
have, the imminence of harm, and the necessity of protection, are factors that must be taken into 
account when considering the regulation of positive obligations of the sort being described. To my 
mind, at least peremptory rights must be protected by these obligations, even implicitly. 
One manifestation of this criterion may be the regulation of silent complicity, whose 
nature as positive law or lex ferenda is debated. According to it, an entity can be considered to be 
complicit with the violations of another because of its inaction and failure to publicize, denounce 
or deal with the violation in a pertinent manner in accordance with its capacities. Furthermore, in 
lex lata it is accepted that omissions that legitimize or encourage abuses can clearly constitute 
the basis of legal responsibility,1300 and thus provide an example of the existence of duties to act. 
According to these considerations, in cases in which the revelation of ongoing serious violations 
can only be made possible by their being exposed by an actor that knows about them, its inaction 
                                                     
1299 Cf. articles 1.1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), and 9 of the ILC articles on State 
responsibility, along with paragraph 4 of the commentary to that article, as found in: International Law Commission, 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, at 49. 
1300 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 347-348; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights, op. cit., A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., para. 77. 
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would facilitate or permit the impunity of the violations and fail to assist victims who need that 
help.  
Concerning jus cogens, since it implicitly binds all potential offenders and assistants to 
violations, which is consistent with its essential legal and communal character, it can be 
considered that inaction when the effectiveness of its norms is at stake engages responsibility. 
This is supported by the rationale of the regulation of some violations of jus cogens in the articles 
on the responsibility of States and of international organizations drafted by the ILC, according to 
which recognizing or contributing to those violations or not doing anything to try to stop them is 
unlawful. After all, they command their addressees to cooperate to lawfully “bring to an end” 
serious breaches of jus cogens.1301  
In my opinion, the events in which I propose the creation (or recognition) of positive 
human rights duties of non-state entities are not the only ones in which they can be created, but 
are ones in which those duties are indispensable or crucial for the protection of human rights. 
Positive obligations of that sort can be created in other circumstances taking into account 
protection needs and the conditions for the creation of non-state legal capacities.  
It must also be considered that some legal traditions attach great importance to the 
concept of responsibility –in the non-technical sense of duties rather than in the sense of a 
consequence of breaches-. This notion, present in some soft law and hard law instruments, may 
endorse the notion of (not necessarily legal) positive duties of non-state entities.1302 However, as 
John H. Knox argues any interpretation of such responsibility must be in accordance with human 
rights law and cannot be invoked to attempt to legitimate violations or undue restrictions of human 
rights.1303  
To avoid that risk, obligations can never be considered as conditions for the enjoyment 
and exercise of inherent rights, and their existence must be justified by the necessity of protecting 
human dignity,1304 being non-state correlative duties preferable to converse ones. Otherwise, 
                                                     
1301 Cf. articles 41 of the articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts drafted by the 
International Law Commission, adopted at its fifty-third session in 2001, and 42 of the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of international organizations adopted in 2011, A/66/10. 
1302 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 32-33; articles 2, 3, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 
22, 24, 25, or 27 of the Pre-Draft Declaration on Human Social Responsibilities, as found in: Commission on Human 
Rights, Human rights and human responsibilities: Final report of the Special Rapporteur, Miguel Alfonso Martínez, on 
the Study requested by the Commission in its resolution 2000/63, and submitted pursuant to Economic and Social 
Council decision 2002/277, E/CN.4/2003/105, 17 March 2003;articles 9-11 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Responsibilities drafted by the InterAction Council. 
1303 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 34-47. 
1304 Cf. Part I, supra; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 1-3, 20, 47. 
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there could be a risk that non-state duties could be used as excuses to diminish the effectiveness 
of the protection of human rights and to condition their enjoyment.1305  
It is also important to mention that international initiatives have considered that in some 
cases non-state actors must have positive duties de lege ferenda or even that they have some of 
those duties in lex lata. This can be seen in draft projects on responsibilities of non-state entities 
and even in hard law instruments, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.1306 
To recapitulate, positive duties of non-state actors can be based on legitimate social or 
legal expectations of protection, as indicated by guarantor position theories; on the urgent need of 
protecting an individual, whose dignity and rights can only be protected by an actor; on the 
creation of a risk of violation by an actor; or on the special needs of protection of some especially 
vulnerable victims, among other possible legal justifications, which have been taken into account 
by international bodies concerning State duties in order to make them more stringent.  
Additionally, it is possible to identify situations in which positive human rights obligations 
of non-state actors are justified and expected given their frequent, intense or immediate 
possibility of affecting human rights and guarantees, as happens in armed conflicts and other 
contexts, which are not necessarily contingent and sporadic but may deal with frequent relations 
or interactions between some actors and some individuals or rights, as may happen with 
corporations, women, persons with disabilities or migrants, for instance. 
Regarding armed conflicts, this theory is confirmed in the report on “A more secure world: 
our shared responsibility” written by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
where it is mentioned that: 
 “Under international law, the primary responsibility to protect civilians from suffering in war lies with 
belligerents — State or non-State. International humanitarian law provides minimum protection and 
standards applicable to the most vulnerable in situations of armed conflict, including women, children 
and refugees, and must be respected”1307 (emphasis added). 
The previous quotation illustrates how a State-centric approach is unsustainable from the 
point of view of the protection of victims, because human rights and guarantees can often be as 
threatened and violated by States as by non-state entities, for instance given their possibility of 
assuming similar roles, as happens with belligerents in some regards, among other examples. 
                                                     
1305 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 2-3, 16, 34-35, 37. 
1306 Cf. Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to 
human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 2003; John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding 
Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. (“the Norms could have become the basis for a later binding instrument or 
influenced the development of customary international law […] the most heinous human rights violations amounting 
to international crimes” engage the responsibility of corporations, if attributable to them); African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, articles 27 through 29. 
1307 Cf. A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, United Nations, A/59/565, 2004, para. 232. 
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Concerning the identification of the vulnerability of some rights or individuals in relation to 
non-state entities, it can be said that human rights treaties on the rights of women, persons with 
disabilities, migrants or children, among others, expressly recognize the possibility of victimization 
vis-à-vis non-state entities, and States are permitted and required to adopt positive measures of 
protection to prevent or respond to those violations. Logically, non-state authorities would be 
required to do the same when they replace States completely or partly. Moreover, the possibility 
of creating positive duties of non-state actors can be based on grounds that are similar to those 
that led to the regulation of positive measures of protection in those instruments, as happens with 
international organizations that become parties to human rights treaties, for instance, given the 
need that they protect human dignity from non-state abuses within the scope of their powers and 
competences for that protection to be full.  
Since they protect humanitarian legal goods, positive human rights duties of non-state 
entities are embedded in a global framework of protection of human dignity. In practice and due 
to the impact of interaction between legal agents, actions from different levels of governance and 
normative systems are required for its effective protection.1308 Moreover, those duties can be 
regulated by international law, since the sources of law permit non-state actors to have 
international legal capacities, including them; and those duties can be implemented or 
incorporated in internal law. 
Moreover, individuals can have even direct international criminal responsibility and be 
subject to international procedures, the harshest possible ones,1309 as responses to their inaction 
or omission when they breach duties to do something. That this logic is sometimes enshrined in 
domestic and international criminal law confirms that non-state entities can have (implicit and 
even explicit or quasi-explicit, i.e. necessarily accompanying other express regulations) positive 
human rights duties, which need not be criminal. Individuals (who are non-state entities)1310 that 
operate on their own or as agents of State or non-state entities1311 can be sanctioned for failing to 
protect victims in some events1312 -for instance if they have a guarantor position-. In this regard, 
                                                     
1308 Cf. Statement issued by the President of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Requests for Interim 
Measures (Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court), where it is mentioned that “For the Court to be able effectively to  
perform its proper role in this area both Governments and applicants must co-operate fully with the Court.” 
1309 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 27-31; Principles of International Law recognized 
in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, with commentaries, op. cit., at 374, 
paras. 98 and 99. 
1310 Cf. Andrew Clapham, “Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 3, 7; Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, op. cit., 
paras. 25, 34. 
1311 Cf. Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal, with commentaries, op. cit., at 374, para. 99. 
1312 In this regard, for instance, in the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the ICC it is held that a policy 
against a civilian population can be “implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at 
encouraging” attacks against it, although mere omissions do not prove that policy. Cf. Elements of Crimes (Elements 
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for example, article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is telling, because 
it expresses that failure to act may lead to international (criminal) responsibility in the following 
way: 
Article 28 
Responsibility of commanders and other superiors 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court:  
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally 
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her 
effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of 
his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should 
have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within 
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a superior 
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by 
subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: 
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the 
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;  
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the 
superior; and  
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to 
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution” (emphasis added). 
Concerning the expression quasi-explicit duties, it refers to those obligations that are not 
worded as such but their existence is widely accepted or not controversial because failure to 
behave in some way is clearly understood to entail responsibility and expose the entity to which a 
breach that can be attributed to legal sanctions. Those duties can implicitly accompany other 
regulations, as those dealing with sanctions, correlative rights, etc. 
Regarding how stringent positive duties of non-state actors can be, it can be mentioned 
that duties arising from risks generated by an actor have a greater than usual intensity and their 
standards should be stricter, as can be inferred by analogy from State obligations. In most other 
cases, positive duties of non-state actors will usually be assessed in terms of an ordinary “due 
diligence”, which relies on the “prevention of certain foreseeable harms”, as mentioned by Bruno 
Demeyere.1313 This consideration explains both what ordinary positive duties demand and why 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the Crimes of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, corresponding to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court), footnote 6, at 5; Albin Eser, op. cit., at 819. 
1313 Cf. Bruno Demeyere, op. cit., at 176. 
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non-state actors must be bound by them, because the foreseeability of possible harms and their 
relation to omissions of an actor help explain why positive duties may bind it. 
Human rights positive obligations of non-state entities have been recognized in practice. 
One example is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Justice and Equality Movement 
of Sudan and the United Nations, according to which armed and intergovernmental actors made 
human rights commitments of a positive nature, which are partly based on preexistent norms and 
obligations, and include commitments to prevent and bring to an end violations against some 
rights of the child, ensure the safety of individuals, ensure the provision of assistance, investigate 
allegations of violations, and cooperate in the protection of children, among others.1314 
Likewise, in the discussion of the Case of Boimah Flomo, et al. versus Firestone Natural 
Rubber Co., LLC, as can be seen in excerpts quoted below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, applying the ATS –that permits claims about violations of jus gentium to be filed 
even against non-state entities-, seemed to accept the idea that the defendant corporation could 
have a duty to prevent its employees from being helped by children in their labors if their 
engagement in them were contrary to international human rights law. Furthermore, the 
respondent itself adopted a policy according to which child labor would not be admitted and was 
to be discouraged and prevented by it, which seems to be an acceptance of its having positive 
obligations to prevent risks of negative impacts on human rights related to its activities.  
Therefore, both the Court and the non-state entity involved in the case seemed to accept 
that positive duties of non-state entities can exist (whether the corporation thought that they have 
a legal nature is unsettled, although it was concerned about being declared legally responsible for 
failures). In my opinion, in similar cases, as a result of the direct relation between the work 
conditions of employees and their requesting help from others, even children, in light of their 
workload (excessive, according to some), a risk of informal recruitment of child labor by 
employees can be created by the orders or acquiescence and inactivity corporations, that must 
detect and prevent labor that is contrary to international (human rights) law and cannot benefit 
from it.  
Concerning the design or identification of obligations of non-state diligence, 
considerations of beneficial, silent and posterior forms of complicity, and their relation to the 
prevention of or response to violations,1315 are pertinent as well. Other elements worth 
                                                     
1314 Cf. articles 1 and 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
and the United Nations regarding Protection of Children in Darfur of 21 July 2010. 
1315 On posterior complicity, cf. Albin Eser, op. cit., 806-807; articles 41.2 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001 and 42.2 of the Draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations as adopted by the ILC in 2011; ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Judgement, 29 
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considering are the role or position of entities and legitimate expectations of protection placed on 
them, and whether urgent or proactive action of non-state entities is required for human rights to 
be effectively protected.  
To illustrate the previous ideas, it is convenient to cite the following excerpts of the 
aforementioned decision in the Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC case: 
“We needn’t decide how far corporate vicarious liability for violations of customary international law 
extends […] Having satisfied ourselves that corporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort Statute, 
we turn to the question whether the treatment of child labor at the Firestone plantation alleged by the 
plaintiffs during a period of undetermined length preceding the filing of this lawsuit violated customary 
international law […] Although Firestone doesn’t employ children, at least directly, it sets high daily 
production quotas for its employees, who are poor Liberian agricultural workers. It is difficult for an 
employee to make his daily quota without help, and there is evidence that if he fails to make it he 
loses his job […] [employees] can dragoon their wives or children into helping them, at no monetary 
cost […] We can’t tell from the record whether Firestone has adopted effective measures for keeping 
children from working on the plantation. The plantation covers 186 square miles, which is roughly the 
size of Chicago, and thousands of people live there approximately 6500 employees of Firestone plus 
the members of their families. We don’t know how many supervisors Firestone has deployed on the 
plantation, and hence whether there are enough of them to prevent employees from using their 
children to help them. We don’t know the supervisors’ routines, or how motivated they are to put a 
stop to any child labor they observe. Firestone claims that it now has a policy of firing employees who 
use their children as helpers, but it didn’t have such a policy prior to 2005. The suit was filed that year 
[…] there is evidence that some of the supervisors had observed child labor during the period 
(whatever exactly it is) of alleged liability and done nothing to stop it. There is also evidence that the 
company’s decisionmakers were aware of, and may even have condoned, some child labor on the 
plantation”1316 (emphasis added). 
Other examples of possible positive obligations incumbent on non-state entities include 
obligations of private entities that carry out State functions to disclose or rectify information that is 
relevant for the public and in human rights terms, or the obligation of private entities that control 
information about an individual or that is especially important to him to rectify or disclose to him 
that information, as has been commented in connection with the right of access to information by 
the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 34 on “Freedoms of opinion and 
expression”. In it, the Committee explicitly recognized that private non-state entities can “impair 
the enjoyment” of human rights as the freedoms of opinion and expression, which have 
dimensions that are “amenable to” protection from non-state abuses, being such protection 
required.1317 As argued in Chapters 4 and 8, that protection can assume different forms on the 
condition that the chosen form is effective. One of those forms is commanding non-state 
authorities or actors with special roles to protect or do things to satisfy legitimate demands based 
on those rights. 
                                                                                                                                                            
July 2004, para. 48, where it was argued that “the actus reus of aiding and abetting a crime may occur before, 
during, or after the principal crime has been perpetrated”. 
1316 Cf. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, Decision of 11 July 2011, pp. 15, 20-21. 
1317 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, op. cit., para. 7. 
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It is also important to mention that positive duties of non-state entities (binding or soft law 
duties) can oblige them to protect, promote or fulfill, which are possible commands of positive 
human rights obligations, as mentioned in doctrine and international jurisprudence.1318 
To conclude, as mentioned by Elena Pariotti, some express objections to positive human 
rights obligations of non-state entities, even non-binding ones, that allude to: i) the fact that, 
unlike duties of respect, they may not be derived from the horizontal effects of human rights law 
(although Andrew Clapham explains why they can be perfectly based on them);1319 or to ii) their 
possible contribution to the retreat of the State in regard to its responsibilities,1320 which as has 
been seen is a common objection to non-state human rights obligations, not just positive ones. 
It is possible to refute those objections by saying that specialized non-state human rights 
obligations may be created by the sources of international law and regulate positive duties in an 
express or implied manner when it is so required to effectively protect human dignity, and that 
those obligations must meet important conditions that prevent abuses, as discussed in general 
terms in Chapters 4 and 5.  
In regard to the second criticism, it must be recalled that State obligations, including 
those to protect individuals from non-state abuses, are not eliminated when non-state obligations 
exist.  
Conversely, ignoring the need to properly regulate non-state conduct in a way that 
responds to how it can prevent the enjoyment of human rights would be contrary to how human 
rights work in practice and what needs individuals have in their everyday relations. It would also 
be a failure to regulate human rights law and jus gentium in ways that take into account, on the 
one hand, the needs of individuals, and on the other hand the impact and dynamics of several 
actors and entities, their roles and functions, and their corresponding capacity to affect human 
rights with their actions or inaction. Those considerations justify, and sometimes even demand, 
the creation (or recognition of some implicit) international human rights obligations of non-state 
actors, some of which must oblige them to do somethings for rights to be effectively protected 
and enjoyed, as recognized in the context of the protection of persons with disabilities and in the 
European region.1321 
 
                                                     
1318 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 96, 104-105; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment 12, The right to adequate food (art. 11), op. cit., paras. 10, 20, 29; Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, para. 42. 
1319 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 105; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 
546-547. 
1320 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 105. 
1321 Cf. articles 4, 43 and 44 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and 1 and 59 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
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CHAPTER 7. NON-STATE HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITY AND FULL REPARATIONS 
OF VICTIMS 
 
As argued above, the creation and design of legal capacities of non-state entities, 
including obligations, that seek to encourage and permit the promotion of human rights and 
discourage and outlaw their abuses, are often necessary to fully and effectively protect human 
dignity. Taking into account, as explained by Hans Kelsen, that law belongs to the realm of 
‘ought’,1322 breaches of those obligations can happen in practice, and in those events victims 
must be protected. 
Breaches of non-state human rights automatically have substantive consequences and 
must be addressed in procedures of protection of victims.  
As to the substantive implications, the secondary rules of responsibility1323 regulate the 
responsibility that arises with breaches of obligations attributable to an entity, including aspects 
related to its emergence and duties of the responsible entities, which include some positive 
duties. The fact that responsibility is an automatic consequence of breaches of duties means that 
duties and implications of responsible entities are potential legal capacities of all addressees of 
international obligations  
From the point of view of the practical human and social needs of protection by law, it can 
be said that just as every factual capacity to affect legal goods must be regulated, victims must be 
protected in both substantive and procedural terms, recognizing their rights to reparations, 
preventive measures, and access to remedies, which must have the capacity to protect them 
from non-state offenders. Moreover, all components of reparations (compensation, satisfaction, 
etc.) must be satisfied, which often requires that non-state offenders repair victims, which in turn 
means that those actors must have duties to repair and subjection to procedures of protection.  
The important link between non-state responsibility and the effectiveness of rights of 
victims was taken into account in the Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the 
Human Rights Council of 2008, which said: 
“International law focuses upon the legal responsibility of the State for violations of human rights 
committed on its territory or within its jurisdiction, whether by State agents, other concerned 
authorities or by non-State actors ranging from national liberation movements to private corporations 
or other actors. In appropriate circumstances, however, non-State actors can also be held to account 
for human rights violations and may be relevant interlocutors in the quest to restore respect for 
human rights and to establish accountability for violations. It might thus be appropriate for mandate-
holders to engage in a dialogue with such actors” (emphasis added). 
                                                     
1322 Cf. Hans Kelsen, op. cit., 76-81. 
1323 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 31, para. 3 of the General commentary. 
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That excerpt can be somewhat misleading, insofar as norms protecting human rights, as 
some from international humanitarian law, do not have to focus on States, and non-state 
violations are required to be prevented and sanctioned. It is true that there is a prevalent but not 
absolute procedural focus on State responsibility because of the fact that many human rights 
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies tend to have competence only to examine State conduct. 
However, they are still obliged to examine non-state violations in order to assess State 
compliance with positive duties, and sometimes can examine non-state conduct directly, which 
means that the procedural focus on States is neither absolute nor unchangeable. This is logical 
and necessary, because the focus of human rights must be the protection of human beings.  
Additionally, the citation confirms that it is possible for non-state entities to be held 
accountable for human rights abuses. That accountability can take many forms: legal 
responsibility, arising from breaches of duties attributable to the entities bound by them; liability; 
and ethical, social or other non-legal forms of responsibility. 
In substantive terms, legal responsibility generates legal effects, some of which directly 
protect victims, as the duty to repair; others impose duties on third parties; and others sanction 
violators.1324 A human-centered approach to law must consider that this responsibility is but one 
“side of a die with multiple sides”. In this sense, responsibility deals with aspects related to: 1) the 
rights of victims of all violations, including the rights to full reparations and to access to remedies 
(at least in the legal system of States that must exercise jurisdiction);1325 to 2) the duties and 
rights of third parties, which include the prohibitions of the recognition of or assistance to 
breaches and the entitlements of third parties to react to violations;1326 and related to 3) the legal 
burdens, duties and sanctions of responsible entities, such as those envisaged in international 
criminal law. 
There is an interconnection between the rights of victims and third parties interested in 
the protection of human dignity to claim protection and the duties of responsible entities, as can 
be identified in article 1 of the Draft articles on Diplomatic Protection, that mentions that it is 
                                                     
1324 Cf. Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, adopted in 2008, op. cit., para. 
81. 
1325 Cf. Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, op. cit., at 3; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, paras. 3.c, 18; Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, paras. 4-13; 
articles 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  13 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, or 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
1326 See articles 41, 48 or 54 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts drafted by 
the ILC, or 42, 49 and 57 of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations adopted by the ILC 
on second reading. 
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possible to invoke the responsibility of an entity to which it is possible to attribute a wrongful act 
for an injury; and in the following passage of the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, which said that in addition to being entitled to 
“exercise […] functional protection of its agents”: 
“When [an international organization –a non-state entity-] claims redress for a breach of […] 
obligations [owed to it], the Organization is invoking its own right, the right that the obligations due to 
it should be respected. On this ground, it asks for reparation of the injury suffered, for "it is a principle 
of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an 
adequate form […] the Organization has the capacity to claim adequate reparation, and that in 
assessing this reparation it is authorized to include the darnage suffered by the victim or by persons 
entitled through him."1327 
From the procedural point of view, responsibility-related mechanisms can serve to 
prevent violations or to respond to them and protect individuals.  
Therefore, the protection of individuals (potential victims) from non-state violations is not 
limited to ex post facto measures, because it can have a preventive nature, and instead of 
enforcement measures can consist in persuasive and dissuasive strategies.  
Taking into account that some may disagree with the theories of implicit and lex lata 
general prohibitions of non-state violations of human rights, it can be said that according to that 
opinion there may be events in which an entity violates internationally recognized human rights 
but does not breach international obligations of its own. Nevertheless, mechanisms that are 
based neither on State responsibility nor on non-state obligations can be used (some of them are 
discussed in Chapter 8). Additionally, victims may be protected by liability and objective 
responsibility regimes and rules, and duties are imposed on the agents that participate in the 
relevant act. 
 
7.1. Principles on the responsibility of non-state actors concerning human rights abuses 
In any case, since non-state actors can have international human rights obligations or 
legal burdens, such as being subject to liability regimes, it is convenient to examine relevant 
principles and consequences of the responsibility of non-state actors in the corpus juris of the 
protection of human dignity. 
a) In the first place, despite being elementary, it is necessary to stress that responsibility 
is an automatic consequence of breaches of international legal obligations unless there are 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness. In consequence, every actor bound by those obligations 
                                                     
1327 Cf. International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion of 11 April 1949, at 14 (at 184 according to another sequence of pages shown in the decision). 
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has the potential inherent legal capacity of being legally responsible, not being it necessary for 
this to be explicitly mentioned. 
b) Additionally, it is important to consider that all entities bound by human rights duties 
have their responsibility engaged when they do not comply with them and some general 
principles and rules of responsibility are applicable to all such entities, including States and non-
state entities, but some rules may not be applicable to some entities or will have variations that 
take into account unique features or aspects of specialized protected legal goods or actors.  
Likewise, some norms of the humanitarian corpus juris may belong to branches or sub-
systems that have responsibility rules that are lex specialis, the application of which prevails over 
that of general norms or rules, which remain in the legal system.1328 One example would be the 
requirement of intentional elements concerning international criminal responsibility, as seen in 
article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, that is absent in general human 
rights law stricto sensu. 
It is important to make these clarifications, because some authors consider that it is 
necessary to avoid an improper and counterproductive homogeneous treatment of all offenders 
or protected rights that ignores specificities, differences and unique features of some non-state 
entities or norms, which would make uniform rules inadequate. Moreover, Roland Portmann 
mentions that some primary and secondary norms address certain actors insofar as no “logical 
reasons preclude” their application to them.1329 This opinion is sound because the features of 
some entities may make the application of some general rules impossible or too complicated in 
practice, and specialized rules that take into account those features may protect affected legal 
goods. Because of this, the regulation of the responsibility of some entities may differ from that of 
others in some (not necessarily all) respects, even when they belong to the same sub-category 
(e.g. not all international organizations are alike, and some have quite distinctive characteristics). 
Nevertheless, it is often difficult to strike a balance between the need to take into account 
special features of actors and rights and the importance of having core shared provisions that 
guarantee in absolute terms minimum protection and a non-discriminatory protection of all 
victims, regardless of who the violators are. This explains why there have been discussions 
about, for example, the responsibility of international organizations of integration, due to doubts 
concerning the convenience or possibility of applying general rules or the necessity of regulating 
their responsibility with some special rules. 
                                                     
1328 Cf. International Law Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law, op. cit., paras. 5-10. 
1329 Cf. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 273-277. 
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In my opinion, the need to legally and effectively protect human dignity from all threats, 
and the capacity that different entities have to breach norms that protect it (granted, some of them 
have more power and possibilities of engaging in violations), demand that some common core 
principles and rules of responsibility are be applied in all cases, because the same legal goods 
can be affected and their existence and relevance do not depend on the specificities of an actor 
or breach. Still, differences between actors, when poignant, must be taken into account to 
regulate non-state obligations and responsibility and protect human dignity effectively provided 
that individuals are effectively protected.  
In other words, since human dignity must be equally protected from all violations, some 
common criteria of international responsibility can be applicable to all violations of rights founded 
on it regardless of the type of norms or entities involved. Regarding this idea, the International 
Law Commission has mentioned that the international regime of responsibility does not 
distinguish between “contractual and tortious” or “criminal” responsibilities,1330 which indicates 
their unicity.  
This idea is echoed by Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, who argue that responsibility 
criteria found in international criminal law can be pertinent in relation to non-state assistance to 
non-criminal violations –this idea is correct because all the rules and norms that are pertinent for 
their study, criminal and else, protect human rights and guarantees-. Similarly, the International 
Court of Justice has considered that rules and criteria on the responsibility of States that assist or 
are accomplices of other States that commit wrongful acts can equally be applied to cases in 
which States cooperate with breaches and violations attributable to non-state actors.1331  
It is necessary to take into account that sometimes it is important to examine the regime 
of the norm in which an obligation is found in order to determine conditions and consequences of 
its breaches. Likewise, within some corpus juris there may be specialized regulations on 
responsibility that are lex specialis, which must be applied instead of general secondary 
norms.1332 This happens in relation to assistance and complicity, because general and criminal 
regimes differ in some regards, and not all criminal regimes are identical in all aspects either. 
Notwithstanding, some general and common secondary norms are applicable in all cases, 
because particular features of an actor or regime do not affect their application and they focus on 
common protection needs. 
                                                     
1330 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 55, para. 5 of the commentary to article 12. 
1331 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 341-345. 
1332 Cf. articles 55 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (A/56/49(Vol. 
I)/Corr.4) and 64 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations as adopted in 2011 
(A/66/10). 
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In sum, while it is true that some secondary norms are not applicable to all actors, there 
can and must be common norms and principles of responsibility, including those on the rights of 
victims and some on the generation and consequences of legal responsibility for breaches of 
human rights and dignity. 
All norms on non-state responsibility permit the members of the world community to 
identify violations and their implications and accordingly protect victims, call for the cessation of 
ongoing violations, demand that reparations and guarantees of non-repetition be given, and be 
aware of their duty to not recognize effects of breaches, among other legal consequences.1333  
After all, the nature and identity of those negatively affected by violations of human rights 
and guarantees share their human nature and dignity, which are universal. 
The preceding discussion on the complementarity of common norms and specialized 
secondary rules is partly related to the question of whether there can be common norms 
applicable to all the members of what some perceive as an excessively broad category: that of 
non-state actors, that includes entities as different from each other as international organizations, 
NGOs, corporations, individuals, criminal or terrorist organizations, pirates, and many others.  
To reply to possible objections, it can be said in the first place that it is certainly possible 
for different entities to be addressed by common rules and principles and at the same time be 
eventually subject to specialized norms that depart from the general approach in some aspects.  
For instance, entities as different from each other as States and international 
organizations are subject to some nigh-identical regulations in some regards, for instance in the 
law of treaties or regarding legal responsibility, when this is not illogical, improper or impossible 
and is consistent with the need of protecting identical legal goods of the same legal system. In 
this sense, the norms drafted by States and the ILC that regulate the aforementioned two fields 
have some norms that are almost identical, but the regulation of the responsibility of each of 
those entities also differs in some respects, in order to take into account the particular features of 
some of them, such as international organizations. In sum, it is possible to offer an effective, 
logical and convenient responsibility system adapted to the protection of shared legal interests. 
Secondly, focus must be made on individuals and their rights rather than on potential 
offenders: if the former are correctly considered the central persons of responsibility and other 
regimes, this approach helps to make norms be consistent with the implications of human dignity.  
                                                     
1333 On these effects and principles of legal responsibility, cf. articles 29-31, 34 and 41 of the ILC articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and 29-31, 34 and 42 of the ILC articles on the 
Responsibility of international organizations, in the version adopted in 2011; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, paras. 3-4, 12-15, 17-18. 
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In this regard, for instance, Philip Alston has commented that the very definition of “non-
state actors” is somewhat problematic due to its including quite different entities in a category that 
identifies entities based on the exclusion of others: States. Despite this, in his text Philip Alston 
himself employs that category in a general analysis about non-state actors and human rights, 
examining some common ideas applicable to all of them concerning the links between them and 
human rights, and acknowledging that specialized studies (found in the same book) can focus on 
the particular problems of some actors.1334  
Similarly, it must be recalled that in Chapter 5 it was mentioned that Andrew Clapham 
has demonstrated that non-state actors are all entities different from States, but that some norms 
may use narrower categories of non-state actors for the purposes of those norms.  
This approach, that recognizes common standards relevant for non-state entities and the 
possibility of taking into account the specificities of some of them, is compatible with the idea that 
protection from all non-state violations is required in legal, social and human terms, and that 
special regulations may be required sometimes in order to better protect individuals when general 
rules are insufficient, inapplicable or inappropriate due to the features of some actors or rights.  
For those reasons, non-legal theories that define non-state actors as those with certain 
features in addition to their being different from States (in fact, some of them classify that some 
organs of States that are part of them in legal terms and so able to engage their responsibility as 
non-state)1335 cannot be translated into general legal conceptions. Moreover, it is necessary to 
ensure that individuals are protected from all entities. 
Concerning common principles and rules applicable to all entities that violate human 
rights, it is possible to identify the common duty to repair and the correlative rights of victims to 
reparations and remedies, that can be effective only if all violators participate in reparations. This 
is permitted (and even encouraged) by jus gentium and must be recognized in internal legal 
systems, that can even determine that States that provide reparations can in turn demand 
compensation from non-state violators, among other legal possibilities.1336 
Having said this, norms on non-state responsibility that are expressly applicable only to 
some actors may set an example that must be followed in other norms, that can replicate their 
content and apply it to other actors when no impediments exist and this is not inappropriate, in 
                                                     
1334 Cf. Philip Alston, “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?”, op. cit., pp. 3-19, 25-35. 
1335 Contrast article 4 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Andrea 
Bianchi, op. cit., pp.194-197 (where the distinction between State and non-state entities is criticized as failing to 
reflect realities of the participation of public entities); Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 45-53; Daphné Josselin and William 
Wallace, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
1336 Cf. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, paras. 15-16. 
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order to make the protection of all victims effective and prevent discrimination against some of 
them. 
c) An important feature of the responsibility of non-state entities generally, that is also 
present in the secondary rules on the protection of human rights, is related to the non-
exclusiveness and compatibility of responsibilities. According to them, when many entities 
participate in a violation, all of them can be responsible, because the fact that one category of 
those entities has duties and responsibilities does not exclude the possibility of others having 
them as well. In addition to this, different forms of participation in a given violation may give rise to 
responsibility, including those of direct perpetration, complicity, attempt, or participation in a joint 
unlawful operation, among others. 
Therefore, all entities involved in a violation, that contribute to its commission, impunity or 
success, must be responsible and, as a result, have duties to cease their wrongful acts, repair 
victim(s) and offer guarantees of not participating in violations again, regardless of their identity or 
the presence of other entities involved in a violation or some procedures or not. If the theories of 
implied and general prohibitions indicated in Chapter 6 are accepted, those consequences of 
violations are not only lex ferenda ideas but also lex lata ones.  
The importance that all participants repair victims and have duties to behave in certain 
manners has to do with the fact that those implications can help to protect the human rights of 
victims. On the other hand, forms of participation in violations, as complicity, are wrongful acts in 
themselves that differ from the perpetration of violations, and given their unlawfulness generate 
responsibility. Concerning the independence of wrongful acts emerging from different forms of 
participation, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) declared that: 
“[A]n individual cannot thus be both the principal perpetrator of a particular act and the accomplice 
thereto. An act with which an accused is being charged cannot, therefore, be characterized both as 
an act of genocide and an act of complicity in genocide as pertains to this accused. Consequently, 
since the two are mutually exclusive, the same individual cannot be convicted of both crimes for the 
same act”1337 (emphasis added). 
The fact that different entities can have their responsibility engaged due to the 
participation in the same violation(s) does not necessarily mean that their duties and other legal 
consequences of legal responsibility will be identical. This has been made clear by the 
International Law Commission in relation to the amount of compensation owed by responsible 
entities, as seen in articles 39 of its articles on the responsibility of States and international 
organizations (2011 version, A/66/10), and in its consideration that: 
                                                     
1337 Cf. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Chamber I, The Prosecutor versus Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. 
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998, para. 532. 
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“[T]he assisting State is responsible for its own act in deliberately assisting another State to breach 
an international obligation by which they are both bound. It is not responsible, as such, for the act of 
the assisted State. In some cases this may be a distinction without a difference: where the assistance 
is a necessary element in the wrongful act in absence of which it could not have occurred, the injury 
suffered can be concurrently attributed to the assisting and the acting State. In other cases, however, 
the difference may be very material: the assistance may have been only an incidental factor in the 
commission of the primary act, and may have contributed only to a minor degree, if at all, to the injury 
suffered. By assisting another State to commit an internationally wrongful act, a State should not 
necessarily be held to indemnify the victim for all the consequences of the act, but only for those 
which, in accordance with the principles stated in Part Two of the articles, flow from its own 
conduct”1338 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the idea that every wrongful act generates responsibility but that some of the 
concrete implications of that responsibility may differ in relation to differences in participation, as 
long as that the basic duty to repair persists, is confirmed by the regulation of responsibility in 
international criminal law. In this regard, it has been considered that different degrees of the 
seriousness of criminal responsibilities1339 should be reflected in the graduation of the 
punishment. For instance, according to Albin Eser, this gradation can be made in the decisions of 
the International Criminal Court, because article 78.1 of its Statute stipulates that in its decisions 
the Court must take into account factors as the gravity of the crime and the “individual 
circumstances of the convicted person”.1340 
Regarding the coexistent and not exclusive responsibilities of different participants in 
violations, in doctrine and case law it has been considered that State and non-state, purely State 
or purely non-state responsibilities can simultaneously exist. This has been confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro) and in the draft articles of the International Law Commission on the responsibility of 
international organizations or the articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts drafted by the ILC. They recognize that the responsibility of one entity can coexist 
with that of others in connection with a factual violation if each of those entities incurs in a breach 
of an international obligation (including duties to not contribute to a violation).1341 
That entities with different natures or classified in the same category can be legally 
responsible simultaneously and in relation to the same violations –not being it necessary for their 
responsibilities to be identical or arise from the same modes of participation- is foreseen in the 
current version of the draft articles on the responsibility of States and of international 
                                                     
1338 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 67, para. 10 of the commentary to article 16. 
1339 Cf. Albin Eser, op. cit., pp. 782, 787, 799-800, 808, 920. 
1340 Ibid., pp. 787, 920; article 78.1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
1341 See footnotes 91 and 569, supra. 
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organizations.1342 It is possible to induce a general principle from this consideration, which is not 
exclusively dependent on the nature or particular features of those entities, as evinced by the 
applicability of norms of the latter articles (in their version adopted in 2011, for instance) to cases 
concerning State responsibility.1343 This conclusion can also be reached by analyzing the 
possibilities that entities of the same type have international criminal responsibility in connection 
with one same crime even when their modes of participation are different, and that, generally, an 
entity can be responsible for a conduct of its own related to a wrongful act that differs from that of 
other participants (e.g. assistants and perpetrators).1344 
Lastly, that the responsibility of participants in violations can coexist with that of other 
participants is also acknowledged in provisions that declare that there may be general or lex 
specialis regulations of the responsibility of some participants; and also in those that determine 
that entities can be responsible for interacting with the conduct of other entities through 
assistance, control, coercion, manipulation and circumvention, omission, direction, or else. This is 
envisaged in articles 16 through 18, 57 and 58 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, and 14 through 18, 58 through 62, 65 and 65 of the ILC draft 
articles on the responsibility of international organizations (adopted by the Drafting Committee on 
second reading), for example. 
d) It is also important to distinguish between legal and non-legal responsibilities, being 
the latter frequently invoked in the context of the promotion of human rights. 
The term responsibility comes from the Latin word respondere, and alludes to answering 
to something or someone and to bearing the consequences of one’s acts, among other 
definitions.1345 That notion is shared by legal and non-legal conceptions of responsibility. 
However, the main difference between them lies in the fact that instead of being based on legal 
causes and consequences of breaches of legal norms, non-legal forms of responsibility are 
based on the logic of different normative systems, foundations, or causes, and sometimes do not 
refer to the consequences of failing to abide by certain standards but to the duties of an entity.  
                                                     
1342 Cf. articles 8 through 11, 16, 17, 41.2 and 47 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts of 2001, and 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 42.2, 48, 61 and 62 of the draft articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations as adopted in 2011 (A/66/10). 
1343 Cf. draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations as adopted in 2011, articles 42.2, 48, 58-62. 
1344 Cf. e.g. articles 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2.3 and 6 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 4.3 and 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 8-11, 16-17, 41 and 57-58 of the ILC articles on State responsibility, or 9, 14-15, 16-18, 42, 58-
59, 61-62 and 66 of the ILC articles on the responsibility of international organizations adopted in 2011. 
1345 Other definitions include that of being the cause of something, or of having a duty or behaving virtuously. See 
Raoul Wirtz, “Moral responsibility in organizations”, in: Ronald Jeurissen (ed.), Ethics & Business, Royal Van 
Gorcum, 2007, pp. 25-26; Bin Cheng, op. cit., at 163. 
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According to this, there are notions of ethical and moral responsibility, the so-called social 
responsibility, and legal responsibility, among other possibilities.1346 Corporate social 
responsibility alludes to the non-binding responsibility of corporate entities regarding “social 
development and the common welfare”, which may not be as protective of legal goods as legal 
responsibility and, on the other hand, can even go beyond what legal systems require from 
corporations. This kind of responsibility can therefore help to make up a in a limited manner 
(given the shortcomings concerning entitlements of victims and remedies) for deficiencies in legal 
regulation, as explained by Elena Pariotti.1347 
Generally, these different forms of responsibility refer to the idea of answering to 
someone and the necessary respect of standards and expectations, which can be legal, ethical or 
social, reason why conduct that betrays those expectations implies accountability. The fact that a 
lowest common denominator of core protection of human dignity everywhere and from all actors 
is a foundation of human rights and guarantees1348 requires the creation of legal obligations 
because, as argued before, they ensure the effective protection of individuals and access to 
official protection, given the shortcomings and unreliability of merely voluntary strategies.1349 
Another distinction is that while in jus gentium responsibility generates the emergence of 
legal duties, burdens and capacities of entities that breach legal obligations owed to the 
international society or other actor(s), non-legal forms of responsibility logically refer to ethical, 
moral or social duties. This is reflected in the draft Declaration of Human Responsibilities 
proposed by the InterAction Council -which in my opinion has some ethical staples, as also 
happens with the Pre-Draft Declaration on Human Social Responsibilities-, that says: 
“Every person has a responsibility to respect life. No one has the right to injure, to torture or to kill 
another human person. This does not exclude the right of justified self-defense of individuals or 
communities […] Every person has a responsibility to behave with integrity, honesty and fairness. No 
person or group should rob or arbitrarily deprive any other person or group of their property […] No 
politicians, public servants, business leaders, scientists, writers or artists are exempt from general 
ethical standards, nor are physicians, lawyers and other professionals who have special duties to 
                                                     
1346 Cf. Bin Cheng, op. cit., pp. 163-170; Raoul Wirtz, op. cit., pp. 24-26; Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 432 (on the 
complementarity of social and legal responsibilities); John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding 
Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. (on societal expectations as different from binding norms); Antonio Remiro 
Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 784-786; Christian Tomuschat, op. cit., at 107. 
1347 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 100. 
1348 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 6, 15, 25, 30-31; Chapter 6, supra (on the implicit 
humanitarian obligations and peremptory norms). 
1349 Cf. Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., at 431-432; John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding 
Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit., (“Although thousands of businesses around the world have agreed to 
participate in the Global Compact, its effectiveness is limited by its voluntary nature and the generality of its 
principles). 
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clients. Professional and other codes of ethics should reflect the priority of general standards such as 
those of truthfulness and fairness”1350 (emphasis added). 
On the other hand, non-legal or non-strictly legal forms of responsibility (including soft law 
standards) are not necessarily triggered by breaches of duties, although they can also refer to 
breaches of non-legal duties. Still, different responsibilities may be related with others (e.g. social 
expectations can be supported by ethical considerations) and their logic can be included in the 
content of binding duties by its direct reception in international law, or indirectly by virtue of the 
protection of good faith, for instance. Many of these aspects are discussed in the following 
considerations put forward by Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi addressing the notion of ‘silent 
complicity’: 
“The notion of silent complicity reflects the expectation on companies that they raise systematic or 
continuous human rights abuses with the appropriate authorities […]  
Whether or not such silent complicity would give rise to a finding of a breach of legal obligation 
against a company in a court of law, it has become increasingly clear that the moral dimension of 
corporate action or inaction has taken on significant importance. For example, according to the 
Ethical Investment Research Information Service, ethical investors ‘are becoming less concerned 
about where a company operates, and more concerned about the positive steps that are being taken 
to prevent complicity in violations and to further human rights actively.’ Similarly, shareholder 
resolutions may put pressure on Chief Executives to raise with the authorities issues regarding 
human rights defenders or labour activists who have been imprisoned, even in the absence of any 
legal obligation on the company to do so […] a narrow reading of complicity does not meet today’s 
expectations, particularly in situations where there is little trust in government and security forces. 
The importance of avoiding accusations of silent complicity is considered by some to be central to 
sensible risk management in this area. ‘TNCs operating in countries with repressive and corrupt 
governments are at particular risk of criticism from a wide range of stakeholders for complicity, tacit or 
active, in human rights abuses perpetrated by the state.’ […]  
The manual Human rights - is it any of your business? contains a key element for any corporate 
human rights strategy […] companies need to delineate clearly the boundaries of their 
responsibilities, their willingness to become involved in advocacy and exert influence. This clarifies 
the extent of assumed responsibilities and makes it possible to monitor progress against objectives 
and targets”1351 (emphasis added). 
Many social responsibility arguments highlight that human dignity can be threatened by 
non-state entities, which should therefore behave responsibly. If this is so, and individuals must 
be protected effectively and without discrimination, that demand should be translated into legal 
terms to a certain extent and adapted to the features of jus gentium, lest gaps exist and law does 
not answer to social and human needs.  
It must be said that social responsibility is not limited to humanitarian concerns, and is 
often considered to also be related to the environment, labor standards and practices, fair 
operations, rights and protections of customers, or relations with communities and stakeholders, 
                                                     
1350 Cf. Declaration on Human Responsibilities drafted by the InterAction Council  (available at: 
http://www.interactioncouncil.org/universal-declaration-human-responsibilities), articles 5, 8, 13; John H. Knox, 
“Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
1351 Cf. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, op. cit., pp. 347-348. 
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among other aspects. The cited aspects are mentioned in the ISO 26000 guidance standard on 
social responsibility (along with human rights), for instance.1352 Nevertheless, those aspects can 
be quite connected with the (legal and non-legal) protection of human dignity, because violations 
of them may amount to or generate violations of human dignity, even as far as soft law and non-
legal standards are concerned, as happens with acts contrary to labor, environmental or 
customer rights standards, for instance. 
Being social responsibility important, it is important to not ignore the relevance of ethical 
and moral dimensions of responsibility. Among other things, they can justify and guide the 
shaping of legal duties and responsibility, always in the understanding that law is not meant to 
regulate perfect persons but can have essential mandates also ordained by ethics, can indicate 
some desired conduct, and should not endorse the harm of individuals.1353 
Additionally, there have been and can be attempts to introduce social, ethical and other 
considerations of responsibility in soft law, codes of conduct, guidelines (as the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises), declarations or lists of duties and responsibilities of non-state 
entities as individuals, and also in treaties and hard law.  
In a sense, it is possible to say that soft law instruments and norms, that are not directly 
binding, can reflect legal aspirations that some people have, may contribute to the emergence of 
opinio juris, and can include standards that reflect considerations of social or ethical 
responsibility. However, soft law can also be met with strong opposition or be used to circumvent 
lawmaking processes1354 (for noble or suspicious reasons). 
Concerning this, it is interesting to point out that there have been controversies about the 
properness of mentioning certain ideas of non-legal responsibility in international (non-binding) 
provisions or in non-binding opinions of international bodies.  
                                                     
1352 Cf. the 7 core subjects of social responsibility according to ISO 26000, as shown in: ISO, Discovering ISO 26000, 
2010, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/discovering_iso_26000.pdf (last checked: 05/03/2012), pp. 4, 6-7; ISO, ISO 
26000 project overview, 2010, at 4, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_26000_project_overview.pdf (last 
checked: 05/02/2012); Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, op. cit., 
A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 52, 55, 67, 71. 
1353 Justice is not equal to human rights law and does not make persons perfect, but must protect persons from 
abuses and atrocities and helps to improve their live, reason why a moral dimension exists and is relevant in the 
content of its promotion. Concerning this, e.g. freedom of expression may lead to exchanges and disclosure of 
information that permits to improve political and non-political life. Yet, it may be used in an offensive albeit not 
necessarily illegal way deemed as immoral, reason. This explains why it is important to stress the non-absolute 
identification and the partial separation of law and ethics, in order to prevent denials of rights and to not endorse 
unethical manifestations –although some unethical actions may lead to restrictions of rights in order to protect others, 
due to the existence of correlative duties-. Thus, non-legal responsibilities can be invoked in the absence of their 
legal recognition, and restrictions must comply with all legal requirements in order to prevent abuses in a pluralistic 
society whose institutions –public and private- and members (majorities and minorities) must always respect human 
dignity. 
1354 See footnote 668, supra. 
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In this regard, John Knox disagreed with the ideas of a Cuban delegate named Miguel 
Alfonso Martínez concerning notions found in declarations of human responsibilities (such as the 
draft Declaration on Human Social Responsibilities) that can also be applied to collective non-
state entities. Concerning that debate, it can be firstly said that Knox considers that those 
declarations can be used to introduce “converse duties” in the human rights edifice, and objects 
to the possibility that they can be used to condition the exercise of human rights and make them 
subservient to social or group interests, which is a risk that to him does not exist with duties to 
respect human rights (correlative obligations). Héctor Faúndez Ledesma, who does not deny the 
ethical relevance of the relationship between obligations and rights, shares this objection.1355  
In the second place, some countries, adherents to some traditions or beliefs and authors 
argue that human beings must behave responsibly and stress that their acts can have an impact 
on human rights, reason why they fear that an exclusive focus on liberties and rights may ignore 
mentions of important responsibilities and conduce to undesirable behaviors and even to 
violations, which would go against the idea that rights and duties are interrelated.1356  
The tension between both standpoints can be solved by acknowledging that the 
regulation of both rights and legal burdens (as duties) can protect human dignity and must be 
based on its protection. For this reason, both dimensions are necessary “sides of the same coin”. 
Therefore, both sides put forward interesting considerations. The key to unraveling the 
mystery is to not permit the denial of the “non-conditional” character of human dignity and rights, 
and to prevent that actors as States choke individuals in a totalitarian fashion and disregard their 
dignity. At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that individuals and other non-state entities can 
violate human rights and guarantees, and that because of this it is important to regulate non-state 
duties, responsibility and other legal capacities.  
Truth be told, this analysis is compatible with the theory put forth by Knox, who fears 
manipulations of the notion of responsibilities contrary to human rights. The following elements 
can help to ensure that the human rights edifice is not undermined by non-state responsibilities 
and protects individuals from all violations: ensure that legal responsibilities and obligations 
continue to bind authorities and that they can have vicarious responsibility; guarantee the 
unconditional character of human rights and the protection of human dignity, that must guide the 
                                                     
1355 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 1-2, 32-47; Héctor Faúndez Ledesma, El sistema 
interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos: Aspectos institucionales y procesales, (3rd edn.), 2004, pp. 
87-88. 
1356 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 32-36; list of individuals that endorse the Universal 
Declaration of Human Responsibilities drafted by the InterAction Council, available at: 
http://www.interactioncouncil.org/universal-declaration-human-responsibilities (last checked: 05/03/2012); Christian 
Tomuschat, op. cit., pp. 5, 81; Roberto Andorno, op. cit., at 12. 
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interpretation and application of law and can even have some direct legal effects;1357 protect the 
inherent worth of all human beings from all violations; and acknowledge that international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, refugee law, and even human rights law stricto 
sensu, among others, have included, can include and ought to include norms that protect 
individuals from non-state violators by means of regulating legal capacities of those entities. 
On the other hand, it is important to mention that as entities that can operate in society, 
and as entities that can make decisions (executed and conceived directly by them or through 
organs in the case of collective actors) and affect human beings, non-state entities must behave 
in a responsible manner, necessarily taking into account legal obligations and pertinent ethical 
considerations and social expectations placed upon them.  
Needless to say, notions of social, moral and ethical responsibility of non-state actors are 
relevant and not rendered as unnecessary by their legal responsibility, because they can 
enhance the protection of individuals because they can help to persuade those actors to behave 
responsibly or can be invoked by others to demand a responsible non-state behavior. In this 
sense, public and private actors may react to irresponsible non-state behavior through protests, 
boycotts, exclusions, condemnations, and other initiatives that seek to make actors behave as 
ethically or socially expected from them and/or to bring about legal reforms. Certainly, in practice 
the protection of human beings requires legal and non-legal strategies and dynamics. 
Additionally, human rights and humanitarian considerations often have not only legal but 
also ethical and social implications and dimensions, reason why they can be relevant from their 
perspective and dimensions.  
Given their symbolic and often practical implications, demands based on both legal and 
non-legal non-state responsibility can contribute to making non-state attitudes, culture, policy and 
practice consistent with human dignity. However, non-legal initiatives are not always effective1358 
or legitimate, as may happen when certain pressures do not affect corporations or some protests 
are contrary to fundamental rights or are not based on legitimate demands. 
For these reasons, non-legal notions of responsibility do not replace international 
secondary rules, but rather can help to reinforce it and fill its gaps related to aspects that law 
does not cover or be invoked to bring about changes in positive law. This complementarity can 
contribute to an effective protection of human dignity from non-state violations, but must respect 
the rule of law and fundamental rights.  
                                                     
1357 Cf. Roberto Andorno, op. cit., pp. 4-7, 10; Chapter 1, supra. 
1358 See, for instance, footnote 957, supra. 
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e) Another important aspect of non-state responsibility is the distinction between their 
external and internal accountabilities.1359 
The internal dimension of non-state responsibility is considered to refer to the 
accountability of actors towards individuals and other entities with which it has internal or certain 
close relations, such as employees, donors, staff, or supporters, among others. Some pertinent 
interests and all the rights of those parties must be protected, and are sometimes reinforced by 
substantive norms that bind the respective actors, as happens with labor law; while other times 
they are considered in soft law or de facto defended through extra-legal initiatives, such as the 
threats of withdrawal of support, of ceasing donating or belonging to an NGO, or of no longer 
investing and being a shareholder in a corporation, among other possibilities.  
In turn, the external dimension of non-state responsibility refers to the protection of third 
parties from misdeeds of non-state entities.  
Certainly, some common legal goods may be protected in both dimensions, as happens 
with human dignity, which must be protected for example both in regard to employees and in 
relation to consumers or others. On the other hand, it is necessary to ensure the internal and 
external accountability considerations are not simply illusory and truly prevent actors from “self-
legitimating” themselves or engaging in “mutual legitimization” with other actors and end up being 
unaccountable and circumventing democratic checks.1360 
f) A fifth important element of the human rights responsibility of non-state entities, that is 
also common to all of them regardless of their differences,1361 is the principle of individual 
responsibility, according to which every entity should only be responsible for its own acts, 
including those of its agents.  
The importance and existence of this principle have been stressed by Bin Cheng and 
Hans Kelsen, and the latter went as far as saying that the evolution of the international legal 
system would be marked by its being more faithful to this principle and gradually abandoning the 
idea of making whole collectivities responsible, because many individuals (e.g. citizens) can be 
                                                     
1359 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 103. 
1360 On all these issues, cf. Menno T. Kamminga, “The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to 
the Inter-State System?”, op. cit., pp. 402-403; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 100; August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 48-49; 
Kenneth Anderson, op. cit., pp. 842-846, 888-890, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1886470 (last checked: 06/03/2012). 
1361 Even though it has been said that the concept of non-state entities encompasses entities that sometimes share 
little more than their not being State entities, I hold that all of them can violate human dignity and therefore all human 
beings must be protected from them. Likewise, the contribution of those entities to the promotion of that dignity is to 
be permitted and not hindered, being this command of permission legally implicit in my opinion. On the heterogeneity 
of non-state entities and other issues discussed herein, cf. Philip Alston, “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the 
International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?”, op. cit., pp. 3-8; Gáspar Biró and Antoanella-
Iulia Motoc, op. cit., paras. 23-24. 
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affected otherwise, reason why he considered that individualized responsibility is preferable to a 
collective one. Indeed, individuals can be affected by acts and sanctions against responsible 
States with whom they are related, and they should not suffer because of their misdeeds (which 
often affect them). The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights agreed with this 
conclusion when it analyzed the impact of sanctions. Therefore, it is important that sanctions only 
affect offenders in a lawful manner, respecting the principle of legality and other conditions, and 
not innocents. Hersch Lauterpacht, in turn, considered that the responsibility of collective entities 
could be combined with that of their agents. According to him, this would be a “desirable” 
choice.1362 
The previous insights are very important, and certainly legal evolution attests to the 
wisdom of Kelsen’s word, as confirmed by the evolution of international criminal law, designed in 
part to avoid making whole populations feel responsible and ashamed after World War II and also 
to specifically address the responsibility of individuals who are responsible for the commission of 
crimes.1363 To my mind, however, in relation to non-state collective entities it is not possible or 
convenient to altogether and always ignore their responsibility and only address that of their 
members and contributors, whose responsibility is often necessary to offer a complete protection 
of human dignity, for instance because often violations cannot be committed without collective 
resources, which should be employed to repair victims. Still, individual responsibility is preferable, 
and collective entities must be responsible for their own acts, with measures to address their 
accountability having a burden to respect human rights. 
In fact, the examination of the conduct and responsibility of collective entities does not 
necessarily detract from the analysis of individual responsibility (of members and assistants), 
especially because contrary to some totalitarian ideas groups are not wholly identified with their 
members, who are not subsumed in the former, as demonstrated among others by the legal 
conceptions of the different legal personality of legal persons or international organizations vis-à-
vis their members,1364 and also by the possibility that both collective entities and their members 
are addressees of different norms.  
Altogether, collective and individual “entities” can have legal responsibility. This does not 
imply that members of the former are automatically responsible for their breaches. In fact, as can 
                                                     
1362 Cf. Bin Cheng, op. cit., pp. 208, 210-212; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 8, The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights, 
E/C.12/1997/8, 12 December 1997, paras. 3-16; Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 40-42. 
1363 Cf. Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 178, 181, 193. 
1364 Cf. article 2.a of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations adopted in 2011 
(A/66/10); ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, at 
9, para. 10 of the commentary to article 2; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 79-111. 
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be inferred from the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the works of 
Hersch Lauterpacht, the responsibilities of States and State authorities may be subject to different 
regulations, which do not necessarily coincide.1365 Moreover, the draft articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations of the ILC indicate that the responsibility of members 
of those organizations can be engaged in connection with theirs but that this does not always 
happen, and the other way around.1366  
Additionally, from both symbolic and practical points of view, citizens and inhabitants of a 
State benefit from the declaration of its responsibility in the humanitarian corpus juris, because 
violations of human dignity are exposed and the consequences of secondary rules of 
responsibility are triggered, including those related to reparations, sanctions and guarantees of 
non-repetition.  
However, it cannot be denied that some of the consequences of responsibility, despite 
directly addressing responsible collective entities, can have an indirect and powerful impact on 
innocent members or individuals related to that entity. Because of their innocence and not having 
committed a breach, to make sure that they are not stigmatized and their fundamental rights are 
not affected, it is necessary to individualize responsibility ever more, procuring that it is known 
exactly which agents or entities carried out or designed violations on behalf of a group, avoiding 
generalized accusations; implementing secondary rules on responsibility in an individualized 
manner in regard to reparations, countermeasures or sanctions, among others; supervising the 
effects of sanctions to avoid their negative impact on human rights or their victimizing individuals.  
If these precautionary measures are not taken, attempts to protect human rights from 
responsible collective entities, for instance through coercive measures, may end up unduly and 
negatively affecting human rights of individuals (willingly or unwillingly) related to those entities.  
This was acknowledged and explained by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in General Comment number 8, in which it examined economic sanctions, 
although its conclusions can be extrapolated to other sanctions and implementation mechanisms. 
Because of this, the Committee recommended to bear in mind the need to not impair human 
rights when designing and implementing sanctions. Moreover, it urged the use of precise 
sanctions and exemptions, stressing that the effects of sanctions have to be monitored and 
negative consequences have to be addressed. In the words of the Committee: 
                                                     
1365 Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., at 42; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, para. 
56. 
1366 Cf. articles 17, 18, 62 and 62 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
international organizations adopted in 2011, A/66/10. 
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“While the impact of sanctions varies from one case to another, the Committee is aware that they 
almost always have a dramatic impact on the rights recognized in the Covenant […] 
In considering sanctions, it is essential to distinguish between the basic objective of applying political 
and economic pressure upon the governing élite of the country to persuade them to conform to 
international law, and the collateral infliction of suffering upon the most vulnerable groups within the 
targeted country […] 
Just as the international community insists that any targeted State must respect the civil and political 
rights of its citizens, so too must that State and the international community itself do everything 
possible to protect at least the core content of the economic, social and cultural rights of the affected 
peoples of that State […] 
The imposition of sanctions does not in any way nullify or diminish the relevant obligations of that 
State party […] 
The second set of obligations relates to the party or parties responsible for the imposition, 
maintenance or implementation of the sanctions, whether it be the international community, an 
international or regional organization, or a State or group of States […] rights must be taken fully into 
account when designing an appropriate sanctions regime […]  […] effective monitoring, which is 
always required under the terms of the Covenant, should be undertaken throughout the period that 
sanctions are in force” 1367 (emphasis added). 
The underlying consideration of these ideas confirms that Kelsen was certainly right 
when he advocated a more individualized responsibility in jus gentium. In my opinion, this 
individualization is another necessary step in the humanization of that legal system, because 
otherwise negative effects can be suffered by human beings, who may be indirectly victimized 
and can so end up being doubly victimized –by collective entities and those that sanction them-. 
In sum, the possibility of a collective entity having international legal responsibility does 
not detract from the possibility of individualizing responsibility, which is important because on the 
one hand individualization permits the identification of which concrete persons carried out and 
planned breaches, helping to avoid generalized accusations, and on the other hand can make the 
consequences of responsibility more effective and accurate. In this sense, for instance, the 
responsibility of all individual participants in violations makes it more likely that victims will receive 
compensation and other components of reparation, because no participant that can have means 
or possibilities of meaningfully repairing victims will be excluded. Additionally, this approach 
makes deterrence and punishment also be individualized and thus have a greater likelihood of 
having greater impact and effectiveness, but at the same time tempers them because it can help 
to avoids indiscriminate or generalized sanctions. The Military Tribunal for the Trial of German 
Major War Criminals acknowledged these ideas when it mentioned that “only by punishing 
individuals who commit [international] crimes can the provision (sic) of international law be 
enforced”1368 (emphasis added).  
                                                     
1367 Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8, op. cit., paras. 3-4, 7, 10, 12-
13. 
1368 Cf. Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal, with commentaries, op. cit., at 374, para. 99. 
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Additionally, ignoring the implications of the fact that a collective entity that violates jus 
gentium is also responsible is not only contrary to legal considerations of subjectivity and the 
potential inherent capacity of responsibility possessed by all entities that are bound by 
obligations, because this leads to also ignoring reality and the fact that some violations can be 
committed more easily or only in the context of groups, which are distinct entities that often have 
their own resources and contacts, especially in a transnational, interdependent and global 
context.  
For measures adopted in response to breaches of law and for the consequences of 
responsibility to be meaningful and effective, the responsibility of group entities must be 
recognized and regulated, lest the protection of humanitarian legal goods is not fully realized in 
practice. After all, effectiveness of protection demands full compliance with the principle of 
individual responsibility: each entity that breaches human rights duties, even when different ones 
participate in one same material violation, must be held accountable, lest individuals are not fully 
and effectively protected and fully repaired. This can happen, for example, because an entity that 
knows part of the truth about a violation or has resources that it would be obliged to employ to 
repair victims is not involved. Ignoring the responsibility of violators that breach duties or not 
regulating their conduct so goes against the legally required restitutio in integrum (which is 
mandatory whenever possible and to the extent that it can be provided) and the full reparations of 
victims,1369 to which victims are entitled and that authorities must procure.  
To this, it can be added that If an entity were not bound by a duty but participates in a 
violation of human rights (which is always a legally relevant fact), mechanisms of protection that 
are not based on duties and the existence of responsibility could and should also be employed in 
addition to holding entities with duties that are breached accountable. 
The individualization and identification of the responsibility of all offenders are required by 
and consistent with the principle of individual responsibility, because their responsibility can 
emerge due to their own conduct, which is what that principle demands. The possible coexistence 
of responsibilities is also required by the necessity of holding all violators accountable.  
Moreover, the individualization of responsibility, coupled with the possible coexistence of 
responsibilities, permits to hold both collective entities and their members accountable. 
Concerning collective entities that operate de facto but have no independent formal legal 
personality –which differs from the notion of subjectivity and capacity to have legal capacities, as 
                                                     
1369 Cf. article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “La Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Las reparaciones ordenadas y el acatamiento de los Estados”, at 189; Gina 
Donoso, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 40-41, 43, 45, 52, 56-57, 59, 60-61, 65. 
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examined in Chapter 5-, it can be said that they can be bound by international obligations, as 
examined in section 5.1 but frequently only their members are given express obligations. Since 
they can have obligations, they can be responsible in legal terms, and even if they could not, 
international mechanisms of protection of human dignity that are not based on the preexistence of 
duties, such as some initiatives based on prevention and persuasion, could be used.  
On the other hand, according to the ILC, entities with or without a “separate legal 
personality but acting on a de facto basis” may carry out activities that generate the responsibility 
of entities directing them, controlling them or giving them instructions if a link of effectiveness is 
present.1370 
It is interesting to note that some entities without formal personality have considerable 
power and leverage in the international society, such as the G8 and other groups whose 
decisions can impact on law as a result of initiatives and strategies of members in institutional 
settings.1371 According to the previous considerations, mechanisms that are not based on duties 
can be used in relation to them to protect human dignity, and they could be imposed express and 
implicit legal obligations as well, although in practice typically it will be their members who are 
more likely to be asked to abide by them. 
Concerning the notion and content of the principle of individual responsibility, according 
to Bin Cheng it entails “that responsibility only attaches to the person who is the author of the 
unlawful act […] [a]s a duty can of necessity only be personal, so responsibility is also 
personal”.1372 That notion must be understood in the light of secondary rules, and so it must be 
considered that the conduct of agents of a collective entity are attributable to the latter, which can 
be responsible because that conduct is considered to be its own (although agents can be 
responsible as well). This is consistent with both individual responsibility and positive law.1373 
That being said, concerning the object of this study and in connection with the 
Drittwirkung or the horizontal effects of human rights law, it is convenient to mention that the 
principle of individual responsibility is not violated when a functional authority -State, international 
organization or body or else- has its responsibility engaged in connection with a violation in which 
non-state entities have participated if some requirements of attribution established in secondary 
rules are met, given the violability of human rights and guarantees by private or public non-state 
actors and not only by States, because of how actors can act irresponsibly in connection with the 
                                                     
1370 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 49, para. 9 of the commentary to article 8. 
1371 Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional: Curso General, op. cit., at 56. 
1372 Cf. Bin Cheng, op. cit., at 208. 
1373 Cf. Ibid, pp. 208, 213. 
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conduct of others, and because of the positive duties of authorities to protect these rights and 
guarantees in the interactions of individuals with these actors, as commented unanimously by 
international supervisory bodies and authors.1374  
This affirmation is supported by the consideration that in cases in which authorities 
breach their human rights obligations, due to the principle of simultaneous and not exclusive 
responsibility, the ensuing responsibility of authorities does not exclude the possible existence of 
independent obligations and responsibility of other entities that participate in the respective 
violations. In some cases in which authorities are responsible for having failed to prevent or 
respond to non-state acts with due diligence, the conduct of non-state participants in violations 
can be considered as conduct of the State or other functional authority under international human 
rights law as well.1375 
In connection with these considerations, it is convenient to clarify when States or other 
actors with positive human rights obligations can be responsible for violations in which non-state 
entities participate. First of all, those obligations can breached for failing to address violations 
prior to their perpetration or after their commission with due diligence. In those cases, positive 
duties are breached due to a negligent behavior in relation to non-state threats. 
On the other hand, States and other entities can also be considered to sometimes breach 
their duties to respect human rights in connection with non-state violations. First of all, the duty to 
respect human rights is an obligation to refrain from preventing the exercise of human rights, and 
is therefore a negative obligation. Hence, whenever the conduct of an entity that violates human 
rights is attributable under the secondary norms of responsibility to another entity with human 
rights duties of abstention, the latter is considered to have breached its own duty to respect 
human rights, and the material perpetrator can have simultaneous responsibility. It is necessary 
to determine when this can happen. 
In that regard, the ILC articles on the responsibility of States mention the following 
events: when an entity is placed at the disposal of another one; when an entity carries out (public) 
functions of another one; when an entity commits a violation under the control, direction or 
                                                     
1374 Ibid. inter alia. 
1375 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, Judgment, 4 July 2006, paras. 85-
90, 96, 99-100; articles 5-11 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; 
articles 7 and 9 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations as adopted in 2011 
(A/66/10). An analogous interpretation inspired by the protection of humanitarian legal goods can make one think that 
principles or customary norms with the content of articles 5 through 11 –as long as it is logically possible- of the 
articles on State responsibility are also applicable to functional authorities. Even if this were not accepted, the 
responsibility of those entities in regard to non-state entities can always be triggered at least when they fail to 
discharge an obligation to protect and ensure human rights with due diligence. 
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instructions of another one; or when an insurrectional or another movement establishes a new 
State or takes over the power of one. 
The ILC draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations adopted on 
second reading do not exactly replicate the text of the articles on State responsibility concerning 
the subjective aspect of responsibility, but a thorough analysis of those draft articles permits to 
infer that the underlying rationale of the regulation of most of those events can be accommodated 
in the secondary rules on the responsibility of international organizations, except in my opinion for 
the case about insurrectional movements, given their dynamic concerning the assumption of 
State power.  
It is possible to conclude this because, in the first place, the notion of agents of an 
international organization, found in article 2.d, describes agents as all persons and entities that 
are “charged by the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its functions”, 
even if they are not “official” persons or entities, as discussed by José Manuel Cortés and the 
International Law Commission.1376 Therefore, it is possible to consider that the principle according 
to which the conduct of an entity performing or having functions of another one can be considered 
as conduct of the latter if some conditions are met, and therefore can engage its responsibility, is 
not a principle that only applies to State responsibility. This is because the protection needs, 
rationale and purposes concerning responsibility are related to events of performance of functions 
with the knowledge of their titular and of control of an actor over another one, which have 
elements that can be found in cases in which different actors are involved. 
Regarding the possibility of attributing the conduct of an entity to another one that directs, 
controls or instructs it has been handled in the case law of the International Court of Justice since 
the Nicaragua case and is accepted by the International Law Commission. The Court 
understands that control must be effective for that attribution to occur. This impedes an unlimited 
attribution of acts of an entity to others –reason why the alternative approach that is satisfied with 
overall control is not generally accepted-1377 but takes into account the importance and fairness of 
holding an entity that is seriously or sufficiently involved in a violation materially perpetrated by 
another one accountable, in order to protect victims and prevent impunity.  
Considering that the regulation of the responsibility of international organizations takes 
into account the factor of effective control for other purposes, for instance to determine if a 
member State or an organization must respond for a given act, it can be argued that the 
                                                     
1376 Cf. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 177-184; ILC, Draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations, with commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, at 12, paras. 23-27 of the commentary to article 2. 
1377 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, pp. 47-49, paras. 4-5, 7-8 of the commentary to article 8. 
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possibility of attribution of conduct for the purposes of responsibility under examination does not 
have to be exclusive to the regulation of State responsibility, and does not depend on the unique 
features of States. Rather, it can be considered to be enshrined in a principle based on the 
protection of legal goods from entities that are involved in threats to them, although it can be 
somewhat adjusted in light of the specificities of some entities to determine when control exists.  
On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine an event in which insurrectional or other 
movements take over the formal control of international organizations, because their functional 
and derivative character will impede the legitimacy or formal recognition of their acts as acts of 
those organizations.  
Finally, it must be said that the ILC recognizes that both States and international 
organizations can be responsible for the conduct of other entities that they adopt as its own.1378 
In all the previous events, non-state conduct that is contrary to human rights and 
guarantees can be attributable to States or international organizations, and can therefore 
generate their responsibility. For this reason, when non-state violations of human rights can be 
attributed to an authority, the latter can be considered to breach its own obligations to respect 
human rights (i.e. to refrain from violating them), and the material perpetrator can have 
independent responsibility. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that part of the underlying logic of the previous rules 
can be considered to be derived from or be part of general principles of law,1379 because they 
usually do not depend on specificities of States or international organizations (if they did, their 
analogous extension would be precluded) and are based on the need to protect (humanitarian) 
legal goods, reason why they are relevant for all actors with human rights duties, being 
sometimes adjustments in light of features of some actors necessary, as said paragraphs above. 
It must also be considered that not in all the cases in which an entity with links to an 
entity bound by duties to respect human rights participates in a violation the responsibility of the 
latter entity will be engaged. The regulation of State responsibility deals with this through the 
notion of public or private capacities. This is also present in the regulation of the responsibility of 
international organizations, which are public entities. That notion can also be extended to other 
actors. According to this doctrine, not all acts and omissions of individuals and entities that serve 
as agents or bodies of a public entity are connected with the attributions and functions of public 
                                                     
1378 Cf. articles 11 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (A/56/49(Vol. 
I)/Corr.4) and 9 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations as adopted in 2011 
(A/66/10). 
1379 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, pp. 46, 50, 52. 
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service and powers. Some conduct of those entities are considered to take place in their “private 
capacity” and to not engage the responsibility of the public entities, which is logical because not 
all conduct of agents has a link with the public entities that those agents are related to.1380 Similar 
considerations can be relevant concerning non-public entities that operate de facto or informally 
with certain powers and functions, legitimate or not, taking into account the public dimension of 
the conduct, organization and practices of non-state actors. 
On the other hand, conduct that is contrary to or committed in excess of instructions and 
orders are ultra vires. If it is committed by actors that have a pertinent link with a State, they can 
engage its responsibility, as mentioned in article 7 of the ILC articles on State responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts, which is based on established case law and customary norms.1381 In 
sum, ultra vires or infra vires conduct of agents, officials or public bodies of a State can be 
attributed to that State if it is committed in a public capacity. According to the International Law 
Commission: 
“The central issue to be addressed in determining the applicability of article 7 to unauthorized conduct 
of official bodies is whether the conduct was performed by the body in an official capacity or not. 
Cases where officials acted in their capacity as such, albeit unlawfully or contrary to instructions, 
must be distinguished from cases where the conduct is so removed from the scope of their official 
functions that it should be assimilated to that of private individuals, not attributable to the State […] 
The problem of drawing the line between unauthorized but still “official” conduct, on the one hand, 
and “private” conduct on the other, may be avoided if the conduct complained of is systematic or 
recurrent, such that the State knew or ought to have known of it and should have taken steps to 
prevent it. However, the distinction between the two situations still needs to be made in some cases, 
for example when considering isolated instances of outrageous conduct on the part of persons who 
are officials. That distinction is reflected in the expression “if the organ, person or entity acts in that 
capacity” in article 7. This indicates that the conduct referred to comprises only the actions and 
omissions of organs purportedly or apparently carrying out their official functions, and not the private 
actions or omissions of individuals who happen to be organs or agents of the State. In short, the 
question is whether they were acting with apparent authority”1382 (emphasis added). 
The secondary rules on the responsibility of international organizations do not entirely 
follow the previous logic. According to them, the conduct of agents of those actors can sometimes 
be attributable to an international organization even if it is an ultra vires conduct that exceeds the 
attributions and powers of an agent, but only if that conduct falls under the competence of the 
respective organization.1383 Because of the functional and derivative character of international 
organizations, for a conduct to be attributable to them a condition must always be met: that 
                                                     
1380 Cf. the distinction between “purely private” or “nonofficial” conduct and those that are abusive, “under color of 
authority” or with connection with an official function, as explained in: Ibid., pp. 42, para. 13 of the commentary to 
article 4, and 46, paras. 6-8 of the commentary to article 7; International Law Commission, Draft articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, pp. 18, para. 7 of the commentary to 
article 6, and 27-28, paras. 4 and 9 of the commentary to article 8; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 219-223. 
1381 Cf. Ibid., at 46, para. 4 of the commentary to article 7. 
1382 Ibid., at 46, paras. 7-8 of the commentary to article 7. 
1383 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with 
commentaries, A/66/10, 2011, pp. 26-29, commentary to article 8; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 211-214. 
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conduct must fall within the scope of the (implied or express) powers and attributions of those 
organizations, which have the legal capacities that permit them to achieve the goals for which 
members and founders created and support them. This is expressed in article 8 of the ILC articles 
on the responsibility of international organizations adopted on second reading, which states: 
“Excess of authority or contravention of instructions 
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization shall be considered an act of that 
organization under international law if the organ or agent acts in an official capacity and within the 
overall functions of that organization, even if the conduct exceeds the authority of that organ or agent 
or contravenes instructions.” 
On the other hand, in the case of individuals that are members of criminal groups or 
participate in joint illegal enterprises, different regulation alternatives have addressed their 
responsibility and exist in different regimes. According to them, the conduct of persons that also 
participate in such an enterprise cannot be automatically attributed to other members, being there 
a requirement of a dolus eventualis for someone to be responsible for conspiracy or co-
perpetration.1384 
The previous examples concerning ultra vires conduct and dolus eventualis illustrate how 
a general possibility of holding entities accountable for the acts of others must and can be 
sometimes adjusted due to the specific features of some actors, and how this is compatible with 
the application of some general considerations and purposes even in those cases despite the 
presence of specialized different rules. 
Additionally, as examined in Chapter 6, sometimes non-state entities have or can have 
positive human rights. They can be duties to protect human rights, which impose obligations even 
concerning inter-private relations, and therefore oblige to prevent or duly respond to non-state 
violations. Additionally, positive duties can also be duties to fulfil some human rights, which 
impose obligations of striving to create or bring about conditions that permit the exercise of a 
given right, or of directly making a right be enjoyed.  
Those obligations require that when a right cannot be enjoyed due to non-state 
obstacles, the entity with the respective positive obligations deals with them in order to create the 
conditions that permit individuals to exercise and enjoy their human rights and guarantees. This 
implies striving to neutralize non-state obstacles and/or directly providing pertinent services.  
In General Comment 12 on the right to adequate food, among others, the Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights Committee distinguishes the categories of positive obligations 
mentioned above. Its opinion can be read substituting mentions to States with all entities with the 
                                                     
1384 Cf. Albin Eser, op. cit., pp. 789-793; Stefano Manacorda and Chantal Meloni, “Indirect Perpetration versus Joint 
Criminal Enterprise: Concurring Approaches in the Practice of International Criminal Law?”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2011, pp. 162-175. 
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pertinent positive human rights obligations and identifying underlying general principles applicable 
to other rights and different actors: 
“The right to adequate food, like any other human right, imposes three types or levels of obligations 
on States parties:  the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil.  In turn, the obligation to fulfil 
incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide. The obligation to respect 
existing access to adequate food requires States parties not to take any measures that result in 
preventing such access. The obligation to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that 
enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food.  The obligation 
to fulfil (facilitate) means the State must pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen 
people’s access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food 
security.  Finally, whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy 
the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) 
that right directly.  This obligation also applies for persons who are victims of natural or other 
disasters”1385 (emphasis added). 
It is convenient to recall that when a State privatizes or delegates its functions to other 
entities, it does not get rid of its duties and is obliged to supervise and ensure that individuals are 
protected against possible abuses or lack of protection from those that carry out those 
functions.1386 This rebuts objections that argue that the regulation of non-state duties and 
responsibilities will weaken human rights, because as said before they in fact strengthen them. 
On the other hand, positive obligations to protect human rights demand acting with due 
diligence before and after a violation takes place, to prevent and appropriately respond to non-
state violations and effectively protect victims. There are circumstances in which the diligence 
with which obliged actors must act is greater than usual, such as when they create a risk, when 
they have a guarantor position, when especially vulnerable individuals or rights require intense 
protection, or when an entity supported or having certain links with those actors can perpetrate a 
violation, among other events.1387  
It is important to add that, as has been considered by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, as in the case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. the United States of 
America, the obligation to ensure the exercise of human rights must be interpreted and applied in 
light of the general principle of due diligence, and accordingly (unless otherwise stated, it can be 
added) it is an obligation of means and not one of result. Moreover, the regulation of that 
obligation is based on the recognition that private and public non-state entities can violate human 
rights, as confirmed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Cotton Field case and by 
the Inter-American Commission as well.1388  
                                                     
1385 Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, op. cit., para. 15. 
1386 See footnote 59, supra. 
1387 Cf. John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, where it is held 
that “additional steps to protect against misconduct by entities that the state owns, controls, or substantially supports, 
and to promote respect for human rights by corporations with which the state does business.” 
1388 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, 
Merits Report, op. cit., paras. 111, 133 (there is a “link between discrimination, violence and due diligence” […] 
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Apart from generating specialized duties in relation to specific cases of violations, the 
obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of human rights imposes the burdens of tackling 
and addressing social and other practices that are contrary to those rights, and also requires 
taking into account the concrete needs of victims. This is reflected in the regulation of the 
protection of persons with disabilities and also concerning the protection of women and children 
that are victims of domestic abuse. In this regard, positive duties oblige to respond with 
appropriate measures that have prospects of effectiveness to threats of violations that are known 
or ought to have been known by States and other duty holders. All organs of collective entities 
with those obligations are obliged to protect individuals in a coordinated and diligent manner.1389 
The previous criteria coincide with considerations found in the ILC articles on State responsibility 
and in decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.1390  
Additionally, States, functional authorities and other entities with positive human rights 
obligations are obliged to address potential or existent non-state violations through different 
effective means, including cultural, legal and other mechanisms. They are required to use all 
mechanisms with prospects of effective protection that are available to them, as mentioned by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Cotton Field case,1391 which means that they are 
often under a duty to employ multiple mechanisms that reinforce each other. Therefore, use of 
the mechanisms described in Chapter 8 may be mandatory in some cases. Concerning this, the 
Inter-American Court mentioned that the specific needs of protection of rights and the 
circumstances of a case determine how an authority must respond to threats to human dignity in 
a comprehensive way that prevents “risk factors” and strengthens measures of protection.1392 
                                                                                                                                                            
States are “responsible for failures to protect women from domestic violence acts perpetrated by private actors. 
Domestic violence, for its part, has been recognized at the international level as a human rights violation” and rights 
must be protected from them); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico, judgment, op. cit., para. 280 (“the juridical consequence of an act or omission of a private individual [may be] 
the violation of certain human rights”). 
1389 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, 
Merits Report, op. cit., paras. 133, 145, 160, 173, 177, 212; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, judgment, op. cit., paras. 236, 258, 288. 
1390 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Mastromatteo v. Italy, Judgment, op. cit., para. 68; European 
Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 50; European Court 
of Human Rights, Case of Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 129-130; European Court of Human Rights, 
Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 219; ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, pp. 35 (para. 4 of the commentary to article 2) and 
46 (para. 8 of the commentary to art. 7). 
1391 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, judgment, op. cit., 
paras. 246, 252, 258, 279-280, 283, 285, 290, 292. 
1392 Cf. Ibid., paras. 235, 258 (thus, prevention and other measures must complement each other, and each of those 
categories can include different strategies, such as cultural, persuasive or other initiatives). 
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On the other hand, it must be said that there are discussions surrounding the possibility 
of States protecting individuals from non-state threats that take place abroad, which is a topic 
partly related to the extraterritorial protection of human rights.  
The framework and principles on corporations and human rights designed by John 
Ruggie, for instance, mention that the extraterritorial reach of State protection from corporate 
abuses is not mandatory but is permitted. According to this idea, jurisdictional bases that permit 
extraterritorial protection from non-state abuses are admissible and legitimate. However, human 
rights activists have decried what they perceive as a missed opportunity to identify or develop an 
extraterritorial obligation to protect.1393 According to the framework and principles designed by 
Special Rapporteur Ruggie say about the subject, it would seem that State responsibility to 
protect from and sanction non-state violations committed overseas could never arise, because of 
the lack of a binding obligation that commands such protection.  
To my mind, however, even if the aforementioned framework and principles are correct 
from a general point of view, which does not delve into specifics, express and implicit specialized 
obligations of States and other authorities that demand extraterritorial protection from non-state 
abuses can still exist. In this sense, if the events in which the duty to behave with due diligence is 
more intense are taken into account, it is possible to conclude for example that when an actor 
with positive duties generates the risk of a non-state violation being committed abroad, it should 
strive with the utmost diligence to prevent its commission or to respond to it, lest its responsibility 
is engaged. 
This analysis does mean that other extraterritorial obligations in relation to non-state 
abuses cannot exist, since law may evolve, especially because the framework described above is 
described as a starting point that does not foreclose other “developments” and constitutes a 
“common platform for action, on which cumulative progress can be built”.1394 Accordingly, it 
embodies a minimum that can be expanded by other norms and systems that provide greater 
protection. Additionally, one of the mandates of its drafter was to “clarify existing standards”,1395 
and it may be that not all existing norms were codified or identified. 
                                                     
1393 Cf. John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. (the 
limitation of the duty to protect to abuses within a State’s territory or jurisdiction “was controversial, because human 
rights advocates have argued that developed states have a duty to protect against foreign abuses committed by 
corporations domiciled in their territory” and critics were concerned that “the Principles did not characterize the duty 
to protect as extending extraterritorially”). 
1394 Cf. John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit.; Human 
Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Seventeenth session, 
A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1, 15 June 2011, para. 4. 
1395 Cf. John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. 
 
 
468
The facts that international Courts and other supervisory bodies can directly or indirectly 
examine the conduct of non-state actors, and that the previous considerations are not necessarily 
dependent on State features but rather obey to the logic of positive duties and are based on the 
effective protection of individuals, make most of the principles and considerations just examined 
be amenable to application to non-state de facto or functional authorities or non-state entities with 
positive human rights obligations as well, being some adjustments that do not detract from the 
required protection permissible. 
The foregoing analysis explains why it has been considered that positive human rights 
obligations are related to the horizontal effects of those rights. It is because they are relevant 
even in relations between individuals and public or private non-state entities, and the relevance of 
those rights is thus not limited to or based on relations between individuals and States or other 
authorities (covered by the vertical or lateral dimensions of protection). However, the horizontal 
effects of human rights are not always indirect and dependent on the duties of authorities, 
because actors without that character can also be directly bound by legal capacities in the 
humanitarian corpus juris and the protection of human dignity has comprehensive and transversal 
effects and implications (see Chapter 1).  
The consideration that horizontal human rights effects do not have to depend on State 
duties answers to the fact that their protection would be unreliable otherwise, as revealed by the 
Mastromatteo paradox. Furthermore, the fact that some supervisory bodies can only examine 
State conduct does not imply that other entities cannot have duties, responsibilities and 
subjection to other procedures, such as those related to the supervision of compliance with 
international criminal norms, the European Convention on Human Rights or the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,1396 among other possibilities. 
The responsibility of States and other actors in relation to non-state conduct can be 
summarized by saying that they can be responsible for non-state violations when they fail to 
prevent or respond to non-state violations with the diligence law requires them to behave with, or 
when the conduct of non-state entities that violates human rights is attributable to them, case in 
which they are considered to breach their duty to respect human rights.  
In my opinion, apart from States, due to lateral effects of human rights, that in my opinion 
must not be limited to functional and de facto authorities but also involve all actors on which there 
are legitimate legal expectations (e.g. “traditional leaders”), and also due to the transversal or all-
                                                     
1396 Ibid.; section 2.3, supra; articles 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 6 of the Statute of the 
ICTR and 7 of the ICTY. 
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encompassing scope of the universal protection of human dignity,1397 non-state entities can be 
responsible when they breach positive or negative duties based on their role and the enjoyment 
of human rights is negatively affected. This is revealed, among others, by the opinion of the 
Human Rights Committee in the UNMIK case, by the consideration that human dignity must be 
protected by different actors, by international criminal norms, by non-state responsibility for 
complicity or participation in violations, or by human rights obligations that can bind functional 
authorities, as international organizations, that are endowed with some competences that are 
essential for the enjoyment and exercise of human rights and for the accessibility and integration 
of persons with disabilities. Interestingly, Amnesty International criticized UNMIK for failing to 
investigate the abduction and murder of Kosovo Serbs, echoing criticisms made by the Human 
Rights Committee.1398 This confirms that non-state actors can have positive human rights duties. 
g) Lastly, it is convenient to examine if non-state human rights responsibilities entail 
some risks. This was partly examined previously, when objections to non-state human rights legal 
capacities were examined.  
It is often argued that non-state responsibilities can be pointed out by States to elude 
their own. However, because legal responsibilities can be complementary and are not exclusive, 
and since State responsibility can be engaged for failing to tackle non-state violations or for 
cooperating with them, non-state responsibilities in fact make it necessary to scrutinize State 
behavior and stress that non-state conduct must also be examined to determine if violations 
occurred and, eventually, if non-state obligations were breached as well. 
Another possible risk, according to some authors, is the possibility that, consciously or 
not, human rights ideas are invoked in ways that actually weaken existing guarantees and 
fundamental rights by making them cover too much ground or strain resources to protect them. 
To this, it can be responded that human rights law already requires protection from non-state 
violations, and that a multi-level framework accommodates many actors and mechanisms that 
can contribute to offer a full protection. Denying the existence of non-state abuses, in fact, makes 
human rights cover too little and disregards many victims. 
Others, as John Knox, warn how responsibilities should never be interpreted or used as 
emanating from duties compliance with which can condition the enjoyment of human rights,1399 
                                                     
1397 Cf. sections 3.1 and 4.1, supra 
1398 Cf. article 44.1 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Declaration of the European Union to 
its Formal Confirmation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en, last checked: 
07/03/2012); Amnesty International, Kosovo: UNMIK’s Legacy. The failure to deliver justice and reparation to the 
relatives of the abducted, Amnesty International Publications, 2013, pp. 5-22. 
1399 Cf. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 1-3, 10, 16, 34-35, 37-40. 
 
 
470
which would be contrary to their non-conditionality and inherent character. To this, it can be said 
that an interpretation of human rights based on human dignity and its non-conditionality, coupled 
with the strict conditions for restricting rights, ensure that such perversion is forbidden. 
Likewise, the use of notions that demand human rights protection from non-state 
violations, such as the principle of equality and non-discrimination, must be used in a coherent 
and careful way that is respectful of the foundations of human rights law, lest they can be used 
against those very foundations. In this sense, some NGOs and authors have warned that some 
entities may be tempted to falsely invoke the responsibility of non-state entities to impose their 
own agendas to the detriment of guarantees that are paid lip service, such as human rights. For 
this reason, care must be taken to identify when arguments are not truly based on human rights 
law but on ideological aspirations that are disguised as legal arguments that actually can 
undermine the exercise of some human rights such as those related to privacy and 
conscience.1400 The practice of portraying aspirations as legal norms is often handled 
imperceptibly, consciously or not, by non-state entities.1401  
Therefore, claims of protection from non-state entities must be carefully examined to 
prevent that perfectly lawful non-state conduct is attacked with “human rights” arguments that, if 
successful, would be contrary to rights of the utmost importance that are true achievements in 
human history, such as rights of conscience and conscientious objectors.1402  
Otherwise, it is risked that an official or de facto “thought police”1403 attacks inalienable 
rights to have and manifest beliefs and opinions, paradoxically violating liberty and human dignity 
“in the name of human rights and liberty”. It must be considered that all the components of the 
framework of the legal protection of human dignity are relevant, and this includes both the 
                                                     
1400 On these issues, cf. Patrick B. Craine, “Vatican website taken down by pro-abortion hackers”, LifeSiteNews.com, 
07/03/2012, available at: http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/vatican-website-taken-down-by-pro-abortion-hackers 
(last checked: 07/03/2012); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, op. cit., paras. 7, 15, 20, 40; 
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression adopted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions […] violate the right to freedom of expression”); Nate 
Anderson, “Who Was That Masked Man”, Foreign Policy, 31/01/2012, available at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/31/who_was_that_masked_man?page=0,3 –last checked: 07/03/2012-  
(“The ideology can be inconsistent and is often unformed, as it always will be in a "group" like Anonymous; the irony 
of shutting down websites you don't agree with in the name of free speech and transparency seems to be lost on 
many of them”); Roger Kiska, “Vraiment Excellent!”, Turtle Bay and Beyond –International Law, Policy, and 
Institutions-, 28/01/2011, available at: http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/family/vraiment-excellent/ (last 
checked: 07/03/2012); Grégor Puppinck, “The Italian Crucifix Case: A Watershed?”, Turtle Bay and Beyond, 
09/05/2011, available at: http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/abortion/the-italian-crucifix-case-a-watershed/; 
European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Judgment, 24 June 2010, paras. 
13, 55-58, 61-64, 108 (this case denies the substance many accusations of human rights deniers of those who 
conceive marriage in a traditional way, being those accusations often quite intolerant themselves). 
1401 See footnote 691, supra. 
1402 Cf. Alliance Defense Fund, “305 parents, children sue Spain over anti-Christian education”, 25/03/2010, available 
at: http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/News/PRDetail/3909 (last checked: 08/03/2010). 
1403 Cf. George Orwell, 1984, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2008 (First Mariner edition). 
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protection of privacy rights and the protection from (true) non-state violations. This last idea also 
means that human rights cannot be invoked to justify violations of other human rights, as 
mentioned in international instruments.  
On the other hand, as Andrew Clapham has well explained, violations can take place in 
private contexts, which confirms that human dignity must be protected in them. What must be 
done is to be cautious and not manipulate and politicize human rights, to use proportionality tests 
when examining conflicts of rights, and to determine what legitimate exercises of rights do not 
amount to abuses of rights and do not violate their content, as happens with reasonable 
distinctions, which can respect the principle of equality and non-discrimination.1404  
In sum, human rights must be protected in all situations, lest arguments purported to be 
human rights ones can be used against them. In light of the idea that the protection of human 
dignity is the purpose and foundation of human rights, it can be said, for instance, that that 
violence against homosexuals or their criminalization but not disagreement with certain lifestyles 
violate human rights. Likewise, it can be safely concluded that violations of labor rights; domestic 
abuse by spouses of any gender; physical and psychological inhuman treatment of children by 
parents, relatives or other persons; bullying, and other acts, are contrary to the inherent and non-
conditional human dignity, and victims must be protected from them1405 even if those abuses are 
committed by private (and sometimes public) non-state entities and in a so-called ‘private sphere’, 
On the other hand, freedoms of conscience, privacy, and other rights that tend to protect intimacy 
or the individual development and freedom of beliefs and decisions are protected, and must be 
respected, ensuring that they are not interpreted in a way that endorses true human rights 
violations. 
 
7.2. The participation of non-state violators in reparations as a condition of the full 
protection of victims 
That law can and should protect human dignity from threats of non-state violations, and 
that it must also permit non-state promotion of human dignity, answers to the central importance 
that human beings must have in jus gentium. Their importance is recognized in substantive and 
                                                     
1404 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 43-44, 526-531, 544-545. 
1405 Cf. e.g. Commissioner for Human Rights (of the Council of Europe), “Children and Corporal Punishment: The 
Right Not to be Hit Also a Children’s Right”, Issue Paper, 2009, pp. 6-9, available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?Index=no&command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=13
70686&SecMode=1&DocId=1206996&Usage=2 (last checked: 08/03/2012); Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
General comment No. 13 (2011), The right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence, CRC/C/GC/13, 18 April 
2011, paras. 21, 22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 44, 61, 63; articles 1 and 3 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (“Convention of Belém do Pará”), inter alia. 
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procedural norms that seek to protect humanitarian legal goods, and law must serve them 
because it is a human product and an instrument whose power must be legitimate. 
The issues of reparations and the international legal responsibility of non-state entities 
must be examined in light of those considerations. This means that their implications and 
consequences, including the right to remedies and the duties to repair, cease ongoing violations 
and offer guarantees of non-repetition must be interpreted in a way that fully protects human 
dignity when possible, and if such interpretation is not possible then law must change de lege 
ferenda.  
The obligation to repair is one important consequence of responsibility that emerges with 
violations of human rights. One of the purposes of that responsibility is the protection of victims, 
which must guide the critical analysis of norms on responsibility and reparations, in order to 
assess if they are compatible with non-discrimination and the universal protection of human 
dignity. Therefore, the analysis of the legal consequences of human rights violations cannot focus 
exclusively on the duties of responsible entities, and must also take into account that victims have 
rights to full reparations and access to effective remedies and protection. Therefore, responsibility 
and reparations are two sides of the same coin. In the words of the Human Rights Committee: 
“[I]n addition to effective protection of Covenant rights States Parties must ensure that individuals 
also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights […] Without reparation to 
individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy, 
which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged”1406 (emphasis added). 
Just as there is an obligation to repair human rights violations related to the duty of 
responsible entities to provide remedies to victims, there is a right of victims to have access to 
effective remedies and to have effective protection and full reparations. Ergo, the right to full 
reparations and the duty of violators to repair victims complement each other and coexist.  
On the existence of the right of victims to remedies and the obligation of authorities to 
provide them, the following articles can be cited: 25 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights; 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights; or 8 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. All of them recognize the right to an effective remedy as related to the protection 
of human rights. Moreover, in my opinion even article 2.3.a of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, written in the form of a duty “to ensure” that victims of human rights violations 
have “an effective remedy”, implicitly recognizes a right of victims to have remedies, because it is 
correlative to the aforementioned duty and the lack of remedies constitutes a wrongful act. The 
same can be said of similar norms. 
                                                     
1406 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., paras. 15-16. 
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On the other hand, article 79 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
deals with a Trust Fund “for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and 
of the families of such victims”. It highlights how the provision to victims of material goods that 
amount to what they require in terms of compensation (similar mechanisms may be designed in 
relation to other elements of reparations, in my opinion) may be conducted even when the entities 
obliged to compensate victims do not provide the respective components of reparations. When 
this happens, solidarity1407 or coercion1408 mechanisms can be used to satisfy the right to 
reparations. Still, those mechanisms do not deny the existence and importance of the duty of 
violators to provide reparations, and they may be obliged to compensate those who have 
provided elements of reparations.1409 
A first conclusion can be drawn here: if victims of human rights violations have rights to 
reparations and to have access to remedies, and non-state entities can violate human rights, as 
has been recognized by the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights, UNICEF, 
authors and other entities,1410 the conclusion of a syllogism would be that victims must be fully 
repaired even when non-state entities perpetrate violations or participate in them, and not only 
when States directly commit abuses. Sometimes, this requires that those entities provide 
reparations. 
Whether access of victims to reparations in which non-state offenders can be obliged to 
participate can be international and not only internal depends on normative decisions. 
Nonetheless, the fact that in substantive international law protection from non-state violations is 
required due to the horizontal effects of human rights, which exist even if only States have 
obligations, confirms that victims have a right to full reparations if violations in which non-state 
entities participate are committed. Therefore, if domestic law does not ensure those reparations, 
the respective State incurs in a breach based on the failure to adjust internal law and practices to 
international human rights standards and to ensure the full and effective protection of 
individuals.1411 
                                                     
1407 Cf. articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute of the ICC; Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power, paras. 12-17; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, paras. 15-16 and Preamble; Avril McDonald, op. cit., pp. 242, 258, 263, 271, 273-274; Theo van 
Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, op. 
cit., pp. 2-3. 
1408 Since the ICC may order the transfer of money or property “collected through fines or forfeiture” to the Fund. 
1409 See Principle 15 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. 
1410 See footnotes 611 through 615, supra. 
1411 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of Merits, op. 
cit., para. 167. 
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Both actual and potential victims have a right to effective mechanisms of protection that 
have prospects of protecting their rights, which includes the entitlement to be repaired.1412 
Concerning this, they have a right to fully repaired whenever possible. This consideration is firmly 
established in international human rights law and case law, being one the purposes of human 
rights law the complete reparation of victims.  
In this sense, in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights it has been 
said that all of the components of reparations must be provided, because one of the goals of the 
protection of human rights is the full reparation of victims. This implies that there must be a 
restitutio in integrum whenever it is possible. If not, or when the provision of some components of 
reparations is not enough to fully repair victims, additional forms and components of reparations 
must be provided to victims. This principle has been acknowledged by the ILC.1413 Likewise, 
principle 18 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter, Basic Principles) mentions that: 
“In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of individual 
circumstances, victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation 
and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective reparation, as laid out in 
principles 19 to 23, which include the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.” 
That the reparation of violations of norms that protect human dignity must be complete is 
also confirmed by the following consideration: under the general international regulation of 
responsibility, reparations must be full, as indicated in article 34 of the ILC articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It mentions that there must be “full 
reparation for the injury caused by [an] internationally wrongful act” (emphasis added). That 
demand is also present in article 31 of those articles, according to which an entity responsible for 
a breach “is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused” (emphasis added). 
While those articles deal with State responsibility, there is no reason to limit the applicability of the 
                                                     
1412 Cf. articles 25 and 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 13 and 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights, paras. 3, 11-18 of the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, paras. 4-13, 19 of the Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., 
paras. 15-16. 
1413 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Interpretation 
of the Judgment of Reparations and Costs), 17 August 1990, para. 27; Joint Separate Opinion of Judges A.A. 
Cançado Trindade and M. Pachecho Gómez to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Las Palmeras v. 
Colombia, Judgment of Merits, 6 December 2001, pp. 3, 7-19; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 10 September 1993, para. 49; articles 31, 34-37 
of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4) and of the 
ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international organizations as adopted in 201. 
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underlying principles and rules of the aforementioned provisions to State responsibility, because 
rather than being based on specific features of States, they answer to the need to repair victims. 
This being so, the protection of victims and legal goods requires protection from all 
wrongful acts, regardless of who commits them. This is confirmed in the following provisions of 
the ILC draft articles on the Responsibility of international organizations adopted by the Drafting 
Committee in 2011, which are applicable to those non-state entities. The fact that the purposes, 
principles and normative content of those rules coincide with the regulation of State responsibility 
suggests that they are applicable to other responsible entitiesas well, as confirmed in human 
rights law. The pertinent articles on the responsibility of international organizations say: 
“Article 31  
Reparation  
1. The responsible international organization is under an obligation to make full reparation for the 
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 
Article 34  
Forms of reparation  
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Chapter” (emphasis added). 
In the commentary to article 31 on State responsibility, the duty to fully repair was 
discussed by the International Law Commission, which said that it alludes to addressing all the 
consequences of a wrongful act and imposes the duty to seek to counter the effects of breaches.  
The ILC also says that reparation is formulated (not defined, it must be noted) in the 
articles on responsibility as a duty that automatically binds entities responsible for breaches, 
rather than being formulated therein as rights. According to the ILC, this choice is made because 
of the problems that, in its opinion, may arise when reparations are owed to many victims, of 
whom “only a few […] are specially affected by the breach.”1414 In the humanitarian corpus juris, it 
is true that reparation is a duty of violators because, as mentioned by the Human Rights 
Committee in a passage quoted above, it is related to the duty to provide remedies to victims; and 
article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights recognizes the existence of such a duty. 
Simultaneously, however, as explained before and expressed by van Boven, victims have a right 
to reparations, and each of them can claim it.1415 
Problems concerning the handling of claims cannot be an excuse to not comply with 
duties that are correlative to rights of victims. That such rights exist is confirmed in doctrine and 
                                                     
1414 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 91, para. 4 of the commentary to article 31. 
1415 Cf. Avril McDonald, op. cit., at 250. 
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soft law, as revealed for instance in the Preamble and Principle 18 of the Basic Principles, cited 
above, and in the very title of those Basic Principles, that deal with the “Right to Remedy and 
Reparation [of] Victims”.  
In any case, an exclusive focus on the burden dimensions of reparations would still 
confirm the considerations presented here, because the performance of duties to repair cannot 
be ineffective and incomplete. The crux is that, frequently, unless non-state entities that 
participate in violations also participate in reparations, the latter will not be complete and effective, 
as explained below. 
Furthermore, concerning the full character that reparations must have, Bin Cheng has 
studied how the principle of integral reparation demands the elimination of all the proximate 
consequences of a wrongful act, in order to make an “injured party […] ‘whole again’”1416 because 
remedies “should be commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may be made 
whole.”1417 If restitutio in integrum is not possible, the duty to repair still exists. In such cases, as 
indicated before, complementary elements and mechanisms must be resorted to in order to 
address the totality of injuries as much as possible and to “wholly” protect victims, as considered 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.1418 This is another reason why non-state 
participants in violations must be obliged to provide reparations, because injuries cannot be 
wholly addressed unless they contribute to repair victims. This is commanded by substantive 
international law, but that participation can take place in internal fora most of the time. 
Additionally, that reparations should aim to be complete is reflected in the consideration 
that when victims are not fully repaired after certain elements of reparations have been provided, 
other components of reparation must be used because otherwise victims would not be fully 
repaired. This is expressly and implicitly acknowledged in soft law; in the case law of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights on non-pecuniary damages, satisfaction, guarantees of non-
repetition and non-economical reparations of moral or immaterial damage;1419 and in the opinion 
of the International Court of Justice that alludes to the sufficiency of satisfaction as a means of 
reparation in some cases, which means that, conversely, in other cases full reparation cannot be 
achieved unless more components of reparation are used. Moreover, in some cases, as in 
LaGrand, the ICJ it explicitly referred to the insufficiency of apologies – which is a mode of 
                                                     
1416 Cf. Bin Cheng, op. cit., pp. 234-240. 
1417 Ibid., at 234. 
1418 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Interpretation 
of the Judgment of Reparations and Costs), 17 August 1990, para. 27. 
1419 Cf. Gina Donoso, op. cit., pp. 40-41, 51-52; Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, op. cit., pp. 185-187, 198-220; Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, paras. 18-24. 
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satisfaction-.1420 This is confirmed in article 34 of the ILC articles on the responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts and of the ILC draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations adopted by the Drafting Committee in 2011, that mentions that:  
“Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination”. 
Analyzing the commentary to the former article by the International Law Commission 
itself, it is possible to conclude that what the ILC calls forms of reparation and I describe as its 
components -insofar as they “giv[e] effect to the underlying obligation of reparation”1421 and 
“cover particular aspects of reparation”1422- are inextricably linked to the “[f]ull reparation for the 
injury caused”, because their use “separately or in combination will discharge the obligation to 
make reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”1423 
While according to human rights law reparations of victims must be full, the fact that 
general international law considers that reparations must be full as well is relevant for the human 
rights corpus juris. This is because the latter’s norms on responsibility must generally take into 
account general international law and, concretely, the general international regulation of the 
modalities and content of reparations, as has been mentioned by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, that said: 
“The obligation contained in Article 63(1) of the Convention [related to reparations for human rights 
violations] is governed by international law in all of its aspects, such as, for example, its scope, 
characteristics, beneficiaries, etc. […] the obligation to make reparation falls under international law 
and is governed by it”1424. 
Taking into account that victims have a right to be fully repaired, which means that full 
reparations are required, something that the ILC mentions,1425 it can be said that if general or 
specialized rules of responsibility in a given field prevent or do not admit full reparations, those 
rules must be considered flawed and contrary to the rights of victims.  
                                                     
1420 Cf. Ibid.; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries, 2001, pp. 106-107, paras. 6-7 of the commentary to article 37; ICJ, Case concerning 
application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, op. cit., para. 194; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short 
Introduction, op. cit., paras. 465-471. 
1421 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 96, para. 6 of the commentary to article 34. 
1422 Cf. Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, op. cit., 2 July 1993, at 7, footnote of para. 13. 
1423 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 95, para. 1 of the commentary to article 34; article 34 of the previously mentioned draft 
articles. 
1424 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment (Reparations and 
Costs), op. cit., paras. 44-45. 
1425 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 96, para. 6 of the commentary to art. 34. 
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Therefore, just as international human rights supervisory bodies consider that domestic 
norms, conduct and practices that are contrary to integral reparations can constitute breaches of 
human rights law if they are attributable to States, because that law regulates a State duty to 
grant full reparation internally,1426 it can also be argued that international norms must command, 
accommodate and not hinder complete reparations. It can be considered that this requirement is 
implicitly demanded by international principles, norms and jurisprudence. International norms, 
especially those in the human rights and related fields, that are explicitly contrary to that demand, 
and it must change or be eliminated. If no express impediments of that sort exist, then 
international norms must be interpreted as requiring and permitting full reparations.  
On the other hand, it is unlikely that currently there is a peremptory international norm 
that envisages a right of all victims to demand full reparations ordered by international 
supervisory bodies. In that regard, it can be seen that according to some practice and authors, 
international criminal law or liability regimes may deal with human rights lato sensu or 
international humanitarian law norms that can be used to order limited (in territorial, temporal or 
other terms), facultative or partial compensations in the international or domestic levels in some 
cases. This means that currently there are exceptions to norms on full compensation ordered by 
international bodies or domestic bodies that provide certain extraterritorial protection. If a 
peremptory norm on this matter emerges, contrary norms will not be able to produce legal effects.  
Apart from procedural aspects of international remedies, in substantive terms it is safe to 
consider that a right and a correlative duty to full reparations exist already, because procedural 
limitations do not deny it (given the differences between rights and remedies) and there are 
norms that demand that reparations be full and insufficient reparations be complemented with 
other components.1427 
Taking into account that victims have a right to be fully repaired and to receive all the 
possible components of reparations under human rights law,1428 and that authorities must ensure 
that victims receive reparations, it must be analyzed if State-centered schemes suffice to satisfy 
those requirements. As can be guessed, the answer is a negative one, firstly because the 
possibility that State responsibility is not engaged when non-state violations of human rights are 
                                                     
1426 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., para. 16. 
1427 Cf. Avril McDonald, op. cit., pp. 249-251, 262-263, 270-271, 276; article 75.2 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court; Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, op. cit., 2 July 1993, paras. 19, 
90, 113, 107-108, 124; articles 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 63 of its American counterpart; 
Joint Separate Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade and M. Pachecho Gómez to: Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment of Merits, op. cit., pp. 3, 7-19. 
1428 Cf. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, paras. 8-13; Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, para. 18; Gina Donoso, op. cit.; Pablo 
Saavedra Alessandri, op. cit. 
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committed, coupled with the right of victims to full reparations, indicates that limiting reparations 
to events in which States breach their duties goes against that right. Therefore, it can be said that 
victims have a right to have access to effective remedies and reparations in relation to all 
violations, State or not. Moreover, the legal community endorses the ideas that victims must have 
reparations even when States are not responsible, and that non-state entities can violate human 
rights.1429 Additionally, even if States repair victims, if non-state actors participate in a violation, 
reparations will probably be incomplete if they do not participate in the provision of reparations.  
That victims can and must be repaired by non-state entities that participate in violations 
of human rights and guarantees is confirmed, for instance, in domestic norms that protect victims. 
It is also recognized in soft law, as evinced in the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, according to which responsible non-state entities should 
provide reparations; and in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, according to which victims must have access to 
justice “irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility”1430 and non-state 
offenders may be obliged to repair victims and to compensate the State when it has provided 
reparations. In this sense, Principle 15 indicates: 
“In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such 
party should provide reparation to the victim or compensate the State if the State has already 
provided reparation to the victim.” 
In connection with that principle, Theo van Boven acknowledges that a victim-centered 
orientation demands reparation by non-state violators and protection from them (which are not 
necessarily dependent on State responsibility). According to him: 
“While the Principles and Guidelines are drawn up on the basis of State responsibility, the issue of 
responsibility of non-State actors was also raised in the discussions and negotiations, notably insofar 
as movements or groups exercise effective control over a certain territory and people in that territory, 
but also with regard to business enterprises exercising economic power. It was generally felt that 
non-State actors are to be held responsible for their policies and practices, allowing victims to seek 
redress and reparation on the basis of legal liability and human solidarity, and not on the basis of 
State responsibility. The Principles and Guidelines provide for equal and effective access to justice, 
“irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation” (principle 3 (c)). In 
this connection reference is also made to the following provision: ‘In cases where a person, a legal 
person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should provide reparation 
to the victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the victim’ 
(principle 15, last sentence). It is a victim-oriented perspective that was kept in mind in extending, 
albeit in a modest and cautious way [that is still insufficient, in my opinion], the scope of the Principles 
                                                     
1429 Cf. Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, op. cit., at 3. 
1430 Cf. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, paras. 8-13; Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, para. 3.c. 
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and Guidelines to include the responsibility and liability of non-State actors”1431 (emphasis and 
commentary in italics added). 
This opinion is welcome, given the contingent or frequently limited character of State 
responsibility when non-state entities violate human rights and prevent their exercise.1432 In those 
events, it would be unfair, discriminatory and unreasonable to argue that victims can only be 
protected if a State is responsible. 
Furthermore, pursuant to article 75 of its Statute, the International Criminal Court –first 
international criminal judicial body authorized to order reparations-1433 can order the provision of 
several components of reparations, “including” compensation, restitution and rehabilitation (the 
reference to appropriate reparations in the article could be understood as suggesting that it could 
order other components as well). Additionally, international organizations or other entities that are 
parties to instruments that protect human rights and are subject to the competence of supervisory 
bodies may be ordered or recommended to provide elements of reparations1434 if they are found 
responsible for breaches of human rights obligations. 
In my opinion, frequently to fully repair victims it is necessary to involve non-state 
participants in violations of human rights. While as indicated above this can be done internally, 
the possibility that, due to ignorance of international legal demands, domestic law does not fully 
ensure this, makes it necessary to expressly mention the obligation of authorities to ensure that 
participation, which is based on their positive duties of protection and on the obligation to provide 
remedies with prospects of full remedies. Moreover, whenever international authorities are 
allowed to order reparations and they can supervise non-state conduct, they should indicate the 
need of non-state participation in reparations, which is a requirement that can be implemented by 
States or other authorities that order it (as permitted by the substantive duty to repair, that should 
                                                     
1431 Cf. Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, op. cit., at 3. 
1432 State responsibility concerning non-state violations of human rights has a contingent nature, as seen in Part I 
when examining the notions of the Mastromatteo and Rantsev paradoxes, in sections 2.3 and 3.2, supra. 
1433 Cf. “Reparation for victims”, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Victims/Reparation/, last visited on 09/03/2012, where it is said that “For 
the first time, an international criminal court has the power to order a criminal perpetrator to pay reparation to a victim 
who has suffered as a result of the perpetrator’s criminal actions.” 
1434 See, for instance, articles 41 and 59 of the European Convention on Human Rights; European Court of Human 
Rights, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, Pilot-judgment procedure, 18/03/2011 (especially para. 3), in conjunction with 
European Court of Human Rights, Case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, Judgment, 15 October 2009, Final 
15/01/2010, paras. 35, 78-82, 95-100; Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of 
judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements, adopted by the Committee on 10 May 2006, 964th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies, Rules 6.2, 7 and 9; and Council of Europe, “Execution of Judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights”, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/About_en.asp  (last 
checked: 09/03/2012), where it is mentioned that: “When the consequences of a violation cannot be adequately 
erased by the just satisfaction awarded, the Committee of Ministers makes sure that the domestic authorities take the 
other specific individual measures in favour of the applicant which may be required”. 
 
 
481
bind non-state entities that violate human rights and breach implicit, general and/or specialized 
duties). 
Moreover, in its decision in the Cotton Field case, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights mentioned that according to human rights law States must ensure that victims are repaired 
by non-state entities that violate their rights. In this regard, it mentioned that:  
“[A]ny possible violation of [human] rights” must be “considered and treated as an unlawful act, which, 
as such, may result in the punishment of the person who commits it, as well as the obligation to 
compensate the victims for the harmful consequences”1435 (emphasis added). 
Altogether, according to substantive law, all participants in violations of human rights 
should participate in the provision of reparations to victims, and have inherent duties to repair, 
which flow from their human rights obligations (as examined in Chapter 6).  
If the theory of implicit duties to respect human rights and peremptory law discussed in 
Chapter 6 is not agreed with, it would follow that international human rights obligations of non-
state actors should be created, because otherwise the full reparations that victims are entitled to 
would often be improbably because without breach of duties there would be absence of legal 
responsibility and of non-state duties to provide reparations to victims. 
The importance of the participation of non-state violators of human rights has been taken 
into account by authors as van Boven, John Ruggie or John Knox regarding, for instance, 
concerning the obligation that binds States and functional authorities to provide domestic 
remedies against non-state violations, being those authorities authorized and urged to oblige 
violators to repair in their internal law.1436 In this sense, when analyzing the framework and 
principles for the protection of human rights from corporate abuses designed by Ruggie, John 
Knox mentioned that: 
“[S]tates are required, as part of their duty to protect, to take steps to ensure that those affected by 
corporate human rights abuses within their territory and/or jurisdiction have access to effective 
remedies.”1437 
A study of the components of reparations permits to understand why it is necessary that 
non-state offenders provide reparations to victims for them to be fully repaired.  
                                                     
1435 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, judgment, op. cit., 
para. 252. 
1436 Cf. Theo van Boven, “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, op. cit., at 3; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 23, 26, 44; John H. 
Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. (on remedies); Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, Principles 
25-31; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, op. cit., A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., 
paras. 82-103. 
1437 John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. 
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According to several soft law instruments, case law, doctrine and entities as the 
International Law Commission, the following components of reparation can be identified: 
compensation, satisfaction (which refers to non-pecuniary forms of reparation, as apologies), 
rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition and restitutio in integrum (whenever possible). Apart 
from them, the duties to cease ongoing violations and to not cooperate with the recognition or 
effects of serious violations emerge with responsibility as well but are different from the duty to 
repair (and are contemplated in norms different from those of reparations in the ILC articles on 
the responsibility of States or international organizations). Despite this, these duties are linked to 
reparations, and serve to protect victims, who are entitled to request compliance with them. Their 
breach makes victims vulnerable, due to risks of impunity and persistence of violations.1438  
On the other hand, while the ILC considers that non-repetition of violations is outside the 
scope of reparations, the Basic Principles and doctrine1439 include them in their scope, and the 
ILC itself mentions how it is an aspect that, along with cessation of violations, is related to the 
“restoration and repair of the legal relationship affected by the breach.”1440 In my opinion, non-
repetition has at least two functions: to protect victims from being re-victimized and to prevent 
others from being similarly victimized in the future. Therefore, it can be said to belong both to the 
framework of reparations and to that of other duties arising from responsibility.  
Principle 18 of the Basic Principles underlies the connection between full reparations and 
the provision of all components of reparation. It states that: 
“[F]ull and effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include the following forms: 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.” 
It must be recalled that all the components of reparation must be used proportionately, as 
much as victims need them and whenever their provision is necessary to grant full1441 or integral 
reparations. Therefore, non-state participation in the provision of those components is necessary 
if those components cannot be completely effective and lead to full reparations without that 
participation. According to the International Law Commission: 
                                                     
1438 Cf. articles articles 29-30 and 41 of the ILC articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4) and 29-30 and 42 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of international 
organizations as adopted in 2011 (A/66/10); Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, paras. 18, 22-23. 
1439 Cf. Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Las reparaciones ordenadas y 
el acatamiento de los Estados”, op. cit., at 189 vs. articles 30 and 31 of the ILC articles on the legal responsibility of 
States and international organizations (in the 2011 version). 
1440 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 88, para. 1 of the commentary to art. 30. 
1441 Ibid., at 96, para. 5. of the commentary to article 34; Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “La Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos. Las reparaciones ordenadas y el acatamiento de los Estados”, op. cit., at 189. 
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“[F]ull reparation may only be achieved in particular cases by the combination of different forms of 
reparation. For example, re-establishment of the situation which existed before the breach may not 
be sufficient for full reparation because the wrongful act has caused additional material damage (e.g. 
injury flowing from the loss of the use of property wrongfully seized). Wiping out all the consequences 
of the wrongful act may thus require some or all forms of reparation to be provided, depending on the 
type and extent of the injury that has been caused”1442 (emphasis added). 
The importance of the reparation of victims of non-state violations and their access to 
remedies are elements recognized in practice. For instance, in the Human Rights Council panel 
discussion on human rights and victims of terrorism celebrated in June of 2011, Navi Pillay said: 
“Acknowledging the human rights of victims of terrorism “means recognising their loss as well as their 
rights to reparation, information, justice and a life free of fear, with all the support their require” 
(emphasis added).1443 
In the same event, a spokesperson of Amnesty International mentioned that: 
“Victims of terrorism often do not see those responsible brought to justice and do not receive support 
from the state to redress the harm they have suffered […] Victims must be given adequate 
opportunity to be informed of and involved in investigations and trials.”1444 
 
  
                                                     
1442 Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001, at 95, para. 2 of the commentary of article 34. 
1443 Cf. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations, “Realizing the rights of victims of 
terrorism”, 22 August 2011, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/VictimsOfTerrorism.aspx (last 
checked: 09/03/2012). 
1444 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 8. STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS THAT PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN 
IN RELATION TO NON-STATE CONDUCT 
 
Mechanisms that can be employed to protect human dignity from non-state threats can 
be legal or non-legal, based on adjudicative proceedings (contentious) or not, State-sponsored or 
non-state mechanisms, and have features that permit them to be classified in other ways 
according to other criteria, such as their attempting to address the causes or the consequences 
and effects of non-state violations, among other factors.1445 To be effective and sufficiently protect 
victims, those mechanisms must be accessible, appropriate, and respect standards of due 
process, publicness and legitimacy. 
Generally, mechanisms of protection from and prevention of non-state abuses can be 
regarded as contentious or non-contentious. While international legal doctrine tends to classify 
mechanisms for the settlements of disputes as either based on controversial or diplomatic 
procedures, and the former as jurisdictional or not, in my opinion it is more convenient for a 
general classification to distinguish between contentious mechanisms and others. This is 
because the protection of human rights from non-state threats involves not only settling conflicts 
but also addressing causes or preventing abuses, among other possibilities. Apart from this, it 
must be taken into account that not all contentious procedures in which factual or normative 
issues (pertaining binding or non-binding norms) are discussed are settled by authorities that can 
issue binding decisions .1446  
 
8.1. Types of mechanisms that can be used to protect human dignity from non-state 
abuses 
In my opinion, some non-contentious mechanisms and dynamics that can be used to 
promote or protect human rights and guarantees in relation to non-state entities are: a) the use of 
symbolic, expressive, cultural, psychological or educative effects of norms that protect human 
                                                     
1445 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., at 55; Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, 
A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 9, 26, 82-103; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, A/HRC/17/31, op. cit., principles 25 through 31 with their 
commentaries; Human Rights Commission, General Comment No. 31, op. cit., paras. 8, 13-19. 
1446 On the classifications mentioned in the paragraph, and on contentious non-binding procedures, cf. Antonio 
Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 676-677; Malcolm N. Shaw, International 
Law, 5th edn., Cambridge University Press, 2003, at 914; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 33, The 
Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
CCPR/C/GC/33, 5 November 2008 (especially para. 11); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Baena-
Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Judgment, 2 February 2001, paras. 187-192. 
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dignity, in order to send messages to society, the public and addressees about which conduct is 
prohibited or encouraged, which values are endorsed by law, and which legal interests are worthy 
of being strongly protected. Those messages can contribute to change attitudes and can prompt 
the support of victims or cessation of abuses, and can also raise awareness of protection needs 
and support initiatives that help victims of non-state offenders and discourage violations.  
Another non-contentious mechanism is related to b) mobilizations and boycotts against 
offenders. Due to non-state interests to have a good reputation, conviction and desires to amend 
mistakes and change, or as a result of how non-state interests are affected, those strategies can 
contribute to changing non-state behavior, although it must be borne in mind that they are not 
always effective1447 and that sometimes their use can be abusive, excessive or unlawful. 
Likewise, non-state entities may c) scrutinize the conduct of other actors, and denounce 
what they perceive as violations or participation in abuses. Concerning this, in practice some 
NGOs have attempted to shame State and non-state entities or urge them to behave in a given 
manner in light of human rights and related standards when those entities are about to commit or 
engage in what the non-governmental organizations perceive as conduct that is or can be 
contrary to norms that protect human dignity. 
On the other hand, it is possible to seek to tackle non-state abuses outside judicial or 
quasi-judicial contentious processes settled by a third party by attempting to prevent their 
commission by means of d) addressing the causes and roots of the circumstances and factors 
that, according to non-state actors themselves or to those who examine their conduct, are 
invoked in relation to or lead to the perpetration of violations. Care must be taken to stress that 
those factors in no way justify violations of human dignity, because according to that dignity 
human beings have an inherent and non-conditional worth that forbids treating individuals as 
means to achieve goals. 
In the security context, this strategy has been identified by the High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, that mentioned that a strategy that seeks to tackle challenges 
posed by terrorism–that is contrary to human rights, it must be said- must include: 
“(a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including through 
promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform; working to end 
occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing 
poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse. All of the strategies discussed above 
for preventing other threats have secondary benefits in working to remove some of the causes or 
facilitators of terrorism; 
(b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education and fostering 
public debate. One recent innovation by UNDP, the Arab Human Development Report, has helped 
                                                     
1447 See footnote 957, supra. 
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catalyse a wide ranging debate within the Middle East on the need for gender empowerment, political 
freedom, rules of law and civil liberties”1448 (emphasis not added). 
To address causes of violations, it is possible to spread and disseminate what the norms 
on the protection of human dignity demand and say, or in other words to teach what they regulate 
and why they are so important. It is important to do this because ignorance of humanitarian 
norms may be a factor that sometimes makes law ineffective.  
International humanitarian law, for example, regulates a duty of parties to armed conflicts, 
including non-state ones, to instruct their members and civilians about IHL and disseminate what 
its norms (some of which protect human rights) command and regulate. This is mentioned in 
articles 127 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 144 of the 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 19 of Protocol II 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or 83 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, according to 
which: 
“Dissemination 
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of armed conflict, to 
disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in their respective countries and, 
in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military instruction and to encourage 
the study thereof by the civilian population, so that those instruments may become known to the 
armed forces and to the civilian population. 
2. Any military or civilian authorities who, in time of armed conflict, assume responsibilities in respect 
of the application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall be fully acquainted with the text thereof” 
(emphasis added). 
Teaching about the humanitarian corpus juris can help to increase its effectiveness and 
the likelihood of its respect. In this sense, Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld consider that 
education constitutes one mechanism for the guarantee and implementation of international 
humanitarian law, and it must be added that it can be used in relation to other norms. According 
to them: 
“[An] aspec[t] of implementation and enforcement […] The overriding importance of dissemination of 
humanitarian law, first but not exclusively among the armed forces, can hardly be exaggerated. The 
better the rules of humanitarian law are known, the greater the chance that they will be respected in 
practice. Regrettably, quite a few states continue to lag behind in this respect. In this unfortunate 
situation, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, under the guidance of the ICRC and the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, are running programmes of 
dissemination, both among their members and beyond that circle, and, occasionally, even for the 
armed forces. Needless to say, these activities of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
cannot in any way absolve the authorities from their responsibilities. It may be repeated that at least 
the dissemination of the applicable law is a ‘must’ under Protocol II as well”1449 (emphasis added). 
Apart from addressing some causes of human rights abuses, measures that seek to 
promote and protect those rights can also e) seek to deprive potential offenders of the means 
                                                     
1448 Cf. A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, United Nations, A/59/565, 2004, para. 148. 
1449 Cf. Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War (3rd edn.), op. cit., pp. 139-140. 
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with which they perpetrate offenses or participate in them; deter violations; prevent their 
commission; or address their effects and protect victims.  
Those measures can be implemented and seek to prevent violations, lessen their effects 
and/or protect victims and sanction offenders after violations are committed. 
Examples of measures that aim to tackle the effects of non-state abuses or prevent their 
commission include: freezing assets that can be used in the perpetration of acts of terrorism, 
prohibiting granting safe haven to armed groups that can attack civilians, denying visas or 
residence permissions to violators who want to flee prosecution, self-defense against non-state 
actors that commit major uses of force in order to protect individuals in the attacked State, or 
granting protection to refugees threatened by non-state agents of persecution or to individuals 
that are not refugees but run a real risk of being subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or of being deprived of their lives by non-state entities, among other possibilities. 
Additionally, causes and consequences of non-state abuses can be tackled by means of 
f) international and inter-actor cooperation. 
The importance of cooperation in different areas (judicial, economic, etc.) is recognized, 
for instance, in instruments dealing with transnational organized crime or the protection of the 
rights of persons with disabilities or of economic, social and cultural rights.1450 
Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, for example, 
highlights that cooperation can and must include non-state participants. Their contribution is often 
invaluable, and they can represent affected individuals and contribute with their expertise, which 
are some of the reasons of the importance of inter-actor cooperation. Their contribution is also 
relevant in lawmaking, participation and implementation processes, as revealed in articles 4.3, 29 
or 33 of the Convention. Article 32 also mentions different possible forms of cooperation, although 
in a way that is less demanding and detailed than that of articles 7, 13, 16 through 22, 24 and 26 
through 30 the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime, because it does 
not impose certain specific modes and fields of cooperation but mentions some possible 
components of cooperation, the elements of which must be determined on a case-by-case basis 
taking into account the needs of victims and the effectiveness of law. That article states that:  
                                                     
1450 In that regard, it is possible to identify paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) or articles 2 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 4.2 and 32 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador), or 1, 7, 13, 16 through 22, 24 and 26 through 30 of 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which contains a rich and detailed regulation 
of cooperation in several areas, concerning judicial, administrative, economic, information or technical cooperation, 
mong others. The Protocols to the last Convention also contain similar provisions. 
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“States Parties recognize the importance of international cooperation and its promotion, in support of 
national efforts for the realization of the purpose and objectives of the present Convention, and will 
undertake appropriate and effective measures in this regard, between and among States and, as 
appropriate, in partnership with relevant international and regional organizations and civil society, in 
particular organizations of persons with disabilities. Such measures could include, inter alia: 
(a) Ensuring that international cooperation, including international development programmes, is 
inclusive of and accessible to persons with disabilities; 
(b) Facilitating and supporting capacity-building, including through the exchange and sharing of 
information, experiences, training programmes and best practices; 
(c) Facilitating cooperation in research and access to scientific and technical knowledge; 
(d) Providing, as appropriate, technical and economic assistance, including by facilitating access to 
and sharing of accessible and assistive technologies, and through the transfer of technologies” 
(emphasis added). 
Cooperation in the human rights context must be conducted acknowledging that just as 
non-state entities can be complicit in State abuses or contribute to make States respect and 
protect human rights, for instance urging them to do so, non-state actors may also cooperate with 
other non-state entities in the violation or promotion and protection of human rights. 
Therefore, it is necessary to deal with all entities that can contribute to the perpetration 
and success of violations of human rights. In this sense, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001) command States to combat the financing of terrorism or other forms of 
assistance to it. This is not exclusively a phenomenon related to terrorist actors, and in this regard 
the High-level panel considered that it is necessary to deal with non-state alliances in the context 
of organized crime and violations of legal goods. It said that: 
“Organized crime is increasingly operating through fluid networks rather than more formal hierarchies. 
This form of organization provides criminals with diversity, flexibility, low visibility and longevity. 
Connections among different networks became a major feature of the organized crime world during 
the 1990s, thus creating networks of networks. The agility of such networks stands in marked 
contrast to the cumbersome sharing of information and weak cooperation in criminal investigations 
and prosecutions on the part of States.”1451 
Additionally, for it to successfully protect shared legal goods, cooperation must not only 
involve several actors but also integrate several normative systems and levels of governance. 
This permits to make up for shortcomings and limitations of some actors and systems and to 
provide a more robust protection of human dignity. 
Human rights and humanitarian guarantees can be promoted or defended vis-à-vis non-
state entities in many other ways that are not based on contentious judicial or quasi-judicial 
processes. They also include g) peace-making or peace-keeping endeavors, that are also 
relevant when peace is or can be disrupted by non-state entities, that often participate in armed 
conflicts, in which human rights and guarantees are constantly threatened, and in other conflicts 
                                                     
1451 Cf. A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, United Nations, A/59/565, 2004, para. 170. 
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that do not reach the threshold of armed conflicts but pose threats to those rights as well. 
Because of this, the facilitation and conclusion of peace-agreements can contribute to the 
promotion and protection of human rights.  
That protection can also be enhanced by h) the adoption of commitments and standards 
that seek to protect human dignity. They can be binding or not, as happens with some 
Memorandums of Understanding or some codes of conduct. While binding instruments can be 
supported by mechanisms of coercion and implementation and by official endorsement, non-
binding standards can still have expressive effects, be heeded and taken into account by different 
social and legal actors, be invoked by affected persons, and contribute to change attitudes.  
Therefore, unilateral commitments and norms on non-state behavior can contribute to 
shaping non-state conduct and reactions to it. When those regulations are found in jus gentium 
and are binding, not only victims but all members of the world society have a legal entitlement to 
request protection from violations and to demand that responsible entities stop their abuses, 
provide guarantees of non-repetition, and repair victims, because human rights obligations have 
an erga omnes or erga omnes partes character. On the other hand, some actors may be entitled 
to employ countermeasures when human rights obligations are violated, as discussed in articles 
48 and 54 of the ILC articles on State responsibility or 49 and 57 of the ILC articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations (2011 version). 
Non-state human rights standards and commitments tend to be manifested in codes of 
conduct, as those adopted by corporations or other entities, such as NGOs; or in agreements that 
recognize or uphold human rights and guarantees, such as an agreement entered into by 
Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement and the United Nations or the San José Agreement 
between the FMLN and El Salvador. 
Another important way in which human rights and guarantees can be protected from non-
state abuses (which may sound ironic at first, but is often necessary) is through i) restrictions of 
fundamental and human rights or suspensions of human rights obligations when all the 
requirements imposed by international and internal law are met. As indicated before, law 
requires, among others, that those measures are necessary, proportionate and adopted to protect 
some permissible objectives, including human rights and other goals that may be directly related 
to or at least compatible with the protection of human rights, such as peace and security. 
Human rights can also be protected from non-state abuses in j) regimes of accountability 
in which violators can be sanctioned or that condition the exercise of some non-human rights 
entitlements or benefits either on the respect of certain standards or on the fulfillment of some 
requirements. 
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For example, to enjoy a consultative status and corresponding benefits in accordance 
with ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, non-governmental organizations must “be concerned with 
matters falling within the competence” of the ECOSOC, have purposes that are compatible with 
those of the United Nations, have recognized standing or a representative character, possess a 
“democratically adopted constitution” and some organizational features, have a representative 
structure and “mechanisms of accountability to [their] members”, and have democratic decision-
making processes, among others. Otherwise, their consultative status may be denied, suspended 
or withdrawn. 
Regimes of accountability may be imposed on non-state entities or created by them, can 
be based on duties or on non-binding standards, and can protect the interests or rights of third 
parties. In this regard, for instance, NGOs are advised to be accountable to their donors and 
members and provide a framework to ensure this. They and other actors can even determine, for 
instance, that failure to act in accordance with human rights demands permits affected individuals 
to denounce violations before bodies appointed by those actors. 
On the other hand, regimes that contemplate some adverse effects of violations and 
sanction them do not necessarily have to be based on international legal obligations, but can also 
be based on the respect of soft law commitments. In this sense, for instance, there is a possibility 
of removal from the non-binding Global Compact initiative, which is applicable to those 
companies that fail to submit an annual progress report on its implementation or to inform about 
alleged systematic or egregious abuses they are accused of having committed.1452 About this 
mechanism, Ban-Ki Moon declared “more than 2,400 companies [have been removed] from the 
Compact for failing to report to their stakeholders on progress they have made.”1453  
There are other mechanisms to promote human rights standards apart from reporting, 
such as the publication of failures of non-state actors that adhere to them to comply with them. 
Another example of a regime of “supervision” of soft law is that of the monitoring initiatives of 
Geneva Call regarding non-binding norms that seek to regulate the conduct of even non-state 
entities in relation to a “Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel 
Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action.”1454 
An additional mechanism that can be used to seek to protect human dignity from non-
state entities is k) interpreting norms and principles in its light and striving to make normative 
                                                     
1452 Cf. “859 Companies Delisted for Failure to Communicate on Progress”, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/8-02-01-2010 (last checked on: 12/03/2012). 
1453 Cf. “Crucial for more businesses to join UN corporate responsibility pact, says Ban”, available at: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38786&Cr=business&Cr1 (last checked: 12/03/2012). 
1454 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 101. 
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manifestations compatible with it. For instance, domestic norms that can be used to protect 
individuals can be interpreted in light of international human rights law and principles on the 
protection of human dignity, to ensure that they are protected from non-state abuses. 
Another way in which the respect of norms that protect human dignity can be promoted in 
regard to non-state entities, or in which violations attributable to them can be discouraged or 
addressed, is through l) non-contentious means of dispute settlement or solution, such as 
negotiation, mediation or conciliation, in which non-state entities can participate or their conduct 
can be examined. They do not necessarily have to apply binding norms. 
According to the “Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Coalition”, those means permit to 
“bridge” accessibility gaps that prevent individuals from seeking protection, allowing them to 
request the declaration (and condemnation) of the existence of threats or violations, and offer 
venues for the resolution of disputes regarding them.1455  
It is also important to mention that those mechanisms can be found in domestic law; and 
that due to the shortcomings of procedures with merely recommendatory outcomes, they can and 
must be complemented by judicial mechanisms or by strategies based on binding norms, to 
ensure that even if the outcome of those strategies is not binding, it will be more persuasive 
because of its being based on or supported by obligatory norms or mechanisms of protection. 
Similarly, it is possible to use m) non-contentious supervision, examination and follow-up 
mechanisms that seek to promote and/or protect norms or standards (binding or not) that directly 
or indirectly demand protection from non-state violations. That supervision can be international, 
as happens with reporting mechanisms, or domestic, conducted for instance by human rights 
institutions (public or private with public functions) that can contribute to the protection of human 
rights from non-state violations and comply with the duty of States to protect and promote human 
rights even if affected individuals do not request protection. The use of these mechanisms can 
identify problems, areas where legislative or other action is needed, or victims who must be 
repaired. Therefore, these mechanisms can have a preventive or an ex post facto character, and 
can lead to recommendations or conclusions with strong legal effects. Interestingly, judicial 
entities can conduct some of these mechanisms, as happens with advisory opinions. 
Additionally, the conduct of n) investigation and research permits to obtain information on 
violations or challenges and required action of a legislative, enforcement or other nature. They 
can be vital components of the promotion of human rights and guarantees and be taken into 
                                                     
1455 Cf. Corporate Responsibility, the corporate responsibility coalition, “Protecting rights, repairing harm: How state-
based non-judicial mechanisms can help fill gaps in existing frameworks for the protection of human rights of people 
affected by corporate activities”, op. cit., pp. 1, 11. 
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account to strengthen their framework, because they permit to study how to make regulations and 
guarantees more effective or complete, how to better protect victims, or which situations must be 
addressed, among others. 
On the other hand, contentious mechanisms can be resorted to: ex post facto, 1) after a 
violation takes place, and end up in the declaration of the responsibility of those that that have 
breached human rights duties and the order that they repair victims; or ex-ante, 2) with 
preventative purposes, that is to say to prevent violations, as happens with precautionary or 
provisional measures, for instance.  
Additionally, it can be said that the contentious protection of human rights and of 
humanitarian global legal goods can be national or international. 
The contentious protection of victims of non-state violations can be indirect, when State 
conduct is examined taking into account its duties to prevent or respond to non-state violations, 
and if it is successful it can protect individuals directly from State breaches and indirectly protect 
them non-state violations that States should prevent/have prevented or responded to. 
Interestingly, State duties can sometimes be invoked in contentious procedures to prevent non-
state violations, as indicated in the next paragraph. Additionally, it is necessary to recall that 
direct protection from States alone can sometimes fail to protect some victims or ensure that they 
receive full reparation. 
On the other hand, it must be added that both direct and indirect mechanisms of 
protection from non-state violations can have preventive or remedial (ex post facto) functions and 
effects. Concerning indirect mechanisms of protection, for instance, States or functional 
authorities can be asked by a national or international judicial or quasi-judicial entity to not expel 
individuals to places where their human rights can violated by non-state entities or where these 
actors can create risks of violations, as can be seen in the jurisprudence of the Committee 
against Torture and the European Court of Human Rights,1456 the latter of which considered in the 
case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom that: 
“Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed [to not be tortured or subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment], Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger 
emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown 
that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by 
providing appropriate protection […] [individuals must not even be exposed to] harm [that] would 
emanate not from the intentional acts or omission of public authorities or non-State bodies [as may 
                                                     
1456 See footnote 742; Committee Against Torture, Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, op. cit., paras. 6.4 through 7. 
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happen when they are at risk] “due to the direct and indirect actions of the parties to [a] conflict”1457 
(emphasis added). 
Additionally, contentious and non-contentious mechanisms of promotion and protection of 
human rights that can be used to address non-state conduct can be international, domestic or 
transnational. Additionally, they can be public or non-state mechanisms, as for example 
arbitration or some conciliation procedures. Moreover, they can also be or indirect or direct, 
preventive or remedial. 
In that regard, there can be quasi-judicial or judicial dispute settlement mechanisms that 
are contentious, such as arbitration (that can be domestic or international, or take place in 
accordance to lex privata), and there can be procedures of motu proprio investigations of alleged 
violations that can initiate with no application of victims being necessary, as happens with 
domestic or international criminal procedures or with investigations conducted by human rights 
institutions that can adopt recommendations or binding decisions. 
Additionally, non-state behavior may be examined in processes that are not based on the 
examination of potential, imminent or past breaches of duties, but rather on non-binding 
regulations that can be examined and guaranteed (as far as this is possible). One example of this 
is the possibility that National Contact Points examine corporate conduct in light of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which have human rights components. 
It is interesting to note that the use of contentious mechanisms does not exclude that of 
non-contentious ones, and may even complement or encourage it.  
Furthermore, because of the importance of the protection of human dignity, the synergy 
and complementarity of different mechanisms that can be used to achieve it must be encouraged, 
especially because each of them has weaknesses and strengths not possessed by the others. 
This is illustrated by an example, in which a complaint filed by Friends of the Earth Norway and 
the Forum on Environment and Development against Cermaq ASA regarding alleged violations of 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ended in an “agreement […] finalized after 
mediation in the new Contact Point for responsible business, Norway’s National Contact Point for 
the OECD Guidelines”.1458 
It is important to note how, in addition to their being able to participate as defendants in 
contentious processes with preventive or remedial purposes (or a combination thereof), if 
lawmakers so decide or at least permit, non-state actors can also formally or informally contribute 
                                                     
1457 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, 28 June 2011, 
paras. 213, 281-282. 
1458 Cf, “Agreement on OECD complaint”, Reuters, 11/08/2011, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/11/idUS43037+11-Aug-2011+HUG20110811 (last checked: 12/03/2012). 
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in contentious mechanisms that can offer an indirect or direct protection from non-state threats. 
That contribution may consist in filing applications and presenting claims; representing victims; or 
providing information and opinions related to facts, law or specialized knowledge, for instance as 
experts, witnesses, representatives of victims; or through amicus curiae, reports or shadow 
reports, among other possibilities. 
These (and other) forms of participation are not limited to public judicial remedial 
procedures that examine allegations of breaches of law, and therefore can also take place in 
some mechanisms with features of confidentiality; in those that examine non-binding norms; or 
can serve to request or support requests related to the prevention or sanction of violations, for 
instance. In this way, for example, two non-state entities, Amnesty International (an NGO) and 
Friends of the Earth International (a “grassroots environmental network”), cooperating between 
themselves:  
“[F]iled an official complaint against oil giant Shell for breaches of basic standards for responsible 
business set out by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) […] The 
complaint was filed with UK and Netherlands government contact points for the OECD […] Shell will 
be under scrutiny for its environmental and human rights impacts during a hearing in the Dutch 
Parliament on the company’s activities in Nigeria”.1459 
This example illustrates how mechanisms can be supported by non-state cooperation 
and be complemented by or lead to the use of other strategies of protection and promotion. This 
is, in turn, compatible with the idea that it is important to combine strategies that integrate soft 
and hard law and persuasive and coercive components, and to have a comprehensive approach 
that includes different mechanisms and norms that are directly or indirectly relevant for the 
effective protection of human dignity. For example, norms and mechanisms on environmental 
law, criminal law or the prohibition of the use of force can sometimes help to protect human rights 
and guarantees. 
 
8.2. Possible features of mechanisms that can promote or protect human dignity in 
relation to non-state actors 
The distinction between contentious and non-contentious mechanisms to promote and 
protect human dignity and to repair damages must not lead to the consideration that they are 
completely different and unrelated, insofar as mechanisms that can be classified in one of those 
categories share some relevant traits with some from the other category. Therefore, it must be 
                                                     
1459 Cf. Amnesty International, “Shell accused over misleading figures on Nigeria oil spills”, 25/01/2011, available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/shell-accused-over-misleading-figures-nigeria-oil-spills-2011-01-25 
(last checked: 12/03/2012). 
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explored which are some of those traits that mechanisms can have regardless of their 
contentious character or lack thereof. 
In the first place, mechanisms can have preventive or remedial purposes or have both of 
them. In this way, for instance, precautionary and provisional measures or urgent appeals can be 
adopted by some judicial or quasi-judicial bodies or by special rapporteurs or working groups, and 
seek to contribute to the prevention of conduct or effects that are contrary to human rights and 
guarantees or international legal goods.1460  
The same purpose can be sought by State or other entities by means of denouncing 
threats of violations; regulating non-state behavior in order to encourage conduct that is 
consistent with the respect of human dignity and discourage behavior contrary to it; or striving to 
generate material, cultural and psychological conditions and factors that are conducive to the 
respect of human dignity, for example. Moreover, as indicated above, international entities, be 
them experts or working groups, when conducting contentious procedures or not, can often adopt 
preventive measures, for example urgent appeals,1461 and request protection from non-state 
threats if their mandates implicitly or expressly permit them to do so, asking authorities to grant 
that protection, which is based on positive duties of authorities and horizontal human rights 
effects. Moreover, they can sometimes interact with non-state actors directly, and can so logically 
ask them not to violate human rights or to cease ongoing violations.1462 
Additionally, contentious and other mechanisms of promotion and protection of human 
rights can serve to protect from non-state abuses either directly or indirectly. In this regard, some 
(national or international) judicial or non-judicial bodies and entities may directly request or order 
non-state actors to do or refrain from doing something for human rights to be respected or 
protected (e.g. the International Criminal Court, national judges, or the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities can do this).1463 Conversely, some mechanisms may be used to 
request or order certain actor to protect human rights from non-state abuses because it either has 
a duty to do so or is urged to protect despite not having a binding obligation. NGOs, for instance, 
                                                     
1460 Cf. ICJ, Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 468; articles 41 
of the Statute, 63.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; 
Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council of August 2008, paras. 43-45 (“Urgent 
Appeals”). 
1461 Ibid. 
1462 Cf. Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council of August 2008, paras. 43-45, 
81-83. 
1463 Cf. articles 43.6, 54.3.f, 56.1, 59.5, and 68.b of the Rome Statute of the ICC, or 4, 11 and 12 of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
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can request this in their statements and press releases, and so can States and other entities 
within or outside contentious mechanisms ending in a binding decision or a recommendation. 
This, in turn, reveals how mechanisms of promotion or protection can be based on duties 
or non-binding regulations (for example, as the process before the National Contact Points in 
regard to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises).1464 Sometimes both types of 
regulation can be taken into account when using a mechanism of protection or promotion of 
human rights.  
On the other hand, those mechanisms may have an obligatory outcome, as happens e.g. 
with judgments, conciliation or normative legal agreements entered into; or they can have non-
binding results, as happens with non-binding agreements or recommendations adopted by 
supervisory international bodies or some mechanisms handled by some human rights institutions 
or entities (as States, international organizations, NGOs, etc.) that seek to shame alleged State or 
non-state offenders.  
To this it must be added that the non-binding character of the outcome of a mechanism 
neither prevents it from having binding legal effects indirectly nor implies that the norms on which 
the mechanism is based or which it reinforces have to be non-binding. For instance, quasi-judicial 
bodies that can only adopt recommendations can examine human rights obligations. Both 
obligatory and voluntary mechanisms could be handled properly or be motivated by extra-legal 
(e.g. political) considerations (reasonable or not from a non-legal perspective), especially in a 
field in which activism plays an important role.1465 This is one of the reasons why the distinction 
between lex lata and lex ferenda is so important and cannot be ignored. 
On the other hand, previous ideas found in this section reveal that it is possible for non-
state entities to contribute and/or cooperate to the promotion and protection of human rights. This 
confirms that they may not only violate them and that non-state entities, both those with public or 
private purposes, can contribute to that promotion and protection. A wide non-state participation 
is important because each actor may have its own temptations, flaws, shortcomings and 
limitations, and it is important for others to check them and complement their initiatives in an open 
and democratic way from social, economic and legal points of view.1466 
Regarding the ways in which non-state entities can contribute to the protection of human 
dignity by cooperating with other entities, it can be said that they can, for instance, file claims, 
                                                     
1464 Cf. Jernej Letnar Cernic, “The 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, ASIL Insights, 
op. cit. 
1465 Cf. George J. Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, and Peter Juviler, “Rethinking the Human Rights 
Universe”, op. cit., pp. 335-337; Amartya Sen, op. cit., pp. 343-344. 
1466 Cf. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
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represent victims, denounce violations, shame alleged offenders (States or not), request 
protection, or set in motion mechanisms of protection of lex privata (such as processes, sanctions 
or exclusions against perceived offenders of regulations that can and should have a human rights 
dimension). Additionally, non-state actors can help to administer, implement or oversee 
regimes1467 that benefit the exercise of human rights directly or indirectly. Accordingly, it is also 
possible to classify mechanisms of promotion and protection based on the role played (or not) by 
non-state entities. 
Moreover, the study of some mechanisms conducted above also reveals that human 
dignity can be protected in different ways, not limited to judicial contexts or to international and 
national levels. In this sense, for instance, the transnational, domestic or international conduct of 
non-state actors operating outside (but not necessarily against) public legal systems may be 
manifested in the adoption of regulations or manifestations (e.g. condemnations of violations) that 
permit to enhance or trigger the protection of human dignity from non-state abuses.  
On the other hand, judicial and non-judicial mechanisms can be to expressly or implicitly 
defend human rights, and can be found in international, domestic, transnational or private 
normative ambits. This is confirmed by norms and practices on universal jurisdiction; the 
extraterritorial protection of human rights; transnational litigation; or some domestic norms, such 
as some found in the United States of America, Colombia and the United Kingdom, which 
demand or permit legal protection from non-state violations of human rights.1468 
The multiplicity of levels and actors that can contribute to protect human dignity is crucial 
because every legal level can have shortcomings that make it necessary for others to 
complement or reinforce the protection they can offer, especially in a globalized world where gaps 
and lack of coordination can be taken advantage of by actors to elude control.  
Those actors can do this for different reasons, including: first, the possible 1) weakness 
of some authorities that act alone and lack the freedom, power or resources possessed by 
violators. To counter this, the cooperation of other actors can help to make up for those deficits 
and offer effective protection of shared legal goods. Absence of control can also be conscious 
and obey to 2) (selfish) interests, support of offenders, bias or mistakes in one level of 
governance, legal system or by one actor. For this reason, the framework of the effective 
protection of human dignity cannot rely exclusively on one of them, and in practice different actors 
                                                     
1467 Cf. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 34-38; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First 
Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors: Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and Scope of 
Project and Legal Issues, The Hague Conference, 2010, pp. 13-17. 
1468 Cf. August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 53-61; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 
2007, pp. 1255-1260. 
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and mechanisms must complement each other and be coordinated in light of shared legal goods, 
preferably in a coordinated fashion that operates in practice in a global legal space with 
substantive (shared interests) and procedural (concerning complementarity) dimensions. 
It must also be mentioned that the protection of international legal goods in domestic law 
or lex privata can be based on the protection of those legal goods qua international legal goods, 
for instance when jus gentium is received in internal normative systems; or it can be indirect, for 
example when domestic law is interpreted in light of international law. This acknowledges that 
domestic authorities and certain non-state actors can contribute to the observance of international 
law. It is quite important that they are able to do so because of the imperfections and limitations of 
jus gentium. Apart from protecting international law, actors can also protect global legal goods 
that are shared by different legal systems and actors, which are sometimes shaped by their 
interaction and are commonly protected in different normative systems and actions. 
Continuing with the analysis of features of mechanisms for the protection of human 
dignity, it is convenient to illustrate how mechanisms, even judicial, quasi-judicial or adjudication-
based ones, among others, can and must interact and complement each other for that protection 
to be effective, and why all the features and forms of protection discussed in this Chapter are 
relevant.  
One first example is found in article 31 of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, which aims to tackle actions of non-state entities that can affect 
human rights and operate in an effective or surreptitious way in the current globalized context, 
although they are able to participate even outside it. For those reasons, it is necessary to tackle 
their challenges with cooperation strategies and in clever ways that integrate different initiatives. 
After mentioning different mechanisms, related to law-enforcement, protection of victims, 
and cooperation and assistance, which can be ex post facto measures but can also have a 
preventive dimension, article 31 of that Convention completes the picture mentioning preventive 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, and stressing the importance of cooperation in which State 
and non-state entities participate, of research and evaluation, of education and dissemination, 
and of information. All of those elements are important for the protection of (shared) legal goods, 
and many of them can address some causes of crimes and violations. Strategies that seek to 
regulate non-state conduct (e.g. adopting codes of conduct) employed by judicial and non-judicial 
authorities and entities are also highlighted. As can be seen, that article stresses the importance 
of combining different mechanisms that have been examined in this Chapter. It reads: 
“Prevention 
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1. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and evaluate national projects and to establish and 
promote best practices and policies aimed at the prevention of transnational organized crime. 
2. States Parties shall endeavour, in accordance with fundamental principles of their domestic law, to 
reduce existing or future opportunities for organized criminal groups to participate in lawful markets 
with proceeds of crime, through appropriate legislative, administrative or other measures. These 
measures should focus on: 
(a) The strengthening of cooperation between law enforcement agencies or prosecutors and relevant 
private entities, including industry; 
(b) The promotion of the development of standards and procedures designed to safeguard the 
integrity of public and relevant private entities, as well as codes of conduct for relevant professions, in 
particular lawyers, notaries public, tax consultants and accountants; 
(c) The prevention of the misuse by organized criminal groups of tender procedures conducted by 
public authorities and of subsidies and licences granted by public authorities for commercial activity; 
(d) The prevention of the misuse of legal persons by organized criminal groups; such measures could 
include: 
(i) The establishment of public records on legal and natural persons involved in the establishment, 
management and funding of legal persons; 
(ii) The introduction of the possibility of disqualifying by court order or any appropriate means for a 
reasonable period of time persons convicted of offences covered by this Convention from acting as 
directors of legal persons incorporated within their jurisdiction; 
(iii) The establishment of national records of persons disqualified from acting as directors of legal 
persons; and 
(iv) The exchange of information contained in the records referred to in subparagraphs  (d) (i) and (iii) 
of this paragraph with the competent authorities of other States Parties. 
3. States Parties shall endeavour to promote the reintegration into society of persons convicted of 
offences covered by this Convention. 
4. States Parties shall endeavour to evaluate periodically existing relevant legal instruments and 
administrative practices with a view to detecting their vulnerability to misuse by organized criminal 
groups. 
5. States Parties shall endeavour to promote public awareness regarding the existence, causes and 
gravity of and the threat posed by transnational organized crime. Information may be disseminated 
where appropriate through the mass media and shall include measures to promote public 
participation in preventing and combating such crime. 
6. Each State Party shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the name and 
address of the authority or authorities that can assist other States Parties in developing measures to 
prevent transnational organized crime. 
7. States Parties shall, as appropriate, collaborate with each other and relevant international and 
regional organizations in promoting and developing the measures referred to in this article. This 
includes participation in international projects aimed at the prevention of transnational organized 
crime, for example by alleviating the circumstances that render socially marginalized groups 
vulnerable to the action of transnational organized crime” (emphasis added). 
A second example is the decision adopted by the Human Rights Council in Resolution 
A/HRC/RES/17/4 of 6 July 2011 to contribute to address the challenges to human rights created 
by potential corporate abuses, among other ways by means of establishing a Forum on Business 
and Human Rights, whose work is to be guided by the working group on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. It is entrusted with: 
“[D]iscuss[ing] trends and challenges in the implementation of the Guiding Principles and promot[ing] 
dialogue and cooperation on issues linked to business and human rights, including challenges faced 
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in particular sectors, operational environments or in relation to specific rights or groups, as well as 
identifying good practices”. 
Participation in the Forum is, in turn: 
“[O]pen to the participation of States, United Nations mechanisms, bodies and specialized agencies, 
funds and programmes, intergovernmental organizations, regional organizations and mechanisms in 
the field of human rights, national human rights institutions and other relevant bodies, transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, business associations, labour unions, academics and 
experts in the field of business and human rights, representatives of indigenous peoples and non-
governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council; the Forum 
shall also be open to other non-governmental organizations whose aims and purposes are in 
conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including 
affected individuals and groups, based on arrangements, including Economic and Social Council 
resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996, and practices observed by the Commission on Human Rights, 
through an open and transparent accreditation procedure in accordance with the Rules of Procedure 
of the Human Rights Council”1469 (emphasis added). 
In turn, the functions of the working group are related to the dissemination of principles 
on corporations and human rights, the examination of issues related to their implementation and 
of recommendations regarding them, and to their effectiveness. Those tasks must be conducted 
in cooperation and contact with State and non-state entities of various socio-legal levels,1470 can 
be considered to be embedded in a campaign that seeks to deal with the challenges to human 
rights and guarantees posed by a particular type of non-state entities; and integrates strategies of 
education, research and studies, dissemination of information and cooperation with actors and 
different legal systems and levels of governance. Even though those tasks and actions are based 
on a normative framework that, unfortunately, largely fails to recognize the binding character of 
corporate human rights obligations (with the possible obvious exception of jus cogens duties), 
their combination constitutes a good strategy because it is multifaceted and acknowledges that in 
order to deal with the threats posed to humanitarian legal goods by non-state entities, isolated 
actions are insufficient and different dimensions must be included.  
This confirms that strategies that seek to protect human dignity from non-state threats 
cannot be reductionist or limited and must integrate different actors, given the multidimensionality 
of problems, sources, aspects and implications of the challenges, all of which must be addressed; 
and also due to the presence of alliances, cooperation among offenders and their taking 
advantage of social opportunities, legal gaps and lack of coordination. 
The interplay of different mechanisms and the importance of not limiting strategies of 
promotion and protection to just some of them can also be gleaned from the Declaration and 
Programme of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance of 2001. It exhorts to tackle the roots and sources of 
                                                     
1469 Cf. Human Rights Council, Resolution 17/4, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, A/HRC/RES/17/4, 6 July 2011, paras. 12-13. 
1470 Ibid. para. 6. 
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violations; to educate, instruct and train; to permit non-state cooperation, bearing in mind the 
roles and responsibilities of States and the possible violations that can be committed by other 
entities, whose respect of human dignity must be ensured; to use both persuasion and culture 
strategies and enforcement measures and legal proceedings; and to having a “social and 
international order” of protection of human rights and human dignity in which non-state entities 
can contribute.1471 
To conclude, it is convenient to mention that all measures and mechanisms that can be 
used to protect human dignity from non-state violations and to regulate non-state burdens or 
obligations must comply with the conditions of respecting fundamental rights, the principle of 
legality, peremptory law, and other requirements of legal capacities of non-state entities (see 
Chapter 5, supra). When employed, the conditions of measures of restrictions of rights and 
suspension of duties must be satisfied as well. After all, it is necessary and obligatory to protect 
human dignity from non-state abuses, as those that constitute terrorism, but this must be done 
respecting the rule of law and human rights. 
On the other hand, any State or non-state entity that uses ab initio permissible (lawful) 
mechanisms against potential or actual non-state abuses must take measures to avoid affecting 
human and fundamental rights. Additionally, it must be stressed that entities targeted by 
sanctions still retain any human rights duties they have, with which they must comply.1472 
  
                                                     
1471 Cf. Durban Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 2001, paras. 10-22, 115 of the Declaration, and paragraphs 57, 
74, 93, 95, 104, 112, 213 and 215 of the Programme of Action. 
1472 Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8, op. cit., paras. 3-15. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
If practitioners and legal scholars ignore human needs due to their being too fond of 
some abstract theories and fictions about what human rights are or not, ignoring what their 
content is, what their foundation demands and how they are affected in practice, they do a 
disservice to human beings, because their knowledge and role gives them the opportunity to 
contribute to improve the legal protection of human dignity, which is often missed. This happens 
when some argue that international law ‘cannot’ or ‘should not’ directly protect individuals from 
non-state violations. This is reminiscent of so many cases throughout history, depicted among 
others in the painting “the unwed mother” by Jean-Louis Forain, which conveys the helplessness 
of someone affected by law as applied by bored and disinterested legal practitioners that may not 
care about her fate and may be more concerned about their private interests -as Leo Tolstoy 
depicted in his novel “Resurrection”-,1473 about theories they learned and blindly accept, or about 
formalities and complex but unnecessary legal theories. 
 
 
‘The unwed mother’, by Jean-Louis Forain. Bristol Museum & Art Gallery 
 
In light of these considerations, in my opinion it is not acceptable to deny individuals an 
effective protection of human dignity from violations attributable to non-state entities. This 
demands going beyond the paradigm of exclusive-State duties, which often fails to offer 
                                                     
1473 Cf. Leo Tolstoy, The Awakening/The Resurrection. 
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protection to some victims, has been overcome in some cases, and is not required under 
international law, as can be revealed by its analysis and that of the practical and theoretical 
evolution of human rights movements and of the international corpus juris, that encompasses 
human rights and guarantees.  
Certainly, a State-centered scheme could go against the nature of human rights and 
guarantees, making them relevant only in certain relations instead of always benefiting 
individuals. This is acknowledged in practice. For instance, when it is said that the Security 
Council must respect human rights for its resolutions to be consistent with the principle of legality 
(given the presence of human rights in the Charter of the United Nations and in customary and 
peremptory law), it is implicitly recognized that such non-state body can violate human rights, the 
relevance of which does not depend on the presence of States –logically, States must respect 
human rights even when implementing those resolutions, and retain their human rights duties-. 
Moreover, as commented in Chapter 8, international law and other normative systems 
can and often do protect human dignity from non-state threats, sometimes unconsciously or 
implicitly,1474 for instance implementing civil and criminal norms that protect human rights directly 
or indirectly. The norms of those systems must be compatible with human rights and guarantees, 
and ought to be interpreted in their light.  
The protection of human rights and guaratees can also be formal or informal, promoted 
by States or by other actors, substantive or procedural, and legal or extra-legal, but must always 
seek to effectively protect their foundation: human dignity, which all actors must respect. Other 
values and principles, such as liberty, equality, autonomy or integrity, are closely related to dignity 
and must be protected as well, but their defense can never be contrary to the inherent worth of 
individuals, and the human rights system cannot be perverted by theories or norms that ignore it.  
If human dignity is not fully and effectively protected by law, there may be different 
negative implications, including: firstly, implementing law in accordance with arguments that hold 
that the protection from non-state violations is not within the scope of the legal framework of the 
protection of human rights. This could lead to ignoring legal possibilities, the demands of their 
foundations, and normative and practical developments. If those theories are believed in by 
practitioners and lawmakers, they may deny protection to human beings who suffer or are about 
to be attacked by non-state entities based on that belief. This can impede the full protection of 
human beings, demanded by their non-conditional dignity, and discriminates against some 
victims based on the identity of violators, ignoring the non-conditional nature of human dignity. 
                                                     
1474 Domestic law and norms that are not originally international ones but share their legal goods can protect 
individuals against non-state threats consciously or spontaneously. 
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Those theories can thus become self-fulfilling apocalyptic prophecies, and their mistakes must 
therefore be exposed. 
For that reason, it must be acknowledged that individuals can be protected from non-
state entities through different mechanisms, thanks to the contribution of different actors, and 
based on different norms (see Chapters 6 and 8); and that their protection must often be 
extended de lege ferenda due to the presence of some procedural and substantive limitations 
and gaps in positive law, which must be detected. 
Furthermore, not only norms but also legal theories can have expressive functions and 
practical implications. In connection with this, it must be said that theories that explore when and 
why human dignity must be protected from non-state actors have the potential to change practice, 
especially when they explain why denying protection goes against human dignity, equality and 
obligations of authorities, as explained in Part I.  
Additionally, denials of protection of human rights from non-state abuses send a 
dangerous and wrong message. Victims may feel abandoned and potential non-state offenders 
emboldened due to their belief that their violations are not considered unlawful and are tolerated 
or even ‘permitted’ under jus gentium, which goes against the idea that their abuses are legally 
relevant insofar as they affect essential legal goods.  
According to theories such as that of the Lotus approach, according to which what law 
does not prohibit is permitted, it could be considered that non-state conduct that is not expressly 
prohibited could be permitted. However, this is conclusion is at odds with legal values and 
principles, and the fact that there may be different ways in which conduct can be addressed by 
law, as argued by Simma, indicates that if an act is not expressly prohibited it does not 
necessarily mean that it is permitted. Chapter 6 argues why non-state actors have implicit duties 
to not harm and to respect peremptory human rights. Moreover, it is possible to use mechanisms 
that are not based on obligations to defend human rights, granted that the principle of legality and 
fundamental rights are respected.1475 
When these issues are examined, it is possible to observe that some persons (or sides) 
focus exclusively or excessively on the wrongdoings of some entities and ignore (consciously or 
not) those committed by others, or even excuse them or consider them to be permissible! 
Unlike what those arguments actually suggest, all victims and individuals deserve 
protection and respect because they have an identical human nature and worth. Human rights 
                                                     
1475 Cf. Declaration of Judge Simma to: International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, op. cit., paras. 8-10. 
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and solidarity with all victims call for that protection, and should be given preference over criteria 
of selectiveness and exclusion.  
Therefore, indirect and direct mechanisms of protection must be used to protect victims 
of all abuses, State or not, and it is important to not cling to misleading theories with purposes, 
contexts and origins that may have changed.1476 If some objections to that protection reflected 
positive law or established doctrine, then they would have to change, because human dignity is 
far more important than narrow and exclusivist theories and norms that answer to particular 
ideologies and theories.  
It is ironic that some of those who consider that meta-legal considerations, as some 
natural law or other considerations, must be excluded and are irrelevant, unconsciously or 
deliberately hold fast to different theoretical dogmas that are not immutable.1477 Human dignity, 
more important than theories in practice, must be protected in a complete, non-conditional and 
non-discriminatory fashion, which demands considering that the identity of participants of 
violations are just one factor that must be taken into account to determine how to protect 
individuals, not if they must be protected. 
These ideas can be illustrated with the example of Colombia, because it would be 
inconsistent from the point of view of the protected content of rights and unfair with victims to 
claim that only either guerrillas, State agents or paramilitary groups have violated human rights or 
that only the victims of one of them deserve protection, because all parties have committed 
violations and affected victims, as commented in reports of the United Nations or the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. Interestingly, it is somewhat startling that those reports 
hold non-state armed groups accountable only under international humanitarian law. 
Nevertheless, it must be recalled that IHL and human rights law share the foundation of human 
dignity and some human rights. This not only means that the protection offered in one branch of 
the humanitarian corpus juris, can be offered in others, but also that those reports implicitly 
acknowledge that non-state actors can have human rights responsibilities. Still, omission of 
allusion to human rights duties of non-state actors and recognition of State duties makes the non-
recognition of human rights violations of non-state entities as such the more disappointing, and 
                                                     
1476 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 25-58, 531-548. 
1477 For instance, in a different context, to put one example, some say, for instance, that communism is a modern 
quasi-religion, while others appeal to a laicism that attempts to exclude even the expression of religious beliefs 
protected by human rights and permit them only in “secret” while publicly imposing non-religious ideologies on 
others, something that is contradictory and hypocritical if conscious. Cf. an interesting analysis concerning related 
issues offered in: “Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux”, Editorial, European Journal of International Law, vol. 21, 
2010. 
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their being sometimes called human rights “abuses” or “destruction” is often nothing but a (timid?) 
recognition of their being violations1478 or a subtle (unacceptable) evasion. 
Claiming that only one party to conflicts violates human rights or human dignity can part 
of the strategy of those who ideologically or otherwise agree with those who oppose that party. 
However, the use of this argument can backlash and lead to loss of its legitimacy, as evinced by 
outraged claims of victims of non-state violations who rightly say that it is unfair that only 
violations committed by States or some parties to conflicts are condemned as human rights 
violations by some NGOs or international bodies and that they ignore other abuses.   
This sense of outrage is not exclusive to Colombia, and is a phenomenon identified in 
doctrine. Indeed, the fairness and legitimacy of law are at stake regarding the full protection of 
human dignity from non-state abuses, being it unacceptable that some victims are excluded in the 
name of what human rights or international law “are supposed to do”, ignoring what human rights 
are really meant to do and what their principles, values and foundations demand, and also 
ignoring that international law can and should change. Moreover, some theories that have proved 
to be problematic, as those of legal personality,1479 are often invoked to deny protection. If those 
theories were correct, they would have to change de lege ferenda to ensure the full protection of 
human dignity and consistency with its non-conditional character.  
Certainly, the history and theoretical evolution of jus gentium reveals that humanitarian 
considerations and concerns have inspired practice, theories and change, and that they must be 
taken into account to evaluate if law is appropriate and to guide its interpretation and modify it 
when necessary.1480 After all, law is instrumental and must answer to human and social needs, 
including needs of respect, protection and facilitation of the enjoyment and exercise of human 
rights and guarantees in universal and comprehensive ways.1481 
On the other hand, based on the non-conditional character of human dignity, non-state 
entities must be permitted to condemn, shame or contact State and non-state actors to persuade 
them to conform to humanitarian standards. Such initiatives emphasize that all violations are 
unacceptable and can and must be addressed and that their victims must be protected. 
                                                     
1478 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102. 26 February 1999, paras. 55 of Chapter I, 5-15 and 18-19 of Chapter IV (especially paragraph 
14), or para. 5 of the Final Considerations; Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, A/HRC/19/21/Add.3, 31 January 2012, Summary and 
paras. 76-77, 83-89; Commission on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia, E/CN.4/2006/9, 16 May 2006, para. 17; Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 73-75. 
1479 Cf. Chapter 5, supra. 
1480 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 10-22. 
1481 Cf. Chapter 1, supra. 
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According to this idea, States cannot elude their obligations and responsibility. Additionally, this 
implies any non-state entity that perpetrates or contributes to a violation must repair victims; all 
individuals deserve protection before and after violations takes place; and fundamental and 
human rights must be respected by mechanisms that seek to protect human dignity.1482 
It can be added that the exclusion of some victims, partisan claims and strategies, and 
the discriminatory treatment of victims are not only contrary to the foundations of human rights 
but can also further humiliate and victimize individuals. Additionally, they may generate victim 
competition or make victims feel tempted to take justice into their own hands, being it necessary 
to prevent both dynamics. 
The fact that human dignity is non-conditional additionally demands that all victims be 
repaired, that the human rights of all individuals be respected and protected, whether they commit 
crimes or not and regardless of who threatens those rights. Moreover, non-state cooperation in 
the protection of that dignity is legitimate and must be permitted. 
If the necessity of protecting human dignity from all violations in accordance to the 
demands of the foundations of human rights is ignored, individuals will be abandoned by 
international law and may often not even have the prospects of successful and effective remedies 
and protection, because violators may elude State control, given their power or due to social and 
normative gaps, despite the diligent efforts of authorities. In those cases, victims may have no 
action against the respective State, and can feel betrayed and think that the term human rights is 
a fallacy if they have no other venues of protection, in which case not all human beings would be 
effectively protected when the same rights are violated by different entities. 
Additionally, non-state violators may consider that their conduct is tolerated and re-
victimize individuals, whose right to have guarantees of non-repetition (see Chapter 7) will be 
thwarted, and whose “hope” to find legal protection when neither domestic nor international 
remedies offer them prospects of effective protection will be frustrated. At least in serious cases 
and other events it is necessary for victims to have access to international remedies. 
Theories that completely deny possibilities of international protection of human rights 
from non-state actors not only disregard existing legal norms, values, principles and foundations, 
such as human dignity, equality and effectiveness, but also fail to respond to the problems 
mentioned above, which require law to change if it does not sufficiently protect all victims. Even if 
they admit the positive formal or informal impact that non-state actors can certainly have on the 
promotion and defense of human rights (which is to be encouraged and permitted, as discussed 
in Chapter 1), they will ignore the need to legally address non-state entities conduct that violates 
                                                     
1482 Cf. Introduction, Chapters 5 and 7, supra. 
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legal goods, which must be regulated. Moreover, those theories would be contradictory because 
the same legal sources that can create or permit non-state contribution and participation can 
regulate non-state duties and legal burdens, especially because non-state entities can certainly 
be subjects or addressees of international norms, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Apart from considerations of consistency and meta-legal arguments, non-state violations 
are to be considered as legally relevant and deserving regulation because they affect 
humanitarian legal goods. Since different normative systems and actors can share those goods, 
all of them can respond to those violations. Non-state entities have always been able to violate 
rights based on the inherent worth of individuals, just as for long they have been relevant actors 
in the international and domestic societies and able to impact on shared interests protected by 
law.  
That being said, current social dynamics and opportunities, such as delegation, 
privatization, empowerment of non-state actors, alliances between actors, contacts and networks, 
globalization, interdependence, international and transnational action of public or private 
actors,1483 and gaps and interdependence, among others, create more possibilities of non-state 
threats. Therefore, the need of tackling them by international norms capable of overcoming local 
limitations and demanding universal protection is more pressing than ever (it must be added that 
protecting individuals is, will be and has been always pressing).  
Taking this into account, and considering that human rights and guarantees demand an 
intense protection of vulnerable individuals, legal protection from State abuses cannot be the only 
available one. In sum, the principle of effectiveness and the legal foundations and principles of 
the humanitarian corpus juris demand protection from non-state violations. Otherwise, jus 
gentium can turn into a deficient, hypocritical or discriminatory system, as Part I explains.  
The concept of erga omnes obligations confirms the previous ideas. While most authors 
focus on their horizontal dimension, which alludes to their being owed to a community –the 
community dimension of the world society, or of more limited societies in the case of erga omnes 
partes obligations-, Antonio Cançado mentions the following: 
“In [his] view, we can consider […] obligations erga omnes from two dimensions, one horizontal and 
the other vertical, which complement each other. Thus, the obligations erga omnes of protection, in a 
horizontal dimension, are obligations pertaining to the protection of the human beings due to the 
international community as a whole. In the framework of conventional international law, they bind all 
the States Parties to human rights treaties (obligations erga omnes partes), and, in the ambit of 
general international law, they bind all the States which compose the organized international 
community, whether or not they are Parties to those treaties (obligations erga omnes lato sensu). In a 
vertical dimension, the obligations erga omnes of protection bind both the organs and agents of 
                                                     
1483 Cf. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 4-12; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 
95. 
 
 
509
(State) public power, and the individuals themselves (in the inter-individual relations)”1484 (emphasis 
added). 
In my opinion, the fact that the international community endorses substantive guarantees 
and that the their legal goods can be violated by non-state entities permits to argue that erga 
omnes obligations are protected by correlative implicit obligations. For instance, according to the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, violations of human rights treaties by State 
agents can be considered wrongful acts committed by those agents, and to be able to generate 
their responsibility in addition to the generation of State responsibility,1485 even though those 
treaties expressly mention duties of States and not of their agents.  
For those who object saying that State agents can expressly have criminal responsibility 
and only they can have international responsibility, it can be responded that individuals who 
participate in non-state groups or act on their own can also have international criminal 
responsibility, and that not every State violation amounts to a crime attributable to State 
agents,1486 despite which they can have legal responsibility. Moreover, all actors have a duty to 
respect peremptory law, whether or not they are State agents or organs (See Chapter 6, supra). 
Express or implicit human rights obligations of non-state actors reinforce the protection of 
individuals and are consistent with the principle of effectiveness. When they are necessary for 
that protection to be effective but they do not exist, they must be created de lege ferenda, lest 
human rights are not effective in practice in some events. This is further required by the need to 
prevent impunity, lack of access to remedies and other shortcomings. While voluntary strategies 
have some advantages that binding ones do not, the fact that merely voluntary strategies often 
have those problems makes it necessary for them to be complemented by duties and strong 
mechanisms of protection.  
For example, the shortcomings and limitations of the Global Compact’s effectiveness 
may partly respond to its non-binding character. Curiously, corporations opposed the creation or 
recognition (this is unacceptable, since this attitude amounts to disregarding the possible 
recognition of important human rights duties) of human rights norms on the conduct of 
corporations that could be binding.1487 These considerations, coupled with the identification of 
events in which non-binding standards, as those found in codes of conduct, are used to elude 
                                                     
1484 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, op. cit., para. 77. 
1485 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Case of Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, op. cit., paras. 
236-237. 
1486 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, op. cit., para. 56. 
1487 Cf. John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. With race 
to the bottom and elusion of law phenomena, a lowest common denominator of binding norms protecting human 
beings from abusive actors that entitle them to claim protection is needed. 
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pressure or adverse effects and to have a good reputation, confirm the importance of 
complementing non-binding standards and initiatives with effective and binding norms that have 
both expressive and other effects (e.g. coercion). Moreover, the latter norms can be supervised 
by judges or other authorities, and can be invoked by victims and supporters, who can demand 
their implementation. For this reason, they increase the chances of changing non-state conduct.  
Additionally, national or private initiatives often have limitations, and exclusive reliance on 
them may encourage or fail to counter race to the bottom dynamics, mere lip service to human 
rights, or other practices that are contrary to the effectiveness of the protection of the non-
conditional dignity of individuals. It is evidently necessary to make powerful entities, potential 
abusers and authorities know that they are bound by humanitarian standards everywhere. 
This being said, and as commented in Chapter 4, approaches exclusively based on 
international law or hard law approaches are insufficient as well. This is because persuasive and 
cultural strategies (permitted1488 by law and sometimes required by obligations of authorities) and 
the contribution of multiple actors are crucial for the effectiveness and completeness of the 
protection of human dignity, especially because international strategies have shortcomings as 
well. Therefore, action from different actors and systems must complement that from others, 
especially because just as violations can ignore formal boundaries and distinctions, so must the 
protection of human dignity incorporate both legal and extra-legal (including meta-legal) 
components from different normative systems and actors.  
Just as economic and social studies have indicated that non-state entities can contribute 
to the provision of certain goods, their cooperation is relevant for the protection of international 
legal goods.1489 Certainly, the effectiveness of the protection of human dignity often depends or is 
largely based on non-state participation and contribution. This happens, for example, with 
information provided by non-state actors to international supervisory bodies or with their initiating 
or participating in mechanisms to protect human rights. The link between the effectiveness of the 
human rights system and non-state participation, which must be permitted in an increasingly 
inclusive system,1490 has been identified by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights, who said that: 
                                                     
1488 Cf. Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., paras. 27, 
31, 83. 
1489 See footnotes 443, 452 and 762, supra. 
1490 Cf. Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”; Andrea Bianchi, op. cit., pp. 186-190; 
Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 34-38. 
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“The important role of NGOs in shedding light on human rights violations experienced by vulnerable 
persons and in facilitating their access to justice must be officially recognised. This would be fully in 
line with the principle of effectiveness in which the Convention is grounded.”1491 
The regulation of the positive and negative roles of non-state entities does not imply that 
State obligations of protection are irrelevant, but on the contrary that non-state promotion of 
human rights and guarantees is entitled and permitted and violations are forbidden. Moreover, 
non-state actors can call for compliance with State duties as well. For this reason, far from 
undermining the integral human rights system, non-state participation strengthens it.  
Logically, non-state entities can make mistakes or act simply to further partisan agendas, 
and they can engage in unlawful conduct. For this reason, they must thus be democratically 
checked by other private actors and by public entities, as required by the rule of law. Control of 
their actions must respect the principle of legality and other conditions, examined in Chapter 5. 
Altogether, just as each legal system may have shortcomings and advantages, each 
actor can have problems and strengths (flexibility, etc.). That is why the interaction and 
cooperation of different entities and systems is so important. If they are coordinated and guided 
by the purpose of protecting shared legal goods, common standards may emerge in a global 
legal space and the protection of shared legal interests will have more prospects of 
effectiveness.1492 This explains why it is important to allow actors to participate and contribute to 
the promotion of human rights and to acknowledging the roles and functions that different entities 
can have in this field.   
The importance of non-state action for human rights to be effective is recognized in a 
passage on “Cooperation with civil society” found in the General Comment No. 5 of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, which says: 
“Implementation is an obligation for States parties, but needs to engage all sectors of society, 
including children themselves.  The Committee recognizes that responsibilities to respect and ensure 
the rights of children extend in practice beyond the State and State-controlled services and 
institutions to include children, parents and wider families, other adults, and non-State services and 
organizations.  The Committee concurs, for example, with general comment No. 14 (2000) of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, paragraph 42, of which states:  ‘While only States are parties to the Covenant and thus 
ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all members of society - individuals, including health 
professionals, families, local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, 
civil society organizations, as well as the private business sector - have responsibilities regarding the 
                                                     
1491 Cf. Council of Europe, “Access to justice for persons with disabilities: Commissioner Hammarberg intervenes 
before the Strasbourg Court”, 18/10/11, available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/news/2011/111018tpiromania_en.asp (last checked: 13/03/2012). 
1492 Cf. how non-state entities can prompt States to comply with their humanitarian obligations and contribute to the 
promotion of humanitarian guarantees, as examined, among others, in: Daniel Thürer, op. cit., at 44; ASIL, 
Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting: The Challenge of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 22-23; Elena Pariotti, op. 
cit., pp. 95, 98, 104-105. 
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realization of the right to health.  States parties should therefore provide an environment which 
facilitates the discharge of these responsibilities’”1493 (emphasis added). 
It is important to stress that the need to protect human beings from non-state violations, 
apart from being based on legal and extra-legal considerations, must take into account the raison 
d’être of the humanitarian corpus juris: the protection of human dignity from all threats and 
solidarity with all victims. This indicates that the crux of human rights is the protection of the 
inherent worth of individuals. This is why it is wrong to dismiss the suffering of some victims, 
which cannot be accepted even if legal or political theories endorse that dismissal, ignoring that 
law can and must protect all victims and that norms and theories that oppose this must be 
modified or replaced with proper ones, lest they discriminate against some victims.  
It must be taken into account that in international humanitarian law, that protects human 
dignity and human rights, the Martens clause (in its original version or as adapted to modern 
treaties) appealed to the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.1494 It called for 
dealing with new needs and problems in the context of armed conflicts in order to protect actual 
and potential victims. Likewise, some norms of the humanitarian corpus juris permit the extension 
of protection to cover guarantees against non-state threats. Furthermore, a proper understanding 
of the function of promotion of human rights or of the possibilities of direct and indirect protection 
have led some bodies to condemn or examine non-state violations. Sometimes, though, the 
extension of protection must be achieved by normative changes given the presence of some 
hurdles that an evolutionary interpretation cannot overcome.  
Concerning this, it must be recalled that the appeal to protect human dignity has a meta-
legal dimension as well, and demands not only a proper and fair implementation and 
interpretation1495 of lex lata but also its correction and extension de lege ferenda, to make it 
possible to tackle new or old challenges that are unaddressed or only partially addressed in law.  
As explained throughout this book, tackling those challenges often requires regulating 
rights, duties and other legal capacities of potential offenders (respecting the rule of law and 
essential guarantees). 
Regarding this, the Chairman of a Seminar on Good Governance Practices for the 
Promotion of Human Rights mentioned that the participants of the conference “underlined the 
                                                     
1493 Cf. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5, General measures of implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6), CRC/GC/2003/5, 27 November 2003, para. 56. 
1494 Cf. Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, op. cit., pp. 22, 85, 132, 156, 171; Erika R. George, “The Criminal 
Enterprise? Corporations and International Human Rights Issues of Accountability and Liability at Home and 
Abroad”, in Willem J.M. Van Genugten et al. (eds), Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years after the 1907 Hague Peace 
Conference, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009, pp. 170-171, on the need to address new challenges posed by non-state 
actors and its relation to the purposes and content of the ‘Martens Clause’. 
1495 It must be borne in mind that interpretation is always present when applying law. Cf. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et 
al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 579, 596. 
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following needed actions for the future” concerning responsible actors, that allude to both the 
positive and negative roles they can play in relation to human rights: 
“[A]ct against impunity of state/non-state actors, bearing in mind sensitivity of conflict situations (such 
as through effective courts, truth and reconciliation commissions or national human rights institutions) 
[...] promote joint action between national and transnational actors, including the private sector”1496. 
Human beings are neither angelical nor demonic, but sometimes behave as if they 
were.1497 The same can be said of other non-state entities, which can promote and protect human 
rights or violate them. Those roles are not immutable and one entity can play both roles, ‘fall from 
grace’ or ‘redeem itself’, reason why mechanisms that seek to make non-state culture and 
behavior respectful of human rights are so important. Moreover, an effort must be made to 
persuade potential offenders to contribute to the protection of human dignity, which is something 
that the notion of silent complicity recognizes. It is pertinent to cite Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon, who said: 
“[The] activities [of Businesses] have a profound impact on people’s lives and on key global issues 
[…] Our challenge is to make sure that business is not part of the problem — but the source of 
solutions.”1498 
Altogether, theories that insist on the idea that only States violate human rights ignore 
reality and the fact that States are constructs and collective entities that operate through non-
state actors. Additionally, they may ignore that throughout history, even when many adhered to 
ideas of State prevalence, non-state actors have had international power and influence; and may 
also ignore that there are many non-state actors that have the capacity to violate human rights or 
frequently do so (drug cartels, criminal groups, terrorist groups, armed groups, etc.).  
If it is accepted that States can violate human rights, and it is known that they operate 
through non-state actors, that some acts of the latter are attributable to the former in legal terms, 
and that entities with the power to violate human rights and guarantees must be controlled to 
protect individuals, it can be concluded that apart from States other actors have power to attack 
essential rights based on the inherent worth of human beings. Because of this, it would be 
unsustainable, unfair and contradictory to not protect potential and actual victims from non-state 
violations.  
                                                     
1496 “Chairman’s Statement”, Seminar on Good Governance Practices for the Promotion of Human Rights, organized 
by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Development 
Programme in cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 2004, at 5. 
1497 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Essay, op. cit., pp. 152-155; Fernando Mires, El fin de 
todas las guerras: Un estudio de filosofía política, LOM ediciones, 2001, pp. 118-119 (I disagree with some of the 
last author’s ideas). 
1498 Cf. Secretary General of the UN, Secretary-General Stresses Role of Businesses in Support of Human Rights, 
SG/SM/13869 HR/5073, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sgsm13869.doc.htm and 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1009055 (both last checked on 13/03/2012). 
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If it is known that non-state entities have been able to exert an influence on the shaping 
of international decisions and processes and impact on State behavior even during the peak of 
the “Westphalian” period, it must be recognized that they have the capacity to violate human 
rights and guarantees. This makes it necessary to legally protect the non-conditional human 
dignity from them. Since non-state entities can be addressees of jus gentium, they can have legal 
capacities that seek to achieve this. 
Who can deny that violations of human rights are frequently or easily committed by some 
non-state actors? Those and other threats must be acknowledged, prevented and responded to, 
which is not only demanded by human dignity but also by the need to regulate the conduct of 
actors with the capacity to affect legal interests.  
The human suffering that can be caused by non-state actors is another factor that 
challenges denials of the relevance of protection from them in human rights law. Their violations 
can be addressed directly or through the mediation of authorities in substantive or procedural 
terms. Some international norms, such as those protecting individuals from actors with a 
perceived capacity to violate human rights (e.g. corporations, armed groups, etc.), demand that 
authorities forbid and tackle non-state abuses internally. International norms can both impose a 
general duty to do this and regulate in detail how States must respond to certain abuses. 
Therefore, indirect international strategies of protection are often used to address situations of 
frequent interaction of individuals with non-state entities for factual or normative reasons (e.g. 
concerning rights of persons with disabilities vis-à-vis some functional authorities or in the 
workplace),1499 or to regulate pertinent conduct in contexts in which individuals are frequently or 
especially vulnerable to non-state abuses, as happens with the protection from domestic violence 
or the protection of children.1500 
It can be said that it is necessary to address problems that individuals face concerning 
non-state threats (human and meta-legal dimension), as permitted by the normative substratum 
that demands their protection (directly or indirectly, according to the principles of effectiveness 
and equality and in light of the protection of human dignity, I might add). The following words of 
Antonio Cançado confirm these ideas: 
 “In two other recent cases, A versus United Kingdom (1998) and Z and Others versus United 
Kingdom (2001), the European Court affirmed the obligation of the respondent State to take positive 
                                                     
1499 Cf. common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol II to them; Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, op. cit.; Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, 
A/HRC/8/5, op. cit.; Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with 
regard to human rights; Rome Statute of the ICC; Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, among others. 
1500 Cf. articles 1 and 3 of the “Convention of Belém do Pará”; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Actors, op. cit., pp. 74-75, among others. 
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measures to protect the children against ill-treatment, including that inflicted by other individuals […] It 
is precisely in this private ambit that abuses are often committed against children,  in  face  of  the  
omission  of  public  power,  -  what  thus  requires  a protection of the human rights of the child erga 
omnes, that is, including in the interindividual relations (Drittwirkung).  
This is a context in which, definitively, the obligations of protection erga omnes assume special 
relevance. The foundation for the exercise of such protection is found in the American Convention on 
Human Rights itself. The general obligation […] to respect and to ensure respect for the protected 
rights - including the rights of the child […] requires from the State the adoption of positive measures 
of protection (including for preserving the preponderant role of the family, foreseen in Article 17 of the 
Convention, in the protection of the child […]), applicable erga omnes. In this way, Article 19 of the 
Convention comes to be endowed with a wider dimension, protecting the children also in the inter-
individual relations”1501 (emphasis added). 
In light of what has been said, it is pointless to deny that non-state entities can violate 
human rights and guarantees or participate in their violation, and that their conduct can thus be 
legally relevant and must be addressed by law, which must protect individuals according to both 
legal and meta-legal criteria. Furthermore, currently there are norms and legal practices that seek 
to offer protection from those entities directly or indirectly, and there are also doctrinal and official 
acknowledgments of the necessity of this protection.  
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action can be understood as confirming these 
ideas. It says: 
 “The World Conference on Human Rights also expresses its dismay and condemnation that gross 
and systematic violations and situations that constitute serious obstacles to the full enjoyment of all 
human rights continue to occur in different parts of the world. Such violations and obstacles include, 
as well as torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary and arbitrary 
executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, all forms of racism, racial discrimination and 
apartheid, foreign occupation and alien domination, xenophobia, poverty, hunger and other denials of 
economic, social and cultural rights, religious intolerance, terrorism, discrimination against women 
and lack of the rule of law”1502 (emphasis added). 
The underlined sentences refer to conduct that is contrary to human rights and, in 
consequence, to human dignity, that can be frequently or evidently perpetrated by non-state 
entities.  
For instance, acts of racism, xenophobia and discrimination are frequently (but not 
only)1503 committed by individuals and non-state groups; poverty and the lack of enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural or other rights may be caused by non-state behavior; non-state 
actors commit acts of terrorism and violate human rights;1504 women, migrants, persons with 
disabilities and other vulnerable persons, none of whom must be excluded from protection, are 
often victims of non-state abuses and sometimes receive indirect international protection against 
                                                     
1501 Cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 63-64. 
1502 Cf. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, op. cit., para. 30 of Part I. 
1503 It must be recalled that virtually all human rights can be affected by States and non-states. See sections 1.3 and 
2.3, supra. 
1504 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, op. cit., paras. 2, 5, 
33, and 48, inter alia. 
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those abuses; and the rule of law is relevant not only in relation to authorities (that may be non-
state entities) but also in relation to all actors whose conduct is or must be regulated by law 
expressly or implicitly (being it necessary to regulate all conduct that affects legal goods). 
Both direct and indirect mechanisms and norms that seek to protect human rights answer 
to the same legal foundations, in light of which it can be said that expressions such as non-state 
“destruction” or “abuse” of human rights actually indicate that non-state actors can victimize 
individuals and violate human rights, just as States can. This idea seems to be accepted in 
international decisions, practice and works that consider human rights abuses committed by non-
state actors as contrary to internationally recognized human rights.1505 Denying that non-state 
entities can engage in negative legally relevant conduct that need to be addressed normatively is 
inconsistent and risky, because as said before such denial may make those who believe in it to 
either refrain from using law in the way that it can be used to protect all victims from non-state 
threats directly or indirectly, or not modify and improve law de lege ferenda according to this goal.  
The inconsistency and fallacy of denying that non-state actors violate human rights is 
revealed both by the existence of positive duties of protection and facilitation of human rights, 
which have horizontal effects that address the recognized fact that non-state actors can hinder 
the exercise of human rights; and by the fact that international criminal law, as mentioned by 
Lauterpacht, sometimes protects human rights, and clearly members of non-state groups can 
violate that law and not only State agents.1506  
That being said, ignoring the positive cooperation and promotion of human rights by non-
state entities must be avoided as well, because they can democratize or open up legal processes 
and contribute to the effectiveness of human rights mechanisms and norms, reason why a multi-
actor and multi-level framework is better suited to protect shared or common legal goods. 
That non-state violations of human rights are frequent is revealed in everyday examples. 
For instance, violations occur when children are recruited by non-state armed groups and when 
those groups injure individuals; when environmental, security and other problems with human 
rights implications are caused by corporations, armed groups or other entities; when populations 
are negatively affected by decisions and operations of international organizations;1507 when 
human beings are victims of bullying; when pirates treat crews and others as means for attaining 
their private ends; when individuals are falsely and unjustly slandered and accused by a self-
                                                     
1505 Cf. Part I, supra. 
1506 Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 35-37; http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (last 
checked on 13/03/2012). 
1507 Cf. e.g. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, op. cit., para. 
82; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 53-58, 131, 137-143. 
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righteous NGO; when individuals are abused domestically; when foreigners are attacked by 
xenophobic persons and racist gangs; when children are abused; or when crimes against human 
dignity are committed. Those and other non-state violations affect legal goods of the world 
community, and victims must be effectively protected against them by international law, which 
has the purpose of protecting the inherent worth of individuals. That protection must be granted 
also when States are unable or unwilling to grant it. 
Sometimes, apart from being entitled to promote human rights simultaneously, for 
instance by means of persuasion or by contacting potential offenders, non-state actors and 
authorities are allowed to participate in formal procedures of implementation or lawmaking that 
can enhance the protection of human rights. 
Non-state entities can certainly promote human rights in practice: NGOs disclose, reveal 
and condemn violations of non-state and State actors, and shame them and make them refrain 
from violating human rights; international organizations sometimes seek to regulate and 
supervise the behavior of non-state entities that can potentially violate human rights; and 
corporations adopt private regulations and practices that can promote and enhance the respect 
and exercise of human rights and guarantees (e.g. related to employment), among other 
examples. 
The contribution of non-state actors can complement that of States, and is frequently 
crucial because some entities, such as transnational criminal organizations, pirate groups or 
terrorist networks, also cooperate among themselves and operate in networks. This demands a 
coordinated response from multiple actors working jointly to protect legal goods shared by 
different normative systems, including the protection of human dignity. 
Disaggregated studies confirm that, from a factual point of view, individuals ultimately 
commit all violations. In addition to this, it must be considered that some abuses are more likely 
(not exclusively) to be committed by collective actors, given their resources and abilities. Both 
considerations must be taken into account, among other reasons to acknowledge that non-state 
responsibility may coexist with the responsibility of other actors, State or not.1508 This happens 
with war criminals and the armed groups they belong to, for instance. That coexistence is 
necessary to properly develop a framework that protects human dignity in a complete way and 
from all violations, because it requires full reparations, which more often than not require the 
participation of all entities that participate in violations in the provision of reparations, as examined 
in Chapter 7. 
                                                     
1508 See Chapter 7, supra. 
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Just as responsibilities can coexist, legal capacities based on the protection of human 
dignity can be complementary to others, and therefore State duties that prohibit abuses or 
command protection of human rights can exist alongside non-state duties and other legal 
capacities and norms, including those norms found in voluntary or soft law instruments. 
Hence, it is not only necessary but also possible to integrate and coordinate actions from 
different actors and systems concerned with the protection of human dignity in order to tackle the 
challenges posed by entities that cooperate with others to commit violations in a global 
landscape.1509 The mechanisms that can be used to protect human dignity from non-state 
violations can be found in different normative systems, e.g. public legal systems or lex privata, 
and also in non-legal normative frameworks. 
Moreover, Part I explored how every single human right, stricto or lato sensu, and every 
human guarantee, can be affected (negatively or positively, directly or not) by non-state actors. 
For this reason, it is not convenient to draft exhaustive lists of rights to be protected from them. It 
is preferable to regulate general obligations that demand protection from non-state violations and 
complement them with specialized norms that deal with the specific needs of certain individuals, 
rights or with the particular challenges posed by some actors1510 (see Chapter 6). 
On the other hand, just as non-state entities can affect the exercise of all human rights, 
all non-state entities can potentially violate them, even those actors that frequently promote them. 
For example, NGOs can falsely accuse someone of violating human rights or can politically or 
otherwise cooperate with or support groups that engage in violations.  
Nevertheless, this general potentiality does not detract from the fact that in order to 
design effective and proper regulations it is important to identify those actors that frequently 
commit violations or that can pose serious challenges due to their powers, praxis or dynamics. 
Specialized studies and regulation on them are warranted, but it is important to ensure that 
human dignity is effectively and fully protected from all potential offenders, that mechanisms of 
protection can and must be used when any non-state violation is committed, and that all actors 
have substantive prohibitions from violating human rights. 
The two possible roles that all non-state entities can have also indicate that actors that 
can frequently or seriously engage in human rights abuses, and also those that neither abuse 
them frequently nor have their promotion as one of their tasks, can also contribute to the 
promotion and protection of human rights. For instance, studies have explored the positive impact 
that the activities of corporations with a human rights culture can have and how they can even 
                                                     
1509 See, for example, Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001); Chapter 8 and section 4.1, supra. 
1510 See Introduction and section 1.2, supra. 
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promote the effectiveness of humanitarian legal goods.1511 For instance, their possible 
contribution to the generation of employment can certainly benefit the enjoyment of human rights. 
Since protection from all violations is required, it is logical that several human rights 
instruments demand protection from violations that take place in ambits, relations or spheres that 
are considered to be private.1512 The same requirement demands that measures that implement 
protection in private contexts must respect the human and fundamental rights of alleged 
offenders (including their presumption of innocence). Additionally, essential rights can conflict, 
and those collisions or tensions must be resolved by methods as the prevalence of jus cogens 
and the application of the test of proportionality –when applicable guarantees are respected-,1513 
being it necessary to ensure that none of those rights is ignored. On the other hand, conceptions 
that are not part of positive human rights and embody controversial political ideas cannot prevail 
over true human rights and dignity, and must not be invoked to elude legitimate democratic 
processes and consent. 
It cannot be forgotten that law is instrumental. Whether this is accepted or not in a 
theoretical level, law is used as such in practice. Because of this, scholars and practitioners must 
strive to make law and legal doctrines serve human beings –or, at the very least, to not harm 
them-. Several authors even call for making essential human interests occupy the central place of 
legal analysis and also prevail over all interests and activities regulated by law, including 
economic ones.1514 This may be seen by some as contrary to the separation between law and 
extra-legal considerations, but this separation is not absolute. No matter how much some 
scholars argue that law is a “pure” system, it is not hermetic, and in practice what practitioners 
believe (rightly or wrongly, according to different criteria) may consciously or not find its way into 
legal practice by means of interpretations, regulation or implementation.  
Having said this, extra-legal and meta-legal considerations must be critically examined, 
and it must be evaluated if they must be received in law from a lex ferenda point of view. On the 
other hand, non-legal normative systems and actors without formal rights of participation in legal 
processes can often interact and impact on law and the protection of legal goods. 
                                                     
1511 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 104-105. 
1512 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Hajduová v. Slovakia, Judgment, op. cit., para. 45; 
Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-17/2002, op. cit., paras. 58, 61-62, 64, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, op. 
cit., paras. 87, 90; para. 9 of the Opinion; section 1.1, supra. 
1513 See section 1.1, supra. 
1514 Cf. Olivier De Schutter, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, “CAP reform must put an end to 
dumping” – UN expert, 12 October 2011, available at: 
http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/component/content/article/1-latest-news/1674-cap-reform-must-put-an-end-to-
dumping-un-expert (last checked: 14/03/2012). 
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For these reasons, it is necessary to apply and create mechanisms and norms that 
permit to better protect victims from all potential and actual violations. The election of protection 
mechanisms must be made taking into account that when it is not mandatory to use the same 
remedies available against State abuses, the chosen ones must be effective and permit to 
prevent and respond to violations and repair victims.1515 Some norms and mechanisms of 
protection are found in international humanitarian law, the law of refugees, criminal law, or human 
rights law, among other branches of domestic and international law, and some of them permit to 
protect victims from non-state threats directly and others indirectly. 
An underlying rationale of this book has been the following: non-state challenges to the 
protection of human dignity have existed throughout history, but additionally there are special 
challenges of protection in the global context. Law can and must address both factors to serve 
human beings, and law and doctrine have begun to respond to those challenges.1516 
Concerning the need to protect human dignity effectively and completely, it can be said 
that when it is analyzed if alternative mechanisms of protection can and must be offered, it is 
necessary to examine the vulnerability of rights and individuals and the powers of actors –related 
to their positive and negative roles- from both an extra-legal and a legal perspective. That 
analysis is also useful to design appropriate regulations that take into account the particularities 
and special needs and challenges of rights and actors, respectively. For instance, the specificities 
of actors must sometimes be taken into account by secondary rules of responsibility.  
Nevertheless, some common principles must bind all actors and guide the responsibility 
of all of them, to ensure a minimum shared core legal protection of all victims. In other words, 
specialized protection must not diminish the scope and effectiveness of the general protection 
from all violations. This is possible because specialized norms on the protection of human rights 
are compatible with broader human rights guarantees, as explored in Part I. 
Specialized substantive and procedural responses to non-state threats that are 
compatible with a general protection, and specialized studies that examine how to better deal with 
concrete challenges, can deal with issues such as the special protection of rights and individuals 
that are vulnerable to certain non-state abuses; or the responsibility and duties of corporations, 
armed groups or international organizations, among other actors. They can help to offer 
appropriate responses to challenges of certain actors taking into account their special features, 
such as for instance the limited liability and “freedom of movement across legal orders” that some 
                                                     
1515 Cf. Chapters 3 and 4, supra. 
1516 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit. 
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corporations have, or the functional nature of international organizations, that conditions the 
regulation of their responsibility.1517  
Needless to say, the studies and proposals offered herein must be examined critically but 
in a way that is always faithful to certain values and principles that should guide the design of the 
content of law, its interpretation and application. Moreover, those central values and principles 
must never be compromised, as advised by Mahatma Gandhi and by Daniel O’Connell.1518 
Among them, the respect and protection of human dignity in a non-conditional, effective and 
comprehensive way must be paramount. Even if law improves, there will always be possibilities of 
better dealing with new and old challenges from the point of view of its content, interpretation, 
respect, enforcement and implementation,1519 and therefore the study of how to protect human 
dignity is never-ending. 
Moreover, it is important to be alert so that the inherent worth of all human beings is 
always recognized and properly respected and protected by law, and to ensure that no potential 
or actual victims are discriminated against concerning the universal protection of their dignity. 
  
                                                     
1517 Cf. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 98. 
1518 Cf. Mahatma Gandhi, op. cit., pp. 344-345; Manfred Steger, Gandhi’s Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and 
Nationalist Power, St. Martin’s Press, 2000, pp. 10-11; Michael J. Nojeim, Gandhi and King: The Power of Nonviolent 
Resisistance, Praeger Publishers, 2004, at 92. 
1519 On the difference between compliance and implementation, cf. Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 73-76 (I do not 
necessarily agree with all of Posner’s analysis offered therein). 
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ANEXO: RESUMEN, INTRODUCCION GENERAL Y CONCLUSIONES FINALES 
EN CASTELLANO 
RESUMEN 
 
La tesis doctoral presentada tiene como principal argumento que la protección 
internacional de la dignidad humana debe beneficiar a todas las víctimas con independencia de 
la identidad de los violadores de derechos humanos, que con independencia de su carácter 
estatal o no estatal siempre incurren en hechos con relevancia jurídica internacional al afectar 
bienes jurídicos del ius gentium. 
La tesis tiene la siguiente estructura. La primera parte estudia por qué motivos el 
fundamento jurídico de los derechos humanos y los principios del derecho internacional de los 
derechos humanos y ramas y normas conexas exigen la protección de todas las víctimas de 
agresiones no estatales. Entre aquellos principios se encuentra el principio de igualdad y no 
discriminación, a la luz del cual puede afirmarse que dejar a seres humanos víctimas de 
violaciones contrarias a la dignidad humana desprotegidos y sin protección jurídica efectiva 
constituye discriminación en su contra. La dignidad humana, por su parte, fundamento de los 
derechos y garantías humanos, es incondicional y su protección no puede depender por ello de 
ningún factor ajeno a la identidad humana de sus beneficiarios, incluyéndose entre dichos 
factores ajenos la identidad de los agresores. Con posterioridad, la primera parte presenta las 
sugerencias del autor relativas a en qué momentos es necesario crear obligaciones 
internacionales de derechos humanos de los actores no estatales y en qué momento conviene 
supervisar internacionalmente el cumplimiento de aquellas obligaciones. 
La segunda parte de la tesis se ocupa del estudio de la posibilidad de regular conductas 
no estatales en el derecho internacional. Al respecto, se examinan las condiciones para la 
creación de obligaciones no estatales, como el respeto de derechos fundamentales y del ius 
cogens; aspectos de subjetividad internacional, al hilo de cuyo estudio se defiende la tesis de 
que todo actor cuyo comportamiento regula el derecho internacional es uno de sus sujetos; y la 
posibilidad de que actores no estatales participen en la generación de normas jurídicas 
internacionales que protejan la dignidad humana. Con posterioridad, se examinan aspectos de la 
responsabilidad internacional de los actores no estatales que violen los derechos humanos y los 
motivos por los cuales el derecho de las víctimas a reparaciones integrales exige la participación 
de actores no estatales en la provisión de reparaciones. Por ultimo, en la tesis se examina qué 
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estrategias y mecanismos pueden emplearse para proteger la dignidad humana frente a 
agresiones no estatales, incluyendo mecanismos judiciales y no judiciales, estatales y no 
estatales. 
INTRODUCCION 
 
Es innegable que tanto el ius gentium en general como la rama del derecho1520 
internacional de los derechos humanos han experimentado mejoras significativas que han 
incrementado la posibilidad de proteger a las víctimas de violaciones de la dignidad humana y de 
los derechos humanos. 
Desde la emergencia formal de la referida rama, que suele entenderse como ocurrida 
tras la conclusión de la segunda Guerra mundial debido a desarrollos en sistemas regionales, 
como en un comienzo el europeo, y al marco universal en las Naciones Unidas, las normas y 
procedimientos internacionales sobre la protección de derechos humanos han evolucionado de 
forma considerable en diversos aspectos: por ejemplo, en primer lugar, hoy día no se discute que 
existen normas internacionales sobre derechos humanos que son vinculantes y no meramente 
declarativas. Adicionalmente, instrumentos que en un comienzo no son vinculantes, como por 
ejemplo la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, pueden adquirir incluso un rango 
consuetudinario en todo o en parte. 
Por otra parte, se ha fortalecido el acceso de las víctimas a los procedimientos 
contenciosos sobre derechos humanos y su participación en los mismos, es decir su ius standi y 
locus standi en el plano internacional, que les permite reclamar protección y reparación. 
En este sentido puede indicarse, por ejemplo, cómo desde la entrada en vigor del 
Protocolo 11 al Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las 
Libertades Fundamentales las presuntas víctimas no necesitan acudir a una Comisión y tienen la 
capacidad de presentar sus casos ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos 
directamente. En el sistema regional Americano, por su parte, a pesar de que los peticionarios 
presenten casos ante la Comisión, que se encarga posteriormente de redirigirlos a la Corte 
                                                     
1520 Este ordenamiento jurídico es frecuentemente llamado derecho internacional, lo cual a mi juicio no es del todo 
acertado pues cubre mucho más que las relaciones entre grupos políticos que asumen la forma estatal, lo cual 
podría llevar a engaños de quienes no conocen en detalle este derecho. Al respecto, ver: Harold Koh, "Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law?", The Yale Law Journal, vol. 106, 1997, pp. 2626; Antonio Gómez Robledo, 
Fundadores del Derecho Internacional (Vitoria, Gentili, Suárez, Grocio), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
1989, pp. 14-15, 98-99; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a 
Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, Global Legal Goods Working Papers, Nº 2/2011, pp. 
45-46, disponible en SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1753036 
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Interamericana de Derechos Humanos si así procede, los sucesivos Reglamentos de la 
Comisión y la Corte han otorgado mayor capacidad de participación e influencia a las presuntas 
víctimas, cuya opinión, por ejemplo es actualmente un factor decisivo en la determinación sobre 
el envío de un caso a la Corte. Además, esas personas pueden presentar ante la Corte 
peticiones y argumentos que difieran de los sostenidos por la Comisión.1521 
Otras regiones han experimentado desarrollos en otros niveles: el sistema regional 
africano sobre derechos humanos ha comenzado a operar con una Comisión y, aunque por el 
momento esto sea limitado, una Corte Africana de Derechos Humanos puede examinar casos. A 
pesar de que la región asiática aún no tenga un marco de protección regional de derechos 
humanos propio diversos autores y personalidades claman por su creación. 
Aparte de los progresos en el ámbito de la participación procedimental, la dimensión 
sustantiva de la protección también ha mejorado. Al respecto, el contenido de la rama jurídica de 
los derechos humanos se ha incrementado como consecuencia de la adopción de diversos 
instrumentos vinculantes y no vinculantes. En este sentido, es posible identificar incluso una 
etapa de especialización normativa que se presenta con posterioridad al periodo de 
internacionalización de los derechos humanos. Esto es así en tanto después que se admitiese 
que los derechos humanos no concernían exclusivamente a la competencia de los 
ordenamientos jurídicos internos y que en consecuencia podían regularse en el derecho 
internacional, diversos esfuerzos se han ocupado de elaborar normas que puedan abordar 
adecuadamente las necesidades de protección de sectores vulnerables, como los de la infancia, 
las mujeres, los indígenas o personas con discapacidad, entre otros. No obstante, esta 
dimensión no se ocupa exclusivamente del reconocimiento de más derechos de ciertas personas 
o de reforzar su protección para atender necesidades, en tanto las normas y la jurisprudencia 
también se preocupan de forma especializada de proteger de manera reforzada derechos 
vulnerables, intentando protegerlos frente a amenazas que resulten preocupantes, como por 
ejemplo la tortura, el genocidio o la discriminación. De igual manera, debe existir una 
preocupación especializada frente a violadores relevantes, sean estatales o no. 
Los anteriores desarrollos han sido reforzados por dos factores que no operan 
únicamente en el campo de los derechos humanos sino que se enmarcan en el ordenamiento 
jurídico internacional en general y han contribuido a que el mismo experimente una necesaria 
                                                     
1521 Ver Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso González y otras(“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México, 
Sentencia del 16 de noviembre de 2009, párr. 232; artículo 25 del Reglamento de la Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos, aprobado por la Corte en su LXXXV Período Ordinario de Sesiones, 2009; artículo 45 del 
Reglamento de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, aprobado por la Comisión en su 137º periodo 
ordinario de sesiones, 2009. 
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evolución: la emergencia del reconocimiento de las normas imperativas o de ius cogens y de las 
obligaciones cuyo respeto concierne a la comunidad internacional en general, es decir a las 
obligaciones erga omnes. 
A pesar de los desarrollos examinados hasta el momento, que ciertamente no han 
madurado en su plenitud, como lo ponen en evidencia las demandas para una expansión de las 
posibilidades de acudir a órganos supervisores internacionales o las solicitudes para que se 
fortalezca el contenido material de los derechos humanos en ciertos aspectos, hay un aspecto de 
los derechos humanos que tiende a ser ignorado o incluso rechazado por algunas de las 
personas que se ocupan de su estudio y práctica, o que por lo menos se considera misterioso y 
más controvertido de los necesario, a saber: la posibilidad de proteger los derechos humanos 
frente a violaciones atribuibles a entidades no estatales. A menos de que esta problemática sea 
abordada de forma apropiada, las metas del sistema jamás se alcanzarán en su plenitud y 
existirán contradicciones internas que harán al sistema ignorar sus fundamentos. 
Las anteriores ideas serán explicadas y desarrolladas en detalle más adelante, pero en 
el entretanto resulta apropiado mencionar algunas cosas al respecto. Primero, como se declaró 
en la Declaración y Programa de Acción de Viena sobre la Conferencia Mundial de Derechos 
Humanos de 1993, la dignidad humana constituye el origen de los derechos humanos, y su 
protección debe tener en cuenta la universalidad, indivisibilidad e interdependencia de estos 
derechos. 
La centralidad de la dignidad en un marco sobre derechos humanos, que se reitera en 
otros instrumentos, es en consecuencia esencial para determinar cómo debe diseñarse, 
interpretarse y aplicarse aquel marco. No estando su contenido completamente desarrollado en 
el derecho positive, es imprescindible examinar la concepción filosófica de la dignidad humana, 
que como se explica en el Capítulo 1 es el valor inherente de todo ser humano, el cual es 
incondicional o, en otras palabras, no depende de ningún estatus o de circunstancias 
contingentes, como por ejemplo la naturaleza de un agresor. Más aún, teóricamente la dignidad 
humana constituye un a priori del cual derivan los derechos humanos, que se protegen, entre 
otras formas, imponiendo obligaciones, prohibiciones o determinadas capacidades jurídicas a las 
entidades que pueden violarlos, o respondiendo de forma directa o indirecta a todas las 
amenazas con anterioridad y posterioridad a las violaciones de los derechos humanos. 
Una de las consecuencias de esta lógica debería ser la protección integral de la dignidad 
humana, es decir contra todas la amenazas, no únicamente frente a las que puedan atribuirse a 
algún Estado. De lo contrario, algunas víctimas quedarían desprotegidas y las violaciones en su 
contra quedarían impunes. Esto obedece al hecho de que la protección de la dignidad humana, 
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de la que se ocupan los derechos humanos junto a otras ramas y normas, se centra en los seres 
humanos y víctimas, y no debería depender en la identidad de los autores de amenazas. 
Adicionalmente, el carácter universal e interdependiente de la protección de los derechos y 
garantías cuyo fundamento es la dignidad humana exigen una aproximación integral en lugar de 
una limitada que excluya a algunos individuos del ámbito de protección jurídica.1522 
Siendo esto así, resulta difícil sostener que negar la protección a algunas víctimas, cuyos 
derechos humanos han sido o pueden ser violados, sea coherente con una protección 
comprensiva, universal, integral e interdependiente1523 de la dignidad humana, como se exige en 
derecho. De hecho, esta exclusión puede bien constituir una violación adicional y mayor cuando 
no se brinde ninguna protección efectiva a las víctimas: la vulneración del principio de igualdad y 
no discriminación. En consecuencia, no puedo negar que me resulta sorprendente ver cómo 
algunos defienden la exclusión de algunas víctimas del ámbito de protección ofrecido por el 
derecho de los derechos humanos y otros marcos normativos que buscan proteger la dignidad 
humana, es decir la exclusión de las víctimas de abusos no estatales. 
Lo anterior es más sorprendente si se tiene en cuenta que algunos ordenamientos 
jurídicos internos, en los cuales emergió el reconocimiento de la protección de los derechos 
humanos con carácter previo a su reconocimiento internacional, ya recogen de forma expresa la 
posibilidad de proteger los derechos humanos frente a amenazas no estatales, exigiendo en 
ocasiones determinados requisitos, como se discute en algunas secciones de este texto. Por 
estas y otras razones, sostengo que el campo de los derechos humanos no podrá acercarse a la 
obtención apropiada de sus metas a menos que se procure proteger a todas las víctimas, con 
independencia de la denominación formal de los violadores. 
De no ser así, se dará más importancia a consideraciones formales artificiosas que al 
sufrimiento y a las necesidades de protección reales de los seres humanos. En relación con 
estas consideraciones, es menester tener en cuenta que un análisis desagregado revela que el 
Estado no es sino una entidad ficticia operada por personas,1524 y que en el transcurso de la 
historia muchos actos que se han atribuido a los Estados han tenido un origen no estatal que 
                                                     
1522 Ver la Parte I, infra; Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, “Looking beyond the State But Not Ignoring It”, en George 
Andreopoulos et al., Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe, Kumarian Press, Inc., 2006, pp. 5-6; Nicolás 
Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian 
Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
1523 Ibid. 
1524 Al respecto, ver: Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism, The University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 40-
41, 71; Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?", op. cit., pp. 2627, 2633; Hersch Lauterpacht, 
International Law and Human Rights, Steven & Sons Limited, 1950, pp. 40; Sentencia del Tribunal Militar 
Internacional encargado del juicio y castigo de los principales criminales de guerra del Eje europeo, donde se afirmó 
que: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities [States], and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” 
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puede remontarse en consecuencia a otras entidades.1525 En estos y otros eventos las 
necesidades de protección de los individuos son las mismas dada su igual vulnerabilidad, como 
se explica en el Capítulo 1. 
Además, la ausencia de protección de las víctimas de violaciones no estatales no solo 
constituye una contradicción con los fines del sistemas, razón por la cual las interpretaciones 
jurídicas deberían intentar superar limitaciones y proteger a todas las víctimas, sino que por otra 
parte genera contradicciones normativas internas. Basta decir que la dignidad humana es la 
piedra angular y el fundamento del ámbito de los derechos humanos, como se ilustra en 
instrumentos como la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y como ha sido sostenido 
por diversos autores, y esta característica tiene necesariamente implicaciones 
hermenéuticas.1526 Aparte de la consideración de que la necesidad de proteger la dignidad 
humana debe llevar al reconocimiento de ciertos derechos inseparables de la misma, debe 
reconocerse que ignorar los derechos de algunas víctimas conlleva ignorar su dignidad humana 
y dejarlos desprotegidos, con independencia de la concepción de dignidad humana que se 
defienda. 
Algunas de estas concepciones consideran que los seres humanos son fines en sí 
mismos y que cualquier intento de convertirlos en instrumentos para la obtención de otros fines 
implica la negación de su personalidad y dignidad, como se discute por Kant.1527. Algunos 
autores estiman que los seres humanos tienen un valor intrínseco y que tienen valor en sí 
mismos por el simple hecho de su naturaleza, como explican algunas concepciones 
judeocristianas y no religiosas, razón por la cual es posible hablar de derechos inalienables de 
todo ser humano.1528  
                                                     
1525 Ver Fred Halliday, “The Romance of Non-state Actors”, en Daphné Josselin y William Wallace (eds.), 
Non-state Actors in World Politics, Palgrave (ed.), 2001, pp. 27-34. 
1526 Ver Carlos Villán Durán, Curso de Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, Editorial Trotta, 2006, pp. 
63, 92; Jordan J. Paust, “The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law”, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, Vol. 5, 1992, pp. 54, 56; Chris Jochnick, “Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the 
Promotion of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 21, 1999, pp. 55, 59-60; Andrew Clapham, Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford University Press, 2006, Capítulo 11.  
1527 Ver Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction (versión EPUB), Oxford University Press, 2007, 
pp. 9-10, 22; Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, traducido por Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott, Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication, 1785, pp. 44-47, 50, disponible en: 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/Metaphysic-Morals.pdf (última revisión: 2/11/2011); Immanuel Kant, The 
Critique of Practical Reason, traducido por Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, Penn State Electronic Classic Series 
Publication, p. 89, disponible en: http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/Critique-Practical-Reason.pdf (última 
revisión: 2/11/ 2011); Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, traducido por Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 
Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication, p. 26, disponible en: 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/metaphysical-ethics.pdf (última revisión: 2/11/ 2011); Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 535-547. 
1528 Ver, por ejemplo, papa Juan XXIII, Encíclica Pacem in Terris, 1963, párrs. 3, 9-10, 30; Jack Donnelly, “Human 
Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights”, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 76, 1982, p. 306. 
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Al respecto y en relación con la necesidad de lidiar con toda violación puede añadirse 
que permitir la impunidad de algunas violaciones de derechos humanos permite a los violadores 
manipular y usar a las víctimas como medios para sus propios fines y, a la luz de otras 
concepciones, niega el valor intrínseco de las víctimas. Adicionalmente, puede que las víctimas 
no sean reparadas, lo cual es contrario a lo que dictamina el derecho internacional, y ha de 
añadirse que la impunidad puede terminar estimulando violaciones adicionales, posibilidad 
contra la cual han de emprenderse acciones.1529 
En consecuencia, sostengo que es injusto limitar la protección jurídica a aquellas 
víctimas que tengan la “fortuna” de haber sido agredidas por un Estado. Si los movimientos de 
derechos humanos se caracterizan en buena medida por la solidaridad con las víctimas y su 
sufrimiento, como menciona Andrew Clapham1530, el sufrimiento de las víctimas tanto de Estados 
como de entidades no estatales es semejante y merece la misma atención y respuestas 
efectivas. Más aún, si las obligaciones estatales sobre derechos humanos se basan en la 
posibilidad de que esas entidades pongan en peligro el goce de aquellos derechos, debe ser 
tenido en cuenta que los peligros que suponen las acciones y omisiones de otras entidades son 
en consecuencia relevantes en términos jurídicos y la conducta de estos actores digna de ser 
regulada (como puede entenderse con análisis como el de Nijman),1531 y a su vez las víctimas 
deben tener los mismos derechos o, en ciertas circunstancias, al menos una protección 
alternativa igualmente efectiva o incluso más efectiva (caso en el que pueden y deben ser 
cumulativos los mecanismos protectores). 
Por otra parte, desarrollos jurídicos evidencian cómo entidades no estatales como las 
organizaciones internacionales o los grupos armados no estatales pueden tener de forma 
                                                     
1529 Ver Capítulo 7, infra; Declaración y Programa de Acción de Viena, Conferencia Mundial de Derechos Humanos, 
A/CONF.157/23, 12 de Julio de 1993, párrs. II.60, II.91; Claire de Than y Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law 
and Human Rights, Sweet & Maxwell (ed.), 2003, pp. 12-13; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso 
Gelman Vs. Uruguay, Sentencia, 24 de febrero de 2011, párr. 206. Debe mencionarse que hay una tendencia a 
responsabilizar a todo actor que viole principios considerados como importantes por la comunidad internacional, 
como se analiza en: José Manuel Cortés Martín, Las Organizaciones Internacionales: Codificación y Desarrollo 
Progresivo de su Responsabilidad Internacional, Instituto Andaluz de Administración Pública, 2008, pp. 56-58. Por 
otra parte, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha considerado que la tolerancia de una violación de 
derechos humanos que no es tratada adecuadamente por el derecho “impide que la sociedad conozca lo ocurrido y 
reproduce las condiciones de impunidad para que este tipo de hechos vuelvan a repetirse”, como se manifiesta en: 
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso de la “Masacre de Mapiripán” Vs. Colombia, sentencia, 15 de 
septiembre de 2005, párr. 238. En el mismo sentido, el Preámbulo del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal 
Internacional declara que “poner fin a la impunidad de los autores” de crímenes internacionales puede “contribuir […] 
a la prevención de” nuevas violaciones. 
1530 Ver Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: a Very Short Introduction, supra, pp. 11, 28, 30, 131; Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., p. 107. 
1531 Ver Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of 
international legal personality”, Amsterdam Center for International Law Research Paper Series, Non-State Actors in 
International Law, Politics and Governance Series, 2010, pp. 36, 40; Nicolás Carrillo, “Enhanced Multi-Level 
Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., p. 46. 
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indiscutible obligaciones internacionales con componentes de derechos humanos.1532 Esta 
consideración desmiente la negación de la relevancia de los derechos humanos por fuera del 
esquema individuo-Estado. 
No puede ignorarse que hay autores que sostienen que el fundamento de los derechos 
humanos difiere de la noción de dignidad humana o que debería ser distinto. A pesar de mi 
desacuerdo con estas concepciones, es imprescindible examinarlas. Algunas de estas 
propuestas consideran que el fundamento de los derechos humanos es o debería ser la noción 
de emancipación, es decir la consideración de que las personas deben ser protegidas de 
quienes estén en una posición de poder.1533 Es lógico que estas posturas defiendan la protección 
de los seres humanos frente a Estados y entes no estatales, debido a que los Estados no son las 
únicas entidades con la capacidad de tener más poder y capacidad de dominar o amenazar 
víctimas.  
Aunque la teoría de la emancipación no se acepta de manera oficial por la mayoría de la 
doctrina como el único fundamento de los derechos humanos, puede no obstante considerarse 
como reflejo de uno de los valores o dimensiones especializadas de estos derechos, cuya 
importancia ha sido reconocida por creadores del derecho, jueces y actores jurídicos. De hecho, 
la jurisprudencia de los órganos universales que supervisan instrumentos de derechos humanos 
se hace eco de esto, porque en algunos casos ha considerado que ciertos actores están 
vinculados por obligaciones de respetar derechos humanos a pesar de su naturaleza no estatal 
en razón de que operan en la práctica con poderes y prerrogativas que se asemejan a las 
estatales, o bien porque se encuentran en una posición de poder y se hace necesario proteger a 
las víctimas potenciales y actuales frente a posibles abusos atribuibles a ellos.1534 En ocasiones, 
algunos jueces y autoridades internas han seguido un razonamiento similar al valorar si se ha 
presentado una violación de derechos humanos. 
                                                     
1532 Ver el artículo 3 común a los Convenios de Ginebra sobre Derecho Internacional Humanitario de 1949; artículo 
96.3 del Protocolo Adicional a los Convenios de Ginebra del 12 de agosto de 1949 relativo a la protección de las 
Víctimas de los Conflictos Armados Internacionales (Protocolo I), junto al comentario del CICR a ese artículo, 
disponible en: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750123?OpenDocument (última revisión: 2/11/ 2011); Nicolás 
Carrillo, “The Links between the Responsibility of international organizations and the Quest towards a More 
Reasonable and Humane International Legal System”, international organizations Law Review, Vol. 7, 2010, p. 442; 
artículo 59 del Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales; 
o los artículos 43 y 44 de la Convención sobre los derechos de las personas con discapacidad; Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., p. 73. 
1533 Ver Capítulo 1, infra; y Michael Goodhart, “Human Rights and Non-State Actors: Theoretical Puzzles”, en George 
Andreopoulos et al., Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe, Kumarian Press, Inc., 2006, pp. 36-37. 
1534 Ver Sergio García Ramírez, Los derechos humanos y la jurisdicción interamericana, Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 2002, pp. 117-119; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso Suárez Rosero Vs. 
Ecuador, Sentencia, 12 de noviembre de 1997, párr. 98. 
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Sería poco razonable negar la solidez de estas decisiones, aunque es necesario no 
perder de vista las limitaciones de una aproximación exclusivamente emancipadora de los 
derechos humanos, pues ella dejaría muchas situaciones sin protección y negaría garantías a 
muchas víctimas. Como se manifestó atrás, los seres humanos merecen protección por el simple 
hecho de ser seres humanos, con independencia de quién es el violador y, ha de añadirse, de 
cuándo o en qué circunstancias se comete una violación. Siendo esto así, existen diversas 
situaciones en las que el contenido de derechos íntimamente conectados con la dignidad 
humana es pisoteado sin que el violador se encuentre en una posición fáctica de mayor poder. 
Dejar a las víctimas desprotegidas en estos eventos supone el mismo problema de dejar 
desprotegidas a las víctimas de los actores no estatales y limitar la protección frente al Estado: 
ambas alternativas son limitadas, reduccionistas, inconsistentes con valores y fundamentos y 
discriminan a algunas víctimas. 
Lo anterior no implica que la protección jurídica que se ofrece a las víctimas de las 
entidades no estatales que se encuentren en una posición de poder haya de eliminarse, sino que 
la misma debe complementarse con garantías que se ofrezcan a otras víctimas. Después de 
todo, la teoría de la emancipación no vislumbra como central la protección frente a violaciones 
que se cometan por fuera del contexto de abusos de poder o de una inadecuada ejecución de 
las funciones de autoridades “funcionales”. Esta y otras teorías serán estudiadas con mayor 
detalle en el Capítulo 1 y serán comparadas con la noción de la dignidad humana como 
fundamento de los derechos humanos y otras normas pertinentes. 
Aparte de ser contrario a los fundamentos de los derechos humanos, apoyar la exclusión 
de la protección de las víctimas de entidades diferentes a los Estados genera contradicciones 
internas en la rama de los derechos humanos, que solo pueden evitarse con una aproximación 
integral que ofrezca protección a todas las víctimas. Al respecto, por ejemplo, es posible 
considerar que la afirmación de que los Estados tienen obligaciones para prevenir y enfrentar 
violaciones atribuibles a actores no estatales, y que en caso contrario su responsabilidad se 
genera, no es consistente con la negación de la existencia de violaciones no estatales. Una 
negación en este sentido sería irónica y podría percibirse como ejemplificativa de una doble 
moral por parte de las víctimas afectadas. 
Debido a las limitaciones y la injusticia de una protección de los derechos humanos 
estatocentrista, ha habido intentos y medidas que persiguen disminuir sus problemas, aunque ha 
de decirse que algunos de ellos han demostrado ser insuficientes. Entre ellos se pueden 
mencionar los siguientes: 
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Desde una perspectiva semántica y simbólica, ha resultado inevitable reconocer que 
existen amenazas no estatales al goce y disfrute de los derechos humanos. Esto ha llevado a 
órganos internacionales, autores e incluso ONGs, entre otros, a acuñar términos y etiquetas que 
incluso cuando no emplean la expresión “violaciones de derechos humanos” describen la 
posibilidad de que un actor no estatal afecte negativamente el contenido de los derechos 
humanos. En este sentido, por ejemplo, se encuentran las expresiones de abusos o 
destrucciones de derechos humanos, que han sido usadas tanto frente a Estados como a 
actores no estatales. Estos rótulos han permitido no prejuzgar sobre la posibilidad de considerar 
a alguna de estas entidades como responsable en términos jurídicos por no cumplir con 
obligaciones que las vinculan o por actuar de manera contraria a la garantía del disfrute de 
normas de derechos humanos y otras normas que protegen la dignidad humana.1535  
La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos humanos, por su parte, ha acudido al empleo 
de comunicados de prensa, informes y resoluciones en las que condena o critica conductas 
atribuibles a entidades tan distintas como grupos armados no estatales u organizaciones 
internacionales, o en las que examina conductas no estatales a la luz de normas protectoras de 
la dignidad humana. Esto le permite superar limitaciones al examen de conductas no estatales 
que limitan su competencia en los procedimientos contenciosos.1536 La Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos, a su vez, ha considerado en obiter dicta y ratio decidendi que puede haber 
violaciones de derechos humanos cometidas por actores diferentes a los Estados.1537 La 
importancia de reconocer que las entidades no estatales pueden violar derechos humanos es 
considerable, especialmente frente a acciones de promoción, porque dicho reconocimiento es 
relevante incluso si las entidades en cuestión no están vinculadas por obligaciones jurídicas, en 
tanto para el adecuado desarrollo de sus funciones y el cumplimiento de deberes de promoción 
de derechos humanos y dignidad humana es necesario condenar todas las violaciones y 
recordar a los Estados y otras autoridades pertinentes sobre sus deberes de prevenir y 
responder a aquellas violaciones. 
                                                     
1535 Ver Capítulo 2, infra; Ilias Bantekas y Susan Nash, International Criminal Law, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
2003, p. 14; Robert Dufresne, Review of: Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in 
International Law, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, 2004, p. 227; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., p. 49. 
1536 Ver Resolución 03/08 y comunicado de prensa Nº 28/08 de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos; 
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Tercer informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en 
Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102. 26 de febrero de 1999, párrs. 5-9; Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 
Informe sobre terrorismo y derechos humanos, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, 22 de octubre de 2002, párr. 48. 
1537 Vid. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras, Sentencia de 
fondo, 29 de julio 1988, párrs. 166, 172-174, 176, 177; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso González 
y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México, Sentencia, 16 de noviembre de 2009, párrs. 236, 252, 254; Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03, Condición Jurídica y Derechos de los 
Migrantes Indocumentados, 17 de septiembre de 2003, párrs. 140-153. 
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Por otra parte, algunos autores y organizaciones no gubernamentales de derechos 
humanos se han percatado de que el apoyo de comunidades y víctimas puede perderse si se 
ignoran las violaciones no estatales con base en consideraciones eminentemente formalistas, 
que en cualquier caso podrían ser superadas con determinados análisis jurídicos, y de que negar 
la ilegalidad e injusticia de estas violaciones es insostenible tanto como desde un punto de vista 
jurídico como de uno moral. Por estas y otras razones, algunos de ellos han condenado 
violaciones no estatales o han requerido su cese, con tal de que una crítica únicamente a los 
Estados no sea (justamente) percibida como parcializada o, peor aún, en apoyo de violadores no 
estatales.1538 
Algunos límites de los desarrollos que no consiguen aceptar expresamente la violabilidad 
de normas que protegen la dignidad humana por parte de entidades no estatales son las 
siguientes: en primer lugar, negarse a aceptar que los actores no estatales pueden cometer 
violaciones y no simplemente abusos de derechos humanos (aunque esto sería comprensible si 
acaso fuese correcto que es imposible que existan obligaciones no estatales sobre derechos 
humanos) es inaceptable y ofensivo desde la perspectiva de las víctimas, en tanto impediría 
acciones jurídicas y, desde un punto de vista simbólico, haría que las demandas de las víctimas 
sean más débiles dada la ausencia de apoyo legal (aunque haría que fuese necesario un cambio 
del derecho de lege ferenda). 
En relación con los órganos que aceptan la posibilidad de que existan violaciones no 
estatales, ha de decirse que sus acciones incrementan la protección potencial, y la satisfacción 
simbólica y expresiva de las víctimas. Esto no es de poca monta: de hecho, es necesario resaltar 
cuán importante puede resultar para una victima tener un sentido simbólico de gozar de un 
derecho, y que la importancia de la existencia de acciones jurídicas de protección basadas en el 
reconocimiento de la violabilidad de derechos humanos por parte de entidades no estatales 
constituye uno de los elementos que revisten de importancia a la protección jurídica además de a 
las consideraciones extra-jurídicas, siendo las dos necesarias para tantas víctimas. Con todo, a 
menos que la aceptación en cuestión se vea acompañada de herramientas jurídicas, el poder del 
reconocimiento se verá debilitado junto a la función simbólica, aunque ha de decirse que el 
reconocimiento permite (y ordena) a entidades con el deber o la facultad de garantizar bienes 
                                                     
1538 Vid. Chris Jochnick, supra, p. 58; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 
44, 50 (especialmente el pie de página 94); Nicolás Carrillo, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a 
Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 5, 22. 
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jurídicos internacionales a usar mecanismos internos o de otro carácter que protejan aquellos 
bienes frente a entidades no estatales, como acontece con autoridades internas.1539 
En cualquier caso, debe ser tenido en cuenta que pueden existir derechos que no estén 
acompañados por acciones de protección directas u obligaciones cuyo cumplimiento no tenga 
una supervisión procedimental internacional directa o cuya violación no se vea acompañada de 
sanciones internacionales.1540 En cualquier caso, esto no supondría una negación de que los 
derechos y las violaciones existen. En consecuencia, no es correcto afirmar que las normas que 
protegen la dignidad humana no tienen efectos sustantivos o procedimentales indirecto frente a 
las violaciones no estatales simplemente porque no existe protección frente a ellas, aunque este 
reconocimiento bien puede revelar la necesidad de implementar o diseñar mecanismos directos 
o indirectos de implementación de la norma en cuestión. 
Por estas razones, admitir que las víctimas de las violaciones de normas que protegen la 
dignidad humana son aquellas personas cuyos derechos y garantías normativas relacionadas 
con la dignidad son violados, con independencia de quién comete la violación, es crucial, debido 
a que se presenta una violación en todos aquellos eventos y el derecho debería de lege 
ferenda,1541 imponer obligaciones a los agresores si es que no lo hace de lege lata. Con 
independencia de las obligaciones y capacidades procedimentales (negativas o pasivas) del 
violador, en todos aquellos casos se presenta una violación de la dignidad humana y las normas 
que la protegen. Este es el motive por el que es tan importante apoyar una noción de deberes 
                                                     
1539 Vid. Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observación general No. 31 [80], Naturaleza de la obligación jurídica 
general impuesta a los Estados Partes en el Pacto, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 de mayo de 2004, párrs. 4, 13-15; 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Leval, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, Docket Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, Decisión del 17 de septiembre de 2010, p. 30, especialmente el pie 
de página 30; Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in 
International Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 1990, pp. 225-231; United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, Decisión del 11 de julio de 2011, 
p. 12; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 102, No. 1, 2008, 
pp. 43-44; Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 32, 2004, pp. 
326-328, 345. 
1540 Vid. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, supra, pp. 74-75; Andrew Clapham, “The 
Role of the Individual in International Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, at 29; 
Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 27, 34; Anna Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The Position of 
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, Intersentia, 2001, pp. 58-62; United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, Decisión del 11 de Julio de 2011, 
pp. 11-13; International Law Association, Non-State Actors Committee, First Report of the Committee on Non-State 
Actors: Non-State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approach and Scope of Project and Legal Issues, The Hague 
Conference, 2010, p. 21, donde se clarificó que no todos los actores que tienen un “estatus" jurídico internacional 
tienen las mismas capacidades o, en caso de tenerlas, las tienen en el mismo grado; y Kate Parlett, “The PCIJ’s 
Opinion in Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. Individual Rights under Treaties”, Journal of the History of 
International Law, Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 136-137, donde se refuta el argumento de que una entidad no tienen 
personalidad internacional si no tiene derecho a acudir a un mecanismo internacional para protegerlo. 
1541 La expresión alude a las regulaciones que a pesar de no existir deberían ser parte del derecho positivo, como se 
explica Michel Virally, El devenir del derecho internacional : ensayos escritos al correr de los años,  Fondo de cultura 
económica, 1998, p. 242. 
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implícitos sobre derechos humanos, con el fin de fortalecer la posición de las víctimas. Esta 
cuestión se examina en el capítulo 6. 
Para complementar la función de identificar la posibilidad de que existan conductas no 
estatales contrarias a la dignidad humana (que en términos no eufemistas suponen el 
reconocimiento de la violabilidad de las normas que la protegen), en vista de las limitaciones de 
la función declarativa que se cumple al calificar negativamente las violaciones de los derechos 
humanos, es imprescindible contar con otras medidas. Una de ellas es la competencia de los 
órganos y agentes internacionales que tengan a su cargo tareas relacionadas con la protección y 
promoción de los derechos humanos, como los pertenecientes a los sistemas convencional y 
extra-convencional de las Naciones Unidas, para interactuar con actores no estatales con el fin 
de procurar la prevención o el cese de violaciones o la promoción del disfrute de derechos 
humanos en relación con su conducta.1542 
Otros desarrollos que tienden a reforzar la posición de las víctimas de violaciones no 
estatales se han presentado en el campo del soft law. En este sentido, por ejemplo, los 
Principios y directrices básicos sobre el derecho de las víctimas de violaciones manifiestas de las 
normas internacionales de derechos humanos y de violaciones graves del derecho internacional 
humanitario a interponer recursos y obtener reparaciones mencionan expresamente en el 
Principio 15 que los entes no estatales pueden tener obligaciones de reparar a las víctimas, lo 
cual tiene sentido debido a que en no pocos casos la reparación integral a la que las víctimas 
tienen derecho sólo puede realizarse si todas las entidades que participaron en una violación 
participan a su vez en las reparaciones, bien sea porque los medios a disposición del Estado 
sean insuficientes incluso si el mismo ha fallado en la prevención o respuesta a una violación no 
estatal o porque el contenido de las medidas de reparación nunca puede ser satisfecho del todo 
a no ser que aquellas entidades estén involucradas en el esquema de reparación, como se 
examina en el Capítulo 7. 
                                                     
1542 Vid. Capítulos 1 y 8, infra, especialmente el Manual de los Procedimientos Especiales de Derechos Humanos de 
las Naciones Unidas de agosto de 2008, párrs. 81-83; Comité contra la Tortura, Sadiq Shek Elmi Vs. Australia, 
Comunicación No. 120/1998: Australia, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, Dictamen del Comité contra la Tortura en virtud del 
artículo 22 de la Convención contra la Tortura y Otros Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos o Degradantes, 25 de 
mayo de 1999, párrs. 6.5 al 7; Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observaciones finales del Comité de Derechos 
Humanos sobre Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 de agosto de 2006 (en adelante, el caso ‘UNMIK’), párr. 4. 
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Pensemos, por ejemplo, en algunos componentes del derecho a las reparaciones: el 
derecho a conocer la verdad sobre una violación o las garantías de no repetición.1543 Ha de 
admitirse que en muchos eventos, incluso si el Estado coopera con una violación, la totalidad de 
la verdad o segmentos relevantes sobre el episodio jurídicamente relevante que constituye una 
violación son solo conocidos por el violador directo, que puede perfectamente ser un ente no 
estatal. En tal caso, únicamente con su participación en las reparaciones es posible satisfacer a 
la víctima por completo en relación con aquel elemento de la satisfacción, que a su vez 
constituye una parte de las reparaciones. 
Adicionalmente, ¿quién sino el agresor puede garantizar que no intentará cometer otra 
violación en el futuro? Incluso si el Estado ha participado en algún modo en la violación y 
promete no involucrarse en manera semejante en una violación, la víctima no se sentirá tranquila 
a no ser que los otros participantes prometan no involucrarse en otras ofensas, y el público en 
general también se beneficiará del entrenamiento de agentes para la prevención de violaciones 
similares en el futuro y de las garantías dadas por todos los agresores y asistentes al respecto. 
La identificación de abusos y abusadores potenciales también debe ser tenida en cuenta en 
términos generales y abstractos con el fin de desarrollar e implementar medidas (normativas y de 
otro carácter) de protección frente a ellos. 
Las anteriores consideraciones se apoyan en la evolución de la jurisprudencia 
internacional, que actualmente es clara en cuanto a que las responsabilidades de distintas 
entidades involucradas en una violación del derecho pueden ser complementarias y no son en 
modo alguno exclusivas. Al respecto, por ejemplo la Corte Internacional de Justicia ha 
considerado que los Estados pueden ser cómplices en violaciones de derechos humanos cuyo 
principal perpetrador sea un agente estatal o no estatal, como por ejemplo el genocidio,1544 que 
claramente supone una violación de diversos derechos humanos, como el derecho a la vida. La 
Comisión de Derecho Internacional, por su parte, también ha estimado que los Estados pueden 
                                                     
1543 Ver, inter alia, Principios 18, 22 y 23 de los Principios y directrices básicos sobre el derecho de las víctimas de 
violaciones manifiestas de las normas internacionales de derechos humanos y de violaciones graves del derecho 
internacional humanitario a interponer recursos y obtener reparaciones; Preámbulo y artículo 24 de la Convención 
Internacional para la protección de todas las personas contra las desapariciones forzadas; Comité de Derechos 
Humanos, Abubakar Amirov y Aïzan Amirova c. la Federación de Rusia, Caso Nº 1447/2006, 
CCPR/C/95/D/1447/2006, 22 de abril de 2009, párrs. 11.7, 13; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso 
Barrios Altos Vs. Perú, Sentencia, 14 de marzo de 2001, párrs. 43, 48. 
1544 Vid. Corte Internacional de Justicia, Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia y Herzegovina Vs. Serbia y Montenegro), Sentencia, 26 de febrero de 
2007, párrs. 419-420. 
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ser responsables por ayudar o asistir a violaciones del derecho internacional atribuibles a 
organizaciones internacionales o viceversa.1545  
La anterior lógica puede ser trasplantada a otras situaciones que involucren a otros 
actores. De hecho, distintos actores no estatales pueden ser responsables en distintos grados 
frente a una misma violación, bien sea como autores o partícipes. La posibilidad de que se 
genere una responsabilidad jurídica internacional de los actores no estatales, constituyendo esta 
posibilidad en términos generales un prerrequisito para la posibilidad de determinar la 
responsabilidad simultánea de diversos actores, incluyendo a los Estados, se basa en la 
posibilidad de que las normas internacionales se ocupen directamente del comportamiento de un 
actor en tanto se hayan creado de conformidad con los procedimientos de las Fuentes del 
derecho internacional y respeten normas fundamentales e imperativas. 
En relación con esta cuestión, autores como Theodor Meron o Kate Parlett han 
considerado que la Corte Permanente de Justicia Internacional admitió la posibilidad de que 
entes no estatales como los individuos fuesen destinatarios de normas jurídicas internacionales 
en su opinión consultiva sobre la jurisdicción de las cortes de Danzig, en tanto en su 
razonamiento aceptó que el objeto de un tratado internacional bien puede ser la creación de 
derechos y obligaciones individuales.1546 La discusión sobre si esta posibilidad fue de hecho 
aceptada en la opinión consultiva en cuestión sigue abierta a consideración de algunos, debido a 
que la corte permanente mencionó que un tratado no podía “crear directamente derechos y 
obligaciones para individuos privados” pero que su objeto podía ser “la adopción por las partes 
de algunas reglas definitivas que creen derechos y obligaciones individuales”, que podrían tener 
efectos en sus ordenamientos jurídicos internos,1547 aunque los autores mencionados atrás 
sugieren que en la práctica la corte fue cautelosa y empleó un lenguaje que evadiese críticas a la 
vez que permitiese al derecho convencional regular los derechos y deberes de los individuos. 
Cualquiera sea la respuesta a la cuestión sobre la posición de la corte, hoy día se acepta 
ampliamente que es posible que el derecho internacional regule el comportamiento no estatal y, 
aún más, que proteja los derechos humanos frente al mismo de diversas formas y con diversos 
niveles de intensidad, como explica John Knox: bien sea imponiendo obligaciones a los Estados, 
                                                     
1545 Vid. Comisión de Derecho Internacional, artículos 14, 42 y 58 del proyecto de artículos sobre la Responsabilidad 
de las organizaciones internacionales adoptado en 2011, A/66/10, 2011. 
1546 La traducción de la cita es mía. Ver Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006, p. 40; Kate Parlett, “The PCIJ’s Opinion in Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. Individual Rights under 
Treaties”, op. cit., pp. 120, 143-145; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 
71-73, Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 27-29. 
1547 Vid. Corte Permanente de Justicia Internacional, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of 
Danzig Railway Officials who have passed into the Polish service, against the Polish Railways Administration), 
Opinión Consultiva, Series B, No. 15, 3 de marzo de 1928, pp. 17-18. 
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de conformidad con las cuales sea por ejemplo obligatorio para ellos crear determinado deber o 
derecho en su derecho interno que tenga efectos frente a determinado actor no estatal, o incluso 
de forma más compleja e intensa.1548 
El derecho internacional puede entonces ocuparse de los actores no estatales 
directamente y sin la mediación del derecho interno. De hecho, incluso antes de que se 
redactase la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, los juicios de Núremberg 
constituyeron una materialización de la posibilidad no sólo de vincular a actores no estatales 
(seres humanos, en estos casos) por regulaciones internacionales, sino además de aplicar y 
ejecutar estas normas directamente en el plano internacional. Más aún, con posterioridad 
algunas normas convencionales y consuetudinarias sobre derechos humanos, principios 
jurídicos y normas de soft law, entre otras, han contemplado la posibilidad de dirigir 
recomendaciones o imponer deberes a los individuos1549, o incluso de restringir sus derechos 
cuando ello sea necesario para proteger los derechos de los demás, lógicamente después de 
que se haya efectuado un análisis apropiado de la proporcionalidad de los derechos 
involucrados.1550 
Adicionalmente, aparte de las exhortaciones a los individuos o la posibilidad de que sus 
derechos sean limitados en ciertas circunstancias, normas y órganos internacionales incluso han 
ordenado a los Estados a crear prohibiciones internas con el fin de proteger y promover 
derechos humanos, como por ejemplo las relativas a la discriminación racial, con la orden de que 
los Estados protejan a los individuos de la violencia o violaciones cometidas por otros individuos 
o actores; e incluso han creado y hecho posible hacer cumplir obligaciones que vinculen 
directamente a actores no estatales directamente y sin mediación estatal, como las de naturaleza 
penal. 
Incluso si se analizan desarrollos previos, resulta difícil no advertir cómo por ejemplo la 
prohibición y persecución de la piratería constituye un reconocimiento de la relevancia de los 
actores no estatales para la protección de intereses comunes en una sociedad internacional y de 
la posibilidad de crear normas internacionales que se ocupen de su defensa frente a esos 
actores directamente. Fue su consideración como hostis humanii generis o enemigos de la 
humanidad en virtud del riesgo que creaban para la seguridad y libertad de los mares, intereses 
caros a la sociedad internacional, que llevó a la emergencia de una regla de jurisdicción “cuasi 
                                                     
1548 Vid. John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 20-31. 
1549 Vid. Capítulo 5, infra. 
1550 Vid. Capítulos 1 y 8, infra. 
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universal”, que puede ser concebida más propiamente como una regla que ofrece soluciones a 
posibles conflictos de jurisdicción otorgando al Estado que detenga piratas a juzgarlos.1551 
También es importante mencionar, como se estudia en los capítulos 1 y 8, cómo la 
emergencia de normas sustantivas que imponen obligaciones a entes no estatales y su garantía 
judicial o cuasi judicial en procedimientos contenciosos no son los únicos mecanismos que 
pueden existir para proteger normas basadas en la dignidad humana frente a amenazas 
atribuibles a aquellas entidades, especialmente porque las estrategias no judiciales son 
esenciales y complementarias a las judiciales, y también porque los actores no estatales pueden 
además desempeñar un papel positivo en la protección de las normas en cuestión, lo cual hace 
aconsejable otorgarles ciertas facultades en aquellos eventos. 
Algunos autores sostienen que únicamente cuando ciertas capacidades sustantivas (ej. 
poderes de creación normativa) o algunas capacidades procesales (ej. solicitar la protección de 
un derecho o estar expuesto al examen de cumplimiento de obligaciones) son asignadas 
directamente por normas jurídicas internacionales a un actor es posible considerar al actor en 
cuestión como un sujeto del derecho internacional. Sin embargo, como se examina en el 
Capítulo 5, esto no es necesariamente cierto, y existen teorías alternativas como la de la matriz 
de capacidades y la de la subjetividad entendida como el ser destinatario del derecho que me 
parecen preferibles a una noción limitada de la personalidad jurídica o de la subjetividad, cuya 
defensa puede conllevar algunos efectos indeseados relativos a la ausencia de protección de 
bienes jurídicos esenciales y de seres humanos.1552 
Como se estudia en el Capítulo 1, resulta esencial admitir que existen eventos en los 
que para el derecho internacional es imprescindible imponer obligaciones a diversas entidades 
con tal de ser justo, satisfacer necesidades humanas, cumplir sus propósitos, lidiar con retos a 
diversos bienes jurídicos y adaptarse a las condiciones sociales y prácticas actuales, entre las 
que debe mencionarse que los Estados no pueden ser considerados como los únicos actores de 
la sociedad internacional, incluso en términos formales, como ponen de relieve el hecho de que 
                                                     
1551 Vid- Antonio Cassese, “When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on 
the Congo v. Belgium Case”, European Journal of International Law (EJIL), Vol. 13, 2002, pp. 857-858. 
1552 Acerca de estas teorías, ver: José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y 
Organizaciones Internacionales, Tecnos, 2003, p. 186; Manuel Díez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho 
Internacional Público, Tecnos, 2005, pp. 258; Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, pp. 274-275; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 
64-65; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, quinta edición, 2003, p. 176; Elena Pariotti, 
“Non-State Actors, International Law, and Human Rights”, en Sanford R. Silverburg (ed.), International Law: 
Contemporary Issues and Future Developments, Westview Press, 2011, pp. 102, 104; Comisión de Derecho 
Internacional, proyecto de artículos sobre la responsabilidad de las organizaciones internacionales, con comentarios, 
A/66/10, 2011, pp. 8-9, párr. 8 del comentario al artículo 2; Gaetano Pentassuglia, “Review of: Meijknecht, Anna. 
Towards International Personality: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law”, European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, 2003, p. 391. 
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las organizaciones internacionales, los grupos armados y otras entidades tienen incluso la 
capacidad de celebrar tratados y la capacidad de otros actores de participar y ejercer influencia 
en negociaciones sobre normas internacionales, como lo ilustran las historias legislativas del 
Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional y de la Convención sobre la prohibición de las 
minas antipersonal. Estas cuestiones se estudian con mayor detalle en el Capítulo 5. 
Además, debe decirse que los Estados no son y de hecho no han sido las únicas 
Fuentes de amenazas al respeto del goce y disfrute de derechos que derivan de la dignidad 
humana y que tampoco han sido los únicos participantes de la sociedad mundial y de marcos 
normativos supranacionales, como explican Fred Halliday, Jordan Paust y otros autores, motive 
por el cual llamar al ius gentium derecho internacional adolece de cierta imprecisión.1553 
Al respecto, ¿quién puede negar que el derecho a la vida, cuyo disfrute es 
acertadamente considerado como condición para el goce de otros derechos humanos,1554 ha 
sido violentado por numerosos actores no estatales en el transcurso de la historia? 
Adicionalmente, estudios sobre relaciones internacionales han indicado que no siempre es 
posible determinar con facilidad si la iniciativa u origen de una acción ha de ser atribuida a un 
Estado o a otro actor.1555 Después de todo, los Estados actúan a través de sus agentes, cuyas 
motivaciones y participación son merecedoras de un estudio detallado, como sugieren los 
estudios desagregados de aquellos entes, y los agentes en cuestión pueden además ver su 
responsabilidad comprometida junto a la de los Estados en cuyo nombre actúan1556 o participar 
en y pertenecer a otras entidades. Adicionalmente, hoy día se presenta un factor adicional que 
no puede seguir siendo ignorado: el hecho de que los Estados hayan perdido peso, apoyo y 
poder y de que en muchos casos no desean o son incapaces de lidiar con problemas creados 
por otros actores en relación con el goce y disfrute de derechos y garantías fundamentados en la 
dignidad humana, en ocasiones debido a dificultades como el poder de aquellos actores o a la 
                                                     
1553 Vid. Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, Número 4, 2011; Fred Halliday, op. cit.; Daphné Josselin y William Wallace, 
“Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework”, en Daphné Josselin y William Wallace (eds.), Non-state Actors in 
World Politics, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 4-10, 15, 19. 
1554 Vid. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Case González y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México, 
Sentencia, 16 de noviembre de 2009, párr. 245. 
1555 Vid. Fred Halliday, op. cit., pp. 22-35; Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 53-55. 
1556 Vid. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-14/94, Responsabilidad internacional 
por expedición y aplicación de leyes violatorias de la Convención (arts. 1 y 2 Convención Americana sobre Derechos 
Humanos), 9 de diciembre de 1994, párr. 56; Principios I a IV de los Principios de Derecho Internacional reconocidos 
por el Estatuto del Tribunal Militar Internacional de Núremberg y por el fallo de este Tribunal; Sentencia del Tribunal 
Militar Internacional encargado del juicio y castigo de los principales criminales de guerra del Eje europeo. 
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importancia que se otorgue a intereses que difieran de los esenciales relativos a los seres 
humanos que deberían ser protegidos prioritariamente.1557 
Al respecto, se ha estudiado cómo los Estados que actúan solos e incluso en esquemas 
tradicionales de cooperación son incapaces de enfrentarse a entidades que tengan un poder 
mayor al propio en distintos aspectos, como los económicos, militares, logísticos o de otro 
carácter.1558 El poder y las capacidades de algunos entes no estatales en relación con desafíos 
nuevos y antiguos que generan pueden incrementarse en un contexto globalizado en el que se 
generan dinámicas y oportunidades que pueden aprovechar.1559 
Además, es menester destacar que fenómenos tan variados como la privatización, la 
delegación de poderes (incluso algunos tradicionalmente vinculados con la soberanía), la 
competición entre ordenamientos jurídicos internos para atraer inversión extranjera u otras 
actividades que puedan generar una disminución de estándares que favorezcan a los habitantes 
de los Estados, como por ejemplo fenómenos de dumping laboral, race to the bottom o la 
posibilidad de que violadores potenciales elijan los ordenamientos jurídicos menos garantistas de 
la dignidad humana basados en una lógica de forum shopping,1560 entre otros, hacen necesario 
                                                     
1557 Ver, entre otros, Alfred Van Staden y Hans Vollaard, “The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a Post-
territorial World?”, en Gerard Kreijen et al. (eds.), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, pp. 167-168; Sandra Lavenex, “Globalization, Global Governance and the Bonnum 
Commune: a Conceptual Investigation”, European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 6, 2004, pp. 381, 388; Celestino del 
Arenal, “La nueva sociedad mundial y las nuevas realidades internacionales: un reto para la teoría y para la política”, 
en Cursos de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de Vitoria-Gasteiz 2001, Bilbao, 2002, pp. 23, 27-
29, 34, 52-53, 64-66; Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) 
in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 216; Francisco Galindo Vélez, “Consideraciones sobre la determinación de la 
condición de refugiado”, en Sandra Namihas (Ed.), Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados, Pontificia Universidad 
Católica del Perú – Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Fondo Editorial, 2001, pp. 125-126; Alexandra Gatto, 
“Corporate Social Responsibility in the External Relations of the EU”, en Yearbook of European Law, 24, 2005, p. 
423. 
1558 Ibid.; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 3, 6, 9, 20, 26, 45, 49-50. 
1559 Ibid.; Anna Badia Martí, “Cooperación internacional en la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada transnacional”, 
en Victoria Abellán Honrubia and Jordi Bonet Pérez (dirs.), La incidencia de la mundialización en la formación y 
aplicación del Derecho Internacional Público, Los actores no estatales: ponencias y estudios, Bosch Editor, 2008, p. 
319; ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, Naciones Unidas, 2000, pp. 11-12; 
Gáspar Biró y Antoanella-Iulia Motoc, Working paper on human rights and non-State actors, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/40, 
11 de julio de 2005, párrs. 42-45; Kofi A. Annan, “Foreword”, United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito, 2004, pp. iii-
iv. Disponible en: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-
e.pdf 
1560 Vid. August Reinisch, “The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors”, en Philip 
Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 54-55, 75-76; Menno T. 
Kamminga, “The Next Frontier: Prosecution of Extraterritorial Corporate Misconduct before Non-US Courts”, en 
Willem J.M. Van Genugten et al. (eds.), Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years after the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009, p. 172; Proteger, respetar y remediar: un marco para las actividades empresariales y los 
derechos humanos, Informe del Representante Especial del Secretario General sobre la cuestión de los derechos 
humanos y las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas comerciales, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, 7 de abril de 
2008, párr. 14; Koen de Feyter, “Globalisation and human rights”, en: Felipe Gómez Isa y Koen de Feyter (eds.), 
International Human Rights Law in a Global Context, 2009, pp. 81-82; Alexandra Gatto, supra, p. 423; Janne E. 
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contar con normas internacionales que establezcan estándares mínimos comunes que no 
puedan ser ignorados por países débiles, egoístas o con otros problemas pertinentes. 
La existencia de normas internacionales que protejan a los individuos frente a 
violaciones no estatales directa o indirectamente, siendo la última posibilidad alusiva a la orden 
de que autoridades internas o de otro carácter protejan en lugar de regular el comportamiento no 
estatal directamente, supone un beneficio adicional: en tanto algunos Estados pueden desear 
responder adecuadamente a las amenazas no estatales a la dignidad humana pero son en la 
práctica incapaces de hacerlo debido a su escaso poder, otras entidades pueden verse 
facultadas a proteger a las personas y tener autorización jurídica a sus iniciativas en virtud del 
reconocimiento del carácter ilegal de las violaciones o amenazas en cuestión, bien sea de forma 
facultativa u obligatoria, como cuando su acción complementaria necesaria. 
El factor del poder estatal no ha de subestimarse o descartarse a la ligera. En este 
sentido, por ejemplo, ha de considerarse que no sólo muchas de las economías más poderosas 
en el mundo son corporativas,1561 sino además que múltiples actores han visto incrementado su 
poder suave, sistémico o incluso duro, incluso en comparación con diversos Estados, a los 
cuales pueden presionar.1562 
La anterior consideración, sumada al hecho de que varios actores cuya conducta 
siempre ha sido o cuando menos suele ser problemática desde el punto de vista de la protección 
del valor inherente de los seres humanos, como los grupos criminales transnacionales, han 
forjado alianzas con otros actores y se han aprovechado de algunas posibilidades que ofrece la 
globalización,1563 hacen que sea imposible negar que con frecuencia los Estados que actúan 
solos o por medio de acciones aisladas no puedan tener muchas posibilidades de proteger a los 
seres humanos de forma efectiva. 
De hecho, me incline a pensar que actualmente hay casos en los que ni siquiera una 
simple cooperación entre Estados sea suficiente para ofrecer la protección en cuestión. Esta 
                                                                                                                                                            
Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal 
personality”, op. cit., p. 7; Elena Pariotti, op., cit., p. 98; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 227-228; Zoe 
Salzman, “Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputation”, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, vol. 40, 2008, pp. 860-866; Corporate Responsibility, the corporate responsibility 
coalition, “Protecting rights, repairing harm: How state-based non-judicial mechanisms can help fill gaps in existing 
frameworks for the protection of human rights of people affected by corporate activities”, “briefing paper for the UN 
Secretary General’s Special Representative on Business and Human Rights”, 2010, p. 7, disponible en: 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/core-submission-to-ruggie-nov-2010.pdf (última 
revisión: 06/02/2012). 
1561 Vid. Alexandra Gatto, supra, p. 423. 
1562 Vid. Celestino del Arenal, op. cit., pp. 27-28, 34, 52-53, 64-66; Francisco Galindo Vélez, op. cit., pp. 125-126; 
Janne E. Nijman, “Non-state actors and the international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international 
legal personality”, op. cit., p. 3. 
1563 Ibid. 
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consideración hace hincapié en la importancia de ideas como las de Friedmann, quien 
argumentó que el derecho internacional de la cooperación podía incluir un componente no 
estatal, el cual puede ser esencial para la protección integral de la dignidad humana, como se 
evidencia por el hecho de que de no ser por la contribución formal e informal de diversos actores 
no estatales, como algunas ONGs, los sistemas de protección de derechos humanos, tanto 
locales como internacionales (regionales y universal) no habrían progresado ni se habrían 
desarrollado para ofrecer la poca o mucha protección que han brindado a múltiples personas que 
pudieron tener una última esperanza en el ámbito internacional tras infructuosos intentos de 
obtener protección interna.1564 Aquellos entes incluso han comenzado a examinar y valorar 
conductas no estatales con el propósito de solicitar la protección de garantías humanitarias y 
sobre derechos humanos frente a ellas, y con el fin de recomendar o redactar normas para tal 
propósito, como se explica en los Capítulos 5 y 8. 
A la luz de lo discutido hasta el momento, apoyo la idea de que es necesario contar con 
normas internacionales que vinculen a los entes no estatales directamente y les prohíban 
cometer violaciones de derechos humanos y garantías humanitarias, y de que existan normas 
que faculten y apoyen a algunos actores no estatales, de forma democrática, para que 
desarrollen actividades que persigan promover y proteger la dignidad humana (ver el Capítulo 1, 
infra). 
Sin embargo, debe ser tenido en cuenta que es necesario ser cauteloso en relación con 
las cuestiones discutidas. Al respecto, es menester considerar que algunos autores han 
advertido cómo proyectos de normas que regularían obligaciones no estatales podrían tentar a 
los Estados a distraerse de sus propias obligaciones o a invocarlas como excusa para la 
comisión de abusos, y además que los destinatarios no estatales podrían verse tentados a 
aprovecharse de regulaciones no vinculantes para sugerir que futuras normas u obligaciones 
                                                     
1564 Sobre estas cuestiones, ver Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, en Gerard 
Kreijen et al. (eds.), State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 133-134; 
Voto concurrente del juez A.A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso Castillo-
Petruzzi y otros Vs. Perú, Sentencia (Excepciones Preliminares), 4 de septiembre de 1998, párr. 35; ASIL, 
Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting: The Challenge of Non-State Actors, The American Society of International 
Law, 1998, pp. 22-23; Daniel Thürer, “The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational 
Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State”, en Rainer Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as 
New Subjects of International Law, Duncker & Humblot (ed.), 1999, pp. 44-45, 47; Andrea Bianchi, “Globalization of 
Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, en Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth 
(ed.), 1997, pp. 188-190; Thomas Buergenthal, “The Evolving International Human Rights System”, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, 2006, pp. 803-804; Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., pp. 337-338, 342-343; Luis 
Pérez-Prat Durbán, “Actores no estatales en la creación y aplicación del Derecho Internacional”, en Victoria Abellán 
Honrubia y Jordi Bonet Pérez (Dirs.), La incidencia de la mundialización en la formación y aplicación del Derecho 
Internacional Público: los actores no estatales: ponencias y estudios, Bosch (ed.), 2008, pp. 34-38. 
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vinculantes no son necesarias o para obtener ventajas inmerecidas.1565 A pesar de todo lo 
anterior, considero que los riesgos de una ausencia de regulación superan con creces aquellos 
que supondría la regulación de la conducta no estatal, que puede hacerse con cuidado y 
procurando evitar riesgos como los mencionados, respetando el imperio de la ley y los derechos 
fundamentales de todos los entes involucrados, como se discute en el Capítulo 5. 
Por ejemplo, puede señalarse cómo en el derecho internacional humanitario los entes 
armados no estatales están vinculados por el artículo 3 común, el derecho consuetudinario y en 
ocasiones normas convencionales.1566 Como revelan interpretaciones jurídicas y el propio 
artículo citado, las obligaciones en cuestión no entrañan modificación alguna del estatus de las 
entidades en cuestión que pudiese legitimar sus violaciones1567 y, por el contario, señala 
expectativas sobre el comportamiento no estatal cuyo incumplimiento se expone a críticas. A su 
vez, los Estados siguen vinculados por sus propias obligaciones humanitarias. Esta es una 
consideración cardinal que se tiene en cuenta en el artículo 4.5 del Memorando de entendimiento 
entre las Naciones Unidas y el grupo Justice and Equality Movement de Sudan y en el Manual de 
los Procedimientos Especiales de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas de agosto de 
2008, donde se menciona que: 
 “La interacción entre quienes tengan mandatos y los representantes de un actor no estatal o 
autoridad de facto puede tener lugar en el país en cuestión. El contexto de tales encuentros y las 
condiciones en las que se desarrollen han de buscar asegurar que la participación basada en el 
mandato no sea entendida como apoyando ninguna reclamación particular hecha por el actor no 
estatal o autoridad de facto en cuanto a representatividad, legitimidad u otras cuestiones”1568 
(subrayado añadido; traducción hecha por el autor). 
En consecuencia, los argumentos que se oponen a las obligaciones de determinados 
autores basados en su posible legitimación a pesar de las violaciones que cometan no son de 
recibo en cuanto es posible evitar este fenómeno. En este sentido, cabe añadir que catalogar a 
una entidad como violadora de normas que protegen la dignidad humana dista mucho de ser 
halagador y, por el contrario, indica posibles violaciones que pueden atribuirse a la entidad en 
                                                     
1565 Ver, entre otros, John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 32-46; John H. Knox, “The Human 
Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, ASIL Insights, Vol. 15, Issue 21, 2011, p. 1 (version 
en PDF, disponible en: http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110801.pdf, última revisión: 04/11/2011); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, “Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror?”, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 43, 2005, pp. 457-458; Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., p. 431; Nicolás Carrillo, “Enhanced Multi-
Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., p. 34. 
1566 Ver Tribunal Penal Internacional para la Ex Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Sentencia, 10 de 
diciembre de 1998, párrs. 159-160; artículo 3 del Estatuto actualizado del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la Ex 
Yugoslavia. 
1567 Vid. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., p. 51. 
1568 Vid. Manual de los Procedimientos Especiales de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas de agosto de 
2008, párr. 82. 
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cuestión y la necesidad de regular su conducta.1569 Además, esta indicación señala a otros la 
posibilidad o el deber de responder a violaciones que se cometan o vayan a cometer por medio 
de la creación o mejora de acciones o normas o la implementación de regulaciones existentes. 
En resumen, vincular a un actor por medio de obligaciones de derechos humanos y 
humanitarias y emplear otros mecanismos admisibles sustantivos o incluso procedimentales de 
protección de la dignidad humana para defender a los individuos de amenazas no estatales es 
posible y se exige de lege ferenda si la protección no se otorga de manera suficientemente 
efectiva y complete por la lex lata. Las autoridades y operadores jurídicos están obligados a 
intentar interpretar las normas con el fin de brindar la anterior protección en la medida de lo 
posible. Naturalmente, para cumplir con la juridicidad esto no puede hacerse de manera 
arbitraria: las obligaciones creadas por normas internacionales deben ser tanto accesibles como 
predecibles, siendo estas dos garantías reconocidas en el derecho internacional que han sido 
examinadas en la jurisprudencia, como pone de relieve el caso Kononov que examinó la Gran 
Sala del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos.1570 
La imposición de obligaciones relacionadas con la protección y el respeto de la dignidad 
humana a actores no estatales es una de las medidas que pueden usarse para proteger a los 
seres humanos, y en ocasiones puede ser incluso necesario que estas obligaciones tengan una 
naturaleza penal. Ciertamente, algunas normas del derecho penal internacional comparten la 
finalidad de proteger la dignidad humana junto al derecho internacional de los derechos 
humanos, y en consecuencia ambas ramas pueden ser concebidas como dos caras de una 
misma moneda, aunque en realidad resultaría más apropiado hablar de un dado con múltiples 
caras (de carácter sustancial y procedimental) de las que no son sino dos caras, debido a que 
existen otras normas formalmente clasificadas en otras ramas que comparten el fundamento y la 
meta en cuestión, como acontece con el derecho internacional humanitario, tal y como se 
describe en el instrumento CSCE, el Documento de Helsinki 1992, “El desafío del cambio”, 
Declaración de la cumbre de Helsinki.1571 
                                                     
1569 De modo similar, Andrew Clapham ha considerado que imponer obligaciones de derechos humanos a una 
entidad no aumenta su legitimidad sino que simplemente limita su conducta, como se discute en: Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
1570 Vid. Capítulo 5, infra; Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Gran Sala, Caso Kononov Vs. Letonia, 
Sentencia, 17 de mayo de 2010, párrs. 185-187, 235-239. 
1571 Al respecto, el derecho penal sanciona algunas violaciones de derechos humanos y puede considerarse así la 
otra cara de la moneda de aquellos derechos. Sin embargo, sería descrito de forma más apropiada como una de las 
caras del dado de la protección de la dignidad humana, que admite más respuestas a las violaciones, como revelan 
la protección de la dignidad humana por parte del derecho de los refugiados o el derecho internacional humanitario, 
por ejemplo. Sobre estas ideas, ver Claire de Than y Edwin Shorts, op. cit., pp. 12-13, 29; John H. Knox, “Horizontal 
Human Rights Law”, op. cit., p. 24; Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Informe No. 112/10, Petición 
interestatal IP-02, Admisibilidad, Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador – Colombia, 21 de octubre de 2010, 
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Como se dijo atrás, es posible emplear otras medidas de protección, aunque es 
necesario tener cuidado para asegurar que las mismas pueden proteger a los seres humanos de 
forma efectiva, pues de lo contrario algunas víctimas serían discriminadas y se verían 
desprotegidas, en contra de lo que exigen su valor inherente y el sistema jurídico. Algunas de 
aquellas medidas pueden consistir, por ejemplo, en recomendaciones o incluso normas no 
vinculantes, como las de algunos códigos de conducta; la promoción de una cultura respetuosa 
de los derechos humanos; el cumplimiento de los deberes de protección y prevención de los 
Estados y otras autoridades; la ejecución interna de medidas protectoras de la dignidad humana; 
u otras iniciativas internas, internacionales e incluso transnacionales. 
En relación con los códigos de conducta, como consecuencia de la presión ejercida por 
otros actores y la propia sociedad, algunas corporaciones, ONGs y otras entidades se han 
percatado de la importancia de asumir compromisos para respetar la dignidad humana y otros 
valores. 
La naturaleza jurídica de estos códigos es variada: algunos constituyen una expresión de 
auto regulación mientras que otros son manifestaciones heteronormativas1572; algunos 
simplemente declara aspiraciones mientras que otros suponen un compromiso más fuerte e 
incluso, en ocasiones, jurídico, que puede emerger bien sea por su consideración como derecho 
no estatal a la luz de las teorías de derecho global de Günther Teubner que son examinadas en 
concepciones de derecho administrativo global o teorías de derecho global,1573 o porque el 
derecho internacional o interno otorguen efectos a aquellas manifestaciones normativas, lo cual 
puede acontecer en virtud de las expectativas que generan y la protección de la confianza del 
público a la luz del principio de buena fe, por ejemplo. En cualquier caso, es necesario analizar 
estos códigos con cuidado, porque en ocasiones su creación puede obedecer a ejercicios 
simplemente retóricos destinados a mejorar la imagen pública de su creador o incluso a la 
intención de desviar la atención de la necesidad de crear regulaciones o acciones jurídicas más 
intensas a las que tengan acceso efectivo las víctimas. 
Una medida complementaria a la creación de obligaciones jurídicas internacionales que 
resulta interesante es la creación de una atmósfera y cultura no estatal respetuosa de la dignidad 
humana. Los Comités y expertos de derechos humanos han resaltado que los Estados deben 
                                                                                                                                                            
párr. 117; CSCE, el Documento de Helsinki 1992, “El desafío del cambio”, Declaración de la cumbre de Helsinki, 9 - 
10 de Julio de 1992, párr. 47. 
1572 Vid. Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, supra, p. 33. 
1573 Vid. Gunther Teubner, “‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society”, en Teubner, G. (ed.), Global 
Law Without a State, Dartmouth (ed.), 1997, pp. 12-19; Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global 
Administrative Law”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, pp. 52-55; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué 
es el derecho global?, Thomson Aranzadi, 2007, pp. 108, 159. 
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emplear todas las medidas jurídicas y legítimas que puedan usar con el fin de promover el 
respeto de los derechos humanos por parte de los actores no estatales, incluyendo el desarrollo 
de una cultura coherente con el respeto de la dignidad humana, que entre otras puede ser 
generada gracias a estrategias normativas dada la función y los efectos simbólicos y expresivos 
de las normas. Otros autores y autoridades han considerado que los mecanismos judiciales y no 
judiciales, como los boicots (legales), la socialización, la exclusión o las estrategias de 
persuasión son relevantes para proteger los derechos humanos frente a amenazas no 
estatales,1574 lo cual refleja cómo distintos mecanismos deben y pueden interactuar entre ellos y 
no operar aisladamente. 
 Esta estrategia puede ser efectiva en relación con el fortalecimiento de la protección de 
la dignidad humana y las posibilidades de su respeto en tanto, como ha sido analizado por otros, 
crear obligaciones no estatales puede contribuir a cambiar su actitud y percepciones, tal y como 
ha acontecido con grupos armados no estatales que comenzaron a sentirse vinculados en 
términos jurídicos por el derecho internacional humanitario tras haber sido incluidos entre los 
destinatarios de obligaciones de dicho carácter.1575 
 En consecuencia, las estrategias normativas, en las cuales el derecho internacional 
puede de forma innegable desempeñar un papel relevante, pueden fortalecer la promoción 
integral del respeto de la dignidad humana. Esto se une al imperativo de que los ordenamientos 
jurídicos persigan el respeto futuro y presente de los derechos humanos y la no repetición de 
violaciones previas, entre las cuales lógicamente deben ser incluidas las no estatales.1576 
Otro desarrollo relacionado con la búsqueda de la protección efectiva de los derechos 
humanos, cuya relevancia es innegable debido a que sin él muchas víctimas habrían quedado 
desprotegidas, es el desarrollo jurisprudencial y la exigencia del cumplimiento de los deberes 
                                                     
1574 Vid. Ryan Goodman y Derek Jinks, “Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law”, 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19 No. 4, 2008, p. 735; Mauricio García Villegas, “De qué manera se 
puede decir que la Constitución es importante”, en Álvarez Jaramillo et al., Doce ensayos sobre la nueva 
Constitución, Diké, 1991, p. 40; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., p. 55; 
Proteger, respetar y remediar: un marco para las actividades empresariales y los derechos humanos, A/HRC/8/5, 
op. cit., párrs. 9, 26, 29-32, 84-85, 92; Daniel Thürer, op. cit., pp. 46-47; Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in 
Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, en Bas Arts et al. (eds.), Non-State Actors in International 
Relations, Ashgate Publ., 2001, pp. 13, 35-36; Andrew Clapham y Scott Jerbi, “Categories of Corporate Complicity in 
Human Rights Abuses”, Hastings International and Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2001, pp. 347-348; August 
Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 53, 67-68, 77; Alexandra Gatto, op. cit., p. 431; Gunther Teubner, op. cit., pp. 9, 12-13; Andrea 
Bianchi, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., pp. 188-191; Menno T. Kamminga, 
op. cit., p. 186; Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observación general No. 31 [80], op. cit., párrs. 7, 15. 
1575 Vid. Fred Halliday, “The Romance of Non-state Actors”, op. cit., p. 35; David Capie, “Influencing Armed Groups: 
Are there Lessons to Be Drawn from Socialization Literature?”, en: Geneva Call, Exploring Criteria & Conditions for 
Engaging Armed Non-State Actors to Respect Humanitarian Law & Human Rights Law, “Conference Report—
Geneva, 4-5 June 2007”, 2008. 
1576 Vid. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso González y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México, 
Sentencia, op. cit., párrs. 288-291. 
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estatales de garantizar y proteger los derechos humanos con una diligencia debida, cuyos 
estándares son más exigentes en algunos eventos como frente a personas y derechos 
vulnerables o en las ocasiones en las que el Estado tenga una posición de garante o cree un 
riesgo de violación no estatal de derechos humanos, supuestos en los que los deberes del 
Estado son más severos.1577 Esta responsabilidad estatal fluye de una de las obligaciones 
generales (de medios y no de resultados) de los Estados bajo el derecho internacional de los 
derechos humanos: garantizar el goce y disfrute de los derechos humanos mediante medidas 
positivas incluso frente a amenazas privadas, lo cual exige la prevención y respuesta frente a 
intromisiones con el disfrute del contenido de derechos que sean atribuibles a actores no 
estatales, generándose responsabilidad estatal si no se presentan adecuadamente medidas 
pertinentes. 
Frente a la emergencia de las prácticas de la privatización, las alianzas público-privadas 
y la delegación y transferencia de poderes a organizaciones internacionales y otras entidades, se 
ha considerado que las obligaciones estatales no cesan y que en consecuencia el Estado no 
puede evadirlas o intentar disminuir las garantías de los individuos por medio de la transferencia 
de sus competencias, razón por la cual debe supervisor la ejecución de acciones y la provisión 
de servicios que previamente estaban directamente a su cargo cuando ello sea realizado por 
otros actores públicos y privados, y asimismo debe garantizar que los derechos humanos sean 
protegidos de manera efectiva en relación con las actividades de las organizaciones 
internacionales u otros entes en cuestión.1578 
                                                     
1577 Vid. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) y otros Vs. Estados 
Unidos, Caso 12.626, Informe de Fondo No. 80/11, 21 de Julio de 2011, párrs. 113-114, 122-134; Tribunal Europeo 
de Derechos Humanos, Sección Cuarta, Caso Hajduová Vs. Eslovaquia, Sentencia, 30 de noviembre de 2010, 
párrs. 41, 45-46, 50; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso de la Masacre de Pueblo Bello Vs. 
Colombia, Sentencia, 31 de enero de 2006, párrs. 125-126; Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observación General 20 
al artículo 7 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, 1992, párr. 11; Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos, Caso Ximenes Lopez Vs. Brasil, Sentencia, 4 de Julio de 2006, párrs. 138-141; Comisión 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Comunicado de prensa 114/10. 
1578 Vid. August Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 78-82; Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Press Unit, “Factsheet on 
Case law concerning the European Union”, 2010, p. 3, disponible en: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA6F3298-FE75-48E7-B8A7-
F9C5FF5EB710/0/FICHES_European_Union_EN.pdf (última revisión: 15/11/2011); Tribunal Europeo de Derechos 
Humanos, Caso Matthews Vs. Reino Unido, Sentencia, 18 de febrero de 1999, párrs. 34-35; Andrew Clapham y 
Scott Jerbi, op. cit., p. 339; Normas sobre las responsabilidades de las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas 
comerciales en la esfera de los derechos humanos, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 de agosto de 2003, párr. 1; 
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso Ximenes Lopez Vs. Brasil, Sentencia, 4 de julio de 2006, párr. 
96. 
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 El anterior razonamiento también explica por qué la Comisión de Derecho Internacional 
ha considerado que los Estados no deben eludir sus obligaciones aprovechándose de su 
membresía en organizaciones internacionales y vice versa.1579 
Por otra parte, las anteriores dinámicas revelan hasta qué punto la lógica que subyace 
en las obligaciones internacionales sobre derechos humanos de los Estados también están 
presentes en relación con ciertas actividades no estatales cuando los actores no estatales son 
autoridades funcionales de facto o en virtud de autorización normativa, o incluso en otras 
situaciones, y en consecuencia es posible que existan obligaciones positivas de aquellos actores 
junto a obligaciones de respeto (es decir, de abstenerse de violar derechos humanos), tal y como 
es posible, por ejemplo, en el contexto de la protección de los derechos de las personas con 
discapacidades, en el sistema regional europeo de derechos humanos, o en relación con la 
protección de individuos con derechos internacionalmente reconocidos que sean habitantes de 
territorios administrados por entidades diferentes de los Estados, entre otros casos.1580 En 
ocasiones, existen mecanismos indirectos de protección junto a, en lugar de o además de las 
anteriores obligaciones no estatales directas. 
Las obligaciones positivas de los Estados, de las que derivan sus obligaciones de 
procurar el fin de, sancionar o prevenir violaciones no estatales de derechos humanos, o de 
asegurar la reparación de las víctimas, han abierto las puertas de la protección jurídica 
internacional a muchas víctimas que de otra forma serían incapaces de obtener remedios 
jurídicos dadas las limitaciones de los mecanismos convencionales de protección en relación con 
los sujetos pasivos de los procedimientos contenciosos, que por el momento suelen ser 
únicamente los Estados, a pesar de las limitaciones de estos mecanismos, gracias la sanción de 
las autoridades internacionales a la pasividad de las autoridades funcionales bajo el entendido 
de que sus poderes se justifican si protegen y benefician a los seres humanos,1581 y en virtud de 
la consideración de que el ejercicio diligente de esos poderes y las funciones relacionadas con 
ellos son imprescindibles en una época en la que múltiples actores tienen el poder y la capacidad 
de operar a través de las fronteras o de una forma contraria a la dignidad humana, y en la cual 
además funciones y actividades con relevancia social son desempeñadas por entes no estatales, 
lo que exige al menos a los Estados a vigilar su ejercicio. 
                                                     
1579 Ver los artículos 17 y 61 del Proyecto de artículos de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional sobre la 
responsabilidad de las organizaciones internacionales, adoptado en su sesión número 63, 2011. 
1580 Vid. Capítulo 6, infra; artículo 56 junto al artículo 1 del Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos 
Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales; artículo 44.2 junto al artículo 4 de la Convención sobre los derechos 
de las personas con discapacidad; Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observaciones finales del Comité de Derechos 
Humanos sobre Kosovo (Serbia), CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1, 14 de agosto de 2006, párr. 4. 
1581 Vid. Voto concurrente del juez A.A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión 
Consultiva OC-17/2002, Condición Jurídica y Derechos Humanos del Niño, 28 de agosto 2002, párr. 19. 
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En resumen, las obligaciones positivas han cobijado teorías de efectos horizontales de 
los derechos humanos1582 y han asegurado que al menos algunos efectos de las garantías de los 
derechos humanos se desplieguen entre entes no estatales y que los mismos tengan relevancia 
en la rama del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. No obstante, la mera presencia 
de las obligaciones positivas de los Estados y otras autoridades no es suficiente para garantizar 
la protección exigida por un sistema coherente e integral, universal y comprensivo de la 
protección jurídica de la dignidad humana. Esto puede ser ilustrado con aquellos casos en los 
que el Estado ha cumplido con los deberes a su cargo porque ha actuado con la diligencia 
debida que se le exige en términos jurídicos, a pesar de lo cual se comete una violación que 
permanece impune debido a que el Estado ha sido incapaz de atajarla con los medios admisibles 
a su disposición. En un caso de esta naturaleza, no se genera responsabilidad estatal pero se 
presenta una violación del contenido de derechos humanos en términos sustantivos, materiales y 
fácticos, existiendo víctimas que deben ser protegidas de manera efectiva dado el impacto 
negativo en el goce de sus derechos. 
Negar lo anterior equivaldría a negar que el Estado tiene una obligación de procurar 
prevenir o responder a las violaciones sustantivas no estatales, y la construcción teórica de las 
obligaciones positivas se desmoronaría debido a contradicciones internas. Negarse a ofrecer 
cuando menos una protección efectiva alternativa a las víctimas en aquellas situaciones sería 
injustificado y discriminatorio. 
En la práctica se han presentado casos como el descrito atrás, como lo ilustra el caso 
Mastromatteo. A pesar de estar en desacuerdo con la conclusión sobre la responsabilidad estatal 
en ese caso, en gracia de discusión debe mencionarse que el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos 
Humanos consideró que el Estado demandado, Italia, actuó con diligencia debida y no podría ser 
considerado responsable por el asesinato del hijo del peticionario por parte del crimen. En 
consecuencia, el Tribunal no ordenó que el Estado compensase. Sin embargo, la lógica que 
subyace a la conclusión de una violación y el derecho de toda víctima a ser reparada exige que 
se adopten algunas medidas para que las víctimas no queden desprotegidas en casos como 
este. 
Adicionalmente, los principios generales del derecho revelan que cuando se presenta 
una violación el agresor, cualquiera sea su identidad, está obligado a reparar: esto puede 
                                                     
1582 Vid. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03, Condición Jurídica y Derechos 
de los Migrantes Indocumentados, op. cit., párrs. 140-148; Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observación general No. 
31 [80], Naturaleza de la obligación jurídica general impuesta a los Estados Partes en el Pacto, op. cit., párr. 8; Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-17/2002, Condición Jurídica y Derechos Humanos 
del Niño, 28 de agosto 2002, párrs. 87-91; John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, op. cit., pp. 20-27. 
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exigirse por el principio que exige que una entidad que cause un daño deba reparar a los 
afectados, que ha adquirido la condición de principio general del derecho con relevancia 
internacional.1583 Por otra parte, puede considerarse que existen obligaciones automáticas, 
presuntas y/o implícitas que exigen el respeto del derecho imperativo por parte de todas las 
entidades y que tienen efectos frente a manifestaciones de diversos ordenamientos jurídicos. En 
caso contrario, quedarían en entredicho los efectos del derecho imperativo a través de sistemas 
formales y en relación con todos los agresores potenciales, además de su carácter absoluto e 
incondicional.1584 
 La existencia de normas imperativas que protegen la dignidad humana entraña la 
posibilidad de que actores no estatales estén vinculados por ellas, pues en caso contrario serían 
imposible obtener las metas e intereses de la comunidad internacional relacionados con su 
respeto, y porque las normas de ius cogens prevalecen sobre toda interpretación y aplicación 
que las prive de efectos prácticos, en virtud de su naturaleza imperativa y el principio de 
efectividad.1585 La objeción que eventualmente podría plantearse a estas consideraciones es que 
para que surja una obligación de esta índole el actor en cuestión debería tener personalidad 
jurídica. No obstante, es necesario preguntarse si la noción de la subjetividad jurídica realmente 
se exige por el derecho internacional o es, por el contrario, principalmente una cuestión 
académica y una herramienta teórica descriptiva. De hecho, la propia definición de la 
subjetividad jurídica internacional es controvertida, como se estudia en el Capítulo 5. 
Cabe mencionar que mientras que estudios sobre la historia de la noción de la 
subjetividad, como los realizados por Janneke Nijman, parecen apuntar que en un comienzo, 
lejos de aludir a una participación jurídica formal exclusive o presunta de los entes denominados 
Estados, la noción de la subjetividad no pretendía excluir a otros actores o participantes sino que 
procuraba ofrecer argumentos teóricos para otorgar una mayor participación, aunque sujeta a 
regulaciones normativas, a entidades al interior del Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico.1586 Así, 
                                                     
1583 Vid. Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, pp. 169-170. 
1584 Vid. Roland Portmann, op. cit., pp. 162-167, 273-274, 276-277, 280-281; Tribunal Penal Internacional para la Ex 
Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Sentencia, op. cit., párrs. 144-147, 151-157; Antonio Cassese, “Remarks 
on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law”, op. cit., p. 227; Antonio 
Gómez Robledo, El Ius Cogens Internacional: Estudio histórico-crítico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
2003, pp. 169-170; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized 
Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 17, 30-32. 
1585 Vid. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “La inevitable supremacía del ius cogens frente a la inmunidad jurisdiccional de 
los Estados”, Revista Jurídica de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (RJUAM), No. 18, 2009, pp. 60-63, 74-76. 
1586 Vid. Janneke Nijman, “Leibniz’s Theory of Relative Sovereignty and International Legal Personality: Justice and 
Stability or the Last Great Defence of the Holy Roman Empire”, IILJ Working Paper 2004/2, International Law and 
Justice Working Papers, Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law, 2005, pp. 2-
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incluso tras la paz de Westfalia, la personalidad de entes al interior del imperio no era del todo 
clara, y Leibniz diseñó un concepto de personalidad para equilibrar su deseo de acción 
independiente con la necesidad que percibía de que siguiesen dentro del imperio y sujetos a 
algunas limitaciones,1587 lo que en mi opinión implica su participación no exclusiva en la arena 
internacional, lo cual es contrario a la idea de que la noción de personalidad confirma la 
participación exclusive de los Estados, dada la continuación de la existencia jurídica del imperio. 
En otras palabras, la subjetividad internacional se diseñó para estimular el 
reconocimiento de la relevancia jurídica de la acción estatal junto a la de otras entidades y no 
para excluir a entes no estatales, de manera contraria a teorías como las de Oppenheim y otros 
autores, cuyas conclusiones rebate de manera brillante Jordan Paust, quien demuestra cómo 
incluso durante períodos de la historia del ius gentium supuestamente Estado-exclusivistas otros 
entes han participado y visto cómo son reconocidas sus capacidades jurídicas, derechos y 
obligaciones.1588 En consecuencia, entes no estatales relevantes pueden y deben ser regulados 
por el derecho internacional y considerados sus sujetos.1589 
 No debe ignorarse que algunos análisis críticos de la noción de personalidad jurídica 
internacional que incluso ponen en tela de juicio su pertinencia han sido realizados por distintos 
autores y movimientos, como estudios feministas, Andrew Clapham, Rosalyn Higgins y otros.1590 
Para algunos de ellos, el concepto de personalidad jurídica internacional excluye a participantes 
relevantes, en ocasiones incluso de manera injusta, lo cual es un motivo, a su juicio, para acudir 
a nociones como las de participantes del derecho internacional, que superan los límites de la 
dicotomía objetos-sujetos. Otros consideran que el concepto tiene funciones y objetivos 
eminentemente descriptivos, y nada impide a un actor que no sea considerado como sujeto por 
la doctrina ser objeto de atención normativa internacional; mientras que, por su parte, otros 
autores perciben la existencia de un proceso de inclusión de entidades en el ordenamiento 
jurídico internacional, y claman por su continuación y expansión. 
A la luz de estas consideraciones, es ineludible cuestionarse qué significa personalidad 
jurídica internacional, debido a que no existe acuerdo sobre la noción: diferentes autores asumen 
                                                                                                                                                            
3, 33-34, 52-57; Janne Elisabeth Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004, 
pp. 448-449. 
1587 Ibid. 
1588 Vid. Jordan J. Paust, “Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion”, op. cit., 
pp. 985-1000. 
1589 Ver el Capítulo 5, infra; Janneke Nijman, “Leibniz’s Theory of Relative Sovereignty and International Legal 
Personality: Justice and Stability or the Last Great Defence of the Holy Roman Empire”, op. cit., pp. 2-3.  
1590 Vid. José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 109-110; Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Law”, 
en Bas Arts et al. (eds.), Non-State Actors in International Relations, Ashgate, 2001, pp. 62-63; Janneke Nijman, 
“Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., p. 141; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of 
Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 59-63, 70-71. 
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posiciones divergentes sobre ella. Algunos de ellos apoyan una teoría que enfatiza la 
importancia del acceso pasivo o active a procedimientos en la esfera internacional, mientras que 
otros hacen hincapié en la atribución directa de derechos u obligaciones a una entidad y otros 
autores resaltan como crucial el hecho de que una entidad se asemeje a los Estados en sus 
capacidades internacionales o de que posean una “totalidad” o “mínimo” de capacidades 
jurídicas internacionales (frecuentemente procedimentales)1591, ignorando el hecho de que ni 
siquiera los Estados tienen todas las capacidades jurídicas internacionales posibles, al existir 
derechos, deberes y acciones que tienen otros pero no ellos.1592 
 En vista de la confusión teórica que rodea a la noción de la subjetividad o personalidad, 
es conveniente e interesante examinar la teoría de la capacidades jurídicas internacionales, que 
indaga si determinado actor tiene derechos, deberes o competencias reconocidos o generados 
por normas internacionales, cuestión sobre la cual la denominación formal de un ente como 
persona o sujeto del derecho internacional no influye. Esta concepción es muy útil, aunque es 
necesario tener consideraciones especiales frente a entes cuya existencia dependa del 
reconocimiento jurídico de subjetividad bien en ordenamientos jurídicos internos o en el 
internacional, como puede ser el caso de las organizaciones internacionales o ciertas 
corporaciones, aunque este sería un análisis relativa a la existencia de un actor en lugar de 
referirse a su personalidad, siendo estas cuestiones diversas. 
Por último, aunque sin carecer por ello de importancia, debe señalarse que la necesidad 
de proteger a las víctimas por medios jurídicos frente a agresiones no estatales se ha reconocido 
y tenido en cuenta por autoridades internacionales y nacionales, en los ámbitos de la litigación 
transnacional, jurisdicción universal, derechos humanos u otras. En este sentido, la posibilidad 
que tienen los órganos judiciales y otros órganos y agentes estatales de proteger derechos 
fundados en la dignidad humana directamente y frente a agresiones no estatales constituye un 
paso significativo en la búsqueda de la protección completa de los seres humanos. Este es el 
caso, por ejemplo, de la posibilidad de invocar bases humanitarias fundamentadas en el ius 
gentium frente a violaciones no estatales cuando se aplica el Alien Torts Statute estadounidense 
frente a entes como individuos o corporaciones (que son partes privadas),1593 o de la posibilidad 
                                                     
1591 Vid. Math Noortmann, “Non-State Actors in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 64-66; Manuel Díez de Velasco, 
Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público, Tecnos, 2005, p. 258; José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, Curso de 
Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones Internacionales, Tecnos, 2003, p. 186. 
1592 Vid. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 68-69. 
1593 Vid. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Boimah Flomo et al. v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 
LLC, decisión del 11 de Julio de 2011, pp. 6-15; United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, S. Kadic et al. 
v. Radovan Karadzic, decisión del 13 de octubre de 1995, donde se mencionó que “certain forms of conduct violate 
the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals”; 
Roland Portmann, op. cit., p. 166; Mireia Martínez Barrabés, “La responsabilidad civil de las corporaciones por 
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de emplear bajo ciertas condiciones mecanismos diseñados para proteger derechos humanos en 
relación con actores no estatales bien sea directa o indirectamente, como acontece en el Reino 
Unido o en Colombia.1594 
Estos desarrollos son bienvenidos y necesarios, aunque la mayor parte de ellos se basa 
actualmente en el correcto funcionamiento ordenamiento jurídicos internos, e incluso si se 
consideran adecuados debe reconocerse que su impacto puede ser limitado por ciertos 
obstáculos, como el incremento del poder de diversos actores y los vacíos que no pueden ser 
llenados por normas internas debido a las limitaciones del alcance de sus ordenamientos 
jurídicos, que hacen que aquellos desarrollos sean insuficientes. 
De hecho, esta insuficiencia no es exclusivamente un aspecto de los derechos internos, 
y tal y como ha sido indicado por autores y operadores jurídicos, es necesario y posible que 
diversos ordenamientos jurídicos y actores cooperen entre sí en pos de la obtención de fines 
comunes para que su consecución sea posible.1595 Adicionalmente, para lidiar con los retos a la 
defensa de los derechos humanos que se presentan en la sociedad global actual, los actores 
involucrados en la protección y promoción de los derechos humanos y garantías humanitarias 
deben emplear herramientas y aprovecharse legítimamente de oportunidades disponibles en el 
contexto globalizado,1596 como por ejemplo el adecuado empleo de ciertas tecnologías y 
mecanismos de acción conjunta en marcos o incluso asociaciones informales. Un elemento 
interesante de este esfuerzo común se revela por el hecho de que los intereses comunes no sólo 
pueden moldear la actitud de múltiples actores sino que además pueden ser a su vez moldeados 
de alguna manera por la participación de distintos actores, incluso por expresiones de lex 
humana que suplementan, complementan o influyen sobre la opinio iuris del derecho 
                                                                                                                                                            
violación de los derechos humanos: un análisis del Caso Unocal”, en Victoria Abellán Honrubia y Jordi Bonet Pérez 
(Dirs.), La incidencia de la mundialización en la formación y aplicación del Derecho Internacional Público, Los 
actores no estatales: ponencias y estudios, Bosch Editor, 2008, pp. 232-248. 
1594 Ver Ibid.; artículo 42 del Decreto 2591 de 1991 de Colombia; artículo 6.3.b del Human Rights Act 1998 del Reino 
Unido; Department for Constitutional Affairs, A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998: tercera edición, 2006, pp. 8-9, 
37, disponible en: www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/act-studyguide.pdf (última revisión: 02/02/2012); 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/peoples-rights/human-rights/pdf/act-
studyguide.pdf (última revisión: 29/02/2012). 
1595 Vid. Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: A Process of Inclusion”, op. cit., pp. 133-134; Anna Badia 
Martí, op. cit., pp. 337-338, 342-343; “Statement issued by the President of the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning Requests for Interim Measures (Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court)”, disponible en: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B76DC4F5-5A09-472B-802C-
07B4150BF36D/0/20110211_ART_39_Statement_EN.pdf (última revisión: 15/11/2011), donde se mencionó que 
“[f]or the Court to be able effectively to  perform its proper role in this area both Governments and applicants must 
co-operate fully with the Court”; Sandra Lavenex, op. cit., p. 383; Pierre Calame, “Non-state actors and world 
governance”, Discussion paper, 2008, pp. 22-23, disponible en: http://www.world-
governance.org/spip.php?article297 (última revisión: 27/12/2011); Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Annual 
Report 2011, 2012, pp. 34, 36-37; ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, Naciones 
Unidas, 2000, p. 13. 
1596 Vid. Kofi A. Annan, op. cit., pp. iii-iv; Anna Badia Martí, op. cit., pp. 319-320. 
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internacional formal tradicional, lo que abre las puertas a una sociedad verdaderamente global 
que supere la lógica de las relaciones internacionales y ponga los cimientos de vínculos 
necesarios para la existencia de una comunidad supranacional, que no puede emerger a no ser 
que se tengan en cuenta la opinión y participación de los seres humanos.1597 
Hasta cierto punto, una dimensión de la interacción sinérgica y la unión de esfuerzos, 
actores y ordenamientos jurídicos consiste en la generación de un espacio jurídico global, 
formado por la interacción e intersecciones de ordenamientos jurídicos internos e internacional 
junto a manifestaciones de acción y regulación privadas.1598 En este espacio jurídico pueden 
sostenerse intereses comunes, y su defensa o violación puede afectar a individuos y pueblos 
ignorando fronteras. Estos intereses comunes pueden entrar en el mundo del derecho a través 
de fundamentos jurídicos, objetivos y principios, e incluso pueden constituir bienes jurídicos 
comunes a todos los ordenamientos jurídicos involucrados en el espacio anteriormente referido, 
al menos en cuanto a un núcleo compartido o un mínimo común denominador, que puede 
relacionarse con la protección de la dignidad humana y protegerse por medio de derechos 
humanos y garantías humanitarias, como se discute en el Capítulo 1. 
Esta dinámica puede fortalecer la protección de la dignidad humana frente a amenazas 
no estatales. Esto es así, en primer lugar, porque puede ayudar a prevenir la impunidad de 
violaciones no estatales e incluso a prevenirlas, en tanto la presencia común de bienes jurídicos 
e incluso de políticas en diversos ordenamientos jurídicos puede asegurar que las conductas 
ilegales sean y deban ser reguladas y atajadas en diversos escenarios o al menos en algún nivel 
o espacio jurídico, permitiendo a otros operar en un escenario multi-nivel.1599  
Por otra parte, se enfatiza la relevancia de la posición de las víctimas, con 
independencia de divisiones formales entre normas o escenarios públicos o privados o internos y 
supra-internos, generándose una cultura jurídica común y enviándose un mensaje simbólico a la 
sociedad y operadores jurídicos que debe ser asimilado por quienes tengan la tarea de 
implementar y garantizar el derecho, quienes deberán interpretar las normas existentes a la luz 
de los objetivos de los bienes jurídicos globales para hacerlos efectivos. 
 
                                                     
1597 Vid. Andrew Clapham, “The Role of the Individual in International Law”, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 
1598 Adicionalmente, ver: Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law, IILJ Working Paper 2004/1, New York University, pp. 12-18; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global?, op. 
cit., p. 108; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 15, 17-19, 28, 32, 45. 
1599 Vid. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, pp. 35-43, 46. 
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En tercer lugar, puede decirse que los propios actores no estatales estarán más 
legitimados para actuar en pos de la protección de la dignidad humana en virtud del 
reconocimiento de los bienes jurídicos globales, y su papel como actores y participantes jurídicos 
no podrá negarse. Esto es crucial debido a que muchos desarrollos del proceso hacia una 
protección complete y efectiva de la dignidad humana se deben a la participación no estatal. Por 
ultimo, cabe señalar que los ordenamientos jurídicos, sus ramas y todos los actores involucrados 
en el espacio jurídico global que se orienta y coordina por los bienes jurídicos globales estarán 
llamados a acercarse a los demás por medio de vínculos, lo que contribuirá a generar ese 
espacio jurídico. 
A la luz de las anteriores consideraciones, puede decirse que es imprescindible 
examinar si en la actualidad los marcos jurídicos ofrecen de manera suficiente y efectiva una 
protección de la dignidad humana frente a actores no estatales y a todas las amenazas por 
medio de diversos mecanismos. Este análisis debe realizarse sin perder en cuenta que el 
derecho se justifica si beneficia a los seres humanos1600 y que los individuos estarán sub-
protegidos o, peor aún, desprotegidos si las normas que protegen la dignidad humana se 
consideran como relevantes únicamente en las relaciones con los Estados, lo que contraría el 
hecho empíricamente demostrable de la victimización a manos de entes no estatales y la 
demanda ética y sentido común de proteger a toda víctima. 
De hecho, la mayor parte de las violaciones de derechos humanos y de normas que 
protegen la dignidad humana son atribuibles a actores no estatales,1601 pues en la vida cotidiana 
únicamente un porcentaje de los abusos son cometidos por los Estados, e incluso ellos son 
materializados por entes no estatales con un rol público. Ignorar esto perpetúa una situación 
trágica y envía un mensaje peligroso de impunidad de violaciones y de abandono de víctimas e 
irrelevancia normativa de su sufrimiento, lo cual choca con los ideales de derechos humanos de 
igualdad y valor interno, que alude al ser humano y no a otros que interactúen con él. 
Esto es así porque la víctima, cuya protección debe constituir el centro de un discurso 
consistente sobre los derechos humanos, puede carecer de mecanismos de protección si las 
garantías internas no existen o no son efectivas por alguna razón. No es improbable pensar que 
                                                     
1600 Vid. Voto concurrente del juez A.A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión 
Consultiva OC-17/2002, Condición Jurídica y Derechos Humanos del Niño, op. cit., párrs. 19, 25. 
1601 Vid. Michael Goodhart, op. cit., pp. 24-27, donde se argumenta que los poderes del Estado existen precisamente 
para proteger a los individuos de violaciones no estatales, y que insistir en la responsabilidad exclusive del Estado 
es artificioso y hace que se ignoren las necesidades de protección frente a amenazas no estatales. Más aún, 
teniendo en cuenta que como entes ficticios las violaciones del Estado también son atribuibles a entes no estatales 
(sus agentes), quienes también pueden ser responsables, puede observarse que en términos fácticos en últimas 
siempre hay individuos, quienes son entes no estatales (que pueden componer entes grupales), involucrados en las 
violaciones a la dignidad humana, y con frecuencia cometen violaciones por su propia cuenta o en estructuras 
grupales sin generar la responsabilidad del Estado. 
 
 
597
aquellas víctimas, aparte de no compartir la “sabiduría” de académicos y autoridades que 
ignoran su necesidad de protección cuando sus derechos son conculcados por cualquier actor, 
pierdan la fe en el derecho y lo consideren como diseñado de manera injusta o incompleta, al no 
llegar su protección hasta ellos ni estar diseñado como debería, como ya ha acontecido.1602 Esas 
personas se enfrentarán a su sufrimiento y los daños que padecen sin contar con protección 
jurídica a sus derechos inherentes y reconocidos como superadores de consideraciones 
internas, factores que ciertamente son preocupantes y contra los cuales ha luchado el 
movimiento de los derechos humanos. 
Bien sea porque el derecho a la alimentación ha sido violado y un actor no estatal ha 
tenido alguna participación en la violación, o porque alguien es asesinado por un agente no 
estatal, un régimen coherente y comprensivo de la dignidad humana no debe permitir que 
violaciones de esta índole queden impunes y debería cumplir su vocación de regular 
comportamientos con relevancia desde el punto de vista de los intereses jurídicos que protege. 
En caso contrario, el derecho fallará en su misión de ocuparse de realidades presentes en la 
sociedad en la que debe operar, lo cual sería un sinsentido. Por esta razón, es pertinente 
recordar que los romanos consideraban que sic societas, sicut ius,1603 es decir, que toda 
sociedad tiene su propio ordenamiento jurídico, que también debe tener en cuenta sus 
características particulares y, en mi opinión, también las necesidades humanas, dado el carácter 
instrumental del derecho y el imperativo de que sirva los seres humanos: ciertamente, los 
actores no estatales pueden violar garantías de la dignidad humana y de hecho lo hacen, sin que 
los Estados estén siempre en la capacidad de defender a las personas. En consecuencia, el 
derecho de gentes debe hacer algo al respecto, directa o indirectamente, como exigen las 
circunstancias, algo que se discute a lo largo de este libro. 
El derecho no puede omitir enfrentarse a nuevos desafíos y al reconocimiento de 
intereses y bienes comunes en un panorama globalizado, siendo necesario que se protejan 
aquellos intereses y valores respaldados por el derecho con mecanismos y dinámicas jurídicas 
que sean capaces de enfrentarse a los desafíos a su efectividad. Esto exige repensar el derecho 
internacional porque, como fue argumentado por Jessup y Scelle, es inapropiado hasta cierto 
punto etiquetar al ordenamiento jurídico como internacional debido a que abarca mucho más que 
la regulación de relaciones entre las ficciones jurídicas llamadas Estados, y a través de su 
historia también ha sido llamado, de manera más apropiada, derecho de gentes, término que 
                                                     
1602 Sobre estos asuntos, Vid. Chris Jochnick, op. cit., p. 58; Jordan J. Paust, “The Other Side of Right: Private 
Duties Under Human Rights Law”, op. cit., p. 62; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 
pp. 43-44, 50, 53-54. 
1603 Vid. Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, p. 46. 
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abarca de manera más expresa sus dimensiones inter-gentes, intra-gentes, humanas, colectivas 
y cosmopolitas, no aclaradas del todo con la noción de vínculos y personas “internacionales”.1604 
En relación con lo anterior, debe mencionarse que desarrollos y tendencias como las 
relaciones transnacionales, la relevancia de la regulación privada par alas normas internas e 
internacionales, y la creciente importancia de la protección de los intereses humanos ejercen 
presión para replantearse el conjunto de normas que deben ocuparse de la sociedad supra-
interna. Considero que el mismo podría ser denominado ius gentium humanis, que incorporaría 
tanto las dimensiones de las relaciones interestatales como las relacionadas con los intereses y 
el comportamiento de otros actores, entre los cuales la protección de los seres humanos tendría 
una posición importante. Esto explica el uso del adjetivo humanus, que alude a la centralidad y 
protección de los seres humanos. En pos de la facilidad de lectura del texto, sin embargo, 
también usaré el término derecho internacional. 
Es conveniente enfatizar que la protección de los seres humanos puede hacerse de 
diversas maneras, que no se limitan a la imposición de obligaciones y a la correspondiente 
generación de responsabilidad de los actores no estatales que las violen, porque existen otros 
mecanismos jurídicos y extrajurídicos que pueden usarse para brindar la anteriormente 
mencionada protección, incluyendo el fomento de una cultura no estatal respetuosa de los 
derechos humanos, cuya importancia ha sido señalada desde un punto de vista teórico por 
autores como Amartya Sen y por órganos internacionales, incluyendo algunos de las Naciones 
Unidas.1605 En resumen, la protección de la dignidad humana debe ser integral, lo cual implica 
que la protección se brinde frente a todas las amenazas y a través de todos los medios 
admisibles efectivos, lo que exige que se permita y legitime la contribución de diversos actores 
que operan con el fin de proteger la dignidad humana, cuyas acciones se deben permitir y 
estimular por parte del derecho internacional y otros ordenamientos jurídicos, como los internos o 
incluso las manifestaciones de lex privata, debido a que un único ordenamiento jurídico no puede 
                                                     
1604 Vid. Antonio Gómez Robledo, Fundadores del Derecho Internacional (Vitoria, Gentili, Suárez, Grocio), op. cit., 
pp. 14-15, 98-99; Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Essay (traducido por M. Campbell Smith), 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1917, pp. 119, 139, 142, 152, 157, 165-166; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el 
derecho global?, op. cit., pp. 71-72; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, op. cit., pp. 29, 31-32, 34; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., at 102; Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho 
Internacional, McGraw-Hill, 1997, pp. XLV-XLVI. 
1605 Vid. Proteger, respetar y remediar: un marco para las actividades empresariales y los derechos humanos, 
A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., párrs. 27-32; Amartya Sen, op. cit., p. 345; Oscar Schachter, “Human Dignity as a Normative 
Concept”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, 1983, pp. 853-854; Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, Caso González y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México, Sentencia, op. cit., párr. 256; artículos 2 de la 
Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer y 4 de la Convención sobre 
los derechos de las personas con discapacidad. 
 
 
599
aspirar a ofrecer una protección efectiva completa a los seres humanos, especialmente uno con 
tan pocos recursos como el internacional. 
Debe recordarse que el derecho internacional tiene una larga tradición referente a la 
presencia de mecanismos y doctrinas, como las de subsidiariedad y complementariedad,1606 que 
reconocen que forma parte de un esfuerzo jurídico conjunto en el que las fronteras entre 
ordenamientos jurídicos se difuminan en virtud de una empresa común, el “principio de 
responsabilidad compartida” y la necesidad de que distintos actores y sistemas se 
complementen unos a otros en su promoción, como se aceptó por el presidente del Tribunal 
Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el propio Tribunal y la doctrina en un panorama más amplio de 
interacciones en un mundo globalizado.1607 
Esto, sumado a fenómenos sociales recientes, genera la emergencia del denominado 
espacio jurídico global, en el que actores e instituciones de diferentes ordenamientos jurídicos 
interactúan promoviendo metas comunes, lo cual obedece en parte a la imposibilidad para cada 
uno de ellos de hacer esto de forma aislada y a sus vacíos y limitaciones: el derecho interno 
puede estar demasiado enmarcado en la mentalidad estatal, que en muchos aspectos es egoísta 
y artificial;1608 las manifestaciones normativas no estatales pueden no ser democráticas, pueden 
reflejar interpretaciones parcializadas de normas jurídicas o incluso carecer de compromisos o 
capacidad de coerción. El derecho internacional, por su parte, tiene por lo general pocos 
recursos y procesos de creación normativa estrictos, además de algunos operadores 
parcializados. 
Adicionalmente, existen cuestiones de acción simultánea, distribución de poderes, 
gobernanza multi-nivel o sobre la elusión de debates internos legítimos que deben tenerse en 
cuenta.1609 Estas consideraciones respaldan el que un esquema de protección de las víctimas 
frente a todas las amenazas a su dignidad deba diseñarse con una estrategia jurídica global, 
                                                     
1606 Ver los artículos 17 del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional, 2 del Protocolo Facultativo del Pacto 
Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, 46 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, o 35 del 
Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, entre otros; Darryl Robinson, “The Mysterious Mysteriousness of 
Complementarity”, Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010; artículos 14 y 15 del proyecto de artículos sobre 
Protección Diplomática de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional, A/61/10, 2006; Paolo G. Carozza, “Subsidiarity as 
a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, 2003, pp. 
78-79. 
1607 Ver Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Annual Report 2011, 2012, pp. 34, 36-37. 
1608 Vid. Celestino del Arenal, op. cit., p. 29; Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” 
(dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law”, op. cit., p. 216; Rafael Domingo, ¿Qué es el derecho global?, op. 
cit., pp. 174-181. Considero que los agentes del Estado e incluso los “ciudadanos”, categoría que excluye a los 
extranjeros, piensan con frecuencia en favorecer únicamente a los “suyos”, incluso si esto implica actuar contra 
otros, y por ello se requiere reforzar una categoría consciente y subconsciente más amplia de pertenencia a la 
humanidad. 
1609 Vid. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, pp. 73-76; Paolo G. Carozza, op. cit., pp. 78-79; Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of 
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En relación con la idea de que las medidas protectoras de los individuos frente a las 
amenazas no estatales deben ser múltiples y complementarias, debe resaltarse que lejos de 
apoyar una responsabilidad exclusive y únicamente principal bien sea de los Estados o de los 
actores no estatales, sostengo que estos actores pueden ser en ocasiones únicamente 
cómplices o participantes en violaciones cometidas por Estados y que en otros casos pueden ser 
los principales agresores. Después de todo, la responsabilidad no es exclusiva en el derecho 
internacional,1610 y distintos actores pueden ver generada su responsabilidad de distintas formas 
en relación con una única violación. 
En relación con estas consideraciones cabe decir que para que existan reparaciones 
verdaderamente integrales, que deben contar con elementos simbólicos por el contenido de 
satisfacción,1611 que sólo puede ser satisfecho con la participación de todos los participantes en 
una violación; y para poder ocuparse de todas las amenazas, factores y participantes en las 
violaciones, en todos los casos en los que un actor no estatal esté involucrado en una violación 
de normas que protejan la dignidad humana, el derecho internacional debe ocuparse de tal actor 
directa o indirectamente para garantizar que se persiga la prevención de su participación y para 
responder de manera que se sancione a esa entidad y se le haga reparar a las víctimas. Otros 
ordenamientos jurídicos también deben ocuparse en estos casos para ofrecer esperanza y 
protección a las víctimas antes de que se empleen los mecanismos jurídicos internacionales. 
 Por otra parte, es importante insistir en la idea de que los actores no estatales no son 
únicamente “villanos” potenciales sino que también pueden ser colaboradores invaluables en la 
                                                                                                                                                            
Sovereignty”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20 No. 3, 2009, pp. 535-536; Hans-Otto Sano, “Good 
Governance, Accountability and Human Rights”, en Hans-Otto Sano, Gudmundur Alfredsson y Robin Clapp (eds.), 
Human Rights and Good Governance: Building Bridges, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, pp. 137-141; Pierre 
Calame, op. cit., pp. 19-20, 22-23. 
1610 Ver el Capítulo 7, infra. Adicionalmente, la responsabilidad de un actor no excluye la de otras entidades en 
relación con una misma violación, como se ha reconocido en la doctrina y la jurisprudencia y se ha demostrado por 
el hecho de que los Estados pueden ser cómplices en crímenes cometidos por actores no estatales o por la 
posibilidad de responsabilizar simultáneamente a un Estado y sus agentes por violaciones de derecho internacional 
causadas por un mismo acto. Ver Corte Internacional de Justicia, Case concerning the Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia y Herzegovina Vs. Serbia y Montenegro), 
Sentencia, 26 de febrero de 2007, párrs. 419-420; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva 
OC-14/94, Responsabilidad internacional por expedición y aplicación de leyes violatorias de la Convención (arts. 1 y 
2 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), 9 de diciembre de 1994, párr. 56; Antonio Cassese, “When 
May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case”, op. 
cit., p. 864, donde se manifiesta que “there may coexist state responsibility and individual […] liability”; Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso Castillo Petruzzi y otros Vs. Perú, Sentencia, 30 de mayo de 1999, 
párr. 90. 
1611 Ver los Principios 18 y 22 de los Principios y directrices básicos sobre el derecho de las víctimas de violaciones 
manifiestas de las normas internacionales de derechos humanos y de violaciones graves del derecho internacional 
humanitario a interponer recursos y obtener reparaciones; artículos 31, 34 y 37 de los artículos sobre la 
responsabilidad de las organizaciones internacionales redactado por la Comisión de Derecho Internacional (versión 
adoptada en su sesión Nº 63 en 2011) y 31, 34 y 37 de los artículos de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional sobre 
la responsabilidad del Estado por hechos internacionalmente ilícitos, adoptados en su sesión 53 en 2001.  
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protección complete de la dignidad humana, como evidencia el hecho de que esos actores han 
participado tanto en abusos como en desarrollos positivos, y la protección integral de los 
derechos humanos es impensable sin su participación, dadas las limitaciones jurídicas y 
psicológicas de los agentes de los Estados, que hacen que en ocasiones carezcan de 
flexibilidad, preocupación por “los otros” (es decir, quienes no son compatriotas), la multiplicidad 
de intereses que deben atender y sus prejuicios, que pueden no influir en entes no estatales o no 
hacerlo hasta el mismo punto.1612 Incluso si las limitaciones anteriormente mencionadas se 
superan en algunos casos gracias al hecho de que los agentes estatales pueden tener en cuenta 
intereses humanitarios,1613 el hecho de que esto sea una simple posibilidad exige ser cauteloso y 
resalta la importancia del principio de complementariedad, que alude tanto a la protección en 
múltiples niveles en relación con sistemas jurídicos públicos como a la acción simultánea en 
relación con la actividad no estatal, como se discute en el Capítulo 4. 
 Para comenzar a concluir esta introducción, debe mencionarse que uno de los puntos 
centrales de este texto es la idea de la importancia de un ordenamiento jurídico legítimo y justo, 
es decir un sistema o sistemas jurídicos interconectados con una dimensión procesal que tenga 
en cuenta la participación y las opiniones de todos los entes afectados o interesados, que en 
nuestro caso son los seres humanos debido a que son ellos los actores principalmente afectados 
e interesados en los sistemas relacionados con la protección de la dignidad humana; siendo 
necesario a su vez que el sistema en cuestión cuente con normas cuyo contenido sea justo,1614 
por lo cual es necesario que los sistemas jurídicos indaguen cuáles son las necesidades 
pertinentes de los individuos. Esto hace que sea inaceptable que se permita o fomente el 
sufrimiento humano de forma consciente o inconsciente como consecuencia de la idea de que 
algunos derechos basados en la dignidad humana “no deberían” ser protegidos frente a 
amenazas no estatales. Ello constituye una paradoja de la mayor crueldad. 
                                                     
1612 Vid. Bob Reinalda, “Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory”, op. cit., p. 25; 
Daniel Thürer, op. cit., pp. 40, 58; Pierre Calame, op. cit., pp. 9-10, 17, 22-23.  
1613 Vid. Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in 
International Law”, op. cit., pp. 226-231; Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human 
Dignity in a Globalized Context through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., p. 13; Harold Koh, "Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law?", p. 2659. 
1614 En relación con la justicia (en realidad fairness, término que no traduce exactamente justicia a mi juicio), Thomas 
Franck distinguió entre las nociones de rectitud procesal, como alusiva a la legitimidad, y la justicia sustantiva 
(justice), considerando que ambos componentes hacen al derecho justo, como se explica en: Thomas M. Franck, 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Clarendon Press – Oxford, 1998, pp. 3-24. He de mencionar que no 
estoy de acuerdo con la concepción de justicia sustantiva expuesta allí, que me parece algo limitada, debido a que 
es riesgoso y limitado centrarse en exclusive en la justicia distributiva e ignorar otras consideraciones meta-jurídicas, 
pues esta postura podría llevar a justificaciones de abusos contra la ética y la moral, que sin confundirse con el 
derecho ni hacienda que éste se convierta en instrumento de la imposición de aquellas han de ser tenidas en cuenta 
para que el derecho no se convierta en instrumento que tolere o promueva abusos contra la dignidad humana y 
otros valores. Entre otras cosas, distinguiéndose del derecho positivo, estimo que las ideas de derecho natural aún 
pueden servir para examinar críticamente al positivo. 
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Después de todo, ¿por qué debería tolerarse el que individuos sean agredidos por 
corporaciones de seguridad privada; que no se prevenga o responda a la violencia doméstica; 
que no se impida la participación de grupos armados no estatales en atrocidades y acciones 
crueles, con el consentimiento de pueblos e incluso gobiernos; que las corporaciones puedan 
violar derechos laborales o de otra naturaleza de su empleado y los miembros de las sociedades 
en las que impactan o actúan; o que las iniciativas para que las organizaciones internacionales 
que cometen abusos de derechos humanos tengan ius standi sean opuestas, entre otras 
cuestiones? 
Para una persona, estar en alguna de las anteriores situaciones o en otra en la que sus 
derechos sean o puedan ser violados con la participación de entes no estatales constituye una 
tragedia, y esa persona merece protección jurídica dada su naturaleza humana. El derecho debe 
corregirse si no se ocupa de esas necesidades, y tanto académicos como operadores jurídicos 
están llamados a considerar seriamente la adopción o propuesta de medidas de lege ferenda si 
el derecho no protege adecuadamente a todas las víctimas, como exigen la vocación y 
propósitos de los derechos humanos y otras garantías humanitarias, estudiadas en el Capítulo 1. 
Para todas las víctimas, potenciales y actuales, directas e indirectas, no importa quién viola sus 
derechos como el que sus derechos violados sean protegidos y cómo se ofrece esa protección 
(efectiva). 
Se dice que Deng Xiaoping dijo que el color de un gato es irrelevante, siendo lo 
importante el que atrape al ratón.1615 No puedo compartir plenamente esta frase debido a que no 
suscribo la idea de que las metas, por nobles que sean, justifiquen todos los medios (lo que 
ciertas interpretaciones de la frase podrían entender), como se discute en el Capítulo 5 en 
relación con las condiciones para la asignación de capacidades jurídicas negativas a entidades 
no estatales. No todo está permitido, como recuerda el derecho de los derechos humanos en 
relación con las condiciones para restringir derechos con el fin de proteger otros derechos 
humanos, y es importante tener esto en cuenta porque, por ejemplo, tal y como es importante 
proteger a los individuos de actos terroristas, no toda medida de contraterrorismo es aceptable y 
los terroristas también tienen derechos. En consecuencia, en lugar de adoptar una filosofía 
pragmática, este libro persigue una tarea teleológica: cómo proteger a los individuos de todas las 
violaciones y agresores de la forma que exigen la dignidad humana y otros valores y bienes 
jurídicos esenciales de forma compatible con ellos. 
                                                     
1615 La frase que se le atribuye es la siguiente: “No importa que el gato sea blanco o negro; mientras pueda cazar 
ratones, es un buen gato.” Ver http://es.wikiquote.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaoping (última revisión: 24/09/2012). 
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Con todo, la frase citada no es del todo irrelevante, porque acierta al indicar cuán 
importante es tener en mente los objetivos. En este sentido, Mahatma Gandhi enfatizó la 
importancia de adherirse a los principios,1616 y uno de los principios que defiendo es la protección 
de todas las víctimas, de todos los que sufren la violación de sus derechos humanos y de 
normas que protegen su dignidad humana. 
 Insisto: para las víctimas lo que importa no es tanto quién viola sus derechos sino que 
los mismos sean respetados en toda situación y por todo actor o violador potencial. Andrew 
Clapham resumió esta idea de manera brillante al decir que lejos de ser simplemente escudos 
contra el Estado, los derechos humanos deberían funcionar para proteger a la dignidad humana 
tanto de forma defensiva como proactiva frente a toda posible violación.1617 De hecho, los 
derechos humanos lato sensu y las garantías humanitarias, conceptos explicados en el Capítulo 
1, constituyen un conjunto defensivo complete que ofrece armaduras y escudos contra cualquier 
posible golpe y armas y arcos para permitir la solicitud de medidas cautelares o de respuesta 
frente a cualquier violador potencial o real de la dignidad humana. 
Esta tesis busca indagar de qué manera puede ser efectiva la protección jurídica integral 
de la dignidad humana contra toda posible amenaza en un contexto globalizado, lo cual puede 
requerir cambios. Para realizar este estudio, procederé de la siguiente manera: en una primera 
Parte examinaré los fundamentos normativos y teóricos de los derechos humanos y las garantías 
humanitarias, incluyendo la dignidad humana, la igualdad y no discriminación y los efectos 
horizontales y transversales de los derechos humanos, y de qué manera exigen que todas las 
víctimas sean protegidas de todas las amenazas en virtud del carácter incondicional y universal 
de la dignidad humana. También se examinará en qué ocasiones puede intervenir el derecho 
internacional para proteger de manera integral la dignidad humana frente a toda amenaza. 
La segunda Parte de este trabajo se ocupará, en primer lugar, del análisis de cuestiones 
sustantivas del ius gentium que son relevantes para hacer efectivas las exigencias de los 
fundamentos, estudiadas en la parte anterior, y en consecuencia se analizarán las condiciones 
para asignar capacidades jurídicas que persigan brindar protección frente a amenazas no 
estatales, incluyendo el estudio de la subjetividad jurídica, de condiciones formales y sustantivas 
                                                     
1616 Gandhi dijo que “as the doctrine of satyagraha developed, the expression ‘passive resistance’ ceases even to be 
synonymous, as passive resistance has admitted of violence as in the case of suffragettes and has been universally 
acknowledged to be a weapon of the weak. Moreover passive resistance does not necessarily involve complete 
adherence to truth under every circumstance. Therefore it is different from satyagraha in three essentials: 
Satyagraha is a weapon of the strong; it admits of no violence under any circumstance whatever; and it ever insists 
upon truth.” (subrayado añadido). Cita de: Mahatma Gandhi, The Essential Writings, Oxford University Press, 2008, 
p. 326. 
1617 Vid. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., p. 56, donde se menciona que “[i]f 
human rights once offered a shield from state oppression in the vertical relationship between the individual and the 
state, they now also represent a sword in the hands of victims of private human rights abuses.” 
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y de las Fuentes que pueden generar aquellas capacidades. Además, se prestará atención a las 
posibles obligaciones internacionales que pueden tener los entes no estatales y su posible 
responsabilidad cuando vulneren esas obligaciones, junto a otras modalidades de 
responsabilidad. Esta parte también se ocupará del análisis procesal y sustantivo de las formas 
en que pueden ser promovidas e implementadas las exigencias sustantivas y teóricas de la 
protección integral de la dignidad humana. 
Por ultimo, deseo exhortar a los lectores, incluso si están en desacuerdo con lo que se 
propone en estas páginas, a pensar sobre las cuestiones examinadas en este libro recordando 
que, como en mi opinión se muestra en el cuadro Evicted 1887 de Baldford Fletcher, los seres 
humanos pueden sin duda alguna sufrir tanto por la acción u omisión del Estado (representado 
por el alguacil) como de entes no estatales (representados por los aldeanos insolidarios),1618 y 
que las personas merecen nuestro apoyo y simpatía, sentimientos que espero emerjan al ver la 
pintura, en tanto el arte debe transmitir sentimientos y sensaciones,1619 mientras que por su parte 
las ideas pueden transmitirse en debates doctrinales centrados en el ser humano, que debe ser 
protegido por el derecho, que debe servirle, siendo la noción de solidaridad un tópico constante 
de los derechos humanos, cuya importancia es innegable pues si aspiramos a proteger 
verdaderamente la dignidad humana y aquellos derechos pueden generar armonía normativa o 
establecer un mínimo común denominador jurídico a través de diversos ordenamientos 
jurídicos,1620 al menos en relación con los derechos humanos y garantías de la dignidad humana 
imperativas, ellos deben server para humanizar el derecho1621 en relación con todas las víctimas 
potenciales y actuales y para prevenir caer en la apatía o deshumanización, que constituyen 
peligros tristes, que se plasman en la pintura que se muestran en la pintura mostrada en las 
conclusiones finales (“The unwed mother”), y que deben evitarse al enfrentar trágicos eventos 
actuales y violaciones cotidianas. 
                                                     
1618 La imagen de la pintura y una descripción sobre la misma se ofrecen en la página web de la Queensland Art 
Gallery: http://qag.qld.gov.au/collection/international_art/blandford_fletcher (última revisión: 17/11/2011). La imagen 
se ofrece en las primeras páginas de este libro. 
1619 Vid. Leo Tolstoy, What is Art?, Aylmer Maude (traductor), Crowell, 1899, donde se analiza el proceso de 
transmisión de sentimientos. 
1620 Vid. Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli, “Enhanced Multi-Level Protection of Human Dignity in a Globalized Context 
through Humanitarian Global Legal Goods”, op. cit., pp. 6, 15. 
1621 Vid. Voto concurrente del juez A.A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión 
Consultiva OC-17/2002, op. cit., párrs. 48, 71; Voto concurrente del A. A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03, op. cit., párrs. 25, 27, 88; Theodor Meron, “The Humanization 
of International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, p. 239. 
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CONCLUSIONES 
 
Si los abogados y académicos del derecho ignoran las necesidades humanas en pos de 
su preferencia por ciertas teorías abstractas y ficciones con independencia de cómo afectan su 
implementación y consecuencias prácticas a los seres humanos, le fallan a los individuos, en 
tanto su conocimiento y papel les ha dado la posibilidad y oportunidad de contribuir a la 
protección de la dignidad humana, posibilidad que se habrá desperdiciado e incluso empleado de 
forma que perjudique a otros seres humanos. Esto ocurre cuando alguien dice que el derecho 
“no puede” o “no debe” proteger a los individuos de las amenazas no estatales. Esta situación se 
ilustra en la pintura “the unwed mother” de Jean-Louis Forain, que representa la vulnerabilidad 
de una persona cuya vida se ve influenciada por el derecho tal y como es aplicado por 
operadores jurídicos aburridos y desinteresados que no parecen estar preocupados por su 
destino y quizás están más interesados en formalismos y ciertas teorías abstractas y confusas, o 
incluso en sus intereses privados, como se analiza por Leo Tolstoy en su novela 
Resurrección.1622 
 
8: ‘The unwed mother’, de Jean-Louis Forain. Bristol Museum & Art Gallery 
 
En consecuencia, no es justificable negar la protección efectiva y no simplemente teórica 
de la dignidad humana frente a violaciones atribuibles a entes no estatales, lo que exige ir más 
allá del paradigma de obligaciones exclusivamente estatales, que ha sido incluso superado en 
                                                     
1622 Vid. Leo Tolstoy, Resurrección. 
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algunos casos y no se exige en modo alguno ni por la evolución de la historia práctica y filosófica 
del movimiento de los derechos humanos ni por las características jurídicas del corpus iuris 
humanitario, que incluye a los derechos humanos y a las garantías humanitarias. 
Ciertamente, el insistir en un esquema estatocentrista lleva a negar el carácter humano 
de los derechos y garantías humanitarios, convirtiéndolos en derechos existentes tan sólo en 
algunas relaciones. En este sentido, por ejemplo aquellos autores que defienden la necesidad de 
que las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad respeten los derechos humanos para que 
cumplan con el principio de legalidad, dado el rol de los derechos humanos en la Carta de las 
Naciones Unidas y en el derecho consuetudinario e imperativo, reconocen de forma implícita que 
un órgano internacional no estatal debe respetar los derechos humanos, que constituyen un 
parámetro de legalidad, que no es dependiente de su respeto por Estados para que sea 
relevante o aplicable, aunque lógicamente los Estados deben respetar los derechos humanos 
incluso en relación con la implementación de las referidas resoluciones, y mantienen sus 
deberes, incluso los positivos y las correspondientes responsabilidades vicarias. 
Más aún, como se comenta en el Capítulo 8, el ius gentium y otros sistemas jurídicos y 
normativos pueden brindar protección a la dignidad humana contra amenazas no estatales y lo 
hacen con frecuencia, bien sea inconscientemente o implícitamente,1623 por ejemplo a través de 
normas civiles y penales que protegen los derechos humanos directa o indirectamente de forma 
clara o de forma mínima exigiendo o asegurando la ausencia de contradicciones o la existencia 
de compatibilidad con aquellas garantías a través de estrategias interpretativas, o de forma 
deliberada y expresa. 
La protección también puede ser formal o informal, promoverse por Estados y otros 
actores en términos sustantivos o procesales, por vías jurídicas o extra-jurídicas, pero siempre 
persiguiendo el fortalecimiento de la protección de la dignidad humana y teniendo el potencial de 
robustecer la efectividad del valor fundacional y el bien jurídico de la dignidad humana en el que 
se funda el corpus iuris humanitario. Esa protección también tiene manifestaciones 
especializadas, como la protección de la libertad, de la igualdad, de la autonomía o de la 
integridad, asegurándose así de que otros valores fundacionales íntimamente relacionados con 
la dignidad puedan ser protegidos, pero garantizando a su vez su compatibilidad con la dignidad 
humana e impidiendo la perversión del sistema que podría originarse por permitir la emergencia 
de teorías y normas que acaben atacando o ignorando la dignidad de algunos o todos los seres 
humanos. 
                                                     
1623 El derecho interno y las normas internas que no sean originalmente internacionales pero compartan los bienes 
jurídicos de éstas pueden proteger a los individuos de amenazas no estatales conscientemente o espontáneamente. 
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Debe evitarse despreciar la posibilidad de esta protección dadas las implicaciones 
negativas que ello podría acarrear, que son múltiples: en primer lugar, las negaciones de que la 
protección de los individuos frente a amenazas no estatales se encuentra dentro del ámbito y 
alcance del marco jurídico de protección de la dignidad humana, a pesar de cómo principios y la 
práctica jurídica señalan lo contrario y cómo sus fundamentos reclaman aquella protección 
pueden ser creídas por operadores y legisladores, quienes podrían entonces negar protección a 
seres humanos que sufren o están a punto de ser atacados por entes no estatales, a pesar de 
que lo permitido u ordenado por el derecho e incluso impidiendo su evolución hacia una 
protección integral de los seres humanos, como exige su dignidad incondicional, siendo las 
exclusiones basadas en la identidad o naturaleza de los agresores una condición contraria a este 
valor. Las profecías cuya propia creencia entraña su cumplimiento que son promovidas por estas 
negaciones deben ser evitadas, exponiendo su carácter equivocado. 
Por el contrario, reconocer que en la actualidad existen normas que permiten proteger a 
los seres humanos que son agredidos por entes no estatales, y que se necesita y permite más 
protección en tales situaciones, resalta cuán necesario es identificar limitaciones y vacíos de la 
lex lata para corregirlos de diversos modos, como por ejemplo mediante el diseño o el uso de 
mecanismos de protección y promoción de la dignidad humana que puedan integrar dimensiones 
no estatales positivas y negativas, algunas de las cuales fueron estudiadas en el Capítulo 8; o 
por medio de la cooperación entre ordenamientos jurídicos y actores (que también pueden 
desempeñar un papel positivo e indispensable) para proteger bienes jurídicos humanitarios 
compartidos (moldeados en interacciones) o comunes (quizás por coincidencia). 
Adicionalmente, es necesario tener siempre en cuenta que existe un impacto simbólico 
del derecho y cualquier manifestación normativa, como bien pueden tenerlo las teorías sobre 
cuándo es posible proteger la dignidad humana por vías o normas jurídicas, debido a las 
implicaciones prácticas que estas teorías pueden tener y a la necesidad de coherencia jurídica, 
que no existe cuando se niega a los seres humanos que su dignidad puede ser desconocida por 
entes no estatales y sin embargo existen obligaciones de protección que vinculan a los Estados, 
como se analiza en los Capítulos 1, 2 y 3. 
En lo concerniente a los efectos que puede tener una u otra postura, baste con decir que 
negar que los actores no estatales pueden violar derechos humanos (error que puede ser 
identificado y corregido) puede enviar un mensaje erróneo y peligroso a potenciales o actuales 
agresores no estatales, quienes pueden sentir que sus actos no son ilegales (¡aunque violan 
bienes jurídicos mediante conductas que en consecuencia son jurídicamente relevantes y 
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contrarias a los objetivos y fundamentos de los sistemas jurídicos!), son toleradas  o incluso 
permisibles. 
Según la concepción que considera que aquello que no está prohibido por el derecho 
está permitido (la aproximación Lotus), todos los actos no estatales que no están prohibidos 
podrían ser considerados de manera errónea como actos permitidos; pero de conformidad con la 
concepción que estima que puede haber diversos grados de consideración jurídica de una 
conducta, que es defendida por Simma, es posible mencionar que incluso la ausencia de una 
prohibición de una conducta pueden no equivaler a un permiso de la misma, y por ello en tales 
eventos es posible crear y utilizar mecanismos no basados en obligaciones de conformidad con 
el principio de legalidad y el respeto de los derechos humanos.1624 
De hecho, es posible observar cómo cuando algunas personas (o partes) se concentran 
de forma exclusiva o excesiva en los abusos de algunas entidades e ignoran (conscientemente o 
no) aquellos que son atribuibles a otros, estas personas pueden sentirse inclinadas a excusar las 
agresiones de estos otros, ¡o incluso considerarlas permisibles! Es posible identificar este 
fenómeno, por ejemplo, en discusiones de internet en las que los partidarios de cierta ideología 
conciben (con justicia) los abusos de una parte en ciertos conflictos como condenable, pero 
acaban diciendo que los crímenes brutales, las torturas y las violaciones cometidas por “la otra 
parte” son o fueron necesarias y no equivocadas, ¡incluso cuando condenan una misma 
conducta, como por ejemplo la tortura, cuando es cometida por el adversario! 
A diferencia de lo que sostienen algunas frases o “perlas de la sabiduría” que he 
escuchado, todas las víctimas e individuos merecen protección y respeto, dada su misma 
naturaleza y valor humanos, algo que resalta la exhortación que se encuentra al final de la 
introducción de este libro (algunas de estas “perlas”, esgrimidas de una forma no precisamente 
ecuánime por algunos, sostienen que algunas víctimas, por su pertenencia a algún bando en un 
conflicto, merecen más protección y tienen más valor que otras, algo que choca contra principios 
humanitarios éticos y jurídicos). Mi idea de los derechos humanos y de la solidaridad con todas 
las víctimas, en lugar de apelar a criterios de selectividad y exclusión, clama por la protección del 
valor intrínseco de todos los seres humanos, cualquiera sea su conducta (siendo su dignidad 
inalienable e incondicional), pues todas las víctimas humanas comparten la condición humana 
inalienable y merecen protección efectiva jurídica y extra-jurídica. 
En consecuencia, todos los mecanismos de protección directos e indirectos deben ser 
examinados en detalle, para asegurar que haya consistencia con lo que exige el fundamento 
                                                     
1624 Vid. Declaración del juez Simma a: Corte Internacional de Justicia, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Opinión consultiva, 22 de Julio de 2010, párrs. 8-10. 
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jurídico y extra-jurídico de los derechos humanos y las garantías humanitarias (la dignidad 
humana), en lugar de conformarse con criterios de “objeciones” “teóricas” a la protección frente a 
entes diferentes a los Estados, siendo muchas teorías con frecuencia proclives a equívocos en 
tanto fueron elaboradas con ciertos propósitos y en contextos que pueden haber cambiado,1625 e 
incluso si esto no es así la dignidad humana y los seres humanos son mucho más importantes 
que teorías exclusivistas y limitadas que responden a ciertas visiones del mundo y posturas 
ideológicas. 
Es realmente irónico que algunos de quienes apelan a la exclusión de consideraciones 
meta-jurídicas, como aquellas del derecho natural u otro carácter, se aferran consciente o 
inconscientemente a diferentes dogmas teóricos,1626 mientras el valor no negociable al que 
deberían en todo caso adherirse y defender por complete es el de la dignidad humana y la 
protección no discriminatoria, incondicional e integral que exige, siendo la identidad de los 
autores y participantes en violaciones tan sólo uno de los factores que deben tenerse en cuenta 
para brindar esa protección, sin que pueda alegarse para su exclusión sino para estudiarse con 
el fin de ofrecer una protección efectiva. 
Acerca de esto, puede analizarse el ejemplo colombiano y concluirse que sería 
contradictorio, exclusivista e injusto considerar que tan sólo las guerrillas o grupos paramilitares 
o agentes estatales han violado normas que protegen la dignidad humana o que tan sólo las 
víctimas de alguna de estas partes merecen protección, cuando de hecho todas las partes han 
victimizado seres humanos y cometido violaciones de normas que protegen la dignidad humana, 
como se discute en informes de las Naciones Unidas o de la Comisión Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos. Curiosamente, para algunas personas es inquietante desde un punto de 
vista simbólico que aquellos informes consideren que los grupos armados no estatales pueden 
tener responsabilidad únicamente bajo el derecho internacional humanitario, invocándose los 
derechos humanos tan sólo en relación con el Estado (aunque debe recordarse que el DIH y el 
derecho de los derechos humanos comparten el fundamento de la dignidad humana y algunos 
derechos humanos fundamentales lato sensu, que son derechos humanos a cabalidad, y esto 
evidencia cómo la protección ofrecida por una rama del corpus iuris humanitario, el DIH, puede 
ofrecerse en las demás, razón que hace que sea aún más decepcionante que las violaciones de 
                                                     
1625 Vid. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 25-58, 531-548. 
1626 Por ejemplo, en otro contexto y con ánimo ilustrativo, puede decirse que algunos consideran que el comunismo 
es una cuasi-religión moderna, mientras que otros apelan a un laicismo que procura excluir incluso la expresión de 
creencias religiosas protegida por derechos humanos y la permiten sólo en “secreto” mientras intentan imponer 
públicamente ideologías no religiosas a otros, algo que es contradictorio y de doble moral si se hace 
conscientemente. Ver un análisis interesante sobre cuestiones relacionadas en: “Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom 
Redux”, Editorial, European Journal of International Law, vol. 21, 2010. 
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derechos humanos de entes no estatales no sean reconocidas como tales directamente, al 
menos bajo el rótulo de “abusos” o “destrucción” de derechos humanos.1627 
Afirmar que tan sólo una parte viola derechos humanos, el DIH o la dignidad humana 
puede ser efectivamente una estrategia a cuyo empleo estén tentados quienes apoyen con otra 
de las partes ideológicamente o por otras razones, pero la apropiación de este argumento en un 
discurso de derechos humanos puede ser contraproducente y conducir a la pérdida de 
legitimidad, como se evidencia por las reclamaciones airadas de víctimas de violaciones 
atribuibles a una parte en el país mencionado líneas atrás o en otros lugares y por quienes 
condenan aquellas violaciones de otras partes cuando dicen (justamente) que es injusto que sólo 
algunas violaciones cometidas por el Estado o una parte sean condenadas por algunas ONGs u 
organizaciones internacionales. 
Esta sensación de ultraje no se presenta únicamente en el escenario colombiano, que 
tan sólo ilustra un fenómeno reconocido en la doctrina, y la justicia y legitimidad del derecho 
están ciertamente en juego en relación con la protección integral de la dignidad humana frente a 
abusos no estatales, siendo posible considerar que aquellas dimensiones no están presentes si 
únicamente son protegidas algunas víctimas y otras son, de hecho, despreciadas (acudiendo a 
discursos que resultan ser artificiosos) en nombre de lo que “se supone que hacen” el derecho 
internacional o los derechos humanos, ignorándose en tal evento qué están llamados a hacer 
tales sistemas e ignorando asimismo sus principios, valores y fundamentos, que de hecho exigen 
e incluso permiten en ocasiones una protección comprensiva, y cuando no la ofrezcan deben 
cambiar y evolucionar. Más aún, algunas teorías que han resultado ser no estáticas o 
problemáticas1628 han sido invocadas para denegar protección, como ocurre con algunas teorías 
sobre la personalidad jurídica internacional. Incluso si su objeto fuse realmente limitado, debería 
cambiar de lege ferenda para que la dignidad humana pueda protegerse, como exigen 
fundamentos éticos y del derecho. 
De hecho, hay elementos del trasfondo, el análisis teórico y la historia del ius gentium 
que revelan cómo consideraciones y preocupaciones humanitarias han inspirado la práctica, 
tradiciones, la evolución y el análisis académico y práctico, operando así incluso como 
                                                     
1627 Vid Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Tercer informe sobre la situación de los derechos 
humanos en Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102. 26 de febrero de 1999, párrs. 55 del Capítulo I, 5-15 y 18-19 del 
Capítulo IV (especialmente el párrafo 14), o el párrafo 5 de las Consideraciones finales; Consejo de Derechos 
Humanos, Informe anual de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la 
situación de los derechos humanos en Colombia, A/HRC/19/21/Add.3, 31 de enero de 2012, Resumen y párrs. 76-
77, 83-89; Comisión de Derechos Humanos, Informe de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los 
Derechos Humanos sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Colombia, E/CN.4/2006/9, 20 de enero de 2006, 
párr. 17; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 73-75. 
1628 Vid. Capítulo 5, supra. 
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consideraciones meta-jurídicas que permiten juzgar y valorar el derecho, orientarlo y 
modificarlo,1629 especialmente porque el carácter instrumental que el derecho tiene en la práctica 
(incluso desde la perspectiva de las autoridades y personas afectadas por él) hace que sea 
imperativo para el derecho atender a las necesidades humanas y sociales de regulación, que 
claman por la protección y satisfacción de necesidades humanas fundamentales, como aquellas 
relativas al respeto, la protección y la promoción del disfrute de derechos y garantías 
íntimamente relacionadas con el valor y la dimensión inherente de la dignidad humana, que es 
compartida por todos los individuos y es incondicional.1630 
Como se analiza en los Capítulos 1 y 8, y con base en las consideraciones de la Parte I, 
puede decirse que las entidades no estatales pueden ciertamente condenar, avergonzar y 
contactar a otros actores no estatales que hayan violado o puedan violar bienes jurídicos 
humanitarios, con el fin de persuadirlos a ajustar su comportamiento a su respeto e incluso a su 
protección. Naturalmente, esta lógica resalta que todas las violaciones son inaceptables y han de 
ser debidamente abordadas por el derecho, y por esta razón los Estados no pueden eludir sus 
obligaciones y responsabilidades excusándose en las obligaciones no estatales. De igual 
manera, debe añadirse que cualquier ente no estatal que participe en una violación debe reparar 
a las víctimas: que todos los individuos merecen protección antes y después de la comisión de 
una violación; y que los derechos fundamentales de los entes no estatales que puedan incurrir 
en abusos deben ser respetados, como se menciona en distintas partes de este libro.1631 
Adicionalmente, es necesario prevenir la materialización de los riesgos de que la 
exclusión de las víctimas, los argumentos y las estrategias partisanas, y los tratos 
discriminatorios sea usada, lo cual puede humillar aún más a las víctimas, especialmente cuando 
la parcialización es rampante y los discursos sobre derechos humanos están politizados. Los 
anteriores fenómenos han de evitarse, además, porque pueden fomentar dinámicas como la 
competencia entre víctimas o la victimización por parte de víctimas que se sienten abandonados 
por el derecho y tentados a la justicia por propia mano, siendo ambas cosas injustificadas. 
La coherencia y la necesidad de proteger la dignidad humana exige que sean protegidas 
todas las víctimas, quienquiera que sean, hayan cometido delitos o no, y sin que sea un factor 
condicionante el quién amenaza o viola sus derechos esenciales, tanto en términos teóricos 
como en el marco jurídico y según los fundamentos de los derechos humanos lato sensu y las 
garantías humanitarias, que justifica la protección indirecta y en ocasiones directa de la dignidad 
                                                     
1629 Cf. Voto concurrente del juez A.A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión 
Consultiva OC-17/2002, op. cit., párrs. 10-22. 
1630 Vid. Capítulo 1, supra. 
1631 Vid. Introducción y Capítulos 5, 7, supra. 
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humana frente a entes no estatales, siendo la negación de la existencia de violaciones atribuibles 
a estos entes no sólo injusta y peligrosa sino también contraria a la protección de la dignidad 
humana como fundamento de diversas normas jurídicas y no vinculantes, siendo este 
fundamento un punto de contacto afortunado entre el derecho y las necesidades humanas, lo 
cual contrarresta concepciones herméticas (aceptando algunas cierta apertura), lo cual hace que 
el derecho esté mejor orientado a la satisfacción de necesidades humanas básicas. 
Es necesario superar la tendencia humana al maniqueísmo y las exclusiones, y la 
tendencia teórica a favorecer doctrinas sobre necesidades humanas, ignorando el carácter 
instrumental del derecho, la necesidad de que responda a la realidad y el hecho de que las 
doctrinas restringidas se diseñaron obedeciendo a ciertas razones que pueden haber ignorado 
realidades y necesidades que emergieron con posterioridad o que existieron incluso en la época 
de su gestación. Lo anterior ha de hacerse observando cómo nada impide la extensión de la 
protección de la dignidad humana frente a las amenazas no estatales, como se revela por ciertas 
garantías humanitarias y derechos humanos lato sensu, que revelan cómo esta opción y curso 
de acción requerido puede adoptarse incluso en el corpus de los derechos humanos stricto 
sensu, que de hecho exigen esa protección, aunque optando en ocasiones por ofrecerla de 
forma indirecta a través de la mediación de otros agentes, lo cual en ocasiones constituye una 
decisión justificada cuando ello no resulte ser discriminatorio y se garantice una protección 
efectiva alternativa, aunque siempre debe permitirse cuando menos una vigilancia no estatal 
paralela, dada la necesidad de asegurar una operación efectiva del marco de protección, como 
se observa en los Capítulos 1, 3 y 4. 
Este marco se basa en las mismas exigencias fundamentales de proteger el valor 
inherente de los individuos frente a todas las violaciones,1632 lo cual revela cómo está dentro del 
ámbito del derecho de los derechos humanos y de todo el corpus iuris humanitario proteger a los 
seres humanos frente a violaciones no estatales. 
En caso contrario, si se ignoran la posibilidad la posibilidad y necesidad de dar y 
extender la protección de la dignidad humana de lege ferenda (y en ocasiones de lege lata) de 
conformidad con las exigencias de los fundamentos del corpus iuris humanitario, no sólo dejarán 
abandonados a muchos seres humanos que sufren abusos no estatales, en ocasiones sin contar 
con una posibilidad de acciones efectivas y exitosas para obtener protección y reparaciones 
frente a sus agresores, como acontece cuando ellos eluden el control estatal dado su poder o 
aprovechándose de vacíos sociales y normativos, dinámicas y oportunidades, incluso cuando los 
Estados (u otras autoridades pertinentes) han intentado proteger a las víctimas de manera 
                                                     
1632 Vid. Parte I, supra. 
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diligente (como deben hacerlo), haciendo que sea probable que las víctimas se sientan 
abandonadas por el derecho en esos casos, e incluso traicionadas y con una sensación de que 
el término derechos humanos es una falacia y una mentira, al no ser protegidos todos los seres 
humanos de manera efectiva y teniendo en cuenta incluso idénticos patrones de violación del 
contenido de sus derechos por parte de diferentes actores (incluso participando entes de 
distintas categorías formales en una misma violación o en dinámicas similares). 
Por otra parte, los agresores podrían sentir que su conducta es tolerada si la misma no 
es abordada adecuadamente por el derecho, sensación que puede a su vez estimular la 
impunidad y la re-victimización de los afectados, cuyas garantías de no repetición (vid. Capítulo 
7) serán menoscabadas, y cuya “esperanza” de hallar protección cuando los recursos internos 
sean ineficaces será frustrada: esto puede suceder si los operadores y académicos dan más 
importancia a consideraciones formales que a las necesidades reales y a los objetivos del 
sistema, incumpliendo su papel y expectativas frente a ellos en relación con los objetivos del 
derecho y sus responsabilidades profesionales. 
Por las anteriores razones, las teorías que niegan la dimensión (negativa) no estatal del 
corpus iuris humanitario, aparte de desconocer normas existentes basadas en los mismos 
fundamentos en que se basan las normas que examinan, ignoran los principios de igualdad y 
efectividad, inestimables en el derecho de los derechos humanos. Y mientras admiten el impacto 
positivo formal o informal que pueden tener los actores no estatales en su promoción y defensa 
(que debe permitirse y promoverse, como se discute en el Capítulo 1), ignorarán que es 
imprescindible regular las capacidades no estatales para afectar intereses jurídicos, no sólo 
cuando sean positivas y contribuyan a su efectividad, sino también cuando ataquen bienes 
jurídicos. En estos casos, las teorías también desconocerán el hecho de que la presencia de 
capacidades jurídicas positivas evidencia, en primer lugar, que las mismas Fuentes empleadas 
para crearas pueden generar capacidades jurídicas negativas, o vice versa. En segundo lugar, 
los actores no estatales pueden ciertamente ser sujetos, es decir destinatarios del ius gentium y 
otros sistemas normativos que protegen sus propias normas humanitarias y de los otros que 
tengan bienes jurídicos moldeados por esos sistemas, como se discute en el Capítulo 5. 
Aparte de las demandas de consistencia normativa y de consideraciones meta-jurídicas, 
no puede negarse que las violaciones no estatales, en tanto afectan bienes jurídicos 
humanitarios, son jurídicamente relevantes y deben ser abordadas directa o indirectamente por 
el ius gentium y otros ordenamientos jurídicos. Esto se basa en la violabilidad de los derechos 
humanos y otras garantías humanitarias (que en un sentido amplio abarcan a los derechos 
humanos) por parte de entes no estatales, posibilidad que siempre ha existido, tal como los 
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entes no estatales siempre han sido actores relevantes en la sociedad internacional o en las 
esferas interna o transnacional y han tenido la posibilidad de tener un impacto en intereses 
mundiales y el ius gentium. 
Adicionalmente, es innegable que en el mundo actual hay fenómenos y dinámicas como 
la delegación, la privatización, el empoderamiento de actores no estatales, las alianzas entre 
actores, los contactos y redes, la globalización, la interdependencia, la acción en el plano 
mundial por actores internos públicos o privados,1633 vacíos e interdependencia, entre otros, que 
generan situaciones en las que los individuos son vulnerables y están expuestos a amenazas no 
estatales, quizás incluso cuando el Estado u otra autoridad funcional o fáctica se esfuerce por 
protegerlos, a pesar de lo cual las amenazas se concretan.  
Teniendo esto en cuenta, y considerando que los derechos y garantías humanas exigen 
una protección positiva intensa de los individuos en situación de vulnerabilidad, debe 
garantizarse que la protección jurídica contra el Estado no sea la única disponible. Esto revela 
cómo, tal y como acontece con el principio de efectividad, los fundamentos y principios jurídicos 
del propio corpus iuris humanitario requieren protección frente a violaciones no estatales, y en 
caso que esta no se presente el sistema puede tornarse deficiente, hipócrita o discriminatorio, 
como se explica en la Parte I. 
En relación con lo anterior, es pertinente examinar el concepto de las obligaciones erga 
omnes. La mayor parte de los autores se concentra en su dimensión horizontal, que alude al 
hecho de que son debidas a una comunidad (la dimensión comunitaria de las sociedades 
mundial e internacional o de ámbitos más reducidos, en el caso de las obligaciones erga omnes 
partes). Antonio Cançado menciona de manera magistral cómo aquellas obligaciones también 
pueden tener una dimensión vertical, que es relevante para el objeto del presente estudio. En lo 
concerniente a esta dimensión, menciona que: 
“A mi modo de ver, podemos considerar tales obligaciones erga omnes desde dos dimensiones, 
una horizontal y otra vertical, que se complementan. Así, las obligaciones erga omnes de 
protección, en una dimensión horizontal, son obligaciones atinentes a la protección de los seres 
humanos debidas a la comunidad internacional como un todo. En el marco del derecho 
internacional convencional, vinculan ellas todos los Estados Partes en los tratados de derechos 
humanos (obligaciones erga omnes partes), y, en el ámbito del derecho internacional general, 
vinculan todos los Estados que componen la comunidad internacional organizada, sean o no 
Partes en aquellos tratados (obligaciones erga omnes lato sensu). En una dimensión vertical, las 
obligaciones erga omnes de protección vinculan tanto los órganos y agentes del poder público 
(estatal), como los simples particulares (en las relaciones inter-individuales)”1634 (énfasis 
añadido). 
                                                     
1633 Vid. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 4-12; Elena Pariotti, op. cit., p. 
95. 
1634 Vid. Voto concurrente del A. A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión 
Consultiva OC-18/03, 17 de septiembre de 2003, op. cit. párr. 77. 
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Comparto plenamente las anteriores consideraciones de Cançado, debido a que el 
hecho de que la comunidad internacional prevea garantías sustantivas, aunado a la posibilidad 
de que entes no estatales violen el marco jurídico de protección de la dignidad humana, hace 
que sea posible pensar que las garantías apoyadas por obligaciones erga omnes están 
protegidas por obligaciones implícitas, tal y como el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ha 
mencionado que una violación de tratados sobre derechos humanos por parte de agentes 
estatales resultaba ser ilegal para dichos agentes1635 aún cuando las obligaciones positivas de 
los Estados mencionan expresamente la responsabilidad de los Estados y no la de sus agentes 
(quienes generan su responsabilidad). Similarmente, puede pensarse que hay obligaciones 
implícitas de todo ente no estatal que afecte bienes jurídicos humanitarios y se involucre en 
violaciones de contenidos jurídicos en cuyo respeto esté interesada la comunidad de manera 
especial. En cuanto a quienes objetan lo anterior diciendo que los agentes estatales sí pueden 
tener en todo caso responsabilidad penal expresa, baste recordar que los individuos que 
participan en grupos no estatales e incluso por su propia cuenta también pueden tener 
responsabilidad penal internacional, y que no toda violación estatal constituye un delito atribuible 
a agentes estatales.1636 Incluso si no se aceptan las anterior ideas, cuando menos el derecho 
imperativo impone deberes implícitos. Estas cuestiones se discuten en más detalle en el Capítulo 
6, supra. 
En cualquier caso, de manera expresa o implícita las obligaciones humanitarias no 
estatales son una garantía reforzada que debe emplearse de conformidad con el principio de 
efectividad de la protección jurídica de la dignidad humana, y cuando tales obligaciones sean 
necesarias para que esta protección sea efectiva pero no existan, deben ser creadas de lege 
ferenda. Lo anterior se justifica por la necesidad de enfrentar la posibilidad de impunidad, la falta 
de acceso a recursos jurídicos por parte de las víctimas, y otras limitaciones de las estrategias 
que son únicamente voluntarias, que deben ser complementadas por normas y medidas de 
protección más robustas, como se discute en el Capítulo 4, supra. 
De hecho, como se discute en un artículo escrito por John Knox, las limitaciones de la 
efectividad del Pacto Mundial pueden deberse en parte a su carácter no vinculante. 
Curiosamente, las corporaciones fueron las entidades que más se opusieron al diseño o 
reconocimiento de normas que pudiesen tener un carácter vinculante y versaran sobre derechos 
                                                     
1635 Vid. Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Gran Sala, Caso Kononov Vs. Letonia, Sentencia, op. cit., párrs. 
236-237. 
1636 Vid. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-14/94, op. cit., párr. 56. 
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humanos dirigidas a entidades corporativas1637 (esto es increíble, debido a que esta actitud 
implica el desprecio del posible reconocimiento del derecho existente por parte de otros). Estas 
consideraciones, sumadas a la identificación de eventos en los que los códigos de conducta son 
empleados por corporaciones con fines como el de eludir presiones o efectos adversos o de 
mejorar su imagen pública, hacen que sea recomendable que exista un marco jurídico vinculante 
y verdaderamente efectivo que tenga los efectos simbólicos y prácticos del derecho, que pueda 
ser examinado por jueces u otras entidades con jurisdicción facultativa u obligatoria para 
examinar sus normas, y que pueda además ser invocado por víctimas y quienes las apoyen, 
para que tenga el potencial para cambiar actitudes y comportamientos no estatales.  
Adicionalmente, las iniciativas nacionales o privadas tienen limitaciones, y la 
dependencia exclusiva en ellas constituye una estrategia que puede terminar estimulando o ser 
incapaz de abordar fenómenos de race to the bottom, el respeto simplemente verbal de 
consideraciones humanitarias fundamentales, o incluso el desprecio práctico de su relevancia y 
efectividad. Es sin duda alguna necesario hacer saber a los entes poderosos que están 
vinculados por estándares humanitarios a través de las fronteras, especialmente cuando puede 
que den más importancia a otras consideraciones (ej. ganancias, ideología, etc.) e ignoren o 
incluso ataquen aquellas con un carácter humanitario. 
Dicho esto, tal y como se comentó en el Capítulo 4, el autor no defiende que se persiga 
una estrategia que únicamente sea internacional o basada en normas vinculantes. Esto se debe 
a que estrategias persuasivas y culturales (permitidas1638 y en ocasiones exigidas por el derecho 
en conexión con las obligaciones positivas de las autoridades) y la contribución de múltiples 
actores son cruciales para la efectividad e integralidad de la protección de la dignidad humana, y 
en consecuencia deben complementar estrategias y mecanismos vinculantes y de coerción, 
especialmente porque tal y como las violaciones ignoran distinciones y fronteras formales, así 
debe brindarse una protección de la dignidad humana que opere a través del espectro de 
posibilidades lícitas e incorpore componentes tanto jurídicos como extra-jurídicos (incluyendo a 
los meta-jurídicos) de los derechos humanos y campos relacionados con ellos. 
Debe reconocerse que tal y como ha sido mencionado en estudios de economía y 
ciencias sociales que los entes no estatales pueden contribuir a la provisión de ciertos bienes, su 
cooperación también se reconoce en el panorama jurídico internacional. Ciertamente, la 
                                                     
1637 Vid. John H. Knox, “The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations”, op. cit. Debido a 
los fenómenos del race to the bottom y elusión del derecho, se requiere un mínimo común denominador de normas 
que protejan a los seres humanos y les otorgue acciones de protección frente a actores abusivos. 
1638 Vid. Proteger, respetar y remediar: un marco para las actividades empresariales y los derechos humanos, 
A/HRC/8/5, op. cit., párrs. 27, 31, 83. 
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efectividad de la protección de la dignidad humana debe mucho con frecuencia a la participación, 
cooperación y contribución no estatal, reflejada en la entrega de información a órganos 
internacionales de supervisión o en su participación en procesos de protección. Este vínculo 
entre la efectividad del sistema y la participación no estatal, que debe permitirse en un proceso 
de inclusión,1639 ha sido identificado por el Comisionado de Derechos Humanos del Consejo de 
Europa, Thomas Hammarberg, quien dijo que: 
“El importante papel de las ONGs en las revelaciones sobre violaciones de derechos humanos 
experimentadas por personas vulnerables y en el facilitamiento de su acceso a la justicia debe 
ser reorganizado de forma oficial. Esto sería consistente con el principio de efectividad en el que 
se basa la Convención”1640 (traducción del autor). 
La regulación de los roles positivos y negativos de los entes no estatales no implica que 
las responsabilidades estatales puedan eludirse. Por el contrario, sugiere que la promoción no 
estatal de los derechos y garantías humanas está permitida, bien en relación con el Estado o 
frente a amenazas no estatales. En consecuencia, lejos de debilitar el sistema integral de 
derechos humanos que trasciende barreras formales, la participación no estatal lo fortalece. 
Lógicamente, los entes no estatales pueden cometer errores o actuar con el propósito de 
promover su agenda partisana (si ella existe), y a pesar de sus afirmaciones en sentido contrario 
sus acciones pueden ser ilegales e incluso incompatibles con la protección de la dignidad 
humana. Por ello, deben ser controlados democráticamente por otros actores privados y por 
entes públicos, como exige el imperio del derecho, teniendo en cuenta las garantías y 
limitaciones de este principio y fundamentos, principios y normas del corpus iuris humanitario y 
del derecho de gentes. 
En términos generales, puede decirse que así como cada sistema jurídico puede tener 
limitaciones, la participación cada actor también puede adolecer de ciertos problemas, y cada 
actor tiene con frecuencia además fortalezas únicas (flexibilidad, etc.). Por estos motivos, la 
interacción y cooperación de diversas entidades en pos de la protección de la dignidad humana 
es tan importante. Si esa interacción es guiada por una coordinación y cooperación centrada en 
bienes jurídicos legales y los actores se asisten mutuamente para alcanzar metas comunes, es 
posible que haya parámetros comunes y una protección efectiva en un espacio jurídico global 
integrado.1641 Esto justifica que se de la posibilidad de que participen actores que pueden 
                                                     
1639 Vid. Janneke Nijman, “Sovereignty and Personality: a Process of Inclusion”; Andrea Bianchi, op. cit., pp. 186-
190; Luis Pérez-Prat Durbán, op. cit., pp. 34-38. 
1640 Vid. Consejo de Europa, “Access to justice for persons with disabilities: Commissioner Hammarberg intervenes 
before the Strasbourg Court”, 18/10/11, disponible en: 
http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/news/2011/111018tpiromania_en.asp (última revisión: 13/03/2012). 
1641 Vid. cómo los actores no estatales pueden urgir al Estado a cumplir con sus obligaciones humanitarias y 
contribuir con la promoción de las garantías humanitarias, como por ejemplo se examina en: Daniel Thürer, op. cit., 
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contribuir a promover bienes jurídicos comunes y que se reconozcan los papeles y funciones que 
pueden tener diversas entidades en cuanto a la promoción del disfrute de los derechos y 
garantías humanas. Al respecto, es pertinente citar un pasaje relacionado con la “[c]ooperación 
con la sociedad civil” que se encuentra en la Observación General Nº 5 del Comité de los 
Derechos del Niño: 
“La aplicación de la Convención es una obligación para los Estados Partes, pero es necesario que 
participen todos los sectores de la sociedad, incluidos los propios niños. El Comité reconoce que la 
obligación de respetar y garantizar los derechos del niño se extiende en la práctica más allá· del 
Estado y de los servicios e instituciones controlados por el Estado para incluir a los niños, a sus 
padres, a las familias más extensas y a otros adultos, así como servicios y organizaciones no 
estatales. El Comité está de acuerdo, por ejemplo, con la Observación general No 14 (2000) del 
Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales sobre el derecho al disfrute del más alto 
nivel posible de salud, en cuyo párrafo 42 se establece que: "Si bien sólo los Estados son Partes en 
el Pacto y, por consiguiente, son los que, en definitiva, tienen la obligación de rendir cuentas por 
cumplimiento de éste, todos los integrantes de la sociedad -particulares, incluidos los profesionales 
de la salud, las familias, las comunidades locales, las organizaciones intergubernamentales y no 
gubernamentales, las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y el sector de la empresa privada- tienen 
responsabilidades en cuanto a la realización del derecho a la salud. Por consiguiente, los Estados 
Partes deben crear un clima que facilite el cumplimiento de esas responsabilidades”.1642 
Es importante enfatizar que la necesidad de proteger a los seres humanos frente a 
violaciones no estatales, aparte de basarse en consideraciones jurídicas y extra-jurídicas, debe 
tener en cuenta la razón de ser del corpus iuris humanitario: la protección de la dignidad humana 
frente a todas las amenazas en su contra y frente a todas las entidades que desconozcan el 
valor inherente de los miembros de la humanidad, para aliviar el sufrimiento de las víctimas y 
tener solidaridad con ellas. Todas estas cuestiones se refieren a los seres que son protegidos, 
siendo por ello equívoco ignorar jurídicamente el sufrimiento de algunas víctimas, como las de 
violaciones no estatales, incluso si esto se hace basado en consideraciones teóricas o políticas, 
desconociendo tanto que el derecho puede y debe cambiarse de lege ferenda si es injusto, 
incluso en lo atinente a asuntos sobre su protección completa, que las teorías deficientes deben 
ser modificadas o reemplazadas por otras más apropiadas, como el hecho de que los seres 
humanos deben ser protegidos de conformidad con el principio de igualdad y no discriminación, 
con independencia de sus afinidades políticas o ideológicas o de otras consideraciones. 
No debe olvidarse que en el derecho internacional humanitario, que comparte el 
fundamento y fin de la protección de la dignidad humana en algunas de sus normas y contiene 
algunos derechos humanos, la cláusula Martens (en su versión original o en su forma adaptada a 
tratados contemporáneos) apela a las leyes de la humanidad y las exigencias de la conciencia 
                                                                                                                                                            
p. 44; ASIL, Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting: The Challenge of Non-State Actors, op. cit., pp. 22-23; Elena 
Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 95, 98, 104-105. 
1642 Vid. Comité de los Derechos del Niño, Observación General Nº 5 (2003), Medidas generales de aplicación de la 
Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño (artículos 4 y 42 y párrafo 6 del artículo 44), CRC/GC/2003/5, 27 de 
noviembre de 2003, párr. 56. 
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pública,1643 lo que abre las puertas a abordar normativamente nuevas necesidades y problemas 
en el contexto de los conflictos armados para proteger a las víctimas actuales y potenciales. De 
igual forma, algunas normas del corpus iuris humanitario permiten incluir o extender la protección 
de todas las víctimas, por ejemplo gracias a un entendimiento apropiado de las funciones de 
promoción de los órganos internacionales o a través de protección indirecta. En otros eventos, la 
referida inclusión puede obtenerse gracias a estrategias normativas. En relación con estas ideas, 
cabe mencionar que la apelación a la protección de la dignidad humana también tiene una 
dimensión meta-jurídica, que clama no sólo por aplicaciones e interpretaciones1644 adecuadas y 
justas de la lex lata sino además por la corrección y extensión del derecho de lege ferenda para 
permitir lidiar apropiadamente con retos nuevos o viejos que no obstante son abordados de 
manera insuficiente o insatisfactoria. 
Que no haya dudas: como se explica a lo largo de este libro, la protección completa de la 
dignidad humana contra violaciones no estatales, además de permitir y alentar la promoción de 
la dignidad humana por estos actores cuando ellos puedan contribuir a su defensa, debe asignar 
deberes y capacidades jurídicas negativas a violadores potenciales (respetando el imperio del 
derecho y garantías fundamentales) con el fin de proteger a las víctimas. Esto impone una carga 
(tanto jurídica como moral) a los académicos y operadores jurídicos, quienes deben esforzarse 
por promover estos fines y mecanismos. 
Al respecto, en la declaración del presidente del seminario sobre prácticas de buena 
gobernanza para la promoción de los derechos humanos que se celebró en Seúl el 15 y 16 de 
septiembre de 2004 se menciona que los participantes de la conferencia “resaltaron las 
siguientes acciones requeridas para el futuro” (traducción del autor) en lo concerniente a actores 
responsables, que aluden a los roles tanto positivos como negativos que pueden tener en 
relación con el corpus iuris humanitario global: 
“[A]ctuar contra la impunidad de los actores estatales/no estatales, siendo conscientes de la 
delicadeza de las situaciones de conflicto (como a través de tribunales efectivos, comisiones de 
verdad y reconciliación o instituciones nacionales de derechos humanos) […] promover acciones 
                                                     
1643 Vid. Frits Kalshoven y Liesbeth Zegveld, op. cit., pp. 22, 85, 132, 156, 171; Erika R. George, “The Criminal 
Enterprise? Corporations and International Human Rights Issues of Accountability and Liability at Home and 
Abroad”, en Willem J.M. Van Genugten et al. (eds.), Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years after the 1907 Hague Peace 
Conference, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009, pp. 170-171, sobre la necesidad de responder a nuevos desafíos de los 
actores no estatales y la relación de esta respuesta con los fines y contenido de la “cláusula Martens”. 
1644 Debe tenerse en cuenta que la interpretación siempre está presente cuando se aplica el derecho. Al respecto, 
ver Antonio Remiro Brotóns et al., Derecho Internacional, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007, pp. 579, 596. 
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conjuntas entre actores nacionales y transnacionales, incluyendo al sector privado”1645 
(traducción del autor). 
Los seres humanos no son ni angelicales ni demoníacos, aunque algunos se asemejan 
más a arquetipos de uno de esos extremos que a otros entre ellos. Lo mismo puede decirse de 
todos los entes no estatales, que pueden contribuir1646 o bien a la protección y promoción de la 
dignidad humana o a su violación, no siendo esos papeles inmutables y, debido a la libertad de 
acción, ciertamente un ente puede tener ambos roles simultáneamente o incluso “perder la 
gracia” o “redimirse” y cambiar su interacción con esa protección: este es el motivo por el cual 
son tan importantes los mecanismos destinados a procurar generar un cambio de cultura, 
comportamiento y actitud, como los examinados en el Capítulo 8, entre otros, siendo necesario 
esforzarse para intentar hacer que violadores actuales o potenciales se conviertan en protectores 
y promotores de la dignidad humana, como exige la figura de la complicidad silenciosa (ver el 
Capítulo 7, supra). Sobre esta posibilidad y la necesidad de cambio, el Secretario General Ban 
Ki-moon consideró que: 
“[Las] actividades [de las empresas] tienen un gran impacto en la vida de las personas y en 
asuntos globales clave […] Nuestro reto es asegurarnos de que las empresas no sean parte del 
problema, sino la fuente de soluciones”1647 (traducción del autor). 
Todas esas dimensiones deben ser tenidas en cuenta por el derecho de forma que se 
anticipen todas las posibles interacciones con el fin de cumplir su mandato de proteger de 
manera efectiva a los seres humanos y su valor inherente e inalienable incondicional y universal. 
En líneas generales, desde un punto de vista filosófico y teórico, puede decirse que 
insistir en la falacia de la exclusividad estatal de la autoría de las violaciones de derechos 
humanos no sólo ignora la realidad sino el hecho de que el Estado es una ficción, una 
construcción opera precisamente a través de actores no estatales, como revelan los análisis 
desagregados del Estado y otros entes. Adicionalmente, una fijación en el Estado que puede 
calificarse de casi obsesiva ignoraría que a través de la historia, incluso en épocas en las que 
prevalecían teorías que apoyaban la idea de una supuesta participación internacional exclusiva 
del Estado, los actores no estatales han tenido poder y sus acciones han tenido un impacto 
                                                     
1645 “Chairman’s Statement”, Seminario sobre “Good Governance Practices for the Promotion of Human Rights”, 
organizado por la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos y el Programa 
de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo en cooperación con el gobierno de la República de Corea, Seúl, 2004, p. 
5. 
1646 Vid. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Essay, op. cit., pp. 152-155; Fernando Mires, El fin de 
todas las guerras: Un estudio de filosofía política, LOM ediciones, 2001, pp. 118-119 (no estoy de acuerdo con 
algunas de las ideas del ultimo autor). 
1647 Vid. Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, Secretary-General Stresses Role of Businesses in Support of 
Human Rights, SG/SM/13869 HR/5073, disponible en: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sgsm13869.doc.htm y http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1009055 (última revisión de ambas páginas: 13/03/2012). 
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considerable en el derecho y la sociedad. En tercer lugar, la concepción criticada ignora que en 
la actualidad (y también en otros tiempos) hay actores no estatales con innegables relevancia y 
capacidad de afectar el disfrute de derechos y garantías derivadas de la dignidad humana 
(corporaciones, carteles del narcotráfico, mafias, etc.). 
Si se afirma que los Estados pueden violar los derechos humanos, y se reconoce que 
aquellos entes actúan por medio de actores no estatales (desde una perspectiva extrajurídica), 
que algunos actos de tales actores son atribuibles a los Estados en términos jurídico-formales y 
que los entes con el poder de violar derechos y garantías humanas deben ser controlados y 
frenados, el hecho de que otros actores tengan poder o la misma o similar capacidad que los 
Estados para lastimar seres humanos de facto hace que sea insostenible, contradictorio, 
peligroso e irrazonable, incluso monstruoso, no proteger a víctimas actuales o potenciales frente 
a las violaciones no estatales. Si los entes no estatales han sido capaces de influir en resultados 
y decisiones de la sociedad internacional y de impactar en el comportamiento estatal, incluso 
durante el apogeo del período “westfaliano”, cuánto más debe reconocerse y tratar 
adecuadamente su capacidad de afectar valores y fundamentos jurídicos, como la dignidad 
humana, hoy día, cuando se acepta con claridad que los entes no estatales pueden ser 
destinatarios del derecho de gentes y que la dignidad humana debe ser protegida de manera 
universal e integral, con efectos frente a cualquier agresor potencial. 
A la luz de las consideraciones expuestas en esta tesis, ¿quién puede negar que hay 
violaciones que se pueden cometer principalmente, frecuentemente o fácilmente con 
participación de entes no estatales? Esto exige, en consecuencia, que tales violaciones sean 
prevenidas o se responda adecuadamente a las mismas para proteger a las víctimas, debido a 
que la necesidad de regular jurídicamente el comportamiento de entes con capacidades de 
afectar intereses jurídicos y la necesidad de que sean responsables así lo exigen. 
En consecuencia, resulta injustificado y poco acertado (pues en caso contrario se 
fomentan la impunidad y re-victimización, o las víctimas son abandonadas) ignorar las amenazas 
no estatales, debido a su relevancia jurídica y al sufrimiento humano que pueden causar. En este 
sentido, puede pensarse sobre cómo tratar directamente o con la mediación de las autoridades 
aquellas amenazas, como se exige en algunas normas internacionales, como en aquellas que 
protegen a los individuos de algunos entes con evidentes poderes y capacidad de abusar de 
ellos (ej. corporaciones, grupos armados, etc.), en las normas que regulan derechos que deben 
ser protegidos en situaciones de interacción frecuente con entes no estatales por razones 
fácticas o normativas (ej. derechos de las personas con discapacidad en relación con algunas 
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autoridades funcionales o en su lugar de trabajo)1648, o en normas alusivas a contextos en los 
que los individuos son vulnerables de manera especial o frecuente frente a entes no estatales, 
como los de violencia doméstica o las relativas a protección de los niños.1649 
Al respecto, las siguientes palabras de Antonio Cançado revisten especial interés debido 
a que resaltan tanto la necesidad de enfrentar problemas reales de los seres humanos 
relacionados con amenazas no estatales (dimensión humana y meta-jurídica) como el sustrato 
normativo que exige la protección de esas personas (directa o indirectamente, de conformidad 
con el respeto de los principios de efectividad e igualdad, a la luz de la protección de la dignidad 
humana): 
“En dos otros casos recientes, A versus Reino Unido (1998) y Z y Otros versus Reino Unido 
(2001), la Corte Europea afirmó la obligación del Estado demandado de tomar medidas positivas 
para proteger los niños contra malos tratos, inclusive los infligidos por otros individuos […] Es 
precisamente en este ámbito privado dónde frecuentemente se cometen abusos contra los niños, 
ante la omisión del poder público, - lo que requiere así una protección de los derechos humanos 
del niño erga omnes, o sea, inclusive en las relaciones entre particulares (Drittwirkung). 
Es éste un contexto en que, en definitivo, asumen especial relevancia las obligaciones de 
protección erga omnes. El fundamento para el ejercicio de dicha protección se encuentra en la 
propia Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. La obligación general […] de respetar y 
hacer respetar los derechos consagrados - inclusive los derechos del niño, como estipulado en el 
artículo 19 - requiere del Estado la adopción de medidas positivas de protección (inclusive para 
resguardar el rol preponderante de la familia, previsto en el artículo 17 de la Convención, en la 
protección del niño […]), aplicables erga omnes. De ese modo, el artículo 19 de la Convención 
pasa a revestirse de una dimensión más amplia, protegiendo los niños también en las relaciones 
inter-individuales”1650 (subrayado añadido). 
A la luz de lo que se ha dicho, puede afirmarse que es inútil negar que los entes no 
estatales pueden violar derechos y garantías humanas o participar en su violación, y que la 
relevancia jurídica de esa conducta debe hacer que la misma tenga una respuesta jurídica que 
contemple la protección del ser humano como su meta, existiendo en la actualidad normas y 
prácticas jurídicas que buscan brindar esa protección directa o indirectamente, y además hay 
reconocimientos doctrinales y oficiales de la necesidad de esta protección. En este sentido, 
conviene examinar por ejemplo el siguiente pasaje de la Declaración y Programa de Acción de 
Viena: 
“La Conferencia Mundial de Derechos Humanos manifiesta asimismo su consternación y su 
                                                     
1648 Vid. el artículo 3 común a los Convenios de Ginebra sobre Derecho Internacional Humanitario de 1949 y el 
Protocolo II adicional a estos Convenios; Principios Rectores sobre las empresas y los derechos humanos: puesta 
en práctica del marco de las Naciones Unidas para “proteger, respetar y remediar”, A/HRC/17/31, 21 de marzo de 
2011; Proteger, respetar y remediar: un marco para las actividades empresariales y los derechos humanos, 
A/HRC/8/5, op. cit.; Normas sobre las responsabilidades de las empresas transnacionales y otras empresas 
comerciales en la esfera de los derechos humanos; Estatuto de Roma de la CPI; Estatutos del Tribunal Penal 
Internacional para la Ex Yugoslavia y del Tribunal Penal Internacional para Ruanda, entre otros. 
1649 Vid. artículos 1 y 3 de la “Convención de Belém do Pará”; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Actors, op. cit., pp. 74-75, entre otros. 
1650 Vid. Voto concurrente del juez A.A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión 
Consultiva OC-17/2002, Condición Jurídica y Derechos Humanos del Niño, 28 de agosto de 2002, párrs. 63-64. 
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condena porque en distintas regiones del mundo se siguen cometiendo violaciones manifiestas y 
sistemáticas de los derechos humanos y se siguen produciendo situaciones que obstaculizan 
seriamente el pleno disfrute de todos los derechos humanos. Esas violaciones y obstáculos, 
además de la tortura y los tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos y degradantes, incluyen las 
ejecuciones sumarias y arbitrarias, las desapariciones, las detenciones arbitrarias, el racismo en 
todas sus formas, la discriminación racial y el apartheid, la ocupación y dominación extranjeras, la 
xenofobia, la pobreza, el hambre y otras denegaciones de los derechos económicos, sociales y 
culturales, la intolerancia religiosa, el terrorismo, la discriminación contra la mujer y el atropello de 
las normas jurídicas”1651 (subrayado añadido). 
Las frases subrayadas se refieren a conductas que contrarían los derechos humanos y, 
en consecuencia (si esos derechos están debidamente reconocidos en el derecho positivo) la 
dignidad humana (como lo hacen todas las violaciones de derechos verdaderamente fundados 
sobre la dignidad humana y que merezcan llamarse derechos humanos), y son cometidos con 
frecuencia o de forma evidente por entes no estatales. 
En este sentido, por ejemplo, encontramos que actos de racismo, xenofobia y 
discriminación son cometidos frecuentemente (pero no exclusivamente, dada la posibilidad de 
que virtualmente todos los derechos sean afectados negativamente por Estados y entes no 
estatales)1652 por individuos y grupos no estatales; que la pobreza y la prevención del goce de 
derechos económicos, sociales y culturales u otros derechos humanos puedan tener como factor 
relevante de su causa comportamientos no estatales; que hay actos de terrorismo cometidos por 
entes no estatales, los cuales violan derechos humanos;1653 que las mujeres, junto a los niños, 
migrantes, personas con discapacidad y otros (siendo apropiado identificar a personas con 
vulnerabilidad frecuente pero erróneo excluir a otros, incluyendo a quienes sean víctimas incluso 
si no han sido victimizados de manera frecuente ni identificados como vulnerables por parte de 
grupos ideológicos) son con frecuencia víctimas de entes no estatales e incluso son beneficiarios 
de protección indirecta ordenada o recomendada por órganos supervisores internacionales y en 
virtud de instrumentos internacionales; y que el imperio del derecho no es aplicable únicamente a 
las autoridades (incluyendo a las autoridades no estatales) sino que se extiende a toda entidad 
cuya conducta sea (y deba ser, dada su capacidad de afectar bienes jurídicos) regulada por el 
derecho. 
Tanto los mecanismos y normas de protección directa como los de protección indirecta 
obedecen al mismo fundamento jurídico y revelan cómo los rótulos y términos destrucción y 
abuso no estatal de derechos humanos alude a la capacidad de actores no estatales de violar 
derechos humanos y victimizar individuos (tanto como pueden hacerlo los Estados), como 
                                                     
1651 Vid. Declaración y Programa de Acción de Viena, Conferencia Mundial de Derechos Humanos, Viena, 14 a 25 
de junio de 1993, párr. 30 de la Parte I. 
1652 Vid. secciones 1.3 y 2.3, supra. 
1653 Cf. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Informe sobre terrorismo y derechos humanos, op. cit., 
párrs. 2, 5, 33 y 48, inter alia. 
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parece aceptarse en decisiones internacionales, práctica y trabajos que se refieren a los abusos 
de derechos humanos cometidos por actores no estatales como contrarios a derechos humanos 
internacionalmente reconocidos.1654 Negar que los entes no estatales pueden incurrir en 
comportamientos negativos jurídicamente relevantes que han de ser abordados normativamente 
es inconsistente y riesgoso, porque puede conducir a aquellos que creen en estas teorías a 
negarse a usar el derecho en formas en las que puede y debe ser usado para proteger a los 
individuos frente a amenazas no estatales de forma directa o indirecta o incluso puede llevarlos a 
no modificar y mejorar el derecho de lege ferenda en relación con este objetivo. 
La referida inconsistencia se evidencia tanto por la existencia de deberes positivos de 
protección y facilitamiento de derechos humanos que tienen efectos horizontales en relación con 
actores no estatales como por el hecho de que el derecho penal internacional, como mencionó 
Lauterpacht, puede proteger derechos humanos en ocasiones, siendo claro hoy día que incluso 
los miembros de grupos no estatales pueden violar el derecho, y no únicamente agentes 
estatales.1655 Lógicamente, ignorar la contribución y promoción de entes no estatales también es 
erróneo, pues estos entes pueden incrementar la democratización y efectividad de mecanismos 
y normas al contribuir con su diseño o aplicación, lo cual hace necesario reconocer el posible 
nivel de cooperación multi-nivel y de múltiples actores en la protección de bienes jurídicos 
comunes o compartidos. 
En cuanto a la violabilidad de la dignidad humana y las normas que la protegen por parte 
de entes no estatales, no puede negarse que hay niños reclutados por guerrillas, otros grupos 
armados no estatales o que hay personas afectadas por ellos; que hay habitantes de lugares 
afectados por problemas ambientales, de seguridad y otra índole con implicaciones de derechos 
humanos causados en no poca medida por corporaciones, grupos armados u otros entes; que 
hay poblaciones afectadas negativamente por decisiones y operaciones de organizaciones 
internacionales;1656 que hay víctimas de bullying cuyos victimarios desconocen su dignidad y 
derechos humanos; que hay piratas que tratan a las tripulaciones y a otros como medios para 
obtener sus fines privados; que hay individuos acusados o condenados injustamente por ONGs 
que se comportan de forma casi fanática y mienten sobre la responsabilidad de alguien; o que 
todas las personas víctimas de violencia doméstica (adultos y niños, mujeres y hombres), los 
extranjeros víctimas de ataques xenófobos y bandas racistas, los niños abusados de forma 
                                                     
1654 Vid. Parte I, supra. 
1655 Vid. Hersch Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 35-37; http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (última 
revisión: 13/03/2012). 
1656 Vid. por ejemplo Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Caso Sufi y Elmi Vs. Reino Unido, Sentencia, 28 de 
junio de 2011, párr. 82; José Manuel Cortés Martín, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 53-58, 131, 137-143. 
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impune por su vulnerabilidad, o las víctimas de un criminal cuya violación afecta los intereses de 
la comunidad internacional mundial deben ser protegidos de forma efectiva y no han de ser 
abandonados por el derecho para que éste cumpla con su propósito de proteger el valor 
inherente de todo individuos y para que no se fomente el deseo peligroso de justicia por mano 
propia; o que en ocasione los Estados no desean o son incapaces de proteger protección frente 
a entes no estatales, lo que hace que sea necesario autorizar a otros Estados, entes y niveles de 
gobernanza otorgar o promover esa protección. 
En ocasiones, aparte de estar autorizados para promover la protección de la dignidad 
humana simultáneamente a quienes deben hacer algo (incluso a través de técnicas de 
persuasión y contactando a la entidad involucrada en una violación con una autorización cuya 
extensión varía según cada caso), hay actores y autoridades, como las del ordenamiento jurídico 
del derecho de gentes, que tienen autorización para operar cuando las características de un 
caso lo requieran, debido a que es importante que se ofrezcan mecanismos que reflejen la 
especial relevancia que tienen todas las violaciones para el ordenamiento jurídico, sin que sea 
posible invocar esto como excusa para olvidar que todas las violaciones (no sólo las estatales o 
las no estatales) deben ser tratadas de forma efectiva. 
Por estos motivos, no puede ignorarse que aparte de su impacto negativo, los entes no 
estatales son con frecuencia agentes positivos de la promoción de la dignidad humana, como por 
ejemplo las ONGs que revelan y condenan violaciones de entes estatales o no estatales con el 
fin de avergonzar a los implicados y hacer que cambien patrones de conducta; las 
organizaciones internacionales que procuran regular y supervisar el comportamiento de entes no 
estatales que pueden violar potencialmente derechos humanos; o las corporaciones que crean 
regulaciones privadas y adoptan prácticas que no sólo previenen violaciones sino que además 
promueven y mejoran el respeto y disfrute de derechos y garantías derivadas de la dignidad 
humana merced a la nueva cultura, entre otros. 
Esta contribución de actores no estatales y de la cooperación de múltiples actores, que 
puede ser simultánea según la teoría de los bienes jurídicos globales, es necesaria cuando se 
observa que hay entidades como organizaciones criminales transnacionales, grupos de piratas o 
redes terroristas que no sólo forjan alianzas sino además redes y operan aprovechándose de 
oportunidades ofrecidas en el contexto global. Esto exige respuestas de múltiples actores que 
trabajen conjuntamente para proteger intereses jurídicos comunes, siendo la dignidad humana 
un valor e interés prevalente en los ordenamientos jurídicos. Adicionalmente, la formación de 
vínculos entre ordenamientos jurídicos y actores que reconocen valores jurídicos comunes debe 
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hacer que ellos reconozcan que proteger estos valores sólo es posible si se integran, coordinan y 
cooperan, para que no existan vacíos o posibilidades de impunidad o protección ineficaz. 
Un estudio empírico con un análisis desagregado puede mostrar cómo, en últimas, todas 
las violaciones son cometidas por individuos, y además cómo algunas violaciones tienen 
mayores probabilidades de cometerse debido a las posibilidades que ofrecen ciertos grupos. Por 
este motivo, reconocer que las responsabilidades son simultáneas y no exclusivas (ej. un agente 
estatal y su Estado pueden ser responsables simultáneamente,1657 y lo mismo se predica de 
criminales de guerra y sus grupos armados, por ejemplo) es un primer paso ineludible al 
diseñarse un marco de protección completa de la dignidad humana contra todas las violaciones 
posibles, que ha de contar con garantías de no reparación, que serán completas e integrales 
únicamente si todas las entidades involucradas en una violación están obligadas a participar en 
su provisión (ver Capítulo 7, supra). 
Además de hacer que participen en la provisión de reparaciones a las víctimas cuando 
hayan cometido violaciones de derechos humanos u otras garantías que protejan la dignidad 
humana o cuando hayan participado en ellas, y debido al impacto positivo que puede tener la 
participación no estatal en la mejora de la protección de la dignidad humana (ver Capítulos 1, 4 y 
8), es necesario que se desarrolle un marco que permita y recoja su contribución, bien sea 
formal o informal, asegurándose de que así como la creación de deberes y otras capacidades 
jurídicas a los entes no estatales para proteger a los individuos frente a ellos no hace que los 
deberes estatales sean menos rigurosos, aquella contribución, voluntaria o no, sea 
complementaria a los actos positivos de otros actores que exija el derecho, de la misma manera 
en que el trabajo de ONGs o la promoción de las garantías humanitarias y su disfrute por parte 
de entes no estatales, que es importante y debe ser apreciado, como se revela en estudios sobre 
bienes públicos y en otros análisis, ha de complementar las acciones públicas basadas en 
deberes positivos de protección y facilitación de derechos económicos, sociales y culturales u 
otros derechos humanos. 
En consecuencia, y dadas las posibilidades de cooperación entre actores y la ineficacia 
de respuestas aisladas, es necesario diseñar e implementar una estrategia que integre y 
coordine las posibles acciones y coordinaciones de actores y sistemas normativos (jurídicos o 
no) que se ocupan de la protección de la dignidad humana, con el fin de enfrentar los desafíos 
de entes que cooperan entre sí para cometer violaciones en el contexto globalizado,1658 como se 
discute en los Capítulos 4 y 8. En caso contrario, las iniciativas estarán condenadas al fracaso, 
                                                     
1657 Vid. Capítulo 7, supra. 
1658 Vid. Consejo de Seguridad, Resolución 1373 (2001); Capítulo 8 y sección 4.1, supra. 
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debido a su aferramiento a formalismos que ignoran cómo en la práctica la protección de la 
dignidad humana es la misma, lo que exige la comprensión y coordinación de mecanismos que 
permitan y procuren proteger la dignidad humana y se encuentren en varios sistemas 
normativos, públicos o de lex privata, e incluso en contextos no normativos. 
Esta última idea se relaciona a su vez con la noción de que todo derecho humano, stricto 
o lato sensu, y toda garantía humanitaria, puede ser afectada (negativamente por violación o 
positivamente por defensa) por actores no estatales, bien sea que aquellas garantías se refieran 
a derechos sociales, civiles o de otra índole (que comparten ciertas características y tienen 
algunas diferencias, a pesar de lo cual todos los tipos son verdaderos derechos humanos). Esto 
es posible, entre otras razones, debido a las posibilidades normativas y fácticas de que entes no 
estatales violen o participen en la violación de todo derecho, como se examina en los Capítulos 1 
y 2, lo cual hace que sea desaconsejable redactar listas exhaustivas de derechos que deban ser 
protegidos frente a aquellos entes, siendo mejor  regular obligaciones generales que requieren 
protección frente a entes no estatales cuando quiera que ellos puedan victimizar a alguien, las 
que deben ser complementadas en primer lugar por normas especializadas que ofrezcan una 
regulación conforme con los derechos y las necesidades específicas de ciertos individuos, o que 
tenga en cuenta los retos concretos de determinados actores,1659 y en segundo lugar por 
deberes y otras capacidades jurídicas asignadas a entes no estatales (ver los Capítulos 5 y 6), 
las cuales deben cumplir con diversos requisitos que persiguen garantizar el respeto de los 
derechos fundamentales que tengan los violadores potenciales y del imperio del derecho. 
Así como los entes no estatales pueden afectar negativamente el disfrute de todos los 
derechos humanos, debe decirse que potencialmente todo ente no estatal puede violar derechos 
humanos, incluyendo a aquellos que parecen contribuir a su promoción. En este sentido, por 
ejemplo, las ONGs pueden acusar falsamente a alguien de violar derechos humanos o incluso 
apoyar políticamente a grupos que cometen violaciones. Esto no niega que haya actores 
identificados como violadores frecuentes o potenciales en virtud de su poder, práctica o 
dinámicas, y ciertamente regulaciones y estudios especializados pueden ser necesarios frente a 
ellos, para asegurarse de que los seres humanos están lo suficientemente protegidos en 
términos jurídicos de todos los violadores potenciales, o al menos en términos abstractos, para 
que la regulación sea implementada por mecanismos que se desencadenan cuando una 
situación de violación en la que se involucren los actores se presente. 
Igualmente, los entes estudiados y regulados por su posibilidad de cometer con 
frecuencia o de forma especialmente preocupante violaciones también pueden contribuir de 
                                                     
1659 Vid. Introducción y sección 1.2, supra. 
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forma positiva a la mejora de la protección de los derechos humanos, como se observa en 
estudios concernientes al impacto positivo que pueden tener sobre la efectividad de los bienes 
jurídicos humanitarios las actividades de corporaciones con una cultura respetuosa de los 
derechos humanos o, mejor aún, relativa a su promoción.1660 
Debido a que se exige que los individuos sean protegidos frente a todos los actores, y a 
que como revelan los análisis desagregados los individuos llevan a cabo los actos de actores 
con forma de grupo, es importante recordar cómo diversos instrumentos de derechos humanos 
claman por la protección contra violaciones que se presenten en ámbitos, esferas o relaciones 
que se consideren como privados por parte de algunos.1661 Sin embargo, las medidas que 
implementan aquella protección deben respetar los derechos fundamentales de los presuntos 
agresores (incluyendo la garantía de la presunción de inocencia), y no debe ignorarse que los 
derechos esenciales pueden colisionar y que las respetivas colisiones o tensiones deben 
resolverse con métodos como el de la aplicación del test de proporcionalidad (cuando sea 
aplicable y se respeten las garantías pertinentes),1662 siendo necesario evitar favorecer 
concepciones que no sean parte de los derechos humanos positivos y constituyan ideas políticas 
controvertidas que sean esgrimidas con el fin de intentar que prevalezcan sobre verdaderos 
derechos humanos y que pueden atacar la dignidad humana de algunos individuos o eludir de 
forma ilegítima procesos democráticos y consentimientos legítimos y locales (al no justificarse 
ignorarlos). 
No puede olvidarse que el derecho es instrumental. Si alguien está en desacuerdo con 
esta afirmación en un plano teórico, puede respondérsele que el derecho se usa en todo caso de 
esta forma en la práctica. Precisamente por esta razón, los académicos y operadores jurídicos 
deben comprometerse a que el derecho y sus doctrinas sirvan a los seres humanos (o, como 
mínimo, a que no los lastimen, aunque estimo que esto es insuficiente), y de hecho hay autores 
que claman por colocar a los individuos en el propio centro del derecho y, en consecuencia, de 
todas las actividades reguladas por el derecho, incluyendo a la economía.1663 Esto puede ser 
visto como contrario a la separación entre el derecho y las consideraciones extra-jurídicas por 
algunos, pero aunque esta separación existe hasta cierto punto la misma no es absoluta, pues a 
                                                     
1660 Vid. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., pp. 104-105. 
1661 Vid. Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Sección Cuarta, Caso Hajduová Vs. Eslovaquia, Sentencia, op. 
cit., párr. 45; Voto concurrente del juez A.A. Cançado Trindade a: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 
Opinión Consultiva OC-17/2002, op. cit., párrs. 58, 61-62, 64, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión 
Consultiva OC-17/2002, op. cit., párrs. 87, 90; párr. 9 de la Opinión; sección 1.1, supra. 
1662 Vid. sección 1.1, supra. 
1663 Vid. Olivier De Schutter, Relator Especial de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho a la Alimentación, “CAP 
reform must put an end to dumping” – UN expert, 12 de octubre de 2011, disponible en: 
http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/component/content/article/1-latest-news/1674-cap-reform-must-put-an-end-to-
dumping-un-expert (última revisión: 14/03/2012). 
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pesar de que algunos académicos han tratado de argumentar que el derecho es un sistema 
“puro”, el mismo no es hermético y en la práctica aquello en lo que creen los operadores jurídicos 
puede traducirse (de manera correcta o incorrecta, según diversos criterios) a la práctica jurídica 
merced a oportunidades que ofrecen múltiples interpretaciones permisivas o normas abiertas, 
que hacen que la elección consciente o inconsciente de los operadores tenga mayor o menor 
relevancia. 
Adicionalmente, las consideraciones extra-jurídicas y meta-jurídicas deben ser tenidas 
en cuenta o analizadas (de forma crítica) por practicantes y académicos responsables desde una 
perspectiva de la lex ferenda, siendo a mi juicio un deber ético y cívico de quienes tengan un 
conocimiento jurídico especializado y competencias pertinentes intentar hacer que el derecho 
responda a la necesidades humanas y a la realidad, aunque haciendo que las primeras siempre 
prevalezcan sobre la segunda e incluso las guíen a través del derecho. Por otra parte, los 
sistemas normativos no jurídicos y los actores sin derechos de participación formal reconocidos 
pueden interactuar e impactar sobre asuntos jurídicos y sobre la manera en que son protegidos 
los bienes jurídicos, como se menciona en este libro. 
Por las anteriores razones, es necesario pensar sobre cómo proteger mejor a las 
víctimas de todas las violaciones cometidas y potenciales y, como se mencionó previamente, 
sobre cómo los distintos niveles jurídicos, los mecanismos y el criterio de efectividad permiten 
elegir diferentes estrategias de respuesta a ciertas amenazas, siempre y cuando se brinde 
protección efectiva preventiva y de respuesta a las víctimas cuando no se exijan otras medidas, 
lo cual es necesario1664 porque como seres humanos todas las víctimas tienen un valor inherente 
que es incondicional y exige una protección efectiva y no discriminatoria contra toda violación, 
estatal o no en su origen (formal). Algunas normas, prácticas y jurisprudencia del derecho 
internacional humanitario, el derecho de los refugiados, el derecho penal y los derechos 
humanos, entre otras ramas de diversos niveles jurídicos, ya ofrecen diversos mecanismos de 
protección directa o indirecta contra amenazas no estatales, y las restantes deben seguir el 
ejemplo. 
Considero que los desafíos a la protección de la dignidad humana han existido a través 
de la historia y que los problemas especiales en el contexto global en relación con la protección 
de los seres humanos frente a entes no estatales hacen que sea necesario proteger 
jurídicamente su dignidad. La doctrina e incluso la acción jurídica han comenzado a enfrentarse 
a este reto, como menciona Elena Pariotti.1665 
                                                     
1664 Vid. Capítulos 3 y 4, supra. 
1665 Vid. Elena Pariotti, op. cit. 
 
 
631
Precisamente porque la protección efectiva de la dignidad humana es una meta y la 
lógica subyacente a su garantía integral así lo exige, así como es posible ofrecer en ocasiones 
mecanismos alternativos de manera lícita, también es necesario examinar la situación de 
personas y derechos vulnerables o de actores (en sus papeles negativos y positivos) desde una 
perspectiva tanto jurídica como extra-jurídica, para diseñar de manera apropiada una regulación 
que tenga en cuenta sus particularidades, desafíos y necesidades, de la misma manera en que 
las especificidades de los violadores deben ser tenidas en cuenta por las reglas secundarias 
sobre responsabilidad. 
Naturalmente, este enfoque no debe negar sino mantener y reforzar la protección 
general contra toda amenaza, que se hace eco de la idea de que las regulaciones especializadas 
son compatibles con garantías más amplias de los derechos humanos, idea expuesta en la Parte 
I.1666 En consecuencia, no deben ignorarse los estudios y acciones jurídicas (normativas o 
relativas a la implementación) especializadas que se ocupen de las necesidades o retos 
especiales de ciertos derechos o actores, siendo los trabajos generales como el presente un 
simple punto de partida (naturalmente abierto a críticas y a la discusión, aunque siendo 
necesario que se resalte la importancia de un asunto cuyo tratamiento jurídico no puede ser 
aplazado, por el bien de los seres humanos). 
Los anteriormente referidos estudios especiales, realizados en la doctrina y algunos 
foros jurídicos, que se ocupan por ejemplo de la responsabilidad o deberes de las corporaciones, 
los grupos armados o las organizaciones internacionales, entre otros actores, constituyen una 
tarea especializada en cuya realización es necesario tener presente todas las características 
pertinentes, exigidas y compatibles del corpus iuris humanitario general y las justificaciones 
(como las presentadas en este libro, abiertas a discusión) que informan y justifican estudios, 
regulaciones y mecanismos de protección especializados, que deben ser elaborados 
analizándose cómo pueden protegerse los seres humanos frente a algunos actores (o todos 
ellos) a la luz de las vulnerabilidades especiales de los individuos o de las dificultades que 
supone proteger a las personas frente a tales actores, como por ejemplo los retos de los grupos 
corporativos y su responsabilidad limitada o su “libertad de movimiento a través de 
ordenamientos jurídicos” (traducción nuestra), como comenta Pariotti, o las características 
particulares de la naturaleza funcional de las organizaciones internacionales, que condiciona la 
regulación de su responsabilidad.1667 
                                                     
1666 Vid. sección 1.3, supra. 
1667 Vid. Elena Pariotti, op. cit., p. 98. 
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Con todo, la meta compartida de proteger la dignidad humana frente a todas las 
amenazas, incluyendo tanto las estatales como las no estatales, debería constituir un objetivo 
que también debería estar presentes en estudios con una naturaleza más genérica, como el 
presente libro, siendo todos los análisis, generales y especializados, lejos de tareas 
completadas, parte de un proceso en curso sobre el planteamiento de las cuestiones 
examinadas en estas páginas que deben ser analizadas críticamente pero aferrándose siempre 
a ciertos valores y principios a los que nunca debe renunciarse, como aconsejaron Mahatma 
Gandhi y Daniel O’Connell.1668 Entre estos valores y principios, estimo que debe tener un lugar 
preeminente el respeto y la protección de la dignidad humana de forma incondicional, efectiva e 
integral. Incluso si el derecho es mejorado, siempre habrá espacio para que mejore aún más de 
lege ferenda o para que sea manejado mejor frente a viejos y nuevos desafíos en lo 
concerniente a su contenido, interpretación, cumplimiento, ejecución e implementación,1669 por 
ejemplo. 
Sin embargo, y precisamente por estos motivos, el estudio de este libro únicamente 
examina los fundamentos de mi propuesta para tratar el problema sobre cómo proteger a los 
seres humanos frente a los entes no estatales, y debe ser complementado por estudios más 
detallados de índole tanto general como específica, que se ocupen con más detenimiento de 
cuestiones que sólo fueron estudiadas sucinta o deficientemente en estas páginas, o incluso que 
no hayan sido examinadas en ellas. Estos estudios deben realizarse teniendo siempre presente 
la protección debida y exigida del valor intrínseco y no condicional de cada ser humano, 
reconocido o no por el derecho (siendo su reconocimiento un derecho humano y un deber erga 
omnes de todos los demás), siendo necesario que esa protección sea completa y no 
discriminatoria, como exige el derecho y como merece todo ser humano. 
                                                     
1668 Vid. Mahatma Gandhi, op. cit., pp. 344-345; Manfred Steger, Gandhi’s Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and 
Nationalist Power, St. Martin’s Press, 2000, pp. 10-11; Michael J. Nojeim, Gandhi and King: The Power of Nonviolent 
Resisistance, Praeger Publishers, 2004, p. 92. 
1669 Sobre la diferencia entre cumplimiento e implementación, ver Eric A. Posner, op. cit., pp. 73-76 (debo mencionar 
que no estoy de acuerdo con toda la argumentación de Posner en el libro de la referencia). 
